Raja Ganga Pratap Singh vs Allahabad Bank Ltd.

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Appeal (civil) 357 of 1957

Decision Date: 22 January 1957

Coram: S.R. DAS, T.L.V. AIYYAR, B.P. SINHA, J.L. KAPUR, A.K. SARKAR

In this appeal, the petitioner Raja Ganga Pratap Singh challenged a decree of a Civil Judge of Sitapur, Uttar Pradesh, in which the respondent, Allahabad Bank Ltd., a scheduled bank, sought recovery of money alleged to be due under a mortgage instrument. The appeal arose from the judgment and order dated 28 February 1956 of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) in Miscellaneous Case No. 4 of 1955 and Civil Revision No. 189 of 1955, which themselves were based on the order dated 6 August 1955 of the Civil Judge, Sitapur, in Suit No. 16 of 1953. The appeal was presented before a five‑judge bench of the Supreme Court comprising Chief Justice S.R. Das, and Justices T.L.V. Aiyyar, B.P. Sinha, J.L. Kapur and A.K. Sarkar, and the judgment was delivered by Justice A.K. Sarkar on 22 January 1958.

The petitioner contested the suit on several grounds, the principal one being that he was entitled to relief under the Uttar Pradesh Zamindar’s Debt Reduction Act 1953 (U.P. XV of 1953), which provided for a reduction in the amount recoverable on a debt defined in the Act. Section 2(f) of that Act defined “debt” as an advance in cash or in kind and included any transaction that is in substance a debt, but expressly excluded advances made on or after 1 July 1952 and excluded a debt due to (i) the Central Government or any State Government; (ii) a local authority; (iii) a scheduled bank; (iv) a co‑operative society; (v) a waqf, trust or endowment for a charitable or religious purpose; and (vi) a person where the debt was advanced on his behalf by the Court of Wards to a ward. Because the respondent was a scheduled bank, the debt owed by the petitioner to the respondent fell outside the definition of “debt” and, according to the respondent, the Act could not grant any relief to the petitioner in respect of that liability. The petitioner argued, however, that the portion of the definition that excluded certain classes of debt violated Article 14 of the Constitution, since it created an arbitrary distinction among debtors and denied equal protection of the law to the excluded debtors. He contended that the offending words should be declared invalid and struck out, leaving the remainder of the definition operative, so that “debt” would mean an advance in cash or in kind and include any transaction which is in substance a debt. If this construction were accepted, the petitioner would be entitled to the reliefs provided by the Act. Consequently, the petitioner applied to the Civil Judge, Sitapur, invoking the proviso to Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeking a reference of the constitutional question to the Allahabad High Court for determination of the validity of the excluded‑debtor clause.

In the situation that the Court considered to be correct, the appellant would have been entitled to obtain every remedy that the Act provided. Consequently, this defence gave rise to a question concerning the validity of a specific provision contained in the Act. To obtain a definitive answer, the appellant filed an application before the Civil Judge of Sitapur, invoking the proviso to section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure and requesting that the judge refer the matter to the High Court at Allahabad, which was the supervisory court, for an opinion on the alleged invalidity of the contested portion of the definition of “debt.” The proviso states that when a court is convinced that a pending case involves a question about the validity of any statute, ordinance, regulation, or any part thereof, and that resolving this question is essential for disposing of the case, and when the court believes that the impugned provision is invalid or inoperative but no higher court has yet declared it so, the court must set out its opinion and reasons in a formal case and refer the issue to the higher court for consideration. The learned Civil Judge examined the contested definition and concluded that it violated article 14 of the Constitution because it created an arbitrary distinction among different categories of debtors, rendering the clause invalid. However, the judge also held that deciding the validity of the clause was not required for the disposal of the present case, because even if the judge were to rule in favour of the appellant, the result would be the removal of the entire definition from the Act, given that the offending segment could not be separated from the remainder, and the appellant would consequently remain without the protection of the Act. On this basis, the judge found that the proviso to section 113 of the Code was inapplicable and dismissed the appellant’s application made under that provision. Unsatisfied with this outcome, the appellant subsequently filed a revision application before the High Court at Allahabad, challenging the order of the Civil Judge. Simultaneously, the appellant lodged an additional petition under article 228 of the Constitution, which provides that if the High Court believes a subordinate court is dealing with a substantial question of law concerning the interpretation of the Constitution that is necessary for the case’s resolution, the High Court may withdraw the case and either decide it itself or determine the constitutional question and then return the case with a copy of its judgment for the lower court to dispose of the matter in accordance with that judgment. In the second petition, the appellant prayed that the High Court might withdraw the case and either dispose of it itself or determine the question of the validity of the definition of “debt” in the Act and then remit the case back to the Civil Judge of Sitapur for final disposal based on that determination.

