Indu Bhusan Chatterjee vs The State Of West Bengal

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 18 of 1955

Decision Date: 26 November, 1957

Coram: Syed Jaffer Imam, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, J.L. Kapur

In the matter titled Indu Bhusan Chatterjee versus The State of West Bengal, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 26 November 1957. The opinion was authored by Justice Syed Jaffer Imam, who was joined on the bench by Justices Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha and J. L. Kapur. The petitioner in the proceeding was Mr. Indu Bhusan Chatterjee and the respondent was the State of West Bengal. The case is reported in the 1958 volume of the All India Reporter at page 148 and in the Supreme Court Reports at page 1001. The legal issues involved the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1947, specifically Section 5(2) and Section 6, as well as Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, dated 1860. The headnote of the judgment summarized that the appellant, who was a public servant, had been convicted under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code for accepting a sum of one hundred rupees as an illegal gratification. The appellant argued that the conviction was invalid because the sanction for his prosecution had not been properly granted; he claimed that the officer authorized to issue the sanction had merely read the draft prepared by the police without properly considering the facts and had failed to investigate the truth of the alleged offence. The Court, after examining the evidence, found that the officer had indeed reviewed all the documents placed before him, which provided the necessary material for him to decide that a sanction was required in the interests of justice. Consequently, the Court held that the essentials of a valid sanction were satisfied and that the conviction stood. The judgment also referenced the earlier decision in Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka versus The King, reported in 1948 at 75 Indian Appeals 30.

The appeal was filed as Criminal Appeal No. 18 of 1955, arising from the judgment and order dated 1 December 1954 of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 322 of 1953, which itself sprang from the judgment and order dated 20 November 1953 of the West Bengal First Special Court at Alipore in Case No. 3 of 1953. Counsel for the appellant were N. C. Chatterjee and D. N. Mukherjee, while counsel for the respondent were B. Sen and P. K. Ghosh, appearing on behalf of P. K. Bose. The High Court of Calcutta had certified the case for appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution, indicating that the matter was suitable for review by the highest court. The Court noted that the appellant had been convicted under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code by a Special Judge. The Special Judge sentenced the appellant under Section 161 to three months of rigorous imprisonment and imposed a fine of five hundred rupees, with a provision that default in payment would result in an additional month of rigorous imprisonment. No separate sentence was pronounced under Section 5(2) of the Act. The Court’s analysis focused on whether the sanction for prosecution complied with the statutory requirements, ultimately concluding that the sanction was valid and that the conviction could not be set aside.

The appellant had earlier tried, without success, to obtain relief from the High Court against both his conviction and the sentence imposed on him. The charge framed under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code alleged that on or about 12 May 1952 the appellant accepted a sum of one hundred rupees as illegal gratification from V S Doraiswamy. The alleged motive was that the appellant would, in the performance of his official duties, show favour to Doraiswamy by ensuring a speedy and favourable settlement of the claim cases preferred by Doraiswamy against the Bengal Nagpur Railway, which later became the Eastern Railway. In parallel, a charge under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was framed for the same transaction, stating that the appellant had taken the said amount by corrupt or illegal means or by abusing his position as a public servant. The judgment notes that a detailed narration of the prosecution’s version of how Doraiswamy and the appellant first came into contact and how the alleged bribery process began is unnecessary. Nevertheless, the essential facts are recounted. The two men first met in 1950. Subsequently, Doraiswamy paid the appellant ten rupees in October 1951 and fifteen rupees in January 1952 after the appellant requested gratification for the speedy and favourable disposal of Doraiswamy’s claim cases. At that time the appellant held the post of Assistant Supervisor of Claim Cases of the Bengal Nagpur Railway in the Vizianagram Section.

