Raja Ganga Pratap Singh vs The Allahabad Bank Ltd., Lucknow

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 357 of 1957

Decision Date: Not extracted

Coram: SARKAR J.

In this matter the petitioner, Raja Ganga Pratap Singh, challenged a suit brought by the respondent, The Allahabad Bank Ltd., a scheduled bank, for recovery of money under a mortgage. The petitioner relied upon the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Debt Reduction Act of 1953, which provided that certain advances or debts were excluded from the definition of “debt” for purposes of reduction. Specifically, the definition excluded an advance or debt due to a scheduled bank. The petitioner argued that this exclusion created an arbitrary classification of debtors and therefore violated Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law. Consequently, the petitioner applied to the trial court under the proviso to Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking a reference of the constitutional question to the High Court for an opinion on the validity of the impugned portion of the definition. The trial court rejected the application. The petitioner then filed a revision before the Allahabad High Court and also invoked Article 228 of the Constitution to obtain a declaration that the case should be withdrawn for a determination of the constitutional issue. The High Court dismissed both the revision and the Article 228 application, holding that the matter could be decided without addressing the constitutional challenge.

The lower courts proceeded on the basis that, irrespective of whether the impugned clause of the definition was held unconstitutional, the clause was not severable from the remainder of the definition; therefore the entire definition would have to be struck down, leaving the petitioner without any effective remedy. The Supreme Court, however, observed that the petitioner’s question fell within both the ambit of the proviso to Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the scope of Article 228 of the Constitution. The Court explained that the key issue was whether the excluded category of debt to a scheduled bank contravened Article 14, which required a constitutional interpretation that must be addressed before any ancillary question of severability could be considered. Accordingly, the Court held that the validity of the definition, insofar as it conflicted with Article 14, needed to be adjudicated first, and only after a determination of invalidity could the question of whether the offending portion could be severed from the rest arise.

In this case, a scheduled bank instituted a suit before the Civil Judge of Sitapur, Uttar Pradesh, seeking recovery of money that the appellant owed under a mortgage instrument. The appellant opposed the suit on several grounds, one of which was that he claimed relief under the Uttar Pradesh Zamindar’s Debt Reduction Act (U.P. XV of 1953), which reduced the amount recoverable on a debt as defined in the Act. Section 2(f) of that Act defined “debt” as an advance in cash or in kind and included any transaction that was, in substance, a debt, but expressly excluded an advance made on or after 1 July 1952, or a debt owed to (i) the Central Government or any State Government, (ii) a local authority, (iii) a scheduled bank, (iv) a co-operative society, (v) a waqf, trust or endowment for a charitable or religious purpose, or (vi) a person where the debt was advanced on his behalf by the Court of Wards to a ward. Because the respondent was a scheduled bank, the debt owed by the appellant to the respondent did not fall within this definition, and consequently the appellant argued that the Act could not provide any relief with respect to that debt.

The appellant further contended that the portion of the definition which excluded certain debts violated Article 14 of the Constitution, alleging that it created an arbitrary distinction among classes of debtors and denied the excluded debtors equal protection of the law. He prayed that the offending portion of the definition be struck out as invalid, leaving the remainder of the definition operative. If his contention were accepted, the definition would read simply: “debt” means an advance in cash or in kind and includes any transaction which is in substance a debt, thereby bringing the appellant’s liability to the scheduled bank within the scope of the Act and entitling him to the reliefs provided thereunder. This defence raised a question as to the validity of a provision of the Act.

Consequently, the appellant filed an application under the proviso to Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, requesting that the Civil Judge state a case for the opinion of the Allahabad High Court on the alleged invalidity of the impugned portion of the definition. The proviso provides that when a court is satisfied that a case before it involves a question as to the validity of any Act, ordinance, regulation, or any provision thereof, and that determination is necessary for disposal of the case, the court shall state a case, setting out its opinion and reasons, and refer the matter to the High Court for its opinion.

