Lilavati Bai vs The State Of Bombay

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 5 March 1957

Coram: Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, S.K. Das, P.B. Gajendragadkar

In the two petitions presented under the title Lilavati Bai versus The State of Bombay, the petitioner challenged the constitutional validity of the Bombay Land Requisition Act of 1948, as amended by two subsequent amendment Acts of 1950, and also questioned the enforceability of a requisition order issued by the Governor of Bombay pursuant to section six, sub‑clause (4)(a), of that Act. The petitioner, who was the widow of a former tenant, asserted that she remained in possession of the premises, whereas the Government’s case was that the deceased tenant had vacated the property before his death and had handed over possession to a lodger. A copy of the requisition order had been affixed to the premises, and the petitioner filed an application before the High Court seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Government to relinquish its claim; that application was dismissed by the High Court.

The original Act had been passed by the State Legislature on 11 April 1948. The first amending Act extended the life of the legislation for an additional two years, and the second amendment replaced the words “any purpose” in section five with the phrase “the purpose of the State or any other public purpose.” Both amendments were given retrospective effect from the date of the Constitution of India. The same provision had previously been examined by this Court in an earlier decision, but the arguments advanced in the present petitions were confined to issues not addressed in that earlier case.

On behalf of the petitioner, it was contended that the Act conflicted with article 31 (2) of the Constitution and therefore became invalid at the moment the Constitution came into force. It was further argued that the two amendment Acts had been enacted without the required assent of the President, rendering them ineffective under article 31 (3). In addition, the petitioner submitted that sections five and six of the Act, by making the Government’s findings conclusive, impaired the jurisdiction of the Court, yet the Court retained the authority to determine whether the factual findings actually amounted to a legal vacancy. Finally, the petitioner claimed that the requisition order could not be effective because the tenant had died before the order was issued.

The Court recorded that the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner must be considered in the light of the statutory provisions, the constitutional provisions cited, and the precedents previously established, particularly with respect to the validity of the Act, the effect of the amendments, and the competence of the Government to make a requisition order after the tenant’s death.

The Court observed that the question of the constitutional validity of the Act could no longer be raised under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(2) of the Constitution, because of the authority of the earlier decision of this Court in State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji (1955) 1 S.C.R. 777. The Court explained that the Act did not plainly fall within the mischief contemplated in clause (6) of Article 31; consequently it was caught by the saving provision contained in clause 5(a) of the same article. That saving clause classed the Act as an “existing law” within the meaning of the Constitution, and therefore the Act was deemed valid at the moment the Constitution came into force, even though the Act lacked the phrase “for a public purpose” that Article 31(2) demands. The Court further held that clause (3) of Article 31, which applies only to statutes enacted after the Constitution’s commencement, did not extend to the amending Acts because those amendments did not touch the principal substantive provisions of the original Act. Moreover, the absence of the President’s assent to the amending Acts did not impair their legal force. Since the original Act was valid at the inception of the Constitution and remained so thereafter, and because it did not conflict with any provision of Part III of the Constitution that would invoke Article 13, the Court concluded that the amending Acts were likewise valid under law. The Court went on to state that, in a suitable case, either the High Court or this Court, exercising the special jurisdictions granted by the Constitution, could examine the extent to which the provisions of the Act had been complied with. However, the findings recorded by the State Government under section 5 of the Act—that the tenant had not actually occupied the premises continuously for six months immediately before the order—and under section 6—that the premises had become vacant at the time indicated in the order—were held to be conclusive. These findings were not merely collateral matters that could be reopened; consequently they could not be challenged before this Court under Article 32 or before the High Court under Article 226. The Court relied on Rai Brij Raj Krishna v. S. K. Shaw, (1951) S.C.R. 145, and distinguished Hubli Electricity Co. Ltd. v. Province of Bombay, (1948) L.R. 76 I.A. 57, which was held inapplicable. It also referred to Mohsinali Mohomed Ali v. The State of Bombay, (1951) 53 Bom. L.R. 94 :A.I.R. 1951 Bom. 303. Regarding the phrase “or otherwise” in explanation (a) to section 6 of the Act, the Court rejected a narrow ejusdem generis construction and interpreted the phrase to cover every possible situation of vacancy for any reason. The Court cited Skinner & Co. v. Shaw & Co., (1893) 1 Ch. D. 413, in support of that broader reading. Finally, the Court held that an order of requisition issued under section 6(4)(a) of the Act was not a judicial decree; therefore, the death of one of the parties to that order did not render it wholly ineffective, the only result being that the deceased party’s name would have to be removed from the list of parties to be served under section 13 of the Act. negated. 93 722

