Macherla Hanumantha Rao and Others vs The State of Andhra Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 57 of 1957; Criminal Misc. Petition No. 294 of 1957

Decision Date: 17 September 1957

Coram: Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, J.L. Kapur, A.K. Sarkar

In this case the petition was filed by Macherla Hanumantha Rao and other respondents against the State of Andhra Pradesh. The matter was decided on 17 September 1957 by a bench of the Supreme Court consisting of Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Justice J. L. Kapur and Justice A. K. Sarkar. The citation for the judgment is 1957 AIR 927 and 1958 S. C. R. 396. The legal issue concerned Sections 207 and 207A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which had been inserted by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1955 (Act 26 of 1955). The petitioners challenged the constitutionality of these sections on the ground that they violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees equality before the law. The relevant statutory framework involved the procedure for commitment of offences to the Court of Session when a trial was instituted on a police report, as governed by the amended Code. The headnote of the judgment summarized the controversy as whether the provisions of Sections 207 and 207A, by creating a distinction between cases initiated on a police report and other cases, introduced impermissible discrimination and thus were invalid.

The factual background showed that the appellants were committed for trial to the Court of Session by an in‑quiring magistrate in a proceeding that had been instituted on a police report. The magistrate followed the procedure prescribed in Section 207A, as required by Section 207 of the Code. The appellants subsequently approached the High Court, seeking to have the commitment order set aside on the basis that Section 207A created a discriminatory and unconstitutional classification of accused persons whose cases originated from police reports. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the provisions were not invalid. On appeal before this Court, the same contention was reaffirmed. The Court examined whether the distinction created by Section 207A, when compared with other provisions of Chapter XVIII of the Code, resulted in a less advantageous procedural position for the accused in police‑report cases. The Court held that although the two sections introduced a substantial difference in the commitment procedure for the two classes of cases, they did not affect the trial procedure itself. The appropriate test for constitutional validity, the Court explained, was whether the classification was reasonable and aligned with the legislative objective of securing a speedy trial with minimal delay. Observing that the legislature had deliberately fashioned two distinct commitment procedures—one for proceedings instituted on a police report and another for other proceedings—the Court concluded that this was a reasonable classification connected to the intended objective. Consequently, the Court affirmed that Sections 207 and 207A of the Code of Criminal Procedure were not discriminatory, did not contravene Article 14, and their constitutional validity was beyond question.

The Court noted that it had considered a number of earlier decisions which were relevant to the issues raised in this appeal. The authorities referenced included State of Bihar (1955) S.C.R. 1045, Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari (1955) 2 S.C.R. 925, Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India (1950) S.C.R. 869, The State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara (1951) S.C.R. 682, The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952) S.C.R. 284, Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra (1952) S.C.R. 435, Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja v. The State of Bombay (1952) S.C.R. 710, Qasim Razvi v. The State of Hyderabad (1953) S.C.R. 581, Habeeb Mohamad v. The State of Hyderabad (1953) S.C.R. 661 and The State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh (1953) S.C.R. 254. Following these precedents, the judgment was recorded under the heading “Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction”. The matter arose as Criminal Appeal No. 57 of 1957 together with Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 294 of 1957, both filed against the judgment and order dated 28 September 1956 of the former Andhra High Court at Guntur in Criminal Revision Case No. 241 of 1956. Counsel for the appellants comprised T. V. Sarma, K. Ramaseshayya Chaudhury and T. S. Venkataraman, while the respondent was represented by T. V. R. Tatachari and T. M. Sen. The Union of India intervened in the proceedings through the Solicitor‑General, C. K. Daphtary, assisted by T. M. Sen. The judgment dated 17 September 1957 was delivered by Justice Sinha, who identified the sole question for determination as the constitutionality of sections 207 and 207A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, inserted by Act XXVI of 1955, on a certificate granted under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution.

