Mr. C vs The Advocate-General Of Madras

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 146 of 1956

Decision Date: 6 May 1957

Coram: Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, B. Jagannadhadas, P.B. Gajendragadkar

In this proceeding, the petition filed by Mr C against the Advocate-General of Madras was heard by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was delivered on 6 May 1957 by a bench composed of Justice Bhuvneshwar P Sinha, Justice B Jagannadhadas and Justice P B Gajendragadkar. The case is reported in the 1957 All India Reporter at page 722 and in the Supreme Court Reports at page 1092. The matter concerned an alleged professional misconduct by an advocate whose name was entered on the rolls of both the Madras High Court and this Court. The statutory framework invoked included provisions dealing with professional misconduct of advocates, the power of a High Court to debar an advocate on the basis of a Bar Council Tribunal report, and the procedural rule 30 of Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1950, which governs summons and proceedings in such disciplinary matters.

The High Court, relying on a detailed report prepared by the Bar Council Tribunal, found the advocate guilty of gross professional misconduct. The specific charge was that the advocate had received a sum of money from his client for the purpose of clearing a mortgage and securing a marketable title in a sale transaction, but had failed to apply the money to that purpose and had not accounted for it. The advocate appealed the decision by seeking special leave to appeal before this Court. Upon review, this Court examined the extensive oral and documentary evidence that had been placed before the High Court and found that it fully supported the charge. The Court held that the appeal was untenable, made the rule under rule 30 absolute, and ordered that the advocate’s name be removed from the roll of advocates of this Court. The judgment emphasized that admission to the Bar of this Court demands a very high standard of integrity and that an advocate who has been debarred by a High Court for breach of that standard cannot be permitted to practice here. The Court further explained that proceedings under rule 30 of Order IV are a natural sequel to the disciplinary proceedings under the Bar Councils Act; while the Supreme Court is not bound to follow the High Court’s order automatically, it is not required to conduct a fresh evidentiary inquiry. It is sufficient for the Court to review the Bar Council Tribunal’s record and to consider the High Court’s findings, provided that the advocate is given a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to adduce any additional evidence that the Court may deem appropriate. The Court also allowed that the Attorney General, any other advocate representing the legal profession, the complainant, or the aggrieved party may be heard before a final decision is rendered.

The Court noted that it had referred to several earlier decisions for guidance, namely the case of an Advocate, Case No. XVI of 1942 decided on 23 March 1943; the matter of D. A. Shammugasundaraswami, an Advocate, Miscellaneous Case No. X of 1948 decided on 24 January 1949; the matter of Mr. G, a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court reported in (1955) S.C.R. 490; and the matter of D, an Advocate of the Supreme Court reported in (1955) 2 S.C.R. 1006. The judgment that followed was a civil appellate jurisdiction matter, identified as Civil Appeal No. 146 of 1956. The appeal was taken by special leave from the judgment and order dated 3 December 1954 of the Madras High Court in Referred Case No. 69 of 1954. The appellant’s counsel appeared, while counsel for respondents 1 and 2 also participated. The date of the judgment was 6 May 1957 and it was delivered by Justice Sinha. The Court explained that the appeal by special leave and the summons issued under rule 30 of Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1950, were considered together and would be disposed of by the present judgment.

The appellant had been an advocate of the Madras High Court for more than twenty-five years and had been enrolled as an advocate of the then Federal Court in 1939. The Court observed that the appellant’s career at the Bar had been marked by irregularities. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court, presided over by the Chief Justice, by its judgment and order dated 3 December 1954, had directed that the appellant’s name be removed from the roll of advocates of the Madras High Court on the ground of “grave professional misconduct”. Having been apprised of the High Court’s findings, this Court issued a notice to the appellant requiring him to show cause why he should not be suspended from practice, taking into account the High Court’s findings.