It was held that the name of the deceased tenant had to be struck from the list of parties to be served under section 13 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, because his continued inclusion would be inappropriate after his death. The judgment arose out of an original jurisdiction matter identified as Petition No. 119 of 1955, together with a petition for special leave to appeal catalogued as Petition No. 140 of 1955. Both petitions were filed under the Constitution, the first invoking article 32 for the enforcement of fundamental rights and the second invoking article 136 for special leave to appeal against the judgment and order dated 29 March 1955 of the Bombay High Court in appeal No. 63 of 1954. Counsel appearing for the petitioner were Hardayal Hardy and R. Jethmalani, while the respondent was represented by the Solicitor‑General of India, C. K. Daphtary, assisted by Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar. The judgment was delivered on 5 March 1957 by Justice Sinha. By the present petitions, the petitioner sought relief under article 32 of the Constitution and also asked for special leave to appeal from the Bombay High Court judgment dated 29 March 1955, which had affirmed an earlier judgment of a single High Court judge dated 21 April 1954. The substantive issue before the Court was the challenge to the constitutionality of the Bombay Land Requisition Act (Act XXXIII, 1948), hereinafter referred to as “the Act,” and the enforceability of an order dated 27 January 1954 made by the Governor of Bombay under subsection 6(4)(a) of the Act.

The petitioner was the widow of Dharamdas Chellaram, who had been a tenant of the premises that formed the subject of the requisition. Dharamdas Chellaram died in November 1953, leaving a surviving widow and a daughter. The petitioner asserted that she had been residing in the premises as a member of her husband’s family since 1938 and that her husband had never materially ceased to occupy the premises. She further contended that a man named Narottam Das Dharamsey Patel was merely a lodger who occupied a portion of the premises with the permission and licence of her husband, and that Patel possessed no proprietary interest in the property. According to the petitioner, Patel vacated his portion of the premises sometime in 1953. On the other side, the State of Bombay, as the respondent, presented an affidavit from the Accommodation Officer stating that the petitioner did not reside in the premises at the relevant time. The affidavit claimed that Dharamdas Chellaram had vacated the premises in October 1952 and had handed over possession to Narottam Das Dharamsey Patel. Consequently, the State argued that it was not a fact that the petitioner was residing in the premises at the time of her husband’s death in November 1953. These factual submissions had also been placed before the Bombay High Court through an affidavit filed in opposition to the petitioner’s case. The petitioner’s grievance was that towards the end of January 1954 she discovered, pasted on the outer door of the premises, an order dated 27 January 1954 purportedly issued by the Governor of Bombay, which she claimed formed the basis for her seeking a writ of mandamus from the High Court to restrain the State from giving effect to that order.

In this case the petitioner claimed that an order dated 27 January 1954, issued by the Governor of Bombay, was the reason she approached the High Court of Bombay for a writ of mandamus seeking to prevent the State of Bombay from giving effect to that order. The order, which bore the reference No RA (1) M‑13067 and originated from the Office of the Controller of Accommodation in the Jehangir Building on Mahatma Gandhi Road, stated that an inquiry had shown the premises described below became vacant in October 1952. Consequently, exercising the authority granted by clause (a) of sub‑section (4) of section 6 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 (Bombay Act XXXIII of 1948), the Government of Bombay declared the premises requisitioned for a public purpose, namely to provide housing for a Bombay State Government servant. The premises identified were Flat No 3 on the first floor of the building known as Hem Prabha, situated at 68 Marine Drive, Bombay, and the order was signed in the name of the Governor of Bombay. The order was intended to be served on three individuals: (1) Shri Hirabhai H. Patel, who was the landlord of the premises; (2) Shri Narottam Dharamsey Patel, the person previously mentioned; and (3) Shri Dharamdas Chellaram, who had died before the order was made. The petitioner challenged the validity of this requisition order. Her challenge was heard by Justice Tendolkar, who, by his judgment dated 21 April 1954, dismissed the petition. Unsatisfied, the petitioner then approached this Court, invoking article 32 of the Constitution, and sought a writ, direction, or order questioning both the constitutional validity of the Bombay Land Requisition Act and the legal effect of the requisition order. Simultaneously, she applied for special leave to appeal the High Court’s judgment. Both applications were heard together and are to be determined by this judgment. Before addressing the petitioner’s substantive contentions, the Court considered it appropriate to outline the legislative history and key features of the impugned law. The Bombay Land Requisition Act was enacted by the Provincial Legislature of Bombay on 11 April 1948, under powers conferred on the Governor‑General by section 104 of the Government of India Act, 1935. Initially the Act was to remain in force only until 31 March 1950. However, the Bombay Land Requisition (Amendment) Act, 1950 (Bombay Act No 11 of 1950), published on 28 March 1950, extended its existence to the end of March 1952 and introduced sections 8‑A, 8‑B and 9‑A, which made substantial alterations that do not bear on the present controversy. Later, the life of the Act was further prolonged to 31 December 1958. Subsequently, the Bombay Land Requisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1950 (Act XXXIX of 1950) amended the Act again, replacing the phrase “any purpose” in section 5 with “the purpose of the State or any other public purpose” to bring it into conformity with article 31 of the Constitution, and also amended sections 6 and 7. Section 6 of that amendment provided that all changes made by the amendment were deemed to have been in force from 26 January 1950, thereby giving the amendment retrospective effect. The Court therefore noted the amended provisions of sections 5, 6 and 13, though only the introductory language of those sections was reproduced, as they form the statutory backdrop for the petitioner's challenge. By the Bombay Land Requisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1950 (Act XXXIX of 1950), the Act was

The Act was subsequently amended to replace the expression “any purpose” in section 5 with the words “the purpose of the State or any other public purpose”. This substitution was evidently intended to bring the provision into conformity with the requirements of article 31 of the Constitution. The amendment also triggered related modifications in sections 6 and 7. Section 6 of the amending statute provided that “the amendments made by this Act shall be deemed to have been and always to have been made with effect from the 26th January 1950”, thereby giving the amendment retrospective operation. After these changes, the operative language of sections 5, 6 and 13 (with only the portions necessary for the present discussion reproduced) read as follows.

Section 5(1) declared that, if in the opinion of the State Government it is necessary or expedient, the State Government may, by written order, requisition any land for the purpose of the State or any other public purpose. However, the provision expressly excluded any building or part of a building in which the owner, landlord or tenant, as the case may be, has actually resided continuously for six months immediately preceding the date of the order. Sub‑section (2) required that, when a building or part thereof is to be requisitioned under sub‑section (1), the State Government must conduct such an enquiry as it deems appropriate and must include in the requisition order a declaration that the owner, landlord or tenant has not actually resided in the premises for a continuous period of six months immediately before the order. That declaration was to be conclusive evidence that the owner, landlord or tenant had not resided there.

Section 6(1) provided that if any premises situated in any area specified by the State Government through a notification in the Official Gazette are vacant on the date of such notification, and wherever such premises become vacant thereafter because the landlord, tenant or sub‑tenant ceases to occupy them, or because the premises are released from requisition, newly erected, reconstructed, or for any other reason, the landlord of those premises must give intimation of the vacancy in the prescribed form to an officer authorized by the State Government. Section 6(4) stated that, irrespective of whether such intimation under sub‑section (1) is given and notwithstanding anything contained in section 5, the State Government may, by written order, (a) requisition the premises for the purpose of the State or any other public purpose and may use or deal with the premises for any such purpose in any manner it considers expedient; provided that, where an order is to be made under clause (a) requisitioning premises for which no intimation has been given by the landlord, the State Government shall make such an enquiry as it deems necessary.