For the purpose of deciding the appeal, the Court summarized the material facts. On 22 December 1955, the local police took cognizance of a serious incident involving rioting and murder. The police conducted an investigation, collected whatever evidence could be gathered, and thereafter prepared a charge‑sheet invoking sections 147, 148, 323, 324 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code, read with sections 34 and 149. The charge‑sheet was submitted to the magistrate possessing jurisdiction to entertain the case. Acting in accordance with the procedure prescribed in section 207A of the Code, the magistrate committed the persons named in the charge‑sheet to stand trial before the Court of Session, Guntur Division. The accused filed several revision applications under sections 435 and 439 of the Code, seeking quashing of the commitment order on the principal ground that the order was issued under a provision that was unconstitutional because it created discrimination against accused persons against whom a police charge‑sheet had been filed. These revision applications were presented to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. The High Court dismissed the applications, holding that the contested provisions were not unconstitutional and that the commitment order was therefore valid. The appellants then obtained a certificate under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution, indicating that the case was fit for appeal to this Court, and the present arguments were framed on the basis that sections 207 and 207A, as they stood, prescribed distinct procedures for cases instituted on a police report and for other proceedings, raising the question of their constitutionality.

In the proceedings before the High Court, the order that had been made under section 207A of the Code was declared to be void on the ground that the provisions of that section were unconstitutional because they created discrimination against accused persons against whom a police charge‑sheet had been filed. The revisional applications were subsequently heard by Justice Krishna Rao, who dismissed those applications. Justice Krishna Rao held that the challenged provisions were not unconstitutional and, accordingly, that the order committing the accused to trial was valid under the law. The appellants then sought and obtained the requisite certificate under article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution, which confirmed that the matter was suitable for appeal before the Supreme Court.

The same arguments that had been presented to the High Court were reiterated before this Court. The appellants contended that sections 207 and 207A, as they presently stand, set out two distinct procedures for the committing court. The first procedure applies to a case that is instituted on a police report and is governed by the provisions of section 207A. The second procedure applies to any other proceeding and is governed by the other provisions of Chapter XVIII of the Code. By comparing the two procedures in detail, the appellants argued that the procedure applicable to cases instituted on a police report is less favorable to the accused than the procedure applicable to other cases. They further asserted that the sections that follow section 207A in Chapter XVIII grant certain facilities to the accused that are unavailable under the procedure prescribed in section 207A.

To illustrate their point, the appellants cited section 208(3), which permits an accused person to apply to the magistrate for a process to compel a witness to attend or to produce a document. They observed that sub‑section (2) of section 207A, which is meant to correspond to the provisions of section 208(3), mentions only the prosecution and not the accused. They also noted that sub‑section (4) of section 207A refers solely to prosecution evidence, whereas the corresponding provision, section 208(1), refers to evidence that may be produced either in support of the prosecution or on behalf of the accused. Moreover, the appellants highlighted the absence of any provisions in section 207A that correspond to sections 209(2) and 213(2), which empower the magistrate to discharge the accused, and the lack of any provision in the impugned section 207A that corresponds to section 215, which deals with the quashing of commitments. They further pointed out that while section 209(1) uses the phrase “not sufficient grounds for committing the accused person,” sub‑section (6) of section 207A uses the phrase “no grounds for committing the accused.” Finally, the appellants argued that the new procedure introduced by the impugned section 207A deprives the accused of the benefits conferred under sections 162 and 215 of the Code, as well as under sections 27, 101 to 