According to the factual narrative presented, the appellant was engaged by a person named K. T. Appannah, who ordinarily resided in Bangalore and was thereafter referred to as the Complainant. The engagement was to effect a sale transaction between the Complainant and the owner of a house situated in Madras, who was thereafter called the Vendor for the purposes of the judgment. The appellant’s role was to examine the title deeds of the property that formed the subject-matter of the sale. Prior to the appellant’s involvement, the bargain had already been concluded and the purchase price fixed at Rs. 15,000. Of this amount, Rs. 1,300 had been paid to the Vendor as earnest money. A retired government servant named Sundararajayya, who was a relative of the Complainant and who lived near the appellant’s residence, also assisted the Complainant in acquiring the property and, in that capacity, gave instructions to the appellant on behalf of the Complainant. On 11 May 1951, the Complainant transmitted, by way of a demand draft, the sum of Rs. 1,400 to the appellant in order to meet the costs of stamp duty and registration, as well as a fee of Rs. 150 for the appellant’s work in connection with the transaction.

In this case, the complainant transferred to the appellant the sum of one thousand four hundred rupees by way of a demand draft on 11 May 1951 for the purpose of meeting the stamp-duty and registration costs of the sale deed, and also paid the appellant a fee of one hundred fifty rupees for the work undertaken in connection with the transaction. During the enquiry into the title of the house, it was discovered that a mortgage of five thousand five hundred rupees existed on the property. The mortgage had been created by a registered mortgage deed that had been filed in the Madras High Court in connection with a pending suit relating to the same property. By agreement, the parties decided that the amount of five thousand five hundred rupees would be retained from the overall purchase price to discharge the mortgage, and that the balance of the consideration would be paid to the vendor upon completion of the sale and delivery of vacant possession.

Accordingly, the appellant wrote to the complainant requesting that a demand draft for five thousand six hundred rupees be issued in the appellant’s name for payment to the mortgagee, with the understanding that the mortgage bond, once properly discharged, would be handed over to the appellant acting on behalf of the complainant. In compliance with that request, the complainant forwarded a demand draft made payable to the appellant for five thousand six hundred rupees on or about 26 June 1951, expressly to effect the discharge of the mortgage debt. Subsequently, the complainant sent additional funds to the appellant: a cheque for one thousand two hundred rupees on 21 August 1951, a cheque for five hundred rupees on 26 September 1951, and a demand draft for five thousand five hundred rupees on 19 October 1951, all made out to the appellant. These payments were intended to provide the appellant with the necessary funds to complete the sale and to pay the vendor his share of the consideration.

The sale deed was first executed by some of the executants on 9 July 1951 and later completed by the remaining executant on 6 September 1951, after which it was duly registered. From the period of 11 May 1951 to 24 October 1951, the complainant had therefore paid the appellant a total of fifteen thousand two hundred rupees. That amount was sufficient to cover the full purchase price of thirteen thousand seven hundred rupees, which included the mortgage liability of five thousand five hundred rupees, together with the costs of stamp duty, registration and the appellant’s fees. However, the vendor’s portion of the consideration was not paid by the appellant until 23 November 1951, and the payment was delayed due to the appellant’s own conduct, despite the fact that vacant possession had already been delivered to the appellant as agreed.

It further appeared that the complainant required the mortgage bond, duly discharged, in order to raise funds against the newly acquired property. Nevertheless, the appellant, for reasons of his own, repeatedly postponed the discharge of the mortgage, invoking various pretexts. After prolonged correspondence in which the complainant pressed the appellant for the released mortgage document, the appellant finally sent to the complainant, on 26 June 1952, a collection of documents that he described as “cancelled mortgage documents.”