According to the prosecution, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment at Puri, obtained secret information relating to alleged dishonesty by railway officials and instructed Inspector G N Brahma to make contact with Doraiswamy. Inspector Brahma met Doraiswamy and asked him to appear again in Calcutta on 10 May 1952, after Doraiswamy had filed a complaint together with certain letters purportedly written by the appellant. The Chief Presidency Magistrate of Calcutta then granted permission for a police investigation. Doraiswamy subsequently met the appellant in Calcutta, and the parties agreed that Doraiswamy would pay the appellant one hundred rupees on 12 May 1952 at 6 p.m. at the India Coffee House. Doraiswamy reported the arrangement to the police, and ten‑rupee notes that had been marked were handed to Doraiswamy. On the appointed day the appellant and Doraiswamy met at the India Coffee House as planned. During their conversation they discussed expediting the claim cases that were being handled by the appellant, and Doraiswamy gave the appellant a list of those cases. The appellant placed the list and the bundle of marked ten‑rupee notes in the left‑upper pocket of his shirt. Shortly thereafter, Inspectors H K Mukherjee and S B Mitra, together with G N Gosh, an Assistant Director of Postal Services, and Inspector Brahma, approached the appellant. They accused him of having received ten ten‑rupee notes as a bribe from Doraiswamy and demanded that he produce the notes. After a brief hesitation the appellant produced both the currency notes and the list supplied by Doraiswamy, and the number of notes was subsequently verified against the records of the notes previously given to Doraiswamy.

The currency notes that the appellant produced were examined and were found to correspond exactly with the numbers that had previously been recorded as the notes handed to Doraiswamy for delivery to the appellant. Both the trial court and the appellate court concluded that the prosecution’s case was duly proved, and the appellant was convicted and sentenced in accordance with those findings. It is important to note that the factual findings reached jointly by the lower courts were not challenged before this Court. The sole issue presented for determination was whether a proper sanction under section 6 of the relevant Act had been obtained, because without such a sanction no court could lawfully take cognizance of the offences alleged against the appellant. To understand the argument advanced by counsel for the appellant, it is necessary to set out certain facts and to refer to the testimony of Mr Bokil, who was identified as witness 5 and served as Chief Commercial Superintendent of the Eastern Railway at Calcutta. The appellant, in his capacity as Assistant Supervisor of Claim Cases for the then Bengal Nagpur Railway (later incorporated into the Eastern Railway), possessed authority to dispose of claims whose value did not exceed Rs 75; for claims exceeding that amount he was required to forward a recommendation to his superior, the Assistant Commercial Superintendent. Doraiswamy acted on behalf of numerous individuals who had filed claims against the Railway, and the volume of those claims was considerable. Consequently, every claim either had to be settled directly by the appellant, when its value was Rs 75 or less, or had to be recommended by him to his superior for claims above that threshold. In this manner, the appellant, as the officer in charge of all claim cases, played a pivotal role in the resolution of each case, either by issuing final orders himself or by making recommendations for higher‑valued claims. On 12 May 1952, the appellant received a payment of Rs 100 at the India Coffee House; at that time he was found in possession of the marked ten‑rupee notes and a list of the claim cases that Doraiswamy had provided to him. The prosecution sought sanction for his trial from the Chief Commercial Superintendent, Mr Bokil, identified as witness 5. There is no dispute that Mr Bokil possessed the authority to grant such sanction. In his evidence, Mr Bokil affirmed that before granting the sanction he had reviewed all the pertinent documents and had become convinced that, in the interests of justice, the appellant ought to be prosecuted. Accordingly, he issued a written sanction, which was marked as Exhibit 6. Exhibit 6 explicitly records that on 12 May 1952 the appellant demanded, and Doraiswamy paid, a sum of Rs 100 as a bribe, which the appellant accepted as a motive or reward for the speedy and favourable settlement of the claim cases. The exhibit further states that Mr Bokil considered the facts and circumstances of the case and concluded that, in the interest of justice, the appellant should be brought before a competent court for the offence of accepting illegal gratification as a motive for favoring Doraiswamy in the claim matters pertaining to the Vizianagram Section of the Railway.

