Jaswant Singh vs The State Of Punjab

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 66 of 1954

Decision Date: 25 October, 1957

Coram: J.L. Kapur, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha

In the matter of Jaswant Singh versus the State of Punjab, the Supreme Court rendered its judgment on the twenty‑fifth day of October, 1957. The opinion was authored by Justice J. L. Kapur, who sat on a bench together with Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha. The petitioner in the case was Jaswant Singh and the respondent was the State of Punjab. The decision was recorded under the citation 1958 AIR 124 and 1958 SCR 762. The case concerned the criminal trial provisions that require a sanction for the prosecution of one offence and the trial of two offences where a sanction is required, the applicability of sections five and six of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act II of 1947). The headnote explains that a sanction under section six of the Act had been issued to allow the prosecution of the appellant for receiving an illegal gratification from a person named Pal Singh. The appellant faced two charges: one under section five, sub‑section (1)(a), for habitually accepting or obtaining illegal gratification, and another under section five, sub‑section (1)(d), for receiving a specific illegal gratification from Pal Singh. The Special Judge found both charges proved and convicted the appellant on both counts. On appeal, the Punjab High Court held that the appellant could not be tried or convicted of the offence under sub‑section (1)(a) because no sanction had been granted for that charge, but the High Court upheld the conviction for the offence under sub‑section (1)(d) where sanction had been obtained. The appellant contended that the conviction even for the sub‑section (1)(d) offence was illegal because the entire trial was void and beyond the jurisdiction of the court, owing to the lack of sanction for the first offence. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, stating that the argument that a trial involving two offences requiring sanction is wholly void when sanction is granted for only one offence is untenable. The absence of sanction for the offence of habitually accepting bribes does not invalidate the taking of cognizance of the separate offence of receiving a bribe from Pal Singh, nor does it render the trial for that offence illegal or the court without jurisdiction. The Court referred to the precedents Hori Ram Singh v. The Crown (1939) F.C.R. 159 and Basirul‑Huq v. The State of West Bengal (1953) S.C.R. 836 in support of its reasoning.

The case proceeded under criminal appellate jurisdiction as Criminal Appeal No. 66 of 1954, an appeal from the judgment and order dated the thirty‑first day of December, 1953, of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 540 of 1953. That judgment arose from the order dated the fourteenth day of September, 1953, of the Special Judge, Amritsar, in Corruption Case No. 13/1‑10/3 of 1953. Counsel for the appellant was engaged, while counsel for the respondent represented the State. The judgment was delivered on the twenty‑fifth of October, 1957, by Justice Kapur. The sole point raised on appeal was the validity and effect of the sanction issued under section six, sub‑section (1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Act 2 of 1947). The appellant had been prosecuted for receiving illegal gratification, and the charge framed against him read in part: “That, you, Jaswant Singh, while employed as a Patwari, Fatehpur Rajputan habitually …” The remainder of the charge continued in the following portion of the record, but the present excerpt concludes at this point.

In the charge framed against Jaswant Singh, who was then employed as a Patwari in Fatehpur Rajputan, the prosecution alleged that he habitually accepted or obtained illegal gratification for himself. The specific allegation stated that on 19‑3‑1953, at the Subzi Mandi in Amritsar, he received a sum of Rs 50 from Pal Singh, identified as a witness‑prosecutor, as a reward for forwarding an application identified as Es P A with his recommendation, thereby assisting Santa Singh, the father of Pal Singh, in securing the allotment of Ahata No 10 situated in the village of Fatehpur Rajputan. The charge further contended that by performing this act, Jaswant Singh committed criminal misconduct in the discharge of his official duties as defined in section 5(1)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, an offence punishable under sub‑section 2 of section 5 of the same Act and within the jurisdiction of the Special Judge. The Special Judge found that the appellant had accepted illegal gratification not only from Pal Singh but also from Hazara Singh, Harnam Singh, Joginder Singh, Atma Singh, Hari Singh and Ganda Singh, and that he had indeed received Rs 50 from Pal Singh on the date mentioned at the Subzi Mandi, Amritsar. On this basis the Judge held that the charge under section 5(1)(a) was proven beyond reasonable doubt and that the appellant was guilty of an offence punishable under sub‑section 2 of section 5 of the Act. The appellant appealed this finding to the Punjab High Court, where Dulat J considered the sanction that had been issued. The judge observed that, although the appellant could not be charged or convicted of a more serious offence such as habitually accepting bribes, the sanction was nonetheless valid with respect to the specific illegal gratification of Rs 50 received from Pal Singh. Accordingly, the High Court upheld the conviction, reduced the term of imprisonment to the period already served, and retained the fine imposed. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant contended that the sanction specifically covered only the receipt of Rs 50 from Pal Singh, whereas the charge alleged a pattern of habitual receipt of illegal gratification; he argued that because the sanction did not extend to a habitual offence, the trial court lacked jurisdiction and the conviction could not stand even for the single act mentioned in the sanction. The sanction itself read: “Whereas I am satisfied that Jaswant Singh Patwari, son of Gurdial Singh Kamboh of village Ajaibwali, had accepted an illegal gratification of Rs 50 in five ten‑rupee notes from Pal Singh, son of S Santa Singh of village Fatehpur Rajputan, Tehsil Amritsar, for making a favourable report on an application for allotment of an Ahata to S Santa Singh, father of the said Pal Singh. And whereas the evidence clearly discloses that the said Jaswant Singh Patwari had committed an offence under Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Now therefore, N N Kashyap, I C S, Deputy Commissioner, Asr, as required by Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, hereby sanctions the prosecution of the said Jaswant Singh Patwari under Section 5 of the said Act.” Section 6(1) of the Act outlines the procedure for granting such sanction.

