Martin Burn Ltd vs R.N Banerjee

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 92 of 1957

Decision Date: 20 September 1957

Coram: Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, S.K. Das, P.B. Gajendragadkar

In the matter of Martin Burn Ltd. versus R.N. Banerjee, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 20 September 1957. The decision was recorded by Justice Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, who was joined by Justices S.K. Das and P.B. Gajendragadkar. The case is cited in the 1958 Indian Annual Reports as AIR 79 and in the Supreme Court Reports as SCR 514. The dispute concerned an industrial matter involving the discharge of an employee and the procedural steps required before the Labour Appellate Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. The relevant statutory provisions were sections 9(1) and 9(10) of that Act, as well as section 22, together with the Code of Civil Procedure, Act V of 1908, Order 41, Rule 21, which governs the power to set aside an ex‑parte order and to restore an application to the tribunal’s file.

The respondent, R.N. Banerjee, had been employed by the petitioner, Martin Burn Ltd. Over time his performance and conduct were judged to be unsatisfactory. Despite multiple warnings—both oral and written—there was no improvement in his behaviour. Consequently, the company conducted a thorough inquiry into his service record and submitted a report concluding that he was unfit to remain in employment. Although a formal enquiry was not held, the company served a charge‑sheet on the respondent and gave him an opportunity to respond to the allegations. The company then offered him a choice: either accept termination of his services with full retrenchment compensation, or, if he refused, allow the company to apply for permission to terminate his employment.

The company proceeded to file an application before the Labour Appellate Tribunal under section 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, seeking permission to discharge the respondent. The hearing of this application was conducted ex‑parte because the respondent did not appear. By an order dated 14 October 1955, the Tribunal granted the application and allowed the termination. The respondent subsequently filed an application for review of that order, invoking Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure to set aside the ex‑parte order, Order 9, Rule 13 to nullify it, and Order 41, Rule 21 to restore the original application to the Tribunal’s file. The Tribunal accepted that there was sufficient cause for the respondent’s non‑appearance and consequently set aside the ex‑parte order and restored the application.

At a further hearing, both parties presented evidence. After considering the evidence, the Tribunal concluded that the employer had not made out a prima facie case for permission to discharge the employee and therefore rejected the application. On appeal before the Supreme Court, the petitioner advanced two principal arguments: first, that the Labour Appellate Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to review its own order; and second, that the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction under section 22 of the Act by examining the evidence in great detail and determining that the employer had failed to establish a prima facie case for dismissal.

The Supreme Court held that, pursuant to section 9, sub‑sections (1) and (10) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, the Tribunal possessed the authority to set aside its own ex‑parte order and to restore the application to the file for further consideration. This holding addressed the first contention raised by the petitioner and affirmed the Tribunal’s power to review its decisions in accordance with the procedural provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The Court observed that it was necessary to set aside the 515 ex parte order dated October 14, 1955, and to restore the appellant’s application to the file. It further explained that, under section 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, the Labour Appellate Tribunal’s jurisdiction when deciding whether an employer has made out a prima facie case is limited to examining whether the employer is acting in bad faith, engaging in any unfair labour practice, or resorting to victimisation, and whether the evidence placed before it permits a conclusion on those points. The Tribunal may reach a different view on the facts, but it does not have authority to replace the judgment under review with its own. The Court relied upon the authorities of Atherton West & Co. Ltd. v. Suti Mill Mazdoor Union and Others (1953) S.C.R. 780, The Automobile Products of India Ltd. v. Rukmaji Bala & others (1955) S.C.R. 1241 and Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Limited v. Pt. Ram Sarup (1956) S.C.R. 916. In the present case, the Court held that while the appellant was justified in seeking permission to discharge the respondent because of the respondent’s demonstrably unsatisfactory work and conduct, the standard of proof applied by the Tribunal to determine whether a prima facie case existed was not strictly proper. This deficiency arose because no formal inquiry into the charges against the respondent had been conducted, and the evidence presented by the appellant did not show that the respondent had been given an opportunity to rebut the allegations. Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the Tribunal’s decision.

