Ratan Rai vs State Of Bihar

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 30 January, 1957

Coram: B.P. Sinha, Bhagwati, J.

In this matter the appellants identified as Nos. 2 and 3, who remained alive after the death of appellant No. 1 during the pendency of the appeal, were charged with offences punishable under sections 435 and 436 of the Indian Penal Code. The trial was conducted by the Second Assistant Sessions Judge of Saran at Chapra and was assisted by a jury. The jury returned a majority verdict finding both surviving appellants guilty of the offences charged. The Assistant Sessions Judge, however, disagreed with that majority verdict and consequently exercised the power conferred by section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to make a reference to the High Court of Judicature at Patna. That reference was heard by a Division Bench of the Patna High Court. The learned judges of the High Court examined the contentions raised regarding the alleged defectiveness of the charge presented to the jury and held that those contentions did not merit interference. They further concluded that, given the circumstances, the reference made by the Assistant Sessions Judge was not competent. Despite these findings, the High Court accepted the jury’s majority verdict without further enquiry and affirmed that the appellants were guilty of the offences under sections 435 and 436 of the Indian Penal Code. Consequently, the High Court sentenced each appellant to six months of rigorous imprisonment. The appellants then obtained special leave to appeal to this Court under article 136 of the Constitution, and the present appeal was filed.

The factual background leading to this appeal involved a dispute over the ownership of plot number 1100 in the village of Rampur, Tengrahi. Kailash Rai asserted that he was the owner of the said plot and also claimed possession of a “Palani,” a structure standing on a portion of the plot, as well as a “Punjaul,” which is a haystack situated nearby. Earlier proceedings under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been instituted concerning this area, culminating in a title suit recorded as T.S. No. 58/8 of 1948/50, filed by Kailash Rai against the appellants. On 16 December 1950, the court passed a decree in the title suit dismissing Kailash Rai’s claim to the property. Kailash Rai filed an appeal against that decree, and the appeal remained pending at the time of the incident. On 4 March 1951, Kailash Rai was seated in the Palani when, at about three to four in the afternoon, a crowd of approximately one hundred to one hundred twenty-five persons, including the appellants, arrived at the Palani. The crowd was armed with lathis, bhalfas and pharsas and began to dismantle the structure. Kailash Rai protested the actions, after which the deceased appellant No. 1 ordered that the Palani be set alight. Following that order, appellant No. 2 ignited the Palani using a matchstick, and appellant No. 3 set fire to the Punjaul. The first information report relating to this occurrence was lodged at the Gopalganj Police Station later that evening.

On the night of the incident, at approximately eight o’clock in the evening, the officer in charge of Gopalganj Police Station initiated an investigation. After completing the inquiry, the officer prepared a charge-sheet against the appellants, accusing them of offences punishable under Sections 435 and 436 of the Indian Penal Code. The court that initially received the charge-sheet, referred to as the Committing Court, found that the material presented was sufficient to establish a prima facie case against the appellants. Consequently, it ordered that the matter be forwarded for trial before the Assistant Sessions Judge of the Second Court at Chapra, where the trial was conducted before a jury.

The jury, after hearing the evidence, returned a majority verdict finding the appellants guilty of the charges framed against them. However, the Assistant Sessions Judge did not accept this verdict. He issued a reference to the High Court, accompanied by a letter explaining his reasoning. In the letter, the Judge observed that, according to the evidence before him, the appellants had possessed the Palani and the Punjaul but had lost possession of both sometime before the decree was passed in the title suit on 16 December 1950. The Judge concluded that the appellants were therefore justified in attempting to regain possession from Kailash Rai on 4 March 1951. He further held that, if the appellants set fire to the Palani and the Punjaul during that effort, they were merely destroying their own property and could not be held guilty of the offence of mischief by fire as alleged by the prosecution. The Assistant Sessions Judge tried to analyse the mental processes of the jury in arriving at its verdict; while he accepted the jury’s factual finding that the appellants had been in possession of the Palani and the Punjaul, he disagreed with the legal principles applied by the jury and therefore rejected the majority verdict.

When the High Court considered the reference, counsel for the appellants argued that the charge addressed by the Assistant Sessions Judge to the jury was defective. The counsel also contended that the High Court should have been invited, as required by Section 307(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to examine the entire evidence and to decide, after giving due weight to the opinions of both the Sessions Judge and the jury, whether to acquit or convict the appellants on the offences for which the jury could have rendered a verdict. The High Court, however, limited its consideration to the objections raised about the alleged defect in the charge, overruled those objections, accepted the jury’s majority verdict, convicted the appellants and imposed the sentences as indicated.

The Court held that the High Court’s approach was erroneous and contravened the provisions of Section 307(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 307(3) states: “In dealing with the case so submitted the High Court may exercise any of the powers which it may exercise on an appeal, and subject thereto it shall, after considering the entire evidence and after giving due weight to the opinions of the Sessions Judge and the jury, acquit”.

The provision allows the High Court, after a reference under Section 307(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to either acquit the accused or to convict the accused of any offence that the jury could have convicted him of on the charge that was framed and placed before it; and, if the High Court chooses to convict, it may impose a sentence that the Court of Sessions could have imposed. The Court considered this provision earlier in the case of Akyhlakali Hayatalli v. State of Bombay, where it endorsed observations made by the Privy Council in Ramanugrah Singh v. The Emperor. The Privy Council explained that the powers of the High Court in dealing with a reference are set out in Sub-section (3); the Court may exercise any power that it could exercise on an appeal, including the power to call fresh evidence under Section 428. The Court must examine the whole case and give due weight to the opinions of both the Sessions Judge and the jury before deciding whether to acquit or convict. According to the Privy Council, the paramount consideration for the High Court is whether the ends of justice require setting aside the jury’s verdict. Generally, if the evidence can properly support either a guilty or a not-guilty verdict as viewed by the trial Court, and the jury reaches a conclusion different from that of the judge, the jury’s view must prevail because the jury are the judges of fact. In such circumstances a reference is not justified, and only by accepting the jury’s view can the High Court give due weight to its opinion. However, if the High Court finds that, on the evidence, no reasonable body of men could have arrived at the conclusion reached by the jury, then the reference is justified and the ends of justice require the jury’s verdict to be disregarded.

The Court affirmed that the approach outlined above is the correct method for dealing with a reference under Section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It held that when a reference is presented, the High Court must consider the entire evidence and reach its own conclusion as to whether the evidence could properly support a guilty verdict against the appellants. If the High Court determines that the evidence was such that the jury could reasonably have arrived at a guilty finding even though the judge believed a different conclusion was appropriate, then the reference would not be justified and the High Court should accept the jury’s opinion. Conversely, if the High Court is of the opinion that, on the evidence, no reasonable body of men could have reached the jury’s conclusion, then the reference would be justified and, in the interests of justice, the jury’s verdict should be set aside.

The Court observed that the High Court had limited its review to the arguments concerning the alleged defect in the charge presented to the jury by the counsel for the appellants, and had not examined the whole body of evidence that was on the record. By failing to do so, the Court held that the High Court had contravened the requirements of Section 307(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, the Court expressed the view that the High Court’s judgment, which accepted the majority verdict, convicted the appellants and imposed the sentences without a full consideration of the evidence, was manifestly erroneous, and therefore the convictions and the sentences should be set aside. The Court noted that counsel for the parties had invited it to examine the entire evidence and to reach a conclusion that, under Section 307(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the High Court ought to have reached. The Court concluded that it was not proper to adopt that procedure, and consequently allowed the appeal. The matter was remanded to the High Court with directions to act in accordance with Section 307(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and to deal with the case according to law. The Court further ordered that the appellants would remain on the bail that had previously been granted.