The Court described that the appellant had sent a number of papers to the complainant, among which were documents referred to as “cancelled mortgage documents.” It was explained that the mortgage transaction involving the sum of five thousand five hundred rupees had been undertaken by the owner of the property with the purpose of discharging earlier mortgages that were already chargeable on the same land. All of these documents were required to be withdrawn from the High Court, where they had been kept in the Court’s custody as previously mentioned. Unfortunately, the individual identified as Sundararajayya passed away on June twenty-eighth, nineteen fifty-two. Following additional correspondence, the complainant discovered, at his own expense, that the mortgage liability of five thousand five hundred rupees had not been settled with the mortgagee, contrary to the arrangement that existed between the appellant and the complainant. The complainant had supplied the appellant with funds expressly intended to secure a clear title to the property that he had agreed to purchase. Because the promised clearance had not been achieved, the complainant felt compelled to lodge a regular petition of complaint in the High Court on November fourteenth, nineteen fifty-two. In that petition, the complainant quoted extensively from letters that the appellant had written to him and also referred to the fact that the mortgagee had already commenced a suit in a court of law to recover the mortgage money, and that the complainant had been impleaded as a defendant in that suit. The central allegation against the appellant was that he had failed to discharge the outstanding mortgage on the purchased property, despite having received ample funds from the complainant, and that he had not disclosed the manner in which the complainant’s money, intended for that purpose, had been used. In response to a notice served on February sixteenth, nineteen fifty-three, the appellant filed a statement of explanation that extended to roughly forty-three printed pages; the Court observed that the document resembled a justification of his conduct more than a factual statement. The High Court then referred the complaint to the Bar Council for inquiry and a report. Three members of the Bar Council formed a Tribunal which conducted a detailed inquiry, recording both oral testimony and documentary evidence. The Tribunal submitted its report on May fifth, nineteen fifty-four, concluding that both charges against the appellant had been fully established. The report stated that the appellant not only failed to use the complainant’s money for its intended purpose, but also did not provide any account for the sum of five thousand rupees, which he had admitted to cashing and depositing into his personal bank account rather than his professional account. The Tribunal found that the appellant had indeed received all the amounts sent by the complainant as previously detailed. However, the Tribunal also highlighted an unfortunate aspect of the case: the mortgage bond in question, identified as one of the “cancelled mortgage documents,” had not been produced before the Tribunal. Counsel for the complainant explained the non-production of this crucial document, stating that the mortgage deed had been among the papers left with the complainant’s counsel and that the entire bundle, including that deed, had apparently disappeared from his office.

In this proceeding the Tribunal recorded that the mortgage bond and several other documents had been left by the complainant with his counsel, after which the entire bundle of papers, including those documents, “disappeared from his office.” The Tribunal observed that it was impossible to determine who might have taken the documents or for whose benefit they were removed, as alleged by the counsel for the complainant. An additional troubling feature was that a number of letters, which the appellant had admittedly written to the complainant in connection with the sale, were found by the High Court to have been either tampered with or wholly substituted. With respect to exhibit C-12, which was alleged to have been substituted for the original, the Tribunal noted that the learned counsel for the complainant had not continued to maintain the allegation of substitution, nor had he pressed any claim that other letters in the extensive correspondence between the appellant and the complainant had been altered. The Tribunal further pointed out that no specific charge had been drafted against the appellant concerning those letters; consequently, when the Tribunal spoke of the “charge” being withdrawn, it merely meant that the complainant’s counsel had ceased to pursue his allegations about the alleged alterations or the complete replacement of exhibit C-12, a point that the Court would address later in the judgment. The Tribunal then examined in detail the appellant’s defence regarding the specific allegation that the sum of Rs 5,600, which the complainant had sent for the purpose of discharging the mortgage encumbrance on the purchased property, had been misappropriated. According to the appellant, a demand draft for Rs 5,500 dated 24 October 1951 had been delivered to him through a messenger named Sundararajayya. The appellant claimed that the amount of the draft was credited to his personal bank account, that he retained Rs 500 for payment to the vendor, and that he handed the remaining Rs 5,000 in cash to Sundararajayya. The appellant denied that the complainant had instructed him to make any payment of Rs 5,000 to Sundararajayya, and he further denied having taken any receipt for that sum, although he asserted that he had provided a receipt to Sundararajayya for the smaller amount of Rs 500, which he said he kept on behalf of the complainant for payment to the vendee. After reviewing the totality of the evidence, especially the correspondence exchanged between the appellant and the complainant, the Tribunal concluded that the appellant had “dishonestly and fraudulently represented to the complainant that the mortgage had been cancelled,” that he had selected three documents out of the thirty-six received from the vendor—including the mortgage document itself—and that he had sent those selected items to the complainant describing them as “cancelled documents.”