In this case the Court noted that the appellant was to be tried in a court of competent jurisdiction for offences punishable under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, offences that were alleged to have been committed by him. Accordingly, relying on the authority granted by section 6 of the Act, the Chief Commercial Superintendent, Mr R K Bokil, gave his sanction for the prosecution of the appellant on the ground that he had accepted an illegal gratification as a motive or reward for showing favour to Shri V S Doraiswamy in relation to the claim cases filed against the Vizianagram Section of the Railway. The sanction, recorded as Exhibit 6, together with the evidence of Mr Bokil on his examination‑in‑chief, clearly established that a valid sanction had been accorded. Nevertheless, it was contended before the Special Judge, and earlier before the High Court, that certain statements made by Mr Bokil during cross‑examination demonstrated that he had not applied his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and that, consequently, the sanction was invalid. The Special Judge rejected that contention, holding that Exhibit 6 on its face disclosed a valid sanction for the prosecution of the appellant. The learned judges of the High Court who heard the appeal were of the same view, concluding that Mr Bokil had indeed applied his mind to the relevant facts. Regarding the cross‑examination statements, the High Court observed that they did not show a lack of consideration of the facts; rather, they merely indicated that Mr Bokil had not undertaken an investigation to ascertain the truth of the allegations against the appellant. An application was later filed in the High Court under Article 134 of the Constitution seeking a certificate that the case was fit for appeal to this Court. The order granting the certificate revealed that the judges hearing the application were of the opinion that the sanction in the present case was not a valid one and that the question of whether a proper sanction had been obtained was serious enough to merit the issuance of a certificate. Consequently, it became necessary for this Court to determine the validity of the sanction. Although the substance of the sanction had already been set out, the Court reproduced the exact language of the sanction to avoid any misunderstanding. The sanction read: “Whereas a complaint was made against Shri Indu Bhusan Chatterjee, Assistant Supervisor, Claims, of the B.N. Railway (now Eastern Railway) Garden Reach, Calcutta, who looked after the claims cases against the Railway of the Vizianagram Section, that the said Indu Bhusan Chatterjee had demanded and on 12 May 1952 accepted a bribe of Rs 100 (Rupees one hundred only) from Shri V S Doraiswamy of the Commercial Claims Bureau, Vizianagram as a motive or reward for speedy and favourable settlement of the”.

In the sanction, it was recorded that Shri Indu Bhusan Chatterjee, who was Assistant Supervisor of Claims for Eastern Railway at Garden Reach, Calcutta, had committed an offence punishable under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code by demanding and, on 12 May 1952, accepting a bribe of Rs 100 from Shri V. S. Doraiswamy of the Commercial Claims Bureau, Vizianagram. The sanction further stated that he had also committed the offence of criminal misconduct by illegally and corruptly using his official position as a public servant to obtain a pecuniary advantage for himself, an offence punishable under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1), clause (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act II of 1947. R. K. Bokil, Chief Commercial Superintendent of Eastern Railway, Calcutta, after applying his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case, expressed that in the interests of justice the appellant should be tried in a court of competent jurisdiction for the alleged offences. Because the appellant is removable from office by the authority of the Chief Commercial Superintendent, Bokil invoked the powers vested in him by Section 6(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act II of 1947 and formally accorded sanction for prosecution. The sanction specified that the prosecution would be for the offence of accepting an illegal gratification as a motive or reward for favouring Shri V. S. Doraiswamy in his official functions, namely the settlement of the Vizianagram Section claim cases, punishable under Section 161 of the IPC, and for the offence of criminal misconduct for the corrupt and illegal use of his official position to obtain a pecuniary advantage, punishable under Section 5(2) of the Act. The Court observed that the sanction plainly set out all the material facts concerning the prosecution case, namely the acceptance of Rs 100 on 12 May 1952, which, if established, would constitute offences under the referenced provisions. The sanction also clearly indