P. Balakotaiah vs The Union Of India And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 46 to 48 of 1956

Decision Date: 3 December 1957

Coram: S.K. Das, A.K. Sarkar, T.L. Venkatarama Aiyar

In the matter of P Balakotaiah versus the Union of India and others, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 3 December 1957. The bench comprised Justice A K Sarkar, Justice S K Das and Chief Justice Sudhi Ranjan, with additional judicial officers Justice Aiyyur, T L Venkatarama, Justice Bose, Justice Vivian Das, and Justice Das. The case was reported in the 1958 volume of the All India Reporter at page 232 and in the Supreme Court Reporter at page 1052. The dispute concerned the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Railway Services (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules, 1949, specifically Rules 3 and 7, and their interaction with Articles 14, 19(1)(c) and 311 of the Constitution of India.

The petitioners, who were employed as railway servants, had their services terminated on the ground of national security, invoking Rule 3 of the 1949 Rules. They received notices that alleged, in the opinion of the General Manager, that they were reasonably suspected of being members and office secretaries of the Bengal National Railway Workers’ Union, a body described as Communist‑sponsored. The notices further claimed that the petitioners were closely associated with individuals such as Om Prakash Mehta, B N Mukherjee and R L Reddi, and that they participated in subversive activities. Specific allegations stated that the petitioners attended private meetings of Communist groups, organised agitation among railway workers to call for a general strike from November 1948 to January 1949, and thereby attempted to paralyse communications and the movement of essential supplies, creating disorder and confusion in the country. On the basis of these allegations, the General Manager, after a committee of advisers examined the petitioners’ representations, concluded that the charges were true and terminated their services, providing a month’s salary in lieu of notice.

Challenging this action, the petitioners approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, contending that the Security Rules contravened Articles 14, 19(1)(c) and 311 and that therefore the termination orders were void. The High Court declined to examine the constitutional validity of the Security Rules and dismissed the petitions on alternative grounds. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the expression “subversive activities” in Rule 3, when read in the context of the objective of national security, was sufficiently precise to permit a valid classification. The Court held that the term was clear enough to sustain classification and that the Rules were not invalid for violating Article 14. The Court referred to the earlier decision in Ananthanarayanan v. Southern Railway, A I R 1956 Mad 220, and disapproved it. It observed that the action taken was not because the petitioners were Communists or trade unionists, but because they were engaged in subversive activities, and consequently the terminations did not infringe Article 19(1)(c). The Court further concluded that Article 311 applied only to dismissals or removals by way of punishment, which was not the case here, as the service terms allowed termination on proper notice and Rule 7 preserved pension and gratuity benefits. Thus, the termination order under Rule 3 was akin to a discharge under Rule 148 of the Railway Establishment Code and did not constitute a dismissal or removal within the meaning of Article 311. Accordingly, the Court held that the Security Rules were constitutionally valid and the termination orders stood affirmed.

In the Court’s view, the termination of the appellants’ services did not infringe any of the constitutional rights guaranteed by the Article, because those rights remained exactly as they had been before the termination. The Court explained that Article 311 of the Constitution is applicable only when an order of dismissal or removal is imposed as a form of punishment. Since the employment terms of the appellants allowed termination on the basis of a proper notice, and Rule 7 of the Security Rules safeguarded benefits such as pension, gratuities and other entitlements that an employee could acquire under the service rules, the Court found that there was no premature termination or loss of already‑earned benefits that could be characterized as punitive. Consequently, the order that terminated the services under Rule 3 of the Security Rules was regarded by the Court as equivalent to an order of discharge issued under Rule 148 of the Railway Establishment Code, and it was neither a dismissal nor a removal within the meaning of Article 311. Therefore, Article 311 had no bearing on the matter. The Court relied on the decision in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, Civil Appeal No. 65 of 1957, and referred to the authorities in Satish Chandra Anand v. Union of India, [1953] S.C.R. 655; Shyam Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh and the Union of India, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 26; and State of Bombay v. Saubhagchand M. Doshi, Civil Appeal No. 182 of 1955. While noting that the Security Rules were clearly prospective, the Court observed that the material used to take action against an employee under those rules could be drawn from conduct that occurred before the Rules were enacted. To illustrate this principle, the Court cited the English cases The Queen v. St. Mary, Whitechapel, (1848) 12 Q.B. 120 and The Queen v. Christchurch, [1848] 12 Q.B. 149. The judgment was delivered in the Civil Appellate Jurisdiction concerning Civil Appeals Nos. 46 to 48 of 1956, which arose from the judgment and order dated 16 November 1951 of the former Nagpur High Court in Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 45, 1568 and 1569 of 1951. Counsel for the appellants in Appeals Nos. 46 and 47 of 56 were H. J. Umrigar, D. L. Jayawant and Naunit Lal, while counsel for the appellant in Appeal No. 48 of 56 were D. L. Jayawant and Naunit Lal; counsel for the respondent in all appeals were R. Ganapathi Iyer and R. H. Dhebar. The judgment was pronounced on 3 December 1957 by Justice Venkatramana Aiyar. These appeals challenged the orders of the Nagpur High Court that dismissed the writ petitions filed by the appellants; because they arose out of the same facts and raised identical issues, they were heard together and disposed of in a single judgment. The factual background common to Civil Appeal No. 46 of 1956 and the related appeals was that the appellant had been employed since 1939 as a clerk in the workshop of the Bengal Nagpur Railway at Nagpur, and after the State assumed control of the railway in 1946, the employee accepted the terms offered for continued service as set out in a document dated 5 July 1946.