In the present case, the Tribunal observed that the respondent had taken the monies that were intended to discharge the mortgage and had used those funds for his own purposes, after which he had placed marks of cancellation on the mortgage document and forwarded the same to the complainant under the pressure created by the complainant’s demand for a discharged mortgage document. The Tribunal then turned its attention to the evidence concerning the repayment of five thousand rupees to Sundararajayya out of a demand draft for five thousand five hundred rupees, which had been sent by the complainant and subsequently credited to the personal bank account of the appellant. Although Sundararajayya had died before the commencement of the inquiry and his testimony could not be produced, the Tribunal, despite the complete absence of the mortgage bond from the record and the lack of any explanation that could be offered by Sundararajayya, found no difficulty in concluding that the appellant was clearly guilty not only of professional misconduct but also of a manifest breach of trust. This report of the Tribunal was then scrutinised by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court. The learned Chief Justice, after carefully considering all that could have been pleaded on behalf of the appellant and after examining both oral and documentary evidence, affirmed the findings of the Tribunal and went a step further by declaring that exhibit C-12 was not genuine and that the letters exhibited as C-10 and C-11 contained interpolations made by the appellant, who was then the respondent before the Court. In that connection, the High Court observed that the learned Advocate-General had questioned the genuineness of the letter; whether another genuine letter of the same date existed was deemed unnecessary to determine. The Court noted that the letter was in the respondent’s handwriting and, after a thorough consideration of all circumstances, was of the opinion that the letter must have been introduced into the bundle of documents with the complainant’s advocate at or about the same time when the respondent made the interpolations in the letters dated 6-9-1951 and 6-10-1951 (exhibits C-10 and C-11). Consequently, the High Court directed that the appellant’s name be removed from the roll of advocates of that Court. The appellant against this order obtained special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. At this juncture, the Court found it appropriate to address the arguments advanced by counsel for the appellant, noting that it had been suggested that the Bar Council Tribunal’s inquiry was “rambling and roving.” While this observation was not entirely unfounded, the order sheet of the Tribunal showed that charges had been framed on 22 July 1953 and that the inquiry had continued on numerous dates until the report was finally made on 5 May 1954, the Tribunal having dealt with the matter on as many as forty-five separate occasions.

It was observed that the printed record of the Bar Council Tribunal’s inquiry extended to 296 pages. Producing such a voluminous record inevitably required a considerable amount of time and money from all parties involved. Particular sympathy was extended to the complainant, who had to endure this protracted process after suffering a loss of at least Rs 5,000, if not a larger sum, as determined by both the High Court and the Tribunal. Nevertheless, when the question of responsibility for the difficulties was considered, a substantial portion of the blame could be attributed to the appellant himself. The appellant appeared to employ considerable ingenuity in attempting to explain his interactions with his client, who was described as unfortunate. In response to the charge framed by the Tribunal, the appellant filed a lengthy “written answer” on 27 September 1953. Prior to that, he had already submitted a “written explanation” on 16 February 1953, which ran to 43 printed pages, as had been noted earlier. The record showed that the appellant made every effort to obscure the issues and to conceal his alleged misconduct, a conclusion reached by both the Tribunal and the Madras High Court. Consequently, the tribunal’s inquiry, which had been characterised by the appellant as “rambling and roving,” could not be regarded as a source of grievance for him. The nature of the investigation was described as a quasi-criminal proceeding, and the appellant’s counsel argued that, as a necessary consequence of that description, the charge should have been drafted with greater precision and proved beyond all reasonable doubt.

The Court examined these contentions in light of the material prepared by the Tribunal and concluded that the charge was not so defective as to mislead the appellant or to cause substantial prejudice, nor was there any reasonable doubt as to the truth of the allegations. The charge framed against the appellant read as follows: “That you Mr ‘C’, in acting for the petitioner as his advocate in the matter of scrutinising the title deeds of No 104-A, Lloyds Road, Gopalapuram, Madras, and putting through the sale of the said premises in the petitioner’s favour, received from the petitioner Rs 5,600 for the purpose of discharging a mortgage encumbrance on the property and that you have not applied the monies so entrusted to you then and there for the purposes of entrustment. That you Mr ‘C’ have further not disclosed to the petitioner how and in what manner you have utilised the said monies and that you have not accounted for the same when demanded. That you have for these reasons committed acts of professional misconduct liable to be dealt with under the Bar Councils Act.” With reference to the first paragraph of this charge, it was contended that the appellant had fully answered the allegation. The argument presented thereafter was that the reference to the sum of Rs 5,600 corresponded to a demand draft dated 26 January 1951, and that the appellant claimed to have paid that amount to the vendee on 23 November 1951 when vacant possession was delivered. This line of reasoning was examined in the subsequent discussion.