In the proviso to section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court was instructed that when a lower Court was convinced that a case before it raised a question about the validity of any Act, Ordinance, Regulation or a specific provision thereof, and that such a question had not yet been decided by the High Court to which the lower Court was subordinate or by the Supreme Court, the lower Court must set out its opinion and the reasons for it and forward the matter for the opinion of the High Court. The learned Civil Judge of Sitapur considered that the portion of the definition of “debt” which the appellant contested infringed article 14 of the Constitution because it created an arbitrary distinction between different classes of debtors, and therefore declared that portion invalid. Nonetheless, the Civil Judge concluded that it was not necessary to resolve the issue of invalidity for the purpose of disposing of the present suit. He reasoned that even if the court were to decide in favour of the appellant, the effect would be to strike down the entire definition of “debt” in the Act, since the contested portion could not be severed from the remainder of the definition, and consequently the appellant would lose the protection intended by the Act. On that basis, the Civil Judge held that the proviso to section 113 did not apply to the present situation and accordingly dismissed the appellant’s application under that provision. Thereafter the appellant appealed to the High Court at Allahabad, seeking a revision of the Civil Judge’s order. Simultaneously, the appellant filed another application under article 228 of the Constitution, which provides that if a High Court is satisfied that a case pending in a subordinate court involves a substantial question of law concerning the interpretation of the Constitution and that the determination of that question is essential for the disposal of the case, the High Court may withdraw the case and either decide it itself or determine the constitutional question and then return the case to the subordinate court with a copy of its judgment. In the latter application the appellant prayed that the High Court either withdraw the case and dispose of it itself or, alternatively, determine the question of the validity of the definition of “debt” in the Zamindar’s Debt Reduction Act and then remit the case to the Civil Judge for final disposal in accordance with that determination. The High Court addressed both applications together in a single judgment. It observed that there was no dispute about the clear constitutional principle that every citizen is entitled to equal protection of the laws and that any enactment violating this principle is void to the extent of the violation. The only remaining issue, the High Court held, was whether the impugned portion of the definition of “debt” could be severed from the rest of the provision. The Court further concluded that this issue concerned the construction of the Act itself rather than the interpretation of any constitutional provision.

Even if a question concerning the interpretation of the Constitution were to arise, the Court held that a determination of that question was not required for the disposal of the case. In that view, the High Court dismissed the application in revision and also dismissed the application filed under Article 228. The present appeal was filed from that judgment. The Court observed that the question raised by the appellant falls within the scope of the proviso to section 113 of the Code as well as within the ambit of Article 228 of the Constitution. The proviso to section 113 concerns the validity of an enactment or a provision therein, whereas Article 228 deals with a question of constitutional interpretation. The matter before the Court concerns the validity of a provision in the Zamindar’s Debt Reduction Act. That question also involves constitutional interpretation because the provision’s validity is challenged on the ground that it contravenes a constitutional article. The essential issue that arises in this appeal is whether it is necessary, for the disposal of the case, to decide the validity of a portion of the definition of “debt” contained in the Act. All other conditions required for an order under the proviso to section 113 of the Code or under Article 228 of the Constitution are satisfied, and there is no serious dispute about those conditions. Consequently, the Court found it unnecessary to discuss those conditions further.

The courts below had held that, irrespective of how the question of the validity of the impugned portion of the definition of “debt” was viewed, the appellant would be left without the remedy he sought because that portion of the definition was not severable from the rest of the provision. Accordingly, they concluded that it was not necessary to decide that question in order to dispose of the case. The Court could not agree with that reasoning. It held that the question of the validity of the definition, to the extent that it excluded certain debts raised and pressed by the appellant, had to be decided by the Court. Without a decision on that question, the case could not be disposed of. The view that the impugned part of the definition was not severable and that, therefore, the appellant would obtain no relief, did not alter the requirement to decide the validity issue. The question of severability can arise only after the impugned part has been held invalid; to state that the impugned part is not severable, the Court must first declare that part invalid. Hence it could not be said that because the impugned part was not severable, a determination of its validity was unnecessary.

The Court observed that if the impugned portion of the definition were not severable from the remainder of the provision, then one could argue that it would not be necessary to decide the validity of that impugned portion in order to dispose of the case. Nevertheless, the Court rejected that view and held that it was in fact necessary to determine the validity of the impugned part of the definition before the matter could be properly disposed of. Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal and directed that the High Court withdraw the pending proceedings. The High Court was instructed either to dispose of the case itself or, if it preferred, to first determine the question of the validity of the definition of a debt contained in the Zamindar’s Debt Reduction Act. After making such a determination, the High Court was to return the case to the Civil Judge, Sitapur, so that the judge could dispose of the case in accordance with the High Court’s findings on that question. The Court further ordered that the appellant be awarded the costs of this appeal. The appeal was thus allowed. I47