The appellant requested that the High Court withdraw the suit and either decide the matter itself or determine the validity of the definition of “debt” in the Act and then return the case to the Civil Judge in Sitapur for final disposition in accordance with that determination. The High Court considered both applications together and issued a single judgment disposing of them. In its judgment the Court observed that there was no dispute concerning the well‑settled constitutional principle that every citizen is entitled to equal protection of the laws and that any legislation violating that principle is void to that extent. The Court further noted that the only issue remaining was whether the contested portion of the definition of “debt” in the Act could be severed from the remainder of the provision. The Court emphasized that this issue concerned the construction of the statute itself rather than the interpretation of any constitutional provision. The High Court also held that, even assuming a constitutional question arose, a determination of that question was not required for the disposal of the present case. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed both the revision application and the application filed under Article 228 of the Constitution. The present appeal was filed against that judgment. The Court of Appeal observed that the matter raised by the appellant falls within both the proviso to Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 228 of the Constitution. The proviso to Section 113 raises the question of the validity of an enactment or a specific provision, whereas Article 228 concerns a question of constitutional interpretation. In the instant case the appellant challenges the validity of a provision of the Zamindar’s Debt Reduction Act on the ground that it contravenes a constitutional article, thereby making the issue simultaneously one of statutory validity and constitutional interpretation. The principal question, the Court held, is whether it is necessary to resolve the validity of the disputed portion of the definition of “debt” before the case can be finally disposed of. All other prerequisites for invoking the proviso to Section 113 or for proceeding under Article 228 were satisfied and there was no serious dispute on those points, so the Court did not need to address them further. The lower courts had concluded that, regardless of the approach to the validity of the impugned definition, the appellant would obtain no relief because that portion was not severable from the remainder, and therefore they deemed it unnecessary to decide the validity question. The Court of Appeal disagreed with that reasoning and held that the validity of the definition must be determined.

In this case the provision under review excluded certain debts that had been specifically raised and pursued by the appellant, and the Court held that such an exclusion required a definitive ruling by the Court. The Court emphasized that without a decision on that particular point, the matter could not be properly concluded. The Court further observed that, although the lower Court had expressed the view that the challenged portion of the definition could not be separated from the remainder of the definition, and consequently argued that whatever the decision on validity, the appellant would obtain no relief, this reasoning did not change the necessity of addressing the validity issue. The Court explained that the question of whether the challenged portion could be severed from the rest of the definition would arise only after it had been determined that the challenged portion was in fact invalid; therefore, to assert that the challenged portion was inseparable, the Court first had to declare that portion invalid. The Court rejected the notion that because the challenged portion was allegedly inseparable, it was unnecessary to decide its validity for the purpose of disposing of the case. Accordingly, the Court concluded that it was essential to resolve the question of the validity of the challenged portion of the definition in order to bring the proceedings to an end. On that basis, the appeal was allowed. The Court directed that the High Court withdraw the proceedings and either dispose of the matter itself or determine the validity of the definition of a debt contained in the Zamindar’s Debt Reduction Act, and then remand the case to the Civil Judge of Sitapur for disposal in accordance with that determination. Finally, the Court ordered that the appellant be awarded the costs of the appeal.