Messrs. Crown Aluminium Works vs Their Workmen on 15 October, 1957

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 235 of 1956

Decision Date: 15/10/1957

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, S.K. Das

In the matter titled Messrs. Crown Aluminium Works versus Their Workmen, decided on 15 October 1957, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment under the authorship of Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar, with the bench comprising Justices P.B. Gajendragadkar, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, and S.K. Das. The petitioner was Messrs. Crown Aluminium Works and the respondent was the workmen employed by that undertaking. The judgment was formally dated 15 October 1957 and the citation for the decision appears as 1958 AIR 30 and 1958 SCR 651. The case concerned the provisions of the Industrial Dispute‑Adjudication‑Constitution of Wage Structure Act, specifically the question of whether a wage structure could be revised to the prejudice of the workmen and the governing principle underlying such a revision.

According to the headnote, there is no absolute rule that once a wage structure has been fixed it may never be altered to the disadvantage of the workmen; nevertheless, well‑recognised principles must guide any such revision. One paramount principle, which admits no exception, is that the wages of workmen must never be permitted to fall below the bare subsistence level. Consequently, an industry cannot be said to have a legitimate existence if it can only survive by reducing the wages of its employees beneath that subsistence threshold. The Constitution of India, the headnote observes, aims to create a democratic welfare state that secures social and economic justice for all citizens. The growth of industry, together with the emergence of collective bargaining between organised labour and capital and the resulting industrial legislation, has rendered the old doctrine of absolute freedom of contract and laissez‑faire obsolete, replacing them with principles of social welfare and the common good.

Industrial adjudication, therefore, must keep in view the ideal of a democratic welfare state. Its immediate objective in constituting a wage structure is to obtain genuine and wholehearted cooperation between labour and capital in the production process by justly reconciling their conflicting interests. This reconciliation is to be achieved through the application of several well‑known principles, including the principle of comparable wages, the productivity of the trade or industry, the cost of living, and the ability of the industry to pay. In circumstances where a wage structure belongs to a higher category, the employer may seek its revision, provided that the employer can satisfy the Tribunal that such revision is reasonable on the merits and fair and just to both parties.

However, when an employer invokes its own financial difficulties as a ground for revision, the Tribunal must examine whether those difficulties could be adequately addressed by the retrenchment in personnel that the employer has already carried out and which has been sanctioned by the Tribunal. In the present case, the Industrial Tribunal had fixed both a wage structure and a dearness allowance, while also granting the employer the liberty to abolish two‑hour concessions, a facility bonus and a food concession, characterising those benefits as gratuitous bounties paid at the employer’s discretion. The Labour Appellate Tribunal, on the other hand, held that these concessions, having been enjoyed by the workmen for a considerable period as a matter of right, formed part of the basic wages and dearness allowance. The Tribunal therefore treated them as integral components of the workers’ remuneration rather than as voluntary gifts.

In this case, the Court noted that the various concessions which had previously been paid to the workmen and which had become part of their basic wages and dearness allowance were, by long‑standing practice, deemed to be terms of the conditions of service. Accordingly, the Appellate Tribunal revised the wage structure of the existing workmen by incorporating those concessions into the basic wage and dearness allowance. The Tribunal did not rely solely on the general principle that an employee’s existing emoluments should not be reduced to his prejudice; it also considered additional factors that were supported by the evidence and were neither invalid nor unwarranted. Because the Tribunal’s considerations were founded on material evidence and were not contrary to law, the Court held that the Tribunal’s decision was valid in law. The Court further declared that it would normally be reluctant to entertain an objection that any of the reasons on which the Appellate Tribunal based its decision were invalid or unsupported by the record. When the Court finds that certain payments, although described as gratuitous, are in substance part of the wages and dearness allowance, it concludes that the Tribunal’s decision cannot be set aside.