The provision authorized the competent authority to deem it appropriate to issue a declaration in the order that the premises were vacant or had become vacant on or after the date referred to in sub‑section (1). The Court held that such a declaration would constitute conclusive evidence that the premises were, or had become, vacant. For the purpose of this section, the Court explained that premises occupied by the landlord, the tenant or the sub‑tenant would be considered vacant when the occupying party ceased to be in occupation. Vacancy was deemed to occur when the landlord stopped occupying the premises or when the tenant or sub‑tenant ceased occupation because of termination of tenancy, eviction, assignment, transfer of interest or any other manner of relinquishment, irrespective of any earlier instrument or occupation by another person prior to that cessation. The Court then set out the procedural requirements for orders made under sections 5, 6, 7, 8‑A, 8‑B, sub‑section (7) of section 9 or section 12. It specified that if an order was of a general nature affecting a class of persons, it had to be published in the manner prescribed by the rules. If an order affected an individual, corporation or firm, it was to be served in the manner provided for service of a summons under Rule 2 of Order XXIX or Rule 3 of Order XXX of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. For an order affecting an individual person who was not a corporation or firm, the Court required personal delivery, delivery by post, or, where the person could not be found, leaving an authentic copy with an adult male member of the family or affixing the copy conspicuously at the last known residence, place of business or place of gainful employment.

The Court further held that when a question arose as to whether a person had been duly informed of an order made under the aforesaid sections, compliance with the service requirements of subsection (1) would be conclusive proof that the person had been so informed. Nevertheless, the Court clarified that failure to comply with those requirements would not bar proof of notice by other means, nor would it affect the validity of the order. Turning to the constitutional challenge, the Court observed at the outset that the principal grounds of attack against the constitutionality of the Act, which were based on the fundamental rights recognised in Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31(2) of the Constitution, had to be overruled. This conclusion was reached in view of the earlier decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji. In that precedent, the Court had upheld the validity of the Act, holding that the provisions of the Constitution cited by the challengers did not render the Act unconstitutional. Accordingly, the Court affirmed that the Act remained valid despite the constitutional arguments raised.

In the proceeding, counsel for the petitioner argued that the challenge to the constitutionality of the Act was based on reasons that had not been considered in the earlier decision cited by the Court. The Court indicated that it would now examine these new grounds on their own merits. The petitioner maintained that the Act had become ineffective on 26 January 1950 because it conflicted with Article 31(2) of the Constitution. According to this submission, the Act was essentially dead by the time Act 11 of 1950, which purported to extend the duration of the Act, was enacted. Consequently, the petitioner asserted that the voidness of the original Act rendered its extension by Act II of 1950 equally void, a view supported by the citation of the case reported in 1955 S.C.R. 777. The petitioner further contended that the amendments introduced by the amending Act II of 1950 and by Act XXXIX of 1950 required the President’s assent, and that, as acknowledged, no such assent had been obtained; therefore, the amendments should have no legal effect under Article 31(3) of the Constitution. This line of argument rested on the admitted failure to comply with the requirements of Article 31(3). The petitioner did not dispute that the Act, when originally passed on 11 April 1948, was a valid law. It was also submitted that the Act did not fall within the scope of clause (6) of Article 31. Accordingly, the Act fell within the saving clause, clause 5(a), as an existing law that was not a law to which clause (6) applied. The petitioner argued that the Act would remain valid even if the conditions of clause (2) of Article 31 were not fully satisfied, because the Act, prior to its amendment by Act XXXIX of 1950, did not contain the words “for a public purpose.” The Court’s earlier decision in The State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji had held that the Act was not invalid after the Constitution came into force merely because it did not expressly state that a requisition had to be for a public purpose, provided that the overall tenor and intention of the Act made clear that the requisition was indeed for a public purpose and for the benefit of the community at large. The amending Act therefore merely clarified what could already be inferred from the Act’s language, as the Court had previously observed. On the basis of this reasoning, the argument that the amending Acts II of 1950 and XXXIX of 1950 required presidential assent under clause (3) of Article 31 was found to have no merit. Act 11 of 1950, as far as the present controversy was concerned, merely extended the life of the original Act by two years, and Act XXXIX of 1950 simply made explicit certain provisions that were implicit in the original legislation. Both statutes did not fall within the category of laws contemplated by clause (3) of Article 31, because they were essentially extensions or explanations of the substantive Act, which qualified as an existing law within the meaning of the Constitution.

The Court observed that the statutes enacted in 1950 function merely as extensions or explanations of the substantive Act, which already existed as law within the meaning of the Constitution. Clause (3)(1) of Article 31, however, applies only to statutes created by a State legislature after the Constitution came into force, while the substantive Act had been passed in April 1948. Consequently, there was no difficulty in holding that the Act, which was valid law prior to the commencement of the Constitution, did not become void under Article 13 because it contained nothing inconsistent with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. Since the Act remained valid after the Constitution’s commencement, the amendments made in 1950 were likewise valid law even though the assent of the President had not been obtained. Moreover, the Court referred to its earlier decision in State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji, which had already ruled contrary to the provisions of Article 31(2). The Court said it could not depart from that earlier judgment. On this basis, the petition filed under Article 32 failed, for no fundamental right of the petitioner had been violated that would permit a remedy from this Court. The Court then turned to the remaining arguments raised on behalf of the petitioner that were relevant to the request for special leave to appeal from the Bombay High Court’s judgment.

The petitioner contended that sections 5 and 6 of the Act, as highlighted by the Court, rendered certain matters conclusive, thereby preventing either the High Court or this Court from questioning the State Government’s order that the tenant had not resided continuously in the premises for six months immediately before the order (section 5), or the finding that the premises became vacant in October 1952 as stated in the impugned order. It was argued that by making those provisions conclusive, the legislature had impaired the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and of this Court under Article 32. A further line of argument claimed that the declaration of vacancy depended on a collateral fact, which the Government was required to determine by an enquiry it deemed appropriate, and that the Act barred any judicial scrutiny of the Government’s conclusion on that collateral fact. The petitioner also maintained that, although the State Government’s finding might be conclusive on the factual aspect of vacancy, it could not be conclusive on the legal aspect; therefore, the courts remained free to decide whether the facts discovered constituted “vacancy” as defined in the Act.

The Court considered whether the factual findings could be determined to amount, in law, to a “vacancy” as defined by the Act. In support of their argument, the petitioners placed strong reliance on observations made by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Hubli Electricity Co. Ltd. v. Province of Bombay, reported at pages 65 and 66. The quoted passage states: “The question what obligations are imposed on licensees by or under the Act is a question of law. Their Lordships do not read the section as making the government the arbiter on the construction of the Act or as to the obligations it imposes. Doubtless the government must, in expressing an opinion for the purpose of the section, also entertain a view as to the question of law. But its view on law is not decisive. If in arriving at a conclusion it appeared that the government had given effect to a wrong apprehension of the obligations imposed on the licensee by or under the Act the result would be that the Government had not expressed such an opinion as is referred to in the section.”

There are several responses to this contention. First, it is well settled that observations made in interpreting one statute cannot be applied to the provisions of another statute which is not materially similar, or “in pari materia”, with the earlier statute. The Judicial Committee’s observations were made in the context of section 4(1) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, a provision that contains no words such as “conclusive evidence” or any phrase of comparable meaning. Consequently, if that decision of the Judicial Committee is to be applied to the present Act at all, it goes against the petitioner because the Committee had construed the phrase “opinion of the Provincial Government”. Those words, or words of similar import, appear at the beginning of section 5 of the present Act. According to the Judicial Committee, the phrase denotes the subjective opinion of the Government and not an opinion that is subject to objective judicial tests.

The quoted observations therefore illustrate that, on a proper construction of the statute then before the Judicial Committee, the Government’s opinion—if rendered non‑justiciable—was limited to the question of whether there had been a willful and unreasonably prolonged default. The observations did not extend to the Government’s view on the obligations imposed by the statute on the licensee, whether by or under the Act. As a result, those observations provide no assistance to the petitioner on the full implication of the rule that makes certain matters “conclusive evidence” under sections 5 and 6 of the present Act. The High Court of Bombay has examined this question in several decisions. In Jagatchandra v. Bombay Province, Justice Tendolkar held that a declaration made by the Government shall be conclusive evidence with

In the earlier decision of Tendulkar J., the declaration made by the State Government that a vacancy existed was held to be conclusive with respect to all the facts necessary for determining the vacancy, but not conclusive as to the inferences that might be drawn from those facts or the legal consequences that might follow. That proposition was later questioned by another learned judge of the High Court, Shah J., who expressed the view that the question should be settled by a larger bench. The matter was subsequently examined in detail by Chagla C.J. and Gajendragadkar, who overruled Tendulkar J.’s decision in the case of Mohsinali Mohomed Ali v. The State of Bombay. In that judgment the Bombay High Court held that when the State Government declares a vacancy, the declaration is conclusive both as to the factual circumstances and as to the constituent elements of “vacancy” as defined under the Act. The Court’s reasoning relied on the observations of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Moosa Goolam Ari v. Ebrahim Goolam Ariff, on Lord Cairns’s remarks in Peel’s case, and on Lord Parker of Waddington’s observations in Bowan v. Secular Society Ltd. In support of the petitioner’s position, counsel also urged the distinction traditionally drawn between a court’s power to decide a factual issue that forms a substantive part of the controversy and a court’s power to decide collateral facts that give rise to jurisdiction over the controversy. Counsel argued that the State Government’s finding of vacancy should be treated as a “jurisdictional fact,” meaning that the Government could not make the declaration or issue a requisition unless it first found that a vacancy existed. The Court considered this argument in light of the earlier decision in Rai Brij Raj Krishna v. S. K. Shau & Brothers, which concerned the construction of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act of 1947. In that case the Court held that the Controller was vested with jurisdiction to determine every question, including whether rent had been unpaid, and that upon finding a default the Controller gained the authority to order eviction. The Court clarified that the finding of default was not a “jurisdictional finding” in the sense invoked by the petitioner’s counsel with respect to the State Government’s vacancy finding. Moreover, the Court affirmed that even if the Controller had erred in deciding the question of rent default, the resulting eviction order could not be challenged in a court of law. Justice Fazl Ali, delivering the judgment of the Court, referred to the well‑known observations of Lord Esher, M.R. in Queen v. Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income‑Tax, to the authorities cited in Peel’s case and Bowan case, and to the Privy Council’s pronouncements in the Colonial Bank of Australasia v. Willan, reinforcing the principle that the statutory provision confers exclusive authority on the designated authority to decide the factual issue, and that such a decision is insulated from judicial review.

In this case the Court referred to the well‑known observations of Lord Esher, M.R., expressed in the decision of Queen v. Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income‑Tax (1) and also to the observations recorded in several authorities, namely the decisions reported at (2) [1867] L.R. 2 Ch. App. 674, (3) [1917] A.C. 406, (4) [1951] S.C.R. 145 and (5) [1888] 21 Q.B.D. 313, 319, as well as to the observations of the Privy Council in the case of the Colonial Bank of Australasia v. Willan (1). After considering those precedents together with the provisions of the statute that was before the Court, the Court held that the Act vested the Controller alone with the power to decide whether there was a “non‑payment of rent,” and that such a decision was indispensable to the Controller’s authority to order eviction of a tenant under section 11. The Court further held that the Controller’s determination could not be challenged in any court of law. The Court described this earlier decision as a suitable illustration of the rule that applies equally to the present statute under consideration. The Act contains an explicit provision stating that the determinations made by the State Government on the questions mentioned in sections 5 and 6 of the Act shall constitute conclusive evidence of the declaration so made. However, the Court clarified that this provision does not deprive the High Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 226, nor this Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 32 or on appeal, of their constitutional power to examine whether the statutory provisions have been complied with. Nevertheless, those special powers cannot be employed to reopen the State Government’s findings under section 5 that the tenant had not actually resided in the premises for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the order, nor the finding under section 6 that the premises had become vacant at the time indicated in the impugned order. Such findings are not collateral matters that could be revisited on the basis of fresh evidence. The legislature, in its wisdom, made those declarations conclusive, and it is not for the Court to question that legislative judgment. The petitioner’s counsel argued that Explanation (a) to section 6, as quoted above, contemplates a vacancy when a tenant “ceases to be in occupation upon termination of his tenancy, eviction, or assignment or transfer in any other manner of his interest in the premises or otherwise.” The argument further asserted that, in the present case, there was no termination, eviction, assignment or transfer, and that the words “or otherwise” should be read ejusdem generis with the preceding words, thereby implying that, on the facts of the case, no vacancy existed.

In the case, the Court observed that the affidavit filed on behalf of the Government admitted that, according to law, there was no vacancy. The Court first held that it could not disregard the Government’s own declaration that a vacancy existed. Secondly, the Court found that the rule of ejusdem generis, which the petitioner attempted to invoke, could not be applied. The legislature, the Court noted, had deliberately used the words “or otherwise” in order to prevent any loophole; those words were not intended to limit the definition but to extend it so as to encompass every possible manner in which a vacancy might arise. Generally, a tenant’s occupation ends when his tenancy terminates by the actions of the parties, by operation of law, by eviction, or by assignment or transfer of the tenant’s interest. However, by inserting “or otherwise,” the legislature clearly intended to include situations not covered by the preceding specific clauses, such as a vacancy caused by a third‑party trespass. The Court therefore concluded that the legislature employed “or otherwise” in an all‑inclusive sense, not in the restricted sense suggested by the petitioner. No precedent was cited in which a court held that “or otherwise” should be read ejusdem generis with the preceding words. On the contrary, the Court referred to the decision in Skinner & Co. v. Shew & Co., where the Court of Appeal considered section 32 of the Patents Designs & Trade Marks Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 57) and rejected the argument that “or otherwise” must be read ejusdem generis with “circulars” and “advertisements”. The appellate judges explained that such a construction would truncate the intended scope of the statute, because the word “or otherwise” was used with a contrary purpose. The Court reiterated the general principle that the rule of ejusdem generis applies only when general words follow particular words of the same nature and the legislature is presumed to have used the general words in a restricted sense, belonging to the same genus as the specific words. This restricted meaning is appropriate only where the overall context and scheme of the legislation require it. In the present case, the Court found that the context, object and mischief of the enactment did not call for a restricted interpretation, and therefore the plain and ordinary meaning of “or otherwise” must be given. Consequently, the vacancy declared by the impugned order, even if not expressly covered by the specific clauses, was unquestionably covered by the legal import of “or otherwise”.

In that case the Court explained that where the purpose and the problem that the statute intended to address did not demand a limited interpretation of words of a general nature, the judiciary was bound to apply the ordinary and plain meaning of those words. The Court held that, considering the object and the mischief of the enactment, there was no justification for applying the rule of ejusdem generis. Consequently, the vacancy declared by the order that was being challenged, although it might not have fallen within the specific terms enumerated, was unquestionably covered by the legal import of the expression “or otherwise”. The Court then turned to the remaining allegation that the order could not be enforced because it was addressed to the petitioner’s husband, who had died before the date of the order, and also to two other individuals who had no connection with the premises. The Court found no merit in that submission. It observed that an order issued under section 6(4)(a) of the Act was not a judicial decree in a suit between the Government and the persons named, and therefore the argument that an order against a deceased person was a nullity could not succeed. The order was based on the finding that the tenant had ceased to occupy the premises in October 1952, apparently because he had handed over possession to a person described as a “lodger” or “paying guest”. Although the petitioner’s husband died after October 1952, his death affected the order only to the extent that his name, which appeared among those to be served under section 13 of the Act, should be struck out. That deletion did not, in the Court’s view, undermine the enforceability of the order. Section 13, the Court noted, enumerated the various modes of serving an order made under the Act, distinguishing between orders of a general character, those affecting a class of persons, and those directed to an individual, corporation or firm. Because the present order concerned an individual, the statute permitted service by personal delivery or tender, by post, or, if the individual could not be found, by affixing a copy of the order to a conspicuous part of the premises where the person was known to have last resided. Since the petitioner’s husband was already deceased at the time the order was made, service could only realistically reach the “lodger” who, according to the findings, continued to occupy the premises after October 1952.

In the matter before the Court, the individual who remained in possession of the premises after October 1952 had not lodged any complaint alleging that he had not been served with the order. Accordingly, the only other person who might have been affected by the order, if any, was the petitioner herself. The petitioner acknowledged that she became aware of the order at approximately the time it was issued, because she discovered a copy of the order affixed to the outer door of the premises. By that acknowledgement, the petitioner conceded that she received timely notice of the order that is the subject of the present challenge. Because the petitioner had received proper notice, the Court found that it was unnecessary to invoke the rule of conclusive proof prescribed in sub‑section (2) of section 13. Moreover, the language at the end of the statutory provision makes clear that any defect or omission in complying with the procedural requirements of the section does not invalidate the order. Having examined all the submissions raised in support of the petitions and finding each of them lacking merit, the Court dismissed the petitions and ordered that the costs be awarded against the petitioners in a single lump sum.