Prem Singh And Ors. vs Deputy Custodian General, Evacuee

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 24 May, 1957

Coram: S.R. Das

In the matter styled Prem Singh And Ors. versus Deputy Custodian General, Evacuee, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment dated 24 May 1957. The judgment was authored by Chief Justice S.R. Das. The appellants, namely Prem Singh and others, pursued an appeal that was predicated on a certificate of fitness issued on 25 May 1956 by the High Court of Punjab pursuant to Article 133 of the Constitution. The appeal challenged the decision of that High Court rendered on 18 October 1955, which had dismissed the appellants’ petition filed under Article 226. In that petition the appellants had sought a writ of certiorari to obtain the records and to set aside the order dated 18 August 1953 issued by the Deputy Custodian General, an order that had cancelled the land allotment in the village of Ratauli, Tehsil Jagadhari, District Ambala, an allotment that had originally been made to the appellants on 7 June 1950.

The Court proceeded to recount the sequence of events that gave rise to the present appeal. The appellants were refugees who had migrated from Rawalpindi at the time of the partition, leaving behind 273 acres and 6 kanals of first‑grade land irrigated by perennial canals situated in Chalk No. 205/R‑B., Tehsil Jaranwala, District Lyalpur. In 1947 the authorities allotted to them two parcels of land in the villages of Todarpur and Naharpur, both located in Tehsil Jagadhari, District Ambala, on a temporary basis. When a quasi‑permanent allocation was made in November 1949, the appellants received 133 acres and 15¼ units of land spread between the villages of Khandua and Naharpur; these lands were classified as second‑grade. On 20 February 1950 the allocation in Khandua was withdrawn and the entire 133 acres and 15¼ units were re‑allotted to the appellants in the village of Naharpur. To accommodate a group known as the Brij Lal group, the allocation to the appellants in Naharpur was cancelled on 6 June 1950, and the Director General of Relief and Rehabilitation, hereinafter referred to as the Director General, directed that the appellants be transferred from Naharpur to the first‑grade villages of Jaurian and Kottarkhans in Tehsil Jagadhari, District Ambala. On 7 June 1950 the appellants promptly approached the senior officials of the Relief and Rehabilitation Department, protesting their removal from Naharpur on the ground that they had made improvements in that village and requesting that they be allowed to remain there. In that application they did not seek any allotment of land in the village of Ratauli. The Director General instructed the Revenue Assistant to prepare a report on the matter. On the same day the Revenue Assistant submitted a report stating that the appellants were presently allotted to the second‑grade village of Naharpur, that they were entitled to lands of first‑grade status, and that consequently…

The report recorded that the appellants had been ordered to move from the second‑grade village of Naharpur to the first‑grade villages of Jaurian and Kotarkhana in Tehsil Jagadhari. The officer who prepared the report concluded it with the word “submitted.” However, in the margin of the same report the following notation was added: “Area also is reserved for Railway Workshop in village Ratauli. If approved Prem Singh and Narain Singh may be allotted land in the village.” The presence of this marginal note raised a difficulty because the land in village Ratauli had been earmarked for a Railway Workshop, and it was not clear how land that was reserved for that purpose could be recommended for allotment to the appellants. On the same date the Director General signed an endorsement marked “Approved.” The rapid cancellation of the order dated 6 June 1950 and the subsequent issuance of a fresh allotment in favour of the appellants in village Ratauli—a village the appellants had not requested—appeared to create doubts in the mind of the Deputy Custodian General regarding the regularity of the procedure when he issued his order on 18 August 1953. Nevertheless, the Deputy Custodian General did not base his decision on those doubts.

After the Director General’s approval, a sand was issued on 13 July 1950 granting the appellants a parcel of land measuring 133 acres and 15 ¼ units in village Ratauli, and the appellants assert that they took possession of this land on 15 July 1950. The second respondent, identified as N.R. Basra, is the grandson of the late Rai Sahib Maya Bhan Batra, who had migrated from Phularwan, Tehsil Bhahval, District of Shahapur, leaving behind approximately 543 acres of first‑class canal‑irrigated land in the District of Sargodha. On 15 December 1947, a temporary allotment of 36 acres in village Ratauli was made to Rai Sahib Maya Bhan Batra; this temporary allotment was later reduced to 12 acres because, at that time, no single allotment exceeding 12 acres was permitted. The Rehabilitation Department later issued instructions that persons who had abandoned large holdings in Pakistan could be allotted more than 12 acres, and consequently, on 5 June 1918, Rai Sahib Maya Bhan Batra applied to the Director General for the balance of the lands to which he believed he was entitled in the same village. He died on 29 June 1948, leaving several heirs, including the second respondent. Before any allotment could be made to the heirs, a notification dated 9 September 1949, issued at the request of the Northern Railway, reserved lands in several villages, including Ratauli, for the construction of a Railway Workshop. As a result of this reservation, no land remained available in village Ratauli.