The judgment pertains to Civil Appeal No. 92 of 1957, filed by special leave against the judgment and order dated May 11, 1956, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Calcutta, in Miscellaneous Case No. C‑152 of 1955. Counsel for the appellants were B. Sen, S. N. Mukherjee and B. N. Ghosh, while counsel for the respondent were D. L. Sen Gupta together with Dipak Dutta Choudhri. The appeal was decided on September 20, 1957, and the judgment was delivered by Justice Bhagwati. This appeal arose from an application made by the appellant under section 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, seeking permission to dismiss the respondent. The respondent had been appointed as a pay‑clerk in the appellant’s cash department on April 30, 1945, and his appointment was confirmed effective August 1, 1945. From the beginning of 1949, the respondent was observed to be negligent and careless in his duties, disobedient and slow in performing tasks assigned to him. Despite repeated verbal and written warnings, his conduct did not improve. Consequently, the Chief Cashier wrote to the appellant’s manager on October 24, 1949, stating that the respondent was very negligent, careless, habitually sulky, disobedient, and shirked his duties.

The management recorded that the employee displayed sulkiness, disobedience, and avoidance of duties assigned to him. It further noted that he had recently been careless enough to leave the company’s cash in an open drawer of a safe and to depart for home without locking the drawer. In response, the management asked the employee to provide a written explanation. He submitted his explanation on 28 October 1949, attributing any fault on his part to ill health, excessive workload, and mental anxiety. He requested to be excused from blame and assured that he would take considerably more care in the future with regard to his work.

On 17 November 1949, the Chief Cashier lodged another complaint, stating that the employee had shown no improvement and was grossly negligent despite repeated warnings. The Chief Cashier further observed that the employee habitually absented himself on flimsy grounds, consistently tried to avoid assigned duties, and displayed insubordination in his behaviour and conduct. Consequently, a charge‑sheet was served on the employee on 18 November 1949, and he was suspended pending the final disposal of the enquiry. The following day, 19 November 1949, the employee wrote to the Managing Director, pleading not guilty to the charges and requesting an interview to present his grievances personally. The request was granted, and the employee was interviewed by the Manager, who investigated the matter and found the employee guilty of the framed charges. During the interview, the employee admitted that he had been rude to his superior officer in a fit of temper, expressed repentance, and offered an apology to the Chief Cashier. On 29 November 1949 the employee submitted another letter seeking to be excused. In the Manager’s report dated the same day, it was recommended that the employee be given one more opportunity to demonstrate good behaviour, but that, in view of the employee’s own request, he be transferred to the Mechanical Engineering Department. The Manager concluded the report by warning that any further adverse report regarding the employee’s work or conduct would result in immediate termination of his services. Accordingly, on the same day the appellant sent a letter to the employee confirming the decision to give him another chance, expressly conditioning continued employment on the absence of any further adverse reports. The employee was directed to report to Mr Hooper of the Mechanical Engineering Department, with effect from the following day. Despite these opportunities, the employee failed to improve and was again found to be seriously neglecting his duties.

In the course of the proceedings the Court recorded that the respondent continued to neglect his duties and that complaints were received from the typists that his chatter interfered with their work. Mr Hooper, who was supervising the respondent in the Mechanical Engineering Department, issued several verbal warnings which failed to produce any change in the respondent’s behaviour. Consequently, on 9 February 1951 Mr Hooper gave the respondent a written warning that set out the foregoing facts, demanded that the respondent show an immediate improvement in his conduct, and warned that further action would be taken if the improvement did not occur. The respondent answered this warning by a letter dated 16 February 1951 in which he denied the allegations contained in Mr Hooper’s letter. He pleaded that he was not negligent in his duty because he had to clear a backlog of work relating to parcel challans when he took over the position and because he was also required to perform the work of other clerks who were absent on leave. He admitted that he sometimes talked with his co‑workers but asserted that such talk was not of a nature that would cause his co‑workers to lodge complaints. He asked to be excused for any faults that might have been committed and gave an assurance that he would try his utmost to improve further. Despite these assurances the respondent’s performance did not improve and further complaints were lodged that his work was not being done properly, that he was noisy and disturbed other clerks, and that on two occasions he was found by his superior, Mr Girling, with his head resting on his arms, apparently sleeping. On 3 September 1952 Mr Girling, acting on behalf of the appellant, gave the respondent another warning. The respondent replied on 8 September 1952 denying all the allegations except that he had been found with his head on his arms; he explained that he was ill and that, on the advice of Mr Girling, he had consulted the office doctor who had recommended rest. He promised to endeavour to give complete satisfaction in the discharge of his duties. Nevertheless the respondent showed no improvement and continued to neglect his duties and to act insubordinately. Consequently, on 9 February 1953 the management wrote to him stating that the only recourse left was to dispense with his services, but as a measure of leniency it offered him another chance to show satisfactory improvement and, at the same time, decided to stop his annual increment. The respondent protested the stoppage of his increment by a letter dated 17 February 1953, contending that the charges against him were wholly unfounded and requesting the management to reconsider his case. The Labour Directorate of the Government of West Bengal was approached on his behalf, but the Directorate declined to intervene. The management then instructed Mr Hooper to report on the respondent’s work and conduct by 31 May 1953 and intimated to the respondent that unless a definite improvement was reported by that date his services would be terminated effective 30 June 1953.