The Court observed that the reference to the sum of Rs 5,600 pertained to a demand draft dated 26 January 1951. The appellant asserted that this amount had been handed over to the vendee on 23 November 1951, when vacant possession of the purchased premises was delivered to the appellant. Such a statement could have fully answered the charge if it were established as a fact that, out of the demand draft dated 24 October 1951 for Rs 5,500, the appellant had returned Rs 5,000 to Sundararajayya as he claimed. However, the lower court, affirming the conclusions of the Bar Council Tribunal, found that the appellant had failed to produce reliable evidence that the Rs 5,000 had in fact been paid back to Sundararajayya. Consequently, the findings indicated that the appellant possessed more than sufficient funds to discharge the entire consideration, including the mortgage encumbrance of Rs 5,500, after deducting Rs 1,300 that had already been paid to the vendor as earnest money before the appellant entered the transaction. The appellant’s counsel pointed out that the charge did not allege that the appellant had failed to account for, or had embezzled, any portion of the Rs 5,500 sent on 24 October 1951. This line of argument presumed that the outstanding mortgage debt on the property had to be settled in kind from a specific installment out of the total sum of Rs 15,200 that the complainant had entrusted to the appellant for the transaction. The appellant was required to account for the application of the entire Rs 15,200, which represented the total amount placed in his hands by his client for completing the purchase. The appellant himself did not claim that he had rendered an account of the whole sum. He could not be said to have duly accounted for the total unless it were established that he had paid Rs 5,000 in cash to Sundararajayya. On the appellant’s own evidence, and as found by the High Court in agreement with the Tribunal, the Rs 5,000 had not been paid to Sundararajayya; therefore, the appellant had not accounted for the full amount entrusted to him. This leads to a clear conclusion, stripped of the appellant’s attempts to cloud the issues, that the appellant was entrusted with Rs 15,200, of which he was to discharge the mortgage debt of Rs 5,500, as settled with the mortgagee by the appellant acting on behalf of the complainant. The appellant never claimed to have paid this sum to the mortgagee, and his own statements confirm that he did not discharge the mortgage.

In this case the Court observed that the appellant’s own written explanation, specifically paragraph 58, made it unmistakably clear that he never discharged the mortgage. The appellant declared that he did not pay any money to the mortgagee or anyone acting on the mortgagee’s behalf, that he never made any statement, written or oral, claiming that he had satisfied the mortgage claim, and that any suggestion to the contrary was false. He further stated that he did not possess the necessary funds after 21-11-1951. From these admissions the Court concluded that the appellant did not apply the Rs 5,500 required to discharge the mortgage out of the Rs 15,200 that had been entrusted to him by the complainant for the purpose of obtaining a clear title to the property. The Court noted that it would have been preferable for the Bar Council Tribunal to require the appellant to account for the entire Rs 15,200, which he acknowledged receiving, rather than focusing only on the Rs 5,600 item. Nevertheless, the Court held that the omission of the full amount from the charge did not prejudice the appellant’s defence. Repeated references before the Court indicated that the appellant was not merely imprudent in handling the money but was aware of the charge he faced and acted dishonestly. The charge was clear, and there was no doubt that the High Court was fully justified in affirming the Tribunal’s conclusions and in striking the appellant’s name from the roll of advocates. The Court then turned to the appellant’s further argument that the High Court should not have recorded findings on exhibits C-10, C-11 and C-12 because the complainant’s counsel had not raised allegations of interpolation or forgery before the Tribunal. The Court found this contention well-founded and therefore dismissed the allegations of material alteration in exhibits C-10 and C-11 and of wholesale substitution of the original of exhibit C-12. In assessing whether the charges against the appellant were substantiated, the Court proceeded on the assumption that the letters, as they now appear, are genuine. These letters contain statements made by the appellant himself and represent an attempt to explain his alleged omissions and commissions in the transaction.

In the present matter, the appellant submitted statements that attempted to rationalise his omissions and commissions concerning the sale transaction for which the complainant had engaged him. Those statements were found to be completely discordant with the remainder of the record and especially contradictory to the extensive correspondence that had, as admitted, passed between the appellant and the complainant. The Court did not examine the voluminous correspondence in detail because the appeal proceeded by way of special leave, and the Court deemed it unnecessary to scrutinise closely the factual findings recorded by the High Court in concurrence with the Bar Council Tribunal. According to the Court, the case presented by the complainant was supported by a substantial body of reliable oral and documentary evidence that aligned solely with the appellant’s guilt and was wholly inconsistent with any claim of innocence, notwithstanding the appellant’s belated and futile attempt to cleanse his misconduct.