Because the Railway reservation left no land available in the village of Ratauli, the authorities allotted an area of 112.7 acres on 11 November 1949 in the name of Rai Sahib Maya Bhan Batra at the village of Mussambal Mussalmanan. In February 1950 a rumor circulated that the Rehabilitation Department intended that no individual allottee would be permitted to hold more than 60 acres. Concerned that the single allotment of 112.7 acres might therefore be reduced, B.L. Batra, a son of the late Rai Sahib, submitted a representation on behalf of all the heirs to the Director General. He explained that the three brothers each held only about 37 acres of the total and therefore requested that the full 112.7‑acre allotment not be cancelled; if cancellation were unavoidable, he asked that the heirs be accommodated in the village of Ratauli. Following this representation, in February or March 1950 the heirs received land allocations in three villages: at Mussambal Mussalmanan they were allotted 64 acres 14 3⁄4 units, at Kotarkhana 44 acres 10 3⁄4 units, and at Chahju Nagla 2 acres 13 1⁄2 units.

Respondents Nos. 3 and 4, Hargobind and Jai Kishan, were sons of L. Devan Chand Suri and also refugees from Rawalpindi. They were entitled to a total of 175 acres in place of the lands they had left in Pakistan and applied for allotment in the Karnal District as unsatisfied claimants. After the allocation of 133 acres 15 1⁄4 units in the village of Ratauli, a balance of 93 acres remained available there. On 31 August 1950 the Director General allotted those 93 acres to Respondents 3 and 4, while the remaining 82 acres were allotted to them in the villages of Mahalanwali and Habibpur. Subsequently, when the Railways abandoned the workshop project on the lands that had been reserved, the Officer on Special Duty (Ambala) wrote to the Director General of Relief and Rehabilitation requesting that the lands released by the Railways be reserved for those displaced from Chandigarh, the new capital of Punjab. The Director General replied on 28 October 1950 that the allotment previously made to the appellants should stand and he raised no objection to cancelling other allotments. Accordingly, the 93‑acre allotment to Respondents 3 and 4 in Ratauli was cancelled, although this cancellation was later rescinded and the land restored to them. A letter dated 28 April 1950 from the Chief Administrative Officer (Engineering) of the E.P. Railway, Delhi, to the Chief Engineer (Development) of the Punjab Public Works Department, Simla, indicated that because of severe funding constraints the railway‑workshop project had been abandoned, and that the acquisition notification might not be published in the Punjab Government Gazette.