In order to assess the respondent’s performance, the Management directed Mr. Hooper to submit a report on the respondent’s work and conduct by 31 May 1953. The Management also informed the respondent that if the report did not indicate definite improvement by that date, his employment would be terminated effective 30 June 1953. After observing the respondent’s duties, Mr. Hooper concluded that the work and conduct remained unsatisfactory and, on 19 August 1953, he prepared a memorandum notifying the Management of his findings. No immediate disciplinary action followed this memorandum. Later, on 4 May 1954, Mr. Hooper prepared a final report for the Management. Relying on that report, the appellant sent a letter to the respondent on 10 May 1954 stating that, after receiving Mr. Hooper’s complaint, a thorough enquiry into the respondent’s service record had been conducted. The enquiry determined that the respondent was unsuitable for continued employment, and therefore the appellant decided to terminate his service with full retrenchment compensation. The appellant offered the respondent two alternatives: either accept immediate termination with the payment of the retrenchment compensation, or, if he refused, apply to the Fifth Industrial Tribunal for permission to terminate his service.

The respondent did not reply to the appellant’s proposal, and consequently, on 21 June 1954, the appellant informed him that, as per its earlier letter dated 28 May 1954, it would approach the Tribunal for the required permission. Accordingly, on 21 September 1954 the appellant filed an application before the Fifth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, invoking section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, seeking authorization to dismiss the respondent. Before the Tribunal could consider the application, it became functus officio after thirty days elapsed from the publication of its award in the pending dispute, and the application was consequently struck off the docket. Because an appeal (No. Cal‑152) was already pending before the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Calcutta, involving both parties, the appellant subsequently filed a fresh application under section 22 of the Act before that Tribunal, requesting permission to terminate the respondent’s employment. The Labour Appellate Tribunal, consisting of President Shri M.N. Gan and Member Shri P.R. Mukherji, heard the appellant’s case ex parte and, on 14 October 1955, ordered that the application be allowed, granting permission to dismiss the respondent on the basis that a prima facie case existed. Following this order, the appellant sent a letter to the respondent on 11 November 1955 confirming that the necessary permission had been obtained and that the Management’s decision dated 28 May 1954 to terminate his services would be implemented in accordance with the terms communicated in that letter.

In this case the appellant’s decision of 28 May 1954 to terminate the respondent’s services was put into effect by a letter dated 11 November 1955, which communicated the terms of termination to the respondent. On 6 December 1955 the respondent filed an affidavit before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, Calcutta, seeking a review of the Tribunal’s order dated 14 October 1955, requesting that the order be set aside and that the application filed under section 22 of the Industrial Disputes Act be restored. The Tribunal, then presided over by Mr M N Gan and Mr V N Dikshitulu, heard the parties and on 6 March 1956 issued an order allowing the respondent’s application and restoring the appellant’s case to the Tribunal’s file. After a further hearing during which both sides presented evidence, the Tribunal, now presided over solely by Mr V N Dikshitulu, dismissed the application under section 22 on 11 May 1956 and refused the appellant permission to dismiss the respondent. Aggrieved by this decision, the appellant obtained special leave to appeal to this Court. Counsel for the appellant raised two questions: first, that the Tribunal lacked authority to review its own order of 14 October 1955; and second, that the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction under section 22 of the Act in finding that the appellant had failed to establish a prima facie case for dismissal.

The first contention argued that once the Tribunal had pronounced its order on 14 October 1955 it became functus‑officio and therefore possessed no power to revisit that order. It was further submitted that the respondent’s application of 6 December 1955 did not fall within Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and consequently no review could be entertained. However, the Court observed that the respondent’s application was an omnibus pleading, claiming relief under several procedural provisions: Order 47, Rule 1 for a review; Order 41, Rule 21 for restoration; and Order 9, Rule 13 for setting aside the ex‑parte permission and reinstating the respondent to his original position. The respondent evidently relied on whichever of these provisions might support the relief sought. Whether any of these provisions could be invoked depends on the powers vested in the Labour Appellate Tribunal when it adjudicates matters before it. The Tribunal, being a creature of the statute, must exercise only those powers expressly conferred by the Industrial Disputes Act.

The Court observed that the Labour Appellate Tribunal was a creature of the statute and that all of its powers had to be found within the four corners of that statute. The Constitution and functions of the Tribunal were set out in Chapter eleven of the Act, with sections four to six laying down its constitution and functions and section seven prescribing its jurisdiction to hear appeals from awards or decisions of the Industrial Tribunals. Section nine then dealt with the powers and procedure of the Tribunal. The Court extracted the relevant portion of section nine, which provided that the Tribunal “shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court, when hearing an appeal, under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908)” and that “the Tribunal shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed, and, subject thereto, it may, by order, regulate its practice and procedure and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 … shall, so far as they are not inconsistent with this Act, or the rules or orders made thereunder, apply to all proceedings before the Tribunal.” The Court noted that the Tribunal not only exercised appellate jurisdiction by hearing appeals from Industrial Tribunals but also exercised original jurisdiction under section twenty‑two of the Act when an application was made to obtain written permission to alter conditions of service, to discharge, or to punish a workman, even where such matters were pending before it. If an employer contravened the provisions of section twenty‑two during the pendency of proceedings, the Tribunal could entertain written complaints from aggrieved employees and would decide those complaints as if they were appeals, thereby exercising original jurisdiction that the statute expressly treated as analogous to appellate jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that whether the Tribunal acted in an original or appellate capacity, its authority derived solely from the Act, and that section nine referred to the exercise of the whole of that jurisdiction. No distinction was drawn in section nine between original and appellate jurisdiction, and the provisions applied equally to jurisdiction exercised under sections seven, twenty‑two, or twenty‑three.

In this case, the Court examined Section 9(1) of the Act, which confers on the Labour Appellate Tribunal the same powers as those vested in a civil court when hearing an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. A question was raised before the Court whether the phrase “when hearing an appeal” should be read together with the words “Appellate Tribunal” or with the words “a civil court.” It was submitted that the phrase modifies “Appellate Tribunal,” so that the Tribunal would enjoy the civil‑court powers only while exercising its appellate jurisdiction—specifically, when hearing matters falling under sections 7 or 23 of the Act—and not when it acted under its original jurisdiction, that is, when hearing applications under section 22. The Court found this construction untenable because it ignored the statutory scheme whereby the Labour Appellate Tribunal is authorised to exercise both original and appellate jurisdiction. If the phrase were limited in the manner suggested, the statute would provide no power for the Tribunal when it was operating under its original jurisdiction, which is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision.

The Court therefore held that the powers referred to in Section 9(1) are not confined to appellate functions but extend to the entire jurisdiction exercisable by the Tribunal under the Act. Moreover, the phrase “when hearing an appeal” appears between “a civil court” and “under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,” indicating that it qualifies the reference to a civil court rather than the Tribunal. Consequently, whatever the nature of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction—original or appellate—it is endowed with the same powers as a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure when it is hearing an appeal. The Court emphasized that the mere adjacency of the words “when hearing an appeal” to “a civil court” is sufficient to confer upon the Tribunal, during the exercise of any of its jurisdiction, the powers that a civil court would possess when hearing an appeal. This interpretation aligns with earlier authority in the Burmah‑Shell Oil Storage case and the New Union Mills Ltd. case. Accordingly, the Court concluded that Section 41 Rule 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure becomes applicable, which provides that where an appeal is heard ex parte and judgment is pronounced.

The Court explained that a party against whom an appeal is made may file an application with the appellate court seeking a rehearing of the appeal. If that party can demonstrate to the court that the notice of appeal was not properly served, or that the party was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the appeal was scheduled for hearing, the court is obligated to rehear the appeal. In such a rehearing the court may impose costs or other terms it deems appropriate. In the present case the Labour Appellate Tribunal had heard an ex parte application under section 22 of the Act on 14 October 1955. The summons for that hearing had not been delivered to the respondent because it was addressed to the wrong location. Consequently the respondent had a valid reason for not appearing when the application was called for hearing. The Tribunal therefore recognized that the respondent was entitled to a rehearing of the application and to the setting aside of the ex parte order that had been made against him. Accordingly, the Tribunal’s order dated 6 March 1956, which restored the appellant’s application to the proper file, was considered correct and justified.

The Court further noted that section 9, sub‑section 10 of the Act requires the Labour Appellate Tribunal to follow any prescribed procedure, and, subject to that requirement, the Tribunal may by order regulate its own practice and procedure. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, continue to apply to all proceedings before the Tribunal insofar as they are not inconsistent with the Act or with Tribunal rules. Pursuant to the powers granted by the aforementioned sub‑section, the Tribunal has issued orders governing its practice, and Order 3, Rule 4 expressly states that nothing in the rules limits or otherwise affects the Tribunal’s inherent power to make orders necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the court process. This rule mirrors the inherent powers clause found in section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Even aside from the applicability of Order 41, Rule 21 of the Code, the Tribunal was therefore empowered to pass the order of 6 March 1956, as it was required for the ends of justice and to prevent misuse of the process. The Court concluded that the Tribunal possessed jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte order of 14 October 1955 and to restore the appellant’s application under section 22 of the Act to the file. Accordingly, the appellant’s contention was deemed without merit and was rejected. The Court then moved to consider the next contention raised by the appellant.

Although the Labour Appellate Tribunal possessed authority to consider an application filed under section twenty‑two of the Act, it misunderstood the limits of that authority. In exercising what it believed to be its power, the Tribunal initiated an inquiry that lay outside its competence and consequently reached an erroneous conclusion. That conclusion held that the appellant had failed to establish a prima facie case for the termination of the respondent’s service. The scope and nature of the enquiry prescribed by section twenty‑two have been examined in several decisions of this Court, including Atherton West & Co. Ltd. v. Suti Mill Mazdoor Union and others, Automobile Products of India Ltd. v. Rukmaji Bala and others, and Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Limited v. Pt. Ram Sarup. In the last of those cases, this Court succinctly set out the principles governing such an enquiry and observed at page nine hundred thirty‑five that the Tribunal was not required to adjudicate any industrial dispute between employer and workman. The Court further explained that the Tribunal’s only function was to decide whether a ban placed on the employer, restricting alteration of employment conditions to the prejudice of the workman, should be lifted during the pendency of the proceedings. The Court added that the employer must establish a prima facie case for lifting the ban and that the Tribunal possessed authority merely to grant or deny permission, provided the employer was not acting with malice or engaging in unfair practice or victimisation.

Accordingly, the present case required examination of whether the appellant had indeed made out a prima facie case for terminating the respondent’s service and whether the notice issued on November eleven, nineteen fifty‑five was driven by any unfair labour practice or victimisation. The factual record, as set out earlier in this judgment, demonstrated that the respondent had been grossly negligent in performing his duties. The record further showed that the respondent habitually absented himself on flimsy grounds and displayed insolent behaviour and conduct towards his superiors. Despite repeated oral and written warnings issued by the appellant’s management, the respondent failed to show any improvement in his performance or conduct. Incidents occurring in nineteen forty‑nine, nineteen fifty‑one and nineteen fifty‑two, which culminated in the suspension of his annual increment in February nineteen fifty‑three, clearly illustrated that the management had dealt with the respondent very leniently despite his unsatisfactory work and conduct. The Court noted that the appellant would have been well within its legal rights to take disciplinary action against the respondent on each of those occasions, had it chosen to do so. However, the management repeatedly extended opportunities for improvement out of compassion, ultimately leading to the present dispute over termination.

In this matter, the Court observed that the management of the appellant had repeatedly shown leniency toward the respondent despite repeated instances of unsatisfactory performance and misconduct. After each incident, the management extended further opportunities to the respondent in the hope that his work and behaviour would improve. Nevertheless, the respondent persisted in the same conduct. Two reports prepared by Mr Hooper—one dated 19 August 1953 and the other dated 4 May 1954—were examined by the management, which concluded that the respondent was no longer suitable for continued employment. Rather than proceed directly to dismissal, the management presented the respondent with a choice between two alternatives. The first alternative offered immediate termination of his service provided he accepted the payment of full retrenchment compensation. The second alternative allowed him to refuse that offer and instead make an application before the Fifth Industrial Tribunal seeking permission to terminate his service. The entire sequence of correspondence, culminating in the respondent’s letter dated 17 February 1953, was deemed sufficient to demonstrate the unsatisfactory nature of his work and conduct. The appellant held the view that the respondent’s service records together with Mr Hooper’s reports supplied adequate material to justify the action eventually taken. Consequently, the appellant decided it was unnecessary to issue a formal charge‑sheet to the respondent or to hold a formal enquiry into the allegations concerning his work and conduct.

The Labour Appellate Tribunal considered the appellant’s decision not to provide a charge‑sheet or conduct a formal enquiry as a factor that entitled it to determine independently whether a prima facie case for termination existed. Although the appellant could have chosen to serve a charge‑sheet on the respondent and conduct a formal hearing, and, had it subsequently found the respondent guilty of the charges, the Tribunal would have been unable to intervene and would have granted the appellant the permission it sought, the appellant failed to take those steps. As a result, the respondent was denied an opportunity to respond to the charges against him. The Tribunal therefore rightly assumed the burden of assessing, on the basis of the material placed before it by the appellant, whether a prima facie case for termination of the respondent’s service was established. This approach was taken because the appellant’s omission of a formal enquiry and the denial of a hearing to the respondent left the Tribunal no alternative but to examine the evidence itself to determine if the termination was justified.

The Tribunal observed that the material presented by the parties before it, which consisted solely of affidavits and oral testimony, did not enable the Tribunal to find that the appellant had established a prima facie case for terminating the respondent’s service. The appellant, in paragraphs 8 and 9 of its application, claimed that after receiving Mr Hooper’s report dated 4 May 1954— a report that allegedly stated that work in the department would not improve unless the respondent was removed— the appellant further investigated the matter, examined the respondent’s old service records, and concluded that although the respondent had been given ample consideration, such consideration had produced no effect. The appellant therefore argued that, in the interest of discipline and efficiency, it was necessary to dismiss the respondent. The respondent refuted these allegations in his reply affidavit, stating that none of the warnings, letters, suspensions, or denial of increments issued by the appellant were based on any prior finding of guilt nor followed the usual procedural safeguards, such as issuing a charge‑sheet with specific allegations and conducting an enquiry based on that charge‑sheet together with the respondent’s explanations. The respondent further contended that the entire process was arbitrary, lacked any factual basis, violated the principles of natural justice, and amounted to an unfair labour practice or victimisation.

In response, the appellant filed a rejoinder affidavit through Shri Ramani Ranjan Dhar, a senior assistant of the appellant. In that affidavit, Dhar denied the respondent’s contentions and affirmed that the appellant’s application had sufficiently disclosed the offences for which it sought the Tribunal’s permission to dismiss the respondent. Dhar asserted that the appellant was fully satisfied, after conducting a complete enquiry and investigation, that the respondent had been given more than ample opportunity to explain the charges against him and had been offered several chances to improve his conduct. On that basis, the appellant concluded that the respondent was guilty of the charges. This affidavit evidence was followed by the oral testimony of Mr Hooper, who was called by the appellant. However, Mr Hooper’s evidence did not advance the appellant’s case. Although the appellant had the opportunity, while Mr Hooper was on the stand, to produce his reports dated 19 August 1953 and 4 May 1954 and have them authenticated, or at least to explain the contents of those reports if they were missing, the appellant failed to do so. Apart from a brief reference to the May 4 1954 report, the appellant did not disclose its contents, and Mr Hooper’s deposition contained no material that indicated the report’s contents were prejudicial to the respondent.