Regarding the summons issued by the Court to the appellant, the Court first considered the procedural question of how such summons should be disposed of. The Court examined whether it must commence independent proceedings by conducting a fresh inquiry, recording evidence for and against the appellant, and then reaching its own conclusions, or whether it should rely upon the inquiry already undertaken by the High Court through the Bar Council Tribunal and thereafter issue its orders after affording the appellant an opportunity to be heard against comparable orders. The Court noted that an advocate of the apex court may be permitted to practise in any subordinate court in India even if the advocate is not listed on the roll of any particular High Court. In addressing this issue, the Court referred to precedents dating from the era of the Federal Court and earlier decisions of the apex court that are analogous to the present case. In those earlier cases, the Federal Court and subsequently the apex court acted upon the High Court’s report containing its orders against an advocate, and they passed their own orders after giving the concerned advocate a chance to show cause why disciplinary action should not be imposed, based on the High Court’s findings. The Court observed that those authorities did not deem a fresh inquiry necessary when the High Court’s orders were satisfied as being well-founded in fact and law. The Court further mentioned that the earliest Federal Court precedent, titled In the matter of an Advocate (1), actually involved the appellant himself at an earlier stage of his career. That earlier proceeding was heard by a bench comprising Sir Maurice Gwyer, Chief Justice, Sir S. Varadachariar and Sir Torick Ameer Ali, and concerned charges arising in 1934-35, of which the appellant was convicted in 1941 by the Madras Sessions Court on one count of an attempt to cheat, receiving a term of eighteen months’ rigorous imprisonment.

The appellant had been convicted of an attempt to cheat, for which he served a term of eighteen months of rigorous imprisonment. After completing his sentence, the matter was examined by the Madras High Court on the basis of a report prepared by the Tribunal of the Madras Bar Council. The report, noted as Case No. XVI of 1942 and decided on 23 March 1943, concluded that the appellant’s conviction involved moral turpitude. Consequently, in 1942 the Madras High Court ordered that the appellant be struck off the roll of advocates of that Court. The Federal Court, in its brief order, referenced a similar decision, In re an Advocate, 1 L.R. 46 Mad. p. 903, and observed that it would not automatically apply the Madras High Court’s order without hearing the respondent. After hearing the appellant’s written memorandum at length, the Federal Court expressed that no extraordinary circumstances justified disregarding the High Court’s verdict. Accordingly, the Court held that the appellant had not shown sufficient grounds to prevent his removal from the rolls of the Federal Court following the High Court’s order, and therefore issued an order removing him from those rolls. As a result, the appellant ceased to be listed on the rolls of both the Madras High Court and the Federal Court sometime in 1943.

In 1948 the appellant applied to the Federal Court for reinstatement, relying on a later order of the Madras High Court dated 22 March 1948, which had reinstated him after reviewing affidavits and certificates of good character submitted during the period of his strike-off. During the court’s vacation, a Federal Court judge issued an order restoring the appellant to the roll of advocates of that Court, thereby allowing him to re-enter the legal profession. Within approximately two years of this reinstatement, the appellant allegedly engaged in dishonest and fraudulent conduct that victimised the complainant, as previously noted. A comparable situation arose in the case cited as In re: D. A. Shanmugasundaraswami(1). In that matter, the advocate, also originally from the Madras High Court, faced multiple counts of professional misconduct. Following the requisite inquiry and a report by the Bar Council’s Tribunal, the Madras High Court ordered his name to be struck off its roll of advocates. Since the advocate was likewise on the roll of the Federal Court, subsequent proceedings were initiated under the Federal Court’s rules.

In that case the advocate who had been struck off the roll of the Madras High Court was also listed on the roll of advocates of the Federal Court. Accordingly a summons was issued under Order IV, rule 29 of the Federal Court Rules. The Federal Court, which at that time was composed of Chief Justice Kania, Justice Fazl Ali, Justice Patanjali Sastri, Justice Mahajan and Justice B. K. Mukherjee, issued an order dated 24 January directing that the advocate’s name also be removed from the roll of advocates of the Federal Court. The Court relied on the precedent discussed in the preceding paragraph and expressed its reasoning in the following terms: having regard to that earlier decision of this Court, it was not considered necessary to treat the order of the Madras High Court as automatically triggering a removal order from the Federal Court rolls. The advocate was invited to argue his case in detail before the Court. After hearing the respondent extensively, the Court found no reason to depart from the conclusion reached by the Madras High Court. It was not convinced that any circumstances existed which would make it either possible or proper for the Court to disregard the verdict and the subsequent order of the Madras High Court against the respondent. Consequently, the Court held that no sufficient grounds had been shown to prevent an order removing the respondent from the rolls of this Court, and therefore such an order was made.