In this case, the Court noted that the railway workshop project had been abandoned and that the government had decided not to publish a notification for acquiring the land in the Punjab Government Gazette, and it was uncertain whether this information had been communicated to the Relief and Rehabilitation Department before September 1950. The Court observed that an application filed by B. L. Batra on 20 February 1950 for the allotment of land in village Ratauli, where the applicants previously held temporary allotments, was subsequently followed by another application submitted by the heirs of Rai Sahib Maya Bhan Batra on 23 March 1951. The Additional Custodian acknowledged in his written statement that the latter application existed but claimed that it had not been received, apparently because it had been misplaced in the office. The Court further recorded that a reminder concerning the application was sent on 1 August 1951, but the office of the Director General did not reply. Consequently, on 10 December 1951, Respondent No. 2, N. R. Batra, one of the heirs, addressed a representation to the Financial Commissioner for Relief and Rehabilitation, who also functioned as the Custodian. The Financial Commissioner, acting in his capacity as custodian, rejected the application of Respondent No. 2 on 17 July 1952. Following this rejection, Respondent No. 2 filed a revision petition under Section 27 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, which was considered and disposed of by the Deputy Custodian General. The Deputy Custodian General held that, given the circumstances, the allotment in favour of the appellants in village Ratauli could not be allowed to remain and also dismissed the appellants’ contention that, should any eviction be required in village Ratauli to accommodate the heirs of Rai Sahib Maya Bhan Batra, it should be the respondents Nos. 3 and 4, Hargobind and Jai Kishan, who had obtained their allotment during the pendency of the dispute. Accordingly, the Deputy Custodian General issued an order on 18 August 1953 cancelling the allotment of respondents 4 to 6 (Prem Singh et al.) to the extent of 112 S. A. 7 units in village Ratauli, stating that the area thus made available would be allotted to the petitioners, while the petitioners’ allotments in villages Kotarkhana, Chhaju Nangal and Mussambal Mussalmanan would also be cancelled and could be re‑allotted to respondents 4 to 6 unless they preferred an allotment elsewhere where land was available. The appellants then filed a petition before the Punjab High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking a writ to set aside the order of the Deputy Custodian General. A single judge, by an order dated 3 September 1954, referred the matter to a division bench, which on 28 September 1954 referred two questions to a full bench for determination: (1) whether Rule 14(6) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Rules made under Section 56 of the Act was ultra vires because it exceeded the rule‑making power or conflicted with other provisions of the Evacuee Property Act, and (2) whether Rule 14(6), if intra vires, applied to orders cancelling allotments that had been made before the amendment date. The full bench answered the first question in the negative and held that orders passed by the Custodian or Custodian General under Sections 26 or 27 cancelling pending allotments made before 22 July 1952 were valid, even if the orders were issued before 13 February 1952 by the Custodian and before 25 August 1953 by the Custodian General. Returning to the division bench, the court, in light of the full bench’s answers, found no ground for interference and dismissed the appellant’s writ petition.

The Court examined two questions that had been referred to a Full Bench. The first question was whether rules made under Section 56 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act were ultra vires because they either exceeded the rule‑making power granted by that provision or conflicted with other provisions of the Evacuee Property Act. The second question asked whether Rule 14(6), assuming it was intra vires, could be applied to orders that cancelled allotments when those orders had been issued before the date on which the relevant amendments to the rule were made. The Full Bench answered the first question in the negative, holding that the rules were not ultra vires. Regarding the second question, the Full Bench held that orders passed by either the Custodian or the Custodian General in exercise of their powers under Section 26 or Section 27, which cancelled allotments in pending cases and relating to orders made before 22 July 1952, were valid even if such cancellation orders were issued by the Custodian before 13 February 1952 and by the Custodian General before 25 August 1953. After receiving these answers, the matter returned to the Division Bench, which, having considered the Full Bench’s findings, concluded that there was no ground for interfering with the lower court’s decision and therefore dismissed the appellant’s writ petition. The High Court nonetheless issued a certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court, and the present appeal was consequently filed. The counsel appearing in support of the appeal did not challenge the correctness of the Full Bench’s answers to either of the referred questions. He acknowledged that the Deputy Custodian General, while disposing of the revision petition on 18 August 1953, could exercise the same powers that the Financial Commissioner, acting as Custodian, had possessed on 17 July 1952 when he rejected Respondent No 2’s application. It may be recalled that the allotment ordered in favour of the appellants in the village of Ratauli was made on 7 June 1950. Respondent No 2 had applied to the Financial Commissioner for an allotment of lands in the same village on 10 December 1951, and that application was rejected on 17 July 1952. At that time Sub‑rule (6) to Rule 14 did not exist; Sub‑rule (6) was added to Rule 14 on 22 July 1952. A second provision was added to Rule 14 on 13 February 1953, after Respondent No 2 had filed his revision application under Section 27 to the Custodian General on 9 September 1952. This second provision was further amended on 25 August 1953 by inserting the words “or Section 27” after the figure 28 and before the words “of the Act”. Since the amendment occurred seven days after the Deputy Custodian General had issued his revision order under Section 27, the counsel contended that Rule 14(6) was therefore out of the way, and that it was unnecessary for the Court to express any opinion on the correctness of the Full Bench’s answers. He accepted, without deciding, that the Deputy Custodian General’s powers in revision under Section 27 of the Act were strictly limited.

To determine the extent of the Custodian’s authority to cancel an allotment, it was necessary first to establish the cancellation powers that the Financial Commissioner, who also acted as the Custodian, possessed on 17 July 1952 when he rejected the application. According to the counsel for the appellants, the Deputy Custodian General could exercise only those cancellation powers that were available to the Financial Commissioner in his capacity as Custodian while considering a revision application of the Commissioner’s order.

The Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (Act XXXI of 1950) had been enacted on 17 April 1950. Pursuant to the powers granted under Section 56 of that Act, the Central Government framed rules on 8 September 1950. On that date, Rule 14 comprised five clauses, identified as Sub‑rule 1 through Sub‑rule 5, although those particular sub‑rules were not material to the present inquiry. Exercising the authority delegated by the Central Government under Sub‑section 1 of Section 55 to make rules in accordance with Clause 1 of Sub‑section 2 of Section 56, the Punjab Government promulgated a new rule on 29 August 1951, replacing the earlier rules with retrospective effect. This rule provided that the Custodian was competent to cancel or terminate any lease or allotment, to vary the terms of any lease, allotment or agreement, and to evict the lessee or allottee whenever any of several specified circumstances arose.

The circumstances enumerated in the Punjab rule were as follows: (a) the lease or allotment was contrary to the orders of the Punjab Government or to the instructions of the Financial Commissioner, Relief and Rehabilitation, or of the Custodian of Evacuees’ Property, Punjab; (b) the lessee or allottee had infringed, or intended to infringe, any term of the lease or allotment; (c) the lease or allotment had been obtained by a false declaration or by insufficient information; (d) the area leased or allotted to, or occupied by, the lessee or allottee was greater or lesser than the amount authorized by the Punjab Government, the Financial Commissioner, Relief and Rehabilitation, or the Custodian of Evacuees’ Property, Punjab; (e) claims of other parties concerning the land had been established or accepted by the Custodian or the Rehabilitation authority; (f) the lessee or allottee had been convicted of an offence under the Act; (g) the lessee or allottee had failed to take possession of the land within the time allowed by the Custodian or the Rehabilitation authority, or, after taking possession, had failed to cultivate any part of the land; (h) it was necessary or expedient to cancel or vary the terms of a lease or allotment in order to implement resettlement schemes or rules framed by the State Government, or to distribute land among displaced persons in a manner that appeared to the Custodian to be equitable and proper; and (i) it was necessary or expedient to cancel or vary the terms of a lease or allotment for the preservation, proper administration, or management of the property, or in the interests of proper rehabilitation of the displaced persons.

In this case the appellants argued that because their situation did not fall within any of the clauses listed in the Punjab Rule, the Custodian had no authority to cancel their allotment and consequently the Deputy Custodian General could not set aside the allotment on revision. The Court noted that the appellants had never earlier invoked this rule issued by the Punjab Government. Without prejudice to that general objection, counsel for respondent No 2 asserted that the order dated 18 August 1958, by which the Deputy Custodian General cancelled the allotment made in favour of the appellants, was valid. He relied on the power granted to the Custodian on 17 July 1952 under the Punjab Rule, specifically citing clauses (a), (e), (h) and (i). His contention was that the allotment to the appellants in village Ratauli contravened the orders of the Punjab Government and the instructions of the Financial Commissioner as set out in the Land Resettlement Manual, because the appellants were not colonists of Sahapur District in West Pakistan and therefore were not entitled to be settled in Tehsil Jugadhari, and furthermore that the appellants held no temporary allotment in village Ratauli. Counsel for the appellants rejected this content‑ion, maintaining that the allotment was not contrary to any instruction. Counsel for respondent No 2 further argued that the allotment could be cancelled under clause (e), on the ground that the claims of respondent No 2 had been established or accepted by the rehabilitation authorities, and also relied on clauses (h) and (i). All of these submissions were refuted by the appellants’ counsel. The Court observed that it was unnecessary to pronounce on the arguments based on clauses (a) and (e) because the allotment could lawfully be cancelled under clauses (h) and (i). The Deputy Custodian General had provided persuasive reasons for the cancellation: Tehsil Jugadhari did not form part of the sub‑allocation scheme applicable to the appellants; the appellants had never possessed a temporary allotment in village Ratauli and therefore could not be regarded as sitting allottees of that village; meanwhile Rai Sahib Maya Bhan Batra, who originated from Sahapur, was entitled to be accommodated in Tehsil Jugadhari and, on its face, held a temporary allotment of thirty acres later reduced to twelve acres in village Ratauli. His allotment had been altered only because lands in several villages, including Ratauli, were reserved for a Railway Workshop. When the Railways abandoned that scheme, the heirs of Rai Sahib Maya Bhan Batra asserted their claim to be accommodated in village Ratauli. In those circumstances it was equitable and proper to re‑establish the heirs in that village and to cancel the allotment made to the appellants.