In the cross‑examination, the witness admitted that prior to making the report dated 4 May 1954 against the respondent, he had not prepared a chargesheet because that responsibility lay with the appellant. The Labour Appellate Tribunal was required to decide, on the basis of the material before it, whether the appellant had established a prima facie case for terminating the respondent’s service. The Tribunal recognised that a prima facie case does not demand proof to the utmost degree; rather, it is a case that could be accepted as established if the evidence presented in its support were believed. In assessing whether a prima facie case existed, the Tribunal was to consider whether the evidence on record made it possible to reach the disputed conclusion, not whether that conclusion was the sole one that could be drawn from the evidence. The Tribunal was therefore not called upon to substitute its own judgment for the judgment under review, but only to determine whether the view taken by the appellant was a possible interpretation of the evidence on record, as articulated in the precedent of Buckingham and Carnatic Co., Ltd. The Tribunal examined the evidence before it with meticulous care and concluded that the appellant had not made out a prima facie case for the respondent’s termination. It was observed that the standard of proof applied by the Tribunal was not strictly justified in view of the foregoing observations. Even if that standard alone might have allowed the Tribunal’s finding to be challenged, the actual evidence presented contained a substantial lacuna which rendered it impossible to conclude, even on a face‑value assessment, that a prima facie case existed. The testimony of Mr Hooper failed to disclose the contents of the 4 May 1954 report; his evidence consisted only of a cursory reference to the report without any substantive detail. This paucity of information was insufficient to establish the contents of the report, and it also deprived the respondent of any opportunity to contest the allegations made against him. Consequently, because these essential elements were missing, the evidence placed before the Labour Appellate Tribunal could not be said to support a prima facie case for terminating the respondent’s service, and the appellant could not rely on that contention. Additionally, counsel for the appellant, Mr Sen, attempted to draw a distinction between a simple discharge and a punitive dismissal under clause (b) of section 22 of the Act, arguing that no prima facie case need be established when an employee is sought to be discharged without punishment.

The Court explained that when an employer simply seeks to discharge a workman, the law does not require a charge‑sheet to be given to the employee nor an enquiry conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Such procedural safeguards are required only in situations where the workman is to be punished by dismissal or another form of sanction. In the present matter the workman was being discharged without any reason being assigned, and therefore the discharge did not fall within the category of punishment. The Court therefore did not need to elaborate on that legal principle. It was sufficient to note that Shri Raniani Ranjan Dhar, in an affidavit filed on behalf of the appellant, expressly stated that the respondent was sought to be “dismissed” because he had been found guilty of the various charges levelled against him. At the ex‑parte hearing before the Labour Appellate Tribunal on the application under section 22 of the Act, the appellant contended that it had established a prima facie case for obtaining permission to dismiss the respondent. The distinction that Mr Sen attempted to draw between a simple discharge and a dismissal was held to be irrelevant and required no further consideration by the Court.

Mr Sen also argued that after the Labour Appellate Tribunal, on the same ex‑parte hearing, granted the appellant permission to terminate the respondent’s service on 14 October 1955, the appellant had acted on that permission by issuing a notice dated 11 November 1955 that terminated the respondent’s employment and offered full retrenchment compensation. According to that argument, the termination was irrevocable, and the only further step the respondent could take was to raise an industrial dispute on the ground that his service had been wrongfully terminated. It was submitted that once the appellant had taken this irrevocable step, the Tribunal should not have revisited its decision, should not have returned the application under section 22 to its file, and that any subsequent decision by the Tribunal could not affect the actual termination of the respondent’s service. The Court declined to address these contentions because the sole issue for consideration on appeal was whether, based on the evidence before it, the Tribunal’s decision dated 11 May 1956 dismissing the appellant’s application under section 22 of the Act was correct. The Court noted that the appellant had never raised the contention that the Tribunal should not have reconsidered the matter when it finally heard the application under section 22, and therefore no such argument was before the Tribunal at that stage.

The issue that the Labour Appellate Tribunal was asked to consider concerned whether the appellant had established a prima facie case for the termination of the respondent’s service. Any rights or remedies that may arise from these circumstances can be pursued by either party in separate proceedings that might be instituted at a later date. The Court indicated that it was not presently concerned with adjudicating those potential claims, as they fall outside the scope of the present appeal. Considering the material before it, the Court was of the view that the decision rendered by the Labour Appellate Tribunal, which is the subject of this appeal, was correct. It is acknowledged that the Tribunal had found in favour of the appellant that the termination was not motivated by any unfair labour practice or by any intention to victimise the respondent. Nevertheless, that finding does not alter the Tribunal’s conclusion that the appellant failed to establish a prima facie case for lawfully terminating the respondent’s service. Accordingly, the Court holds that the Tribunal’s order refusing permission to the appellant under section twenty‑two of the Industrial Disputes Act was proper. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed and the appellant is ordered to bear the costs of these proceedings incurred by the respondent. The dismissal of the appeal is thus affirmed, leaving the Tribunal’s original decision in full force and effect.