The judgment was delivered in the Civil Appellate Jurisdiction, Civil Appeal No. 235 of 1956, which was taken by special leave from the judgment and order dated 29 July 1955 of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Calcutta, in Appeal No. Cal. 182 of 1953. Counsel for the appellant represented the petitioner, while counsel for the respondent represented the opposing party. The appeal was decided on 15 October 1957, and the opinion was authored by Justice Gajendragadkar. The appeal arose from an industrial dispute between the appellant, Crown Aluminium Works, Belur, represented by Jeewanlal (1929) Ltd., and its workmen, represented by the Bengal Aluminium Workers’ Union. By an order dated 31 July 1952, the Government of West Bengal referred thirteen matters to Shri S. K. Niyogi, who was appointed to constitute the Sixth Industrial Tribunal under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The learned adjudicator examined the submissions and the evidence presented by the parties, investigated the appellant’s financial position, and rendered an award on 9 October 1953 covering all referred matters. Both parties were dissatisfied with that award, leading to two cross‑appeals. The Labour Appellate Tribunal disposed of those appeals by a consolidated order on 11 July 1955. While the workmen appeared satisfied with the Tribunal’s order, the appellant was not, prompting the present appeal. The principal grievance placed before the Court by counsel for the appellant concerned the revision of the wage structure made by the Appellate Tribunal, which had altered the original tribunal’s wage composition. Though the dispute was narrowly defined, the Court found it necessary to recount the dispute’s history in detail to properly understand the issues. In 1947, the first Omnibus Engineering Tribunal had been constituted to adjudicate industrial disputes in the West Bengal engineering sector, and among the matters referred to that tribunal were issues relating to basic wages, dearness allowance, and leave.

The tribunal that had been set up dealt with, among other matters, disputes concerning basic wages, dearness allowance and leave. It issued a detailed award that was made public on June 30 1948. The appellant was a participant in those proceedings and consequently was bound by the terms of that award. Shortly after, fresh industrial disputes arose between the engineering sector and its employees, and these matters were referred to a second tribunal. That tribunal examined the issues and issued its own award, which was published on September 21 1950. In the second award the dearness allowance that had been fixed by the first tribunal was raised because the cost‑of‑living index had increased, and the leave provisions of the earlier award were altered to bring them into conformity with the Indian Factories Act, 1948. Following the operation of the first award, the appellant periodically adjusted its facility bonus so as to keep pace with the rising cost‑of‑living index. As a result, the various elements that made up the wage structure paid by the appellant to its workmen left no ground for grievance, and the workmen did not raise any claim for a higher dearness allowance. Consequently, neither the appellant nor the workmen were parties to the second arbitration proceedings. In the meantime, a minor industrial dispute emerged between the appellant and its workmen, and the Government of West Bengal ordered that this dispute be referred to the arbitration of Shri G. Palit on November 24 1950. One of the issues before Shri Palit concerned the amount of wage increment that should be granted to the workers in 1950 and the date from which such increment should become effective. The appellant argued that it was not liable to pay the increment because no wage structure existed that would support such a claim. It further contended before Shri Palit that its workers were already well compensated, pointing to the special allowance, bonus, dearness allowance and standard wages that it paid. Thus, the appellant’s position was that the introduction of additional components into its wage structure already provided sufficient provision for cost‑of‑living increases, thereby negating the workers’ claim for an increment. Shri Palit did not accept this argument. He observed that by adding these components the Managing Director had effectively retained control over the amount of benefit, allowing adjustments according to the factory’s output. Accordingly, Shri Palit granted the workers’ demand for an increment of one anna per day, although he admitted that this figure was not derived from any precise calculation. He ordered the appellant to pay the resulting arrears within one month of the award taking effect.

The award directed that the increment be placed into operation for every workman who remained on the appellant’s rolls at the end of 1950. Shri Palit then warned the appellant that it was essential to establish a fixed wage structure as soon as possible in order to achieve lasting peace in the factory. He observed that it would be prudent for the company to adopt a rigid wage structure rather than rely on numerous flexible components, which he believed would only generate unrest. This summarises the background of the dispute between the appellant and its workmen. On 28 March 1952 the appellant served a notice upon its workmen proposing several modifications. The notice stated that factory hours would be reduced from 47 to 40 per week, the facility bonus would be cut by three annas per day, and the temporary dearness allowance for salaried workers would be reduced by ten percent of the prevailing rates. The appellant argued that these economy measures were required because of a financial setback and that they would take effect on 1 June 1952. The Union objected to these changes and a joint discussion was scheduled for 2 June and 26 June 1952. Further economy measures were introduced for discussion by a notice dated 30 May 1952. Those measures included an additional reduction of the facility bonus by six annas per day, the withdrawal of a two‑hour concession of a special bonus, and the dismissal of workers in the rolling‑mills department. The Union accepted only the reduction of weekly working hours from 47 to 42½ hours. Because the joint consultations failed to produce an agreement, the appellant, in a notice dated 27 June 1952, informed the workers that the reductions in working hours, facility bonus and dearness allowance announced on 28 March 1952 would become effective on 1 June 1952. The notice also stated that the two‑hour concession would be withdrawn from 1 July 1952 and that the rolling‑mills workers would be dismissed effective 1 August 1952. The workmen opposed these proposals and immediately presented the industrial dispute to the Labour Commissioner. A joint conference of the appellant and its workmen was held on 4 July 1952, but the Labour Commissioner’s proposals for an amicable settlement were rejected by both sides. Consequently, the appellant dismissed the 52 workmen of the rolling‑mills department, providing fourteen days’ notice pay, and retrenched an additional 227 workers of various categories on 26 July 1952, also with notice pay. The Government of West Bengal concluded that conciliation was impossible and therefore referred the industrial dispute to the Sixth Industrial Tribunal for adjudication.

In this case the dispute was sent to the Sixth Industrial Tribunal for determination. The present appeal is limited to the way the wage structure was created and to certain related questions, therefore the Court will discuss only the findings of the lower tribunals that relate to those issues. The Sixth Industrial Tribunal examined the employer’s financial condition and, relying on the Omnibus Engineering Awards issued in West Bengal in 1948 and 1950, it revised and re‑constituted both the wage scale and the dearness allowance. The Tribunal held that the two‑hour concession, the facility bonus and the food concession were merely gratuitous bounties paid by the employer and that, consequently, the employer could discontinue them whenever it chose. It further concluded that because the wage scale had been properly revised and re‑structured, the employer was entitled to abolish those three concessional payments. The Tribunal’s view on the nature of the alleged concessions was mainly based on the observation that, in an earlier award, Shri Palit had described those payments as purely concessional and said that the workers had no right to treat them as part of their wage structure.

The Labour Appellate Tribunal did not accept that conclusion. The Appellate Tribunal reasoned that the workers had enjoyed the so‑called concessional payments for a considerable period, that they had become an accepted component of the workers’ basic wages and dearness allowance, and that, as a result, they had been incorporated into the terms of the workers’ conditions of service. Additionally, the Appellate Tribunal noted a prevailing convention among industrial tribunals that existing emoluments should not be reduced to the detriment of the workers. Accordingly, the wage structure originally devised by the Sixth Tribunal was altered by the Appellate Tribunal’s award as it applied to the existing employees. The Appellate Tribunal introduced three principal modifications: (1) the total basic wages of a time‑rated employee together with the two‑hour concession that was in force immediately before 1‑June‑1952 would from then on be termed the employee’s “existing basic wage”; (2) the aggregate of the temporary dearness allowance, the facility bonus that existed before 1‑June‑1952 and any food concession permissible under the company rules would from that date be termed the employee’s “existing dearness allowance”, irrespective of whether any part of those benefits had later been reduced or discontinued; and (3) the two‑hour concession, the facility bonus and the food concession would cease to exist as separate items distinct from basic wages and dearness allowance from the date the decision became effective, a date referred to as the “relevant date”. Both the original Sixth Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal agreed that the existing basic wages and the existing emoluments would not be diminished. On behalf of the employer, counsel Mr Sen argued that the Appellate Tribunal’s assumption about the convention not to reduce existing emoluments was erroneous.

Mr. Sen argued that the Labour Appellate Tribunal had erred in assuming a universal convention in industrial adjudications that the existing emoluments of workmen could never be reduced to their prejudice. He maintained that while an increase in the cost‑of‑living index or other relevant factors might justify a revision of the wage structure in favour of the workmen, a corresponding revision should also be permissible in favour of the employer when the employer’s financial position had seriously deteriorated or when other pertinent factors indicated the need for such a change. During his submissions, Mr. Sen emphasized that his principal aim in the present appeal was to contest the validity of the Tribunal’s underlying assumption, rather than to question the propriety or correctness of the specific modifications that the Tribunal had incorporated into its award. The issue raised by Mr. Sen was, in his view, of general importance and therefore required full consideration. Before addressing that issue, the Court found it necessary to refer to the findings of both the original and appellate tribunals concerning the appellant’s financial condition. The aluminium unit at the centre of the dispute had originally been established by an American concern and was taken over by the appellant on 9 August 1951. The appellant’s principal activity consisted of manufacturing household utensils from aluminium circles. Until the outbreak of the war, these circles were imported, but wartime conditions made importation increasingly difficult, prompting the appellant to establish a rolling‑mills department that produced circles from scrap material. Utensils made from these scrap‑derived circles were of inferior quality; nevertheless, the difficulty of importing finished articles created a market for even the inferior products. When higher‑quality imported circles later became available, demand for the inferior utensils fell rapidly, and the business began to incur losses. Consequently, the management was forced to close the rolling‑mills operation permanently in February 1952, and the workmen employed in that department were ultimately discharged on 15 July 1952. The appellant submitted to the tribunals the relevant figures extracted from its statements of accounts covering the period from 1947 to September 1952. Both tribunals examined these financial statements and concluded that the appellant’s overall economic position was far from robust. They observed a marked decline in the sale of utensils during those years and noted that unsold utensils would lose their luster and glaze, becoming stained if stored in the godown for any length of time, which would entail additional expenditure and further losses. Both tribunals concurred that, in 1952 as in several preceding years, the cost of manufacturing exceeded the sale price, an outcome that unequivocally indicated a precarious financial situation for the industrial concern.

The Court observed that such a situation would be a disturbing feature for any industrial enterprise. The original tribunal concluded that there was no reasonable prospect of improvement in the appellant’s financial condition, while the Appellate Tribunal was inclined to hold that, because of the substantial retrenchment undertaken by the appellant, the financial position of the relevant unit of the aluminium industry appeared to have improved. Against this background, the appellant’s counsel argued that the wage structure fashioned by the Appellate Tribunal would impose hardship on the appellant. The counsel further complained that, in redesigning the wage structure, the Appellate Tribunal had been heavily influenced by the assumption that a wage structure could never be altered to the detriment of workmen.

In addressing this issue, the Court stressed the importance of remembering the principal objectives that industrial adjudication in a modern democratic welfare state seeks to achieve when fixing wage structures. The Court quoted Sir Frank Tillyard, noting that “English Common Law still regards the wage bargain as a contract between an individual employer and an individual worker, and that the general policy of the law has been and is to leave to the two contracting parties a general liberty of bargaining, so long as there are no terms against public policy” (1). The Court further observed that, in India as well as in England and other democratic welfare states, extensive progress has been made in modifying this common‑law view through labour‑welfare legislation such as the Minimum Wages Act and the Industrial Disputes Act.

The Court explained that with the emergence of the welfare‑state concept, collective bargaining between trade unions and capital has become recognised and has received statutory support; the State no longer remains a passive onlooker in industrial disputes. The old doctrine of absolute contractual freedom and laissez‑faire has given way to newer principles of social welfare and the common good. Labour, the Court noted, regards the constitution of wage structures as providing “a bulwark against the dangers of a depression, safeguard against unfair methods of competition between employers and a guarantee of wages necessary for the minimum requirements of employees” (2). There can be no doubt, the Court stated, that in fixing wage structures across various industries, industrial adjudication, though gradual and incremental, strives to achieve the principal aim of a welfare state – namely, to secure “to all citizens justice, social and economic”. The Indian Constitution, according to the Court, accords a place of pride to this ideal and forms the foundation of the new guiding principles of social welfare and the common good mentioned earlier.

Finally, the Court acknowledged that while social and economic justice represents the ultimate aim of industrial adjudication, the immediate purpose in an industrial dispute concerning wage structure is to resolve the dispute by establishing a wage structure that does justice to the interests of both labour and capital.

In the Court’s view, a wage structure that promotes harmony between capital and labour would encourage genuine and wholehearted cooperation in the work of production. Such cooperation, the Court observed, would naturally increase output and thereby assist the national economy and overall progress. In achieving this aim, the Court referred to two authorities: (1) “The Worker and the State” by Sir Frank Tillyard, third edition, page 37; and (2) “Wage‑Hour Law” Coverage by Herman A. Wecht, page 2. The Court noted that the immediate objective of industrial adjudication is to take into account a number of guiding principles, for example the principle of comparable wages, the productivity of the trade or industry, the cost of living, and the ability of the industry to pay. By applying these principles and other relevant considerations, tribunals arrive at different categories of wage structures. The categories are sometimes described as a living wage, a fair wage and a minimum wage. The Court explained that these terms, together with their variants such as comfort or decency level, subsistence level, and poverty or floor level, do not have identical meanings in every country or even across different industries within the same country. It is therefore very difficult to define precisely or to describe accurately the content of each concept. In a growing national economy, the meaning of these expressions is liable to expand and to vary over time. For instance, what may constitute a fair wage in a particular industry in one country might be regarded as a living wage for the same industry in another country. Likewise, a wage that is fair today in a given industry may later become insufficient and approach the minimum‑wage level. Consequently, industrial adjudication must apply the relevant principles of wage structure with care and must decide every industrial dispute in a manner that does justice to both labour and capital.

The Court further explained that, when deciding industrial disputes concerning wage structures, one of the principal objectives is to restore peace and goodwill within the industry on a fair and just basis, taking into account all relevant considerations. However, the Court emphasized that there is one principle that admits no exception: no industry may exist unless it can pay its workers at least a bare minimum wage. The Court acknowledged that in under‑developed countries, where unemployment is extensive, unorganised labour may be available at starvation wages, but such employment cannot be encouraged or favored in a modern democratic welfare state. If an employer is unable to maintain the enterprise without reducing wages below a bare subsistence or minimum level, the Court held that the employer has no right to continue the enterprise on such terms. In evaluating the arguments presented by counsel for Mr Sen, the Court stressed that this position must be kept in mind. The question posed by Mr Sen was whether a wage structure fixed in a given industry can never be revised to the prejudice of its workmen. The Court regarded this as a general question in the abstract, to be answered in the context of the principles it had outlined.

In this case the question was answered in favour of Mr Sen. The Court observed that it would be incorrect to state that under no circumstances could a wage structure be revised to the prejudice of workmen. The observation was qualified by noting that, even in theory, a wage structure that falls within the category of a bare‑subsistence or minimum wage should never be revised to the detriment of the employees. However, where the wage structure is above that minimum level, the employer is entitled to seek a revision that may prejudice the workmen, provided that the employer presents a case for such revision that is established on the merits and satisfies the tribunal. In dealing with a claim for revision, the tribunal must examine, as it did in the present matter, whether the employer’s financial difficulties could be adequately addressed by retrenchment of personnel that has already been effected by the employer and sanctioned by the tribunal. The tribunal must also inquire whether the employer’s financial problems are likely to be of short duration or are expected to persist for a considerably longer period. The Court recognised that it would be neither necessary nor feasible to enumerate exhaustively every factor that might be relevant in each case. It was sufficient to state that, after considering all material facts, if the tribunal is convinced that a genuine case for reducing the wage structure exists, the tribunal may accede to the employer’s request to reduce the wage structure, subject to any conditions of time or other safeguards that the tribunal deems appropriate or expedient.

The tribunal, however, must keep in mind several practical considerations. A substantial reduction in the wage structure is likely to generate discontent among the workmen and may create disharmony between the employer and his employees, a result that would never be beneficial to the industry as a whole. Conversely, when assessing the potential discontent that may arise from a wage reduction, industrial tribunals must also consider that an industry burdened with a wage structure beyond its financial capacity risks its very existence, which could ultimately lead to unemployment. Consequently, the Court emphasized that in every such case all relevant considerations must be carefully weighed and that the tribunal must strive to reach a conclusion that is reasonable on the merits and fair and just to both parties. The Court noted with interest that all the tribunals that had previously dealt with the present dispute had consistently directed that existing wages should not be reduced to the prejudice of the workmen. In other words, although each tribunal attempted to constitute a…

The tribunals that examined the dispute each constructed a wage structure after reviewing the material placed before them, and each time they inserted a saving clause to protect the interests of those workmen who were receiving higher wages before the revision. Nevertheless, the Court held that it would be incorrect to assert the existence of an inflexible and unchangeable rule whereby a wage structure fixed by an industrial tribunal could never be altered to the detriment of the workmen. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the objection raised by Mr Sen should be resolved in his favour, but only after considering the relevant considerations and limitations that have been outlined briefly. The Court further observed that Mr Sen was not correct in claiming that the final decision of the Appellate Tribunal rested solely or even chiefly on the alleged convention cited by the Tribunal. In addition to the convention, the Tribunal had also determined that a substantial retrenchment, which had been approved by both tribunals, would enhance the financial condition of the appellant. The Tribunal also noted that the downward trend in the cost‑of‑living index, which the appellant had partly relied upon, could not be taken into account in these proceedings because no specific issue concerning that index had been referred to the Tribunal. Moreover, the appellant had failed to produce sufficient material to show the extent of the decline in the index, nor had it demonstrated whether the decline was temporary or permanent. The Tribunal appeared to regard the wages paid by the appellant to its workmen as either the irreducible minimum or, at most, a modest amount above the minimum wage, thereby constituting a fair wage. If, as the Tribunal’s final conclusions indicate, the decision was based not only on the alleged convention but also on these additional circumstances, the Court found no basis for asserting that the Tribunal’s conclusion was legally vitiated or otherwise unsound. Generally, the Court is reluctant to entertain objections that some of the considerations relied upon by the Tribunal were invalid or unsupported by sufficient evidence on the record.

The Court also addressed a further issue raised by Mr Sen concerning the true nature of the concessional payments made by the appellant to its workmen, payments that the Appellate Tribunal had integrated into the wage structure. The Tribunal had held that these concessional payments were, in effect, payments made to the workmen as a matter of right, and Mr Sen challenged the correctness of that finding. In order to examine the character of these payments, the Court considered their origin. Before the enactment of the new Factories Act, the appellant’s workmen typically worked an average of fifty‑nine hours, consisting of the ordinary fifty‑four hours plus overtime. When the Factories Act came into force, the permissible working hours were reduced, and to compensate the workers for the loss of wages resulting from the reduced hours, the management added wages for two additional hours to the daily earnings of the workmen. These additional two‑hour wages later became known as the two‑hour concession or special bonus.

Management had added to the daily earnings of the workers the wages for two additional hours. The extra two‑hour wages consequently became known as a two‑hour concession or a special bonus. This bonus had been introduced in August 1946. Earlier, in April 1945, a facility bonus had been introduced at a rate of three rupees per day for workers whose basic wages were ten rupees per day or less, and at four rupees per day for workers whose basic wages exceeded ten rupees per day. It appears that this facility bonus was periodically revised upward, and that before June 1952 it was paid according to a graduated scale linked to basic‑wage slabs, varying from six rupees to twelve rupees per day. In addition, the appellant had introduced a food concession for workers who had been employed before 1951. Consequently, the wage structure of the appellant’s concern comprised dearness allowance, facility bonus and food concession. In order to determine the true nature of these payments, it was necessary to consider the appellant’s case as set out by its Labour Officer and Assistant to the Manager, Shri Jaisuklal Shah. According to Shri Shah, the facility bonus was an additional allowance meant to meet the high cost of living, and it was placed on the same footing as dearness allowance. He described the “two‑hour allowance” as a special bonus or extra bonus, stating that it was paid because the workers demanded it and because the company was able to pay it at that time. These statements gave considerable support to the workmen’s contention that the payments in question formed part of the appellant’s wage structure. Indeed, in the appellant’s own statement before the industrial tribunal in the present proceedings, paragraph 2 specifically asserted that prior to June 1952 the company’s pay structure consisted of five items: (1) basic wage, (2) dearness allowance, (3) special bonus or extra bonus, (4) facility bonus or special allowance, and (5) food concession. The position adopted by the appellant before Shri Palit was consistent with this pleading and with the evidence of Shri Shah in the present proceedings. Before Shri Palit, the appellant had argued that there was no occasion to grant any increment to its workmen because, under the various categories of allowances, the company had already substantially constituted its wage structure to the benefit of the workmen. It is also material to note that, because these additional payments were made by the appellant to its workmen, the workmen raised no dispute and did not join the arbitration before the Second Engineering Tribunal. This fact was likewise relevant to the determination of the true character of the payments. If the Labour Appellate Tribunal had taken all these facts into account and had held that the payments were not mere bounties but, in essence and substance, formed part of the basic wage and dearness allowance payable to the workmen, then the Tribunal’s conclusion was justified.

In confirming the Labour Appellate Tribunal's finding that the payments constitute part of basic wage and dearness allowance, the Court found no basis to disturb that finding. The Court noted that there was no dispute before it that, assuming the Tribunal's conclusion is correct, the Tribunal correctly revised the wage structure originally set by the first tribunal and placed the contested payments into the proper heads. The Court then proceeded to consider an additional argument that had been raised by the counsel representing the appellant in this matter. The counsel contended that the Tribunal's award would create two separate wage scales, one applying to workers already employed by the company and another applying to new hires. The Court observed that because it had already held that the Tribunal's modifications benefiting the existing workers could not be successfully challenged, it was unnecessary to examine the propriety of the wage scale established for future entrants. Accordingly, the Court concluded that both of the counsel's submissions were essentially rejected and that no further relief could be granted on their basis. The appeal was therefore dismissed with costs awarded against the appellant, and the formal order of dismissal was accordingly entered into the record.