The Court observed that sections 106 and 114‑111(g) of the Evidence Act had been cited. The citation was used to argue that the procedure in section 207A concerning commitment was less favorable to accused persons than the procedure provided in the later provisions of Chapter XVIII. For the purpose of testing the constitutionality of the impugned provisions of the amended Code, the Court assumed that two different procedures existed within Chapter XVIII for commitment proceedings. The Court also noted that it was not conclusively established that the amendments of Act XXVI of 1955 always disadvantaged or prejudiced accused persons. The Court recalled that the amending Act of 1955 was widely recognized as having introduced changes to the old Code. Those changes were aimed at simplifying and speeding up the procedures dealing with the trial of offences and the inquiries that precede such trials. It was also emphasized that the Code has historically prescribed distinct procedures for the trial of offences. The choice of procedure depends on the seriousness of the charge or on the jurisdiction of the court before which the accused stands trial. In general, minor offences may be tried summarily, either by a magistrate specially empowered for that purpose or by an ordinary magistrate following the regular procedure. Less serious offences are triable by magistrates, whereas more serious offences are triable by a Court of Session or by a High Court. Such cases proceed after a preliminary inquiry and investigation conducted by a police officer or an inquiry by a magistrate, which is commonly described as commitment proceedings. In certain situations, an inquiry may be made by a Civil or Revenue Court in connection with specified offences committed during judicial proceedings or in matters affecting the administration of justice. The Code further classifies offences as triable by magistrates of any class or by magistrates of higher classes, and also divides cases into warrant cases and summons cases. With respect to police powers, offences are categorized as cognizable or non‑cognizable, reflecting the well‑established principle that criminal procedure employs classification of offences and of case categories. The Court acknowledged that, for the first time, the impugned sections prescribed two different procedures for commitment proceedings. However, the Court stressed that there is no distinction between the trial procedure and the procedure for the inquiry that leads to the commitment of an accused to a Court of Session or a High Court in cases that are exclusively triable by such courts. Finally, the Court pointed out that every case involving a serious offence falls within the category of a cognizable case, which permits a police officer to arrest the accused without a warrant.

The Court explained that, in a cognizable offence, a police officer was authorised to arrest a person named as an accused without a warrant and to investigate the matter without first obtaining an order from a magistrate. Consequently, as soon as information about the commission of a cognizable offence was presented to the officer in charge of a police station, the officer’s duty became to record the first information report. Even when no formal first information report existed, if the officer received information that gave rise to a suspicion that a cognizable offence had been committed, the officer was required to investigate the case and to take all necessary steps to apprehend and arrest the persons alleged to have participated in the crime.

The Court further noted that, in cases that were not initially cognizable, a police officer still had a duty to investigate if a competent magistrate ordered such investigation, the magistrate taking cognizance of the offence under section 190 of the Code. In every such investigation, the officer in charge of the police station—or a superior officer deputed to investigate—had to follow the procedure laid down in Chapter XIV of the Code. Under section 169, if the investigation concluded that there was insufficient evidence or no reasonable ground of suspicion to justify forwarding the accused to a magistrate, the officer had to release the accused if the person was in custody. Conversely, if the investigation revealed sufficient evidence or reasonable grounds of suspicion, the officer’s duty was to forward the accused to a competent magistrate for trial or to commit the accused for trial.

Section 173 required that the investigation be concluded without unnecessary delay and that a report containing the results of the investigation be submitted to a competent magistrate. After submitting the police report, the officer in charge of the police station was required, before the magistrate began the inquiry or trial, to provide the accused, free of cost, with a copy of the police report, a copy of the first information report, and copies of all other documents or relevant extracts that the prosecution intended to rely upon. This included any statements or confessions recorded under section 164 and the statements recorded under sub‑section 3 of section 161 of all persons whom the prosecution intended to examine as witnesses.

Upon receipt of the police report and the accompanying documents, the magistrate, under section 173, had to determine whether the case should be tried by himself, by another competent magistrate, or by a Court of Session or a High Court. If the magistrate found that the case was triable exclusively by a Court of Session or a High Court, he was required to follow the procedure introduced in section 207A.