On July 5, 1946 the appellant received a document offering certain terms of employment, and the appellant accepted those terms and thereafter continued his service under the conditions set out in that document. By exercising the powers granted to him by sections 241(2), 247 and 266(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Governor‑General issued a set of regulations known as the Railway Services (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules, 1949, which the Court refers to as the Security Rules. These Security Rules became effective on May 14, 1949. The Court considered it appropriate at this point to reproduce the provisions of the Security Rules that are material to the present appeals, because the principal issue for determination is the validity of those rules.

Rule 3 provides that a member of the Railway Service who, in the opinion of the competent authority, is engaged in or is reasonably suspected of engaging in subversive activities, or who is associated with others in such activities in a way that raises doubts about his reliability, may be compulsorily retired or have his service terminated after the authority has given him due notice or pay in lieu of notice in accordance with his service agreement. The provision further stipulates that such retirement or termination may occur only if the competent authority is satisfied that retaining the employee in public service would be prejudicial to national security, and, where the competent authority is the head of a department, only after obtaining prior approval of the Governor‑General.

Rule 4 explains the procedure to be followed when the competent authority believes there are reasonable grounds that a railway employee should be retired or terminated under Rule 3. The authority must first issue a written order directing the employee to proceed on any leave to which he is entitled, specifying the date from which such leave is to commence. Second, the authority must serve a written notice informing the employee of the proposed action under Rule 3. Third, the employee must be given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed action. Finally, before a final order is made under Rule 3, the authority must consider any representation made by the employee on the matter.

Rule 5 states that nothing contained in the Rules in Chapter XVII of the State Railway Establishment Code, Volume 1, shall apply to any action taken or proposed to be taken under the Security Rules. Rule 7 provides that any person who is compulsorily retired or whose service is terminated under Rule 3 shall be entitled to such compensation, pension, gratuity and/or Provident Fund benefits as would have been available to him under the rules applicable to his service or post on the date of such retirement or termination, had he been discharged because his post was abolished without any alternative suitable employment being provided.

In this case the appellant’s employment was terminated without any alternative suitable post being offered to him. On 6 July 1950 the General Manager of the Bengal Nagpur Railway issued a notice to the appellant under Rule 3 of the Security Rules. The notice stated that, based on the facts set out therein, there were reasonable grounds to believe that the appellant was involved in subversive activities, and therefore the appellant was required to show cause why his services should not be terminated. The notice also placed the appellant under suspension from that date. The appellant responded on 29 July 1950 by submitting a written explanation in which he denied all of the allegations contained in the 6 July notice. The matter was subsequently referred to the Committee of Advisers, which conducted an enquiry on 8 September 1950. After hearing the appellant, the Committee concluded that the charges mentioned in the notice were true. Acting upon the Committee’s report, the General Manager terminated the appellant’s services on 3 April 1951, paying him only one month’s salary in lieu of a notice period.

During the pendency of these events the appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court of Nagpur on 3 February 1951, which later gave rise to Civil Appeal No. 46 of 1956. The writ petition challenged the validity of the notice dated 6 July 1950 and the order of suspension that followed. While the petition was pending, the order of dismissal dated 3 April 1951 was passed; consequently the appellant amended his petition to include a prayer that the dismissal order also be set aside. The appellant argued that the Security Rules relied upon were inconsistent with Articles 14, 19(1)(c) and 311 of the Constitution, and that, as a result, any orders made under those rules were void. The respondents contended that the rules were valid and that the orders issued under them could not be attacked. The petition was heard together with other similar petitions, and on 16 November 1951 the learned Judges delivered a judgment. They held that it was unnecessary to determine the constitutional validity of the Security Rules because, assuming those rules were void, the termination orders could still be sustained under Rule 148 of the Railway Establishment Code. The relevant sub‑rules of Rule 148 were quoted: Sub‑rule (3) provides that the service of other (non‑pensionable) railway servants may be terminated on notice by either side, except in cases of summary dismissal, retirement, or termination due to mental or physical incapacity; Sub‑rule (4) allows the railway administration to dispense with notice by paying the servant salary in lieu of the notice period. The learned Judges therefore concluded that the appellants fell within the category of non‑pensionable railway servants under Sub‑rule (3) and that the payment of one month’s wages in place of notice complied with Sub‑rule (4), rendering the orders intra vires the powers conferred by Rule 148.

The Court observed that the appellants were classified as non‑pensionable railway servants under sub‑rule (3) of Rule 148, and that instead of giving the statutory notice they were paid one month’s wages in accordance with sub‑rule (4). Consequently, the Court held that the orders terminating the appellants’ services were within the authority of the respondents under Rule 148, sub‑rule (3). The lower court therefore dismissed the petitions, and the appellants filed the present appeals against those dismissal orders on a certificate issued under Article 132(1) and Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution. The appellants complained that the ground on which the earlier judgment was based had not been raised by the respondents in their pleadings and therefore should not have been accepted. They further argued that, on the real issues, the Security Rules should have been declared repugnant to Articles 14, 19(1)(c) and 311 of the Constitution and consequently void. Even assuming the Security Rules were valid, the appellants contended that the termination orders were not justified by those rules and, moreover, were invalid because they had not been issued by competent authorities. The appellants also attempted to raise the objection that the enquiry conducted by the authorities was defective and that they had been denied a proper hearing as required by the rules; however, the Court declined to consider that objection because it had not been raised in the original petitions. The Court identified four specific questions for decision in these appeals: first, whether the termination orders could be sustained under Rule 148 of the Railway Establishment Code; second, whether the Security Rules were unconstitutional for infringing Article 14, Article 19(1)(c) and Article 311; third, whether the orders were invalid even when examined under the Security Rules themselves; and fourth, whether the orders had been issued by authorities competent to do so. Regarding the first question, the Court found from the record that the authorities had acted solely under the Security Rules. The notice dated 6 July 1950 was expressly issued under Rule 3 of those rules, and the explanations given by the appellants in response to the charges were taken in strict compliance with the procedure prescribed in the same rule. The matters were then referred to the Committee of Advisers for enquiry. Most importantly, the termination orders themselves expressly stated that they were made under Rule 3. For instance, the notice dated 3 April 1951, which was served on the appellant in Civil Appeal No 46 of 1956, read in part: “I have considered your representation to me in reply to this office letter No. Con/T/2 I/MP/82 dated 6‑7‑1950 and am of the opinion that you are engaged and associated with others in subversive activities in such manner as to raise doubts about your reliability and am satisfied that your retention in public service is prejudicial to national security. I have decided, with the prior approval of the President, that your services should be terminated under Rule 3 of the Railway Services (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules, 1949.”