No court may take cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 161 or Section 165 of the Indian Penal Code, nor of an offence punishable under sub‑section (2) of Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, when such offence is alleged to have been committed by a public servant, unless a prior sanction has been issued. Section 5(1)(a) applies where a public servant habitually accepts illegal gratification, and Section 5(1)(d) applies where a public servant obtains for himself any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. The argument advanced was that the sanction granted covered only the receipt of Rs 50 as illegal gratification from Pal Singh; consequently, the prosecution, the charge and the conviction should have been based on Section 5(1)(d). If that had been done, there would have been no defect in the jurisdiction of the trial court or in the conviction. However, the appellant was tried on the basis of being a habitual receiver of bribes, while the sanction addressed only a single act of receiving illegal gratification. This mismatch, it was contended, rendered the trial void because the court lacked jurisdiction to try the case. The sanction under the Act is not a mere formality; it must be observed with strict compliance. As noted in Basque Agarwala v. King Emperor, the purpose of the sanction provision is to enable the sanctioning authority to consider the evidence before deciding whether prosecution should be authorised or refused. In Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka v. The King, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council expressed a similar view, stating that compliance with clause 23 requires that the sanction be given in respect of the facts constituting the offence charged. Although it is desirable that the sanction document explicitly refer to those facts, it is not essential, because clause 23 does not prescribe a particular form or even require the sanction to be in writing. Where the sanction does not display the factual basis, the prosecution must prove by extraneous evidence that those facts were placed before the sanctioning authority. The sanction to prosecute is a condition precedent to instituting prosecution, and the Government retains absolute discretion to grant or withhold such sanction. Consequently, the sanction document should clearly show that the authority considered the evidence, evaluated all circumstances, and then authorised prosecution. Unless the requisite facts are reflected in the sanction or proved by other evidence, the sanction would be ineffective, and the court would lack jurisdiction to proceed.

In the case before the Court, reference was made to the earlier decision in Yusofalli Mulla Noorbhoy v. The King, where it was held that a valid sanction for each distinct charge—specifically hoarding and profiteering—was necessary to confer jurisdiction on the trial court. The Court explained that without a proper sanction, the prosecution would be null and the trial would lack jurisdiction. Applying that principle to the present facts, the Court observed that the sanction, when read strictly, showed that the sanctioning authority had considered only the facts relating to the receipt of an illegal gratification from Pal Singh. Consequently, the appellant could be lawfully tried only for that particular offence. The Court rejected the argument that a trial involving two offences, both of which ordinarily require sanction, becomes entirely void simply because sanction was granted for one offence and not for the other. Section 6(1) of the Act, the Court noted, bars a court from taking cognizance of an offence for which a prior sanction is required but has not been obtained. Accordingly, the prosecution for the offence under section 5(1)(d) was not barred, because a valid prior sanction had indeed been issued for the offence of receiving a bribe from Pal Singh. However, the offence of habitually receiving illegal gratification could not be taken into cognizance, and the prosecution and trial for that offence were void due to the lack of the required sanction, which is a condition precedent for the court’s jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that the High Court was correct in setting aside the conviction for the latter offence. The Court then turned to the precedent of Hori Ram Singh v. The Crown, in which a public servant faced charges under sections 409 and 477A of the Indian Penal Code – one for dishonestly converting and misappropriating medicines entrusted to him, and the other for wilful omission with intent to defraud the hospital’s account books. Those two distinct offences arose from the same transaction, but only the offence under section 477A required sanction under section 270(1) of the Government of India Act, whereas the offence under section 409 did not. The Court explained that the lack of sanction for the former offence did not preclude prosecution for the latter offence that required no sanction; consequently, the proceedings under section 477A were quashed for lack of jurisdiction, while those under section 409 were allowed to proceed. In a similar vein, the Supreme Court’s decision in Basir‑ul‑Huq v. The State Of West Bengal was cited, where it was held that section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not bar trial of a distinct offence that does not require sanction, even if the same set of facts gives rise to an offence that does require sanction. On that basis, the Court concluded that the absence of sanction for the offence of habitually accepting bribes does not invalidate the taking of cognizance of the separate offence of receiving a bribe of Rs. 50 from Pal Singh, nor does it render the trial for that offence illegal or beyond the court’s jurisdiction.

In this matter, the Court observed that the contention that the trial for the alleged habitual receipt of bribes was illegal and that the trial court therefore lacked jurisdiction did not warrant a finding of prejudice against the appellant. The appellant’s next submission asserted that the evidence establishing his alleged habit of receiving bribes had caused serious prejudice to his defence. However, the appellant failed to demonstrate any such prejudice, and the judgment of the High Court, which was based on the evidence relating to the transaction with Pal Singh, did not indicate the existence of any prejudice. Nothing was placed before this Court that would lead to a conclusion that prejudice existed or that there was a failure of justice. The High Court had held that the trial for the offence of habitually accepting illegal gratification could not be validly conducted and that any evidence presented on that charge could not be taken into account. At the same time, the High Court found that the conviction for receiving a bribe of rupees fifty from Pal Singh was well founded and that the appellant had not been prejudiced in the conduct of his defence. No arguments were raised before this Court challenging the correctness of the High Court’s finding regarding the conviction for receiving the illegal gratification from Pal Singh. After considering the material, this Court agreed with the High Court’s opinion that the offence under section 5(1)(d), namely the receipt of an illegal bribe of rupees fifty, had been satisfactorily proved. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.