The Court observed that the proposed accommodation was plainly equitable and served the purpose of proper rehabilitation of displaced persons as contemplated in Clause (h) and Clause (i). The appellants’ counsel then argued that the order issued by the Deputy Custodian General was manifestly erroneous and therefore should be set aside by a writ of certiorari, citing the presence of obvious mistakes that were visible on the record. The counsel referred to the decision in Hari Vishnu v. Ahmad Ishaque, where a Full Bench of this Court, after reviewing numerous decisions of English and Indian courts, summarized the governing principles as follows: “On the basis of these authorities, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) A writ of certiorari will be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction, such as when a lower court or tribunal acts without jurisdiction, exceeds its jurisdiction, or fails to exercise jurisdiction that it possesses. (2) A writ of certiorari will also be issued when the court or tribunal acts illegally within its clear jurisdiction, for example, when it renders a decision without giving the parties an opportunity to be heard or when it violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The court that issues a writ of certiorari exercises supervisory jurisdiction, not appellate jurisdiction. Consequently, the superior court will not re‑examine the factual findings of the lower court or tribunal even if those findings are erroneous, because a court that has jurisdiction over a matter also has the power to decide both correctly and incorrectly; and where the legislature has not provided a right of appeal, it would defeat legislative intent and policy for a higher court to rehear the case on the evidence and replace the lower court’s findings through certiorari. These propositions are well settled and not in dispute. (4) The remaining question on which there has been some controversy is whether a writ may be issued when the decision of the inferior court or tribunal is erroneous in law.” The Court then cited the case of Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw, 1951‑1 K B 711 (B), together with other authorities, and quoted from the judgment of Mukherjea J. in T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, stating: “An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari but it must be a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings, for example, when it is based on a clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error which can be corrected by certiorari but not a mere wrong decision.” The Court further held on this fourth point that “it may be taken as settled that a writ of certiorari could be issued to correct an error of law, but it is essential that the error be more than a mere error; it must be one that is manifest on the face of the record.”

In this matter the Court observed that the difficulty does not lie primarily in stating the legal principle concerning an error apparent on the face of the record, but rather in applying that principle to the specific facts of a given case. The Court asked when a simple mistake becomes an error that is apparent on the face of the record. Both sides’ counsel were unable to point to a clear, definitive rule that would draw a line between a mere error and an error that is manifest on the record. Counsel for the first respondent, Mr Pathak, relied on observations of Chagla C.J. in Batuk K. Vyas v. Surat Borough Municipality, AIR 1953 Bom 133 (D), contending that an error cannot be said to be apparent on the face of the record unless it is self‑evident and does not require further examination or argument to establish it. The Court noted that this test may provide a satisfactory basis for decision in most cases, but recognised that there could be situations where the test breaks down because judicial viewpoints differ; an error that one judge regards as self‑evident might not be seen as such by another. Consequently, the Court held that the concept of an error apparent on the face of the record cannot be defined with precision or exhaustiveness, as it contains an inherent element of indefiniteness. Accordingly, the determination of whether an error meets that description must be made by a judge on the facts of each individual case.

Having set out the principles that govern the power of a court to issue a writ of certiorari on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record, the Court then turned to the question of whether, in the present proceedings, such errors actually existed. Learned counsel identified three specific points of alleged error. First, the Deputy Custodian General, in his judgment, assumed that the application filed on 23 March 1951 indicated that respondent No. 2 claimed a preferential right to an allotment in Ratauli, and he urged the Court to refer to that application to show that no such claim existed. The Court found that this allegation does not constitute an error of law. Second, the order was said to proceed on the assumption that the allotment made to the appellants lacked the approval of the Financial Commissioner. In fact, the allotment was made by the Director General, and the word “approved” was endorsed on the Revenue Assistant’s report. Moreover, the rejection of respondent No. 2’s application for an allotment in village Ratauli cannot be characterised as an approval by the Financial Commissioner of the appellants’ allotment under the sub‑allotment scheme. Accordingly, this point also could not be described as an error of law. Third, counsel argued that on 7 June 1950, when the allotment to the appellants was effected, respondent No. 2 and his relations were …