It was noted that the appellants, in their petitions, asserted that the action taken against them had been founded on the Services (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules, 1949, and that those rules were ultra vires. The respondents, however, did not allege that the action had been taken under Rule 148 of the Railway Establishment Code; instead, they simply maintained that the Security Rules were valid. In this context, the criticism expressed by Mr Umrigar on behalf of the appellants—that the judgment under appeal rested on a ground which was not only outside the contemplation of the authorities when they issued the orders, but also had not been raised in the pleadings before the Court—was held to have some substance. The parties argued that when an authority issues an order within its competence, the order should not fail merely because it is purportedly made under an incorrect provision, provided that the order can be shown to fall within the authority’s powers under some other rule, and that the validity of an order ought to be assessed on the basis of its substance rather than its form. No exception to this principle was accepted, yet the respondents never contended at any stage that the orders in question were actually made under Rule 148(3) of the Railway Establishment Code, nor did they suggest that the reference to Rule 3 of the Security Rules in the proceedings might be disregarded as a mistake. The learned judges of the lower court based their conclusion on Clause (10) of the service agreement dated 5 July 1946, which provided that for matters not specifically dealt with in the agreement—discharge being one such matter—the Railway rules applicable to persons appointed on or after 1 October 1946 would apply. They observed that Rule 148(3) was one of those rules and that the appellants, being non‑pensionable railway servants, were governed by that rule and therefore liable to be discharged accordingly. This reasoning, however, overlooked the fact that under the same Clause (10) the Security Rules were placed on an equal footing with the rules of the Railway Establishment Code and, together with Rule 148, formed the conditions of service on which the appellants were employed. Consequently, there needed to be a compelling explanation as to why orders expressly made under Rule 3 should not be considered as having been made under that rule. Before this Court, the respondents adopted a different position. They did not deny that the action had in fact been taken under Rule 3 of the Security Rules, but they argued that the power to terminate service under Rule 3 was not distinct from and independent of the power to discharge conferred by Rule 148, and that an order issued under Rule 3 was, on its own terms, an order made under Rule 148(3). Their argument was founded on the provision in Rule 3 which allows service to be terminated in accordance with the service agreement after giving due notice or pay in lieu of such notice.

The appellants disputed the respondents’ position. They argued that the authority to terminate service under the Security Rules is entirely separate from the authority to discharge an employee under Rule 148. They further asserted that the reference in Rule 3 to the service agreement concerns only the requirement to give appropriate notice, noting that the Rules prescribe different notice periods for different classes of employees. Apart from this notice requirement, the appellants maintained that the Security Rules operate independently and that any action taken under those Rules cannot be transferred to Rule 148.

The Court found considerable difficulty in accepting the respondents’ argument. The Security Rules apply to a special class of employees who are engaged, or are likely to engage, in subversive activities. Together with the instructions issued at the time of their promulgation, these Rules constitute a self‑contained code that sets out a detailed and elaborate procedure to be followed when action is contemplated against such employees. The Court recognized the strength of the appellants’ contention that the reference in Rule 3 to the service agreement deals solely with the nature of the notice to be given. If the respondents’ interpretation of the Security Rules were correct, the Court found it hard to perceive any coherent purpose for the Rules. Counsel for the respondents argued that the Rules are intended to protect persons who might be accused of engaging in subversive activities. The Court noted that, if that purpose is accepted, any order taken under the Rules without compliance with the prescribed procedure must be deemed invalid, because the intended protection would have been denied to the employee and Rule 148 could not be invoked to validate such an order. This principle has been affirmed in Sambandam v. General Manager, S. I. Ry. (1) and Prasadi v. Works Manager, Lillooah (2), a view also admitted by counsel for the respondents. The Court held that if the power to terminate service under the Security Rules differs from the power to discharge under Rule 148 when the procedure is not followed, the same distinction must remain even when the procedure is observed, since the character of the Rules does not change based on compliance. Consequently, the Security Rules possess an independent operation apart from Rule 148. However, the Court declined to express a final opinion on this point because counsel for the respondents was prepared to have the validity of the orders examined solely on the basis that they were issued under Rule 3 of the Security Rules, without reference to Rule 148. This situation required the Court to address the appellants’ challenge that the Security Rules are unconstitutional. The first ground raised against the validity of the Security Rules is that they are repugnant to Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court noted this allegation.

According to the Security Rules, the authorities must follow a special procedure before taking action against any person who is suspected of being involved in subversive activities. When the service of an employee is terminated under these rules, the effect of the termination is to label the employee as unreliable and infamous. The petitioners contend that this consequence creates a classification that is discriminatory and therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. They acknowledge that a classification would not offend Article 14 if the persons affected formed a distinct class with an intelligible differentia that bore a reasonable relation to the purpose of the rule. However, they argue that the expression “subversive activities,” which forms the basis of the classification, is vague and undefined. Because the phrase could conceivably encompass lawful conduct, the petitioners maintain that the classification cannot be said to be reasonable. To illustrate their point, they refer to the charges served on the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 46 of 1956, showing how even lawful activities might be brought within the ambit of the impugned rules. The notice, in the material portion, states: “Whereas in the opinion of the General Manager you are reasonably suspected to be a member and office secretary of the B.N. Railway Workers’ Union (Communist sponsored) and were thickly associated with communists such as Om Prakash Mehta, B.N. Mukherjee, R.L. Reddy, etc., in subversive activities in such manner as to raise doubts about your reliability and loyalty to the State. Though a Government employee, you attended private meetings of the Communists, carried on agitation amongst the Railway workers for a general strike from November 1948 to January 1949, evidently to paralyse communication and movement of essential supplies and thereby create disorder and confusion in the country. Consequently, you are liable to have your services terminated under rule 3 of the said Rules.” The petitioners argue that it is not unlawful to be a member of the Communist Party or to engage in trade‑union activities, and if such membership can be the basis for action under the rules, the classification must be held unreasonable.

In support of their argument, the petitioners rely on the decision of this Court in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, where a power granted to the executive to select cases for trial by special courts, using a procedure different from that of ordinary courts, was held not to be a valid classification under Article 14 because it was not reasonably related to the object of securing a “speedy trial.” They also cite the Madras High Court judgment in Ananthanarayanan v. Southern Railway, which held that the words “subversive activities” in Rule 3 lacked definiteness. The petitioners point out that the principles governing whether a classification satisfies the requirements of Article 14 have been examined by this Court in a number of cases and were restated recently. They submit that the present classification, based on the vague phrase “subversive activities,” fails to meet the criteria of intelligible differentia and reasonable nexus to the purpose of the Security Rules, and therefore must be struck down as unconstitutional.

In Budhan Choudhry and others v. The State of Bihar (3), the Court previously set out principles, and the present judgment does not need to repeat those principles. The sole issue that requires determination in these appeals is whether classifying persons on the ground of “subversive activities” is so vague that it cannot serve as a valid basis for classification. Counsel for the appellants, Mr. Umrigar, contends that the term is vague, but his lengthy submission essentially argues only that the expression “subversive activities” may encompass a broad range of conduct and therefore its scope is wide. He acknowledges that the connotation may indeed be broad, yet he insists that breadth equates to vagueness or indefiniteness. The Court observes that even if the phrase were broad, the Security Rules themselves attach sufficient qualification to make the term definite. The Rules were enacted with the purpose of safeguarding national security, a purpose expressly mentioned in the short title of the Rules. Rule 3 further emphasizes this purpose by providing that a member of the Railway service shall not be retired or have his service terminated unless the authorities are satisfied that his continued presence in public service is prejudicial to national security. Consequently, the Court finds that within the context of national security, the words “subversive activities” possess a clear and precise meaning that can support a valid classification. The Court cannot endorse the view expressed in Ananthanarayanan v. Southern Railway (supra) at p. 223, which held that the language of Rule 3 is indefinite even when read together with the phrase “national security”. The Court also rejects the argument advanced by the appellants that, based on the notice dated 6 July 1950 in Civil Appeal No. 46 of 1956, the expression “subversive activities” is so wide as to include lawful conduct and therefore must be unreasonable for classification under Article 14. While it is true that the notice refers to the appellant’s membership in the Communist Party and his involvement in trade‑union activities, it is equally true that neither Communist affiliation nor trade‑union participation is unlawful. However, the mere fact of being a Communist or a trade‑unionist does not automatically imply participation in subversive activities. The Court notes that the action taken against the appellant under the Rules was not predicated on his political affiliation or union work, but on his actual engagement in activities that the Rules deem subversive. Accordingly, the Court holds that the Security Rules are not unconstitutional or repugnant to Article 14. The appellants further contend that the impugned orders violate Article 19(1)(c) and are therefore void, arguing that the termination of their services under the Rules was based on their status as Communists and trade‑unionists, amounting to a denial of the freedom to form associations guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c).

In this case the Court examined whether the orders issued against the appellants effectively denied them the freedom to form associations that is guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution. The Court observed that the charges brought before the authorities did not truly relate to the formation of any association, and therefore there was no infringement of the right protected by Article 19(1)(c). The orders did not prohibit the appellants from remaining members of the Communist Party or from continuing their involvement in trade union activities; consequently, the appellants retained the same rights in those respects after the impugned orders as they had before them. The appellants’ principal grievance was that their services with the State had been terminated. Apart from the provisions of Article 311, this termination did not constitute a violation of any constitutional right. While the appellants unquestionably possessed the fundamental right to form associations under Article 19(1)(c), they did not possess a corresponding fundamental right to remain employed by the State. Hence, when the State terminated their employment, the appellants could not sustain a claim that any constitutional right had been infringed, especially since no question of violation of Article 311 arose. The Court therefore rejected the appellants’ contention on this ground. The appellants also argued that the procedure prescribed by the Security Rules for hearing the charges failed to satisfy the requirements of Article 311 and was therefore void. The Court clarified that Article 311 is applicable only when an order of dismissal or removal is made, and it was necessary to determine whether an order that terminates services under Rule 3 of the Security Rules could be characterised as a dismissal or removal. The Court referred to several earlier decisions – Satish Chandra Anand v. Union of India, Shyam Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Union of India, State of Bombay v. Saubhagchand M. Doshi and Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India – which together establish that not every termination of service falls within the ambit of Article 311. Only when the termination is punitive, i.e., a dismissal or removal as a form of punishment, does Article 311 apply. The Court also reiterated the reasoning in Parshotam Lal Dhingra, where it was held that a termination constitutes punishment if the person had a right to continue in office under service rules or a special agreement, or if the termination results in loss of benefits already earned and accrued. In the present matter, the terms of employment stipulated that services could be terminated on the basis of proper notice, and therefore no premature or punitive termination occurred. Moreover, Rule 7 of the Security Rules expressly preserves the employee’s entitlement to pension, gratuity and similar benefits, ensuring that no forfeiture of accrued benefits takes place. Consequently, the order terminating the appellants’ services under Rule 3 does not amount to a dismissal or removal within the meaning of Article 311, and the challenge on that basis must be dismissed.

The Court observed that the appellant had argued that a person who was discharged under the Security Rules lost the right to be re‑employed and that such loss amounted to punishment. The Court noted, however, that the appellant could not point to any specific rule that imposed a disability of that nature. It further held that an order terminating service under Rule 3 of the Security Rules was analogous to an order of discharge made under Rule 148, and that neither of those orders could be described as a dismissal or a removal within the meaning of Article 311. Consequently, the Court rejected the contention that the termination amounted to punishment under Article 311.

Next, counsel for the appellant submitted that the charges mentioned in Civil Appeal No 46 of 1956, communicated in the notice dated 6 July 1950, referred to events that occurred before the Security Rules came into force on 14 May 1949. The appellant claimed that the order terminating his services therefore gave retrospective effect to the Rules and was not authorized by their terms. The Court explained that the Rules allow action to be taken against an employee who is engaged or reasonably suspected of being engaged in subversive activities. When forming such an opinion, the authority may infer from the employee’s conduct and must consider the employee’s antecedents, which may include conduct that preceded the enactment of the Rules. The Court emphasized that the Rules are prospective, authorising action only for subversive activities that are presently existing or likely to be undertaken in the future—activities that are “in esse” or “in posse.” The use of earlier conduct as material for inference does not make the Rules operate retrospectively, a principle supported by the observations of Lord Denman C.J. in The Queen v St Mary, Whitechapel and The Queen v Christchurch. Accordingly, this contention was also dismissed. Finally, the appellant argued that the impugned orders were not issued by a competent authority under Rule 3, asserting that the General Manager, not the Deputy Manager who communicated the orders, was the proper authority. The Court found on the record that the General Manager had indeed passed the orders, and that finding was accepted. In the result, the Court dismissed the appeals with costs, and ordered the appellants, who had been permitted to proceed in forma pauperis, to pay the court fees payable to the Government.

The Court recorded that the appeal was dismissed. In reaching that conclusion, it referred to two reported decisions dating from the year 1848. The first authority was found in the twelfth volume of the Queen’s Bench reports at page 120 and was also reproduced in the English Reports at page 811. The second authority was located in the same twelfth volume of the Queen’s Bench reports at page 149 and was likewise reproduced in the English Reports covering pages 823 through 825. By citing these two authorities, the Court indicated that the reasoning and principles articulated in those earlier cases were applicable to the matter before it, and therefore supported the dismissal of the appeal. The citations were presented in the format “[1848] 12 Q. B. 120; 116 E.R. 811” for the first case and “[1848] 12 Q. B. 149; 116 E.R. 823, 825” for the second case, reflecting the precise sources of the precedents relied upon. No further discussion of the merits of the appeal was recorded beyond the statement of dismissal and the accompanying citations.