In a matter that must be tried exclusively by a Court of Session or a High Court, the magistrate was required to follow the procedure introduced by section 207A. At the outset of the inquiry, when the accused appeared before the magistrate, the magistrate first had to verify that the documents specified in section 173 of the Code had been furnished to the accused; if the police officer had failed to do so, the magistrate was obliged to supply those documents himself. After ensuring that the accused possessed the relevant reports, the magistrate was then to record the testimony of any witnesses who were presented as eyewitnesses to the incident. In addition, the magistrate retained the power, in the interests of justice, to record any other prosecution evidence he considered necessary, although he was under no duty to record any evidence at all. Having considered all the documents referred to in section 173, examined the accused, and heard the parties, the magistrate could, without having recorded any evidence, discharge the accused if he found that there were no grounds for committing the accused to trial, provided that he recorded the reasons for such a discharge. Alternatively, the magistrate could decide to try the accused himself or to refer the case to another magistrate. If the magistrate concluded that the accused should be committed for trial, he was required to frame a charge that clearly disclosed the offence with which the accused was charged. The accused was then required to submit a list of persons he wished to summon as witnesses for his trial. Following these steps, the case was to be placed before the appropriate Court of Session or High Court for trial in accordance with the procedural provisions of the Code. However, where the investigating police officer, instead of filing the charge‑sheet mandated by section 173, submitted a “final report” stating that no evidence existed and that the case was not fit for trial before either a magistrate or a Court of Session or High Court, the proceedings did not terminate there. In such a situation, the original informant or any other person interested in prosecuting the accused could file a regular petition of complaint before a competent magistrate under section 190 of the Code. Upon taking cognizance under that section, the magistrate was empowered to commence his own inquiry, notwithstanding the police officer’s refusal to prosecute. In cases that are triable exclusively by a Court of Session or a High Court, the magistrate must then follow the procedure laid down in section 208 and the subsequent sections of Chapter XVIII. The magistrate is required to make a record of the evidence presented by the complainant and of any other witnesses produced in support of the prosecution, as well as any evidence adduced on behalf of the accused if the accused chooses to present it at that stage. Typically, an accused does not elect to present evidence at this early stage because of a fear of exposing his defence prematurely.

In the magistrate’s commitment proceeding, the magistrate first recorded the evidence presented by the prosecution and, where the accused chose to present any defence, the evidence offered on the accused’s behalf. After recording this material, the magistrate examined the accused to enable him to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. Following that examination, the magistrate could either discharge the accused, if he found that there were no sufficient grounds for committing the accused to trial, or direct that the accused be tried by himself or another magistrate. The magistrate could also make a discharge order at an earlier stage, provided he recorded the reasons for considering the charge groundless. Alternatively, the magistrate could commit the accused to trial after framing a charge that specified the offence with which the accused was charged. The accused also had the opportunity, if the magistrate permitted, to examine additional witnesses. After hearing those additional witnesses, the magistrate could, if he was satisfied that there were still no sufficient grounds for commitment, cancel the charge and discharge the accused. Consequently, when the magistrate conducted a commitment proceeding on a complaint, the accused enjoyed three distinct stages at which he could be discharged.

The appellants contended that the procedure under section 207A afforded the accused fewer advantages than the alternative procedure. The Court observed that the legislature, exercising its judgment, had based the law on the principle that the primary responsibility for preventing crime and bringing offenders to justice lay with the State, exercised through its police officers, especially in serious cases that involved personal injury to the complainant as well as public peace and order. Police officers were statutorily obligated to ensure that all persons alleged to have participated in such offences were brought before the courts without unnecessary delay. Chapter XIV of the Code prescribed the investigative steps that police must follow, and the Code therefore required that all matters affecting public peace and order be investigated by vigilant public servants. If, after following the procedure laid down in Chapter XIV, the police determined that prosecution was not feasible or necessary, a private party could appear before a magistrate as a complainant. In such circumstances, the magistrate had to be especially careful that private vengeance or considerations unrelated to the vindication of justice did not interfere with the administration of public justice. Accordingly, the provisions of section 208 and the subsequent sections were intended to provide greater safeguards to persons accused of an offence, thereby ensuring that the accused received adequate protection while the State pursued its policy of swift investigation and prosecution of criminal conduct.