In the present case the Court observed that on the date when the allotment was made to the appellants, respondent No 2 and his relatives were not occupants of any land in village Ratauli. The record showed that they were settled in three other villages, and consequently, under the provisions set out in the Land Resettlement Manual, they could not, as former occupants, assert any claim to an allotment in Ratauli. The Court therefore concluded that there was no error of law on the face of the record in this respect. The Court further noted that Rai Sahib Maya Bhan Batra had originally been allotted land in village Ratauli. Because he came from the Sahapur District of Jugadhari, the appropriate Tehsil for his resettlement was identified, and his allotment was later shifted only because the lands of Ratauli and surrounding villages had been earmarked for a Railway workshop. The Court held that these factual circumstances could legitimately be taken into account when applying the departmental instructions contained in the Land Resettlement Manual. Moreover, there was nothing in the departmental rules that prohibited the allocation of land in Ratauli to the heirs of Rai Sahib Maya Bhan Batra, nor was there any provision that removed the Custodian’s authority to cancel the appellants’ allotment. The Court pointed out that, as the appellants themselves indicated in sub‑paragraph (viii) of paragraph 12 of their petition under Article 226, the departmental instructions were not rigid statutes; they were procedural guidelines that allowed the rehabilitation authorities to adjust allocations without strict adherence to the scheme of sub‑allocation. Consequently, it could not be said that the appellants could characterise those instructions as law such that a legal error was plainly evident in the judgment. The alleged errors, even if they could be characterised as errors of law, were in fact merely errors of fact, or at most trivial legal mistakes that could be corrected on appeal but did not amount to a “speaking order” displaying a clear disregard of legal provisions, and therefore did not justify a writ of certiorari. The Court found no substance in the appellants’ contention on this point.

The final argument raised by counsel for the appellants was that if any party were to be displaced from village Ratauli to accommodate respondent No 2, the appellants themselves should not be the ones removed, but rather respondents Nos 3 and 4. Counsel for respondents Nos 3 and 4, however, strongly asserted that there were good reasons not to disturb their clients. They argued that the appellants were larger allottees, and that, if displacement were necessary, it should affect the larger allottee rather than the smaller one. They referred to page 84 of the Land Resettlement Manual, claiming that this rule embodied a general principle of equity. The Court noted that both the appellants and respondents Nos 3 and 4 originated from Rawalpindi and could be resettled in Ratauli only with the sanction of the Financial Commissioner, as indicated on page 82, paragraph 7 of Chapter (iv) of the Manual, which sets out the allocation principles. The Court also observed that the allotments to the appellants had been made by the Director General without the Financial Commissioner’s sanction. The rehabilitation authorities, charged with making such allotments, had exercised their discretion for sound reasons, and the Deputy Custodian General’s order expressly left the allotments to respondents Nos 3 and 4 undisturbed. The Court concluded that there was no basis to interfere with that decision on an application under Article 226, that none of the prerequisites for issuing a writ of certiorari were present, and that the appellants’ claim against respondents Nos 3 and 4 was rightly rejected.

The Court observed that the principle invoked by the parties was a rule of equity that applied generally to all similar cases. It further noted that both the appellants and respondents numbered three and four originated from Rawalpindi and that their resettlement in the village of Ratauli could occur only after obtaining sanction from the Financial Commissioner, as stipulated in the relevant manual. The Court referred to page 82, paragraph 7 of Chapter (iv) of the Land Resettlement Manual, which sets out the principles governing the allocation of land to eligible persons. It was pointed out that the allotment of land in Ratauli in favour of the appellants had been made by the Director General but had never received the required sanction from the Financial Commissioner. Moreover, the rehabilitation authorities, who are charged with the duty of making such allocations, exercised their discretionary powers and, for cogent reasons recorded in the order of the Deputy Custodian General, decided that the allotments to respondents three and four should not be disturbed. The Court found no basis to interfere with that administrative decision on an application filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. It held that none of the prerequisites required for the issuance of a writ of certiorari were satisfied, and consequently the claim of the appellants against respondents three and four was rightly dismissed. The Court further concluded that the dispute was not a proper matter to be resolved by a petition under Article 226, and accordingly ordered the appeal to be dismissed with costs.