The Court also considered another matter involving an advocate of the Bombay High Court who was enrolled as a senior advocate of this Court. In that matter, after the Bombay High Court suspended the advocate from practice for six months, the suspension was brought to the notice of this Court. The Court dealt with the matter under Order IV, rule 30 and issued orders that were substantially the same as those passed by the Bombay High Court. In a further case concerning an advocate identified as “-D”, also an advocate of the Supreme Court, the Court acted under Order IV, rule 30 after the Bombay High Court had suspended the advocate for one year. The advocate sought a fresh inquiry, but the Court rejected the request and proceeded on the record presented by the Bar Council as directed by the Bombay High Court. The Court agreed with the Bombay High Court’s findings of misconduct in connection with a criminal trial and imposed a suspension that ran concurrently with the period fixed by the High Court. By reviewing these precedents, the Federal Court and this Court have established certain principles governing disciplinary actions against advocates who are enrolled in both a High Court and this Court.

The Court explained that when it deals with a summons issued under rule thirty of Order Four of the Supreme Court Rules, or the comparable rule of the Federal Court, it does not automatically apply any disciplinary order previously made by a High Court against an advocate who appears on both the High Court roll and the Supreme Court roll. The Court further held that it is not required to conduct a completely new inquiry and record fresh evidence against the advocate for alleged professional misconduct. Instead, the Court may simply review the record prepared by the Bar Council of the High Court, which was created under that Court’s directions and upon which the High Court based its order, and may consider the findings of the High Court in its own deliberation. Nevertheless, the Court must give the advocate a reasonable opportunity to be heard against any disciplinary action it proposes to take. The Court also retained the discretion to allow the advocate, in appropriate cases, to present additional evidence that it deems necessary. After hearing the advocate or his legal adviser, and, if needed, the Attorney-General or any other counsel appointed to represent the views of the legal profession, the complainant, or any aggrieved party wishing to be heard, the Court may pass any order it considers appropriate in exercise of its judicial discretion. The Court observed that in the present matter, at the final hearing, it saw no need to adjourn the proceeding to issue notice to the Attorney-General, nor was any such request made. Considering the earlier precedents and the principle that enrollment as a Supreme Court advocate ordinarily requires one to be on the roll of a High Court, the Court stated that proceedings under rule thirty of Order Four should normally be regarded as a natural continuation of the proceedings conducted under the Bar Councils Act in the High Court. Consequently, if a person is not deemed a fit and proper individual to remain on the High Court roll, it follows a fortiori that he cannot be permitted to continue on the Supreme Court roll. The Court emphasized that being listed on the Supreme Court roll is a great privilege and should be reserved for persons who demonstrate a high degree of integrity of character. Anyone found by the High Court to have fallen below that standard of integrity must face the consequence of having his name removed from the Supreme Court roll, as the Court previously indicated.

In this case the Court observed that it was regrettable that the appellant, after having previously been struck off the roll of advocates of the Madras High Court and of the Federal Court, had been reinstated and thereby elevated to a position where he could deal with clients who entrust their legal advisers with money in the course of a fiduciary relationship. The Court noted that the protracted proceedings against the appellant, which culminated in the issuance of a summons under rule 30 of Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules, finally resulted in the appellant’s name being removed once more from the roll of advocates of the High Court and from the roll of this Court. However, that removal took place only after the complainant had already suffered the loss of his money. The Court therefore held that the appellant’s continued presence in the legal profession constituted a serious menace to the profession, which requires a high degree of integrity of character and a sense of responsibility—attributes that the appellant was found to be singularly lacking. In view of these considerations the Court concluded that the appeal must fail, that the rule should be applied in its strict and absolute form, and that the appellant’s name shall remain removed from the roll of advocates of this Court. Accordingly the appeal was dismissed.