In this matter the Court observed that the law distinguishes between two modes of committing an accused to trial, depending on whether a competent police officer has completed an investigation and filed a charge‑sheet with a report under section 173 of the Code, or whether a competent magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence on the basis of a complaint. When the latter route is taken, the procedure before the committing magistrate is considerably more elaborate than the summary procedure that follows a police‑investigated case. The Court questioned whether the more elaborate procedure is invariably to the advantage of the accused. It noted that the Legislature has expressed a clear policy that the administration of justice should be swift and that crimes ought to be investigated and perpetrators brought before the courts as quickly as the circumstances of each case permit. Such speedy administration also serves the interests of an accused who maintains his innocence, because a person falsely or wrongly accused would prefer to obtain a declaration of innocence at the earliest possible moment. Conversely, the Court pointed out that a genuine offender would be inclined to delay inquiry or trial in order to postpone judgment. Accordingly, the Court found no doubt that the Legislature was well advised in amending the commitment procedure for cases that have been investigated by a competent police officer, while retaining the older, more elaborate procedure for cases that have not undergone such police investigation or where, after investigation, the matter has been deemed unfit to proceed in public interest. Having recognized that the impugned provisions introduce substantial differences, the Court turned to the question of their constitutionality. It first observed that these provisions do not affect the trial process itself; once a case is committed to a Court of Session, the trial procedure is identical for both categories of cases. Therefore, precedents in which the Court held that prior legislation had introduced significant procedural changes at the trial stage to the disadvantage of the accused were not relevant to the present issue. The principal challenge to the provisions rests on Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court noted that Article 14 has been examined in a series of decisions, namely Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India (1), The State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara (2), The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (3), Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra (4), and Lachmandas (1) [1950] S.C.R. 869 (3). These authorities provide the backdrop against which the constitutionality of the present provisions must be assessed.

In the series of authorities cited, the reports include [1952] S.C.R. 284, (2) [1951] S.C.R. 682, (4) [1952] S.C.R. 435, Kewalram Ahuja v. The State of Bombay (1), Qasim Razvi v. The State of Hyderabad (2), Habeeb Mohamad v. The State of Hyderabad (3) and The State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh (4). All of these decisions were referred to in Budhan Choudhry v. The State of Bihar (5), which is the closest precedent to the matter presently before the Court. The distinction in that earlier case was that a difference arose at the trial stage itself. Specifically, the same accused, concerning the same offence, could be tried under section 30 of the Code before a magistrate who was empowered by that provision, and could also be tried before a Court of Session when the offence occurred in a jurisdiction to which section 30 did not apply. In Budhan Choudhry, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the statutory provision and rejected the contention that the provision violated the equality guarantee in article 14 of the Constitution. In delivering that judgment, Justice Das (who then sat as a Judge of this Court) made observations that are fully applicable to the present case. He stated that article 14 prohibits class legislation, but does not preclude reasonable classification for legislative purposes. For a classification to be permissible, two conditions must be satisfied: first, the classification must be based on an intelligible differentia that distinguishes the persons or things placed in one group from those left out; second, that differentia must have a rational relationship to the object sought to be achieved by the statute. The basis of classification may be geographical, occupational, or founded on any other relevant factor, provided there is a nexus between the basis and the legislative goal. It is also well settled by this Court’s decisions that article 14 condemns discrimination not only by substantive law but also by procedural law, as reflected in citations (1) [1952] S.C.R. 710, (2) [1953] S.C.R. 581, (3) [1953] S.C.R. 661, (4) [1953] S.C.R. 254 and (5) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1045, 1049. A later decision, Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari (1), addressed the question of discrimination in the context of the Code’s provisions, particularly section 197. In that case the petitioners argued that section 197 gave the Government an arbitrary power to grant or withhold sanction at its discretion, thereby contravening article 14. The Court rejected this contention, holding that a discretionary power is not automatically discriminatory. The principles articulated in the cited authorities are therefore applied to the present matter to determine whether any objectionable discrimination exists.

In this case, the Court observed that any doubt about the existence of objectionable discrimination was dispelled because the legislature had enacted a clear classification between the two categories of proceedings at the commitment stage. The classification was based on a highly pertinent factor, namely whether a responsible public servant had previously conducted an inquiry. Such a public servant has the duty to uncover crime and to bring offenders to swift justice. The Court noted that this basis of classification is directly linked to the fundamental principle of administration of justice, which requires that an accused person be tried as soon as possible after the alleged offence, subject to the circumstances of the case. The Court further held that the classification could not be described as unreasonable nor unrelated to the purpose of the legislation, which is to secure a faster trial of offences without unnecessary delay. Consequently, the Court concluded that no discrimination arose and that the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution were not violated. Accordingly, the challenged provisions of the Code were declared constitutional. The appeal was therefore dismissed, and the order of dismissal stands. Thus, the petitioners' challenge was rejected in its entirety. (1) 1955] 2 S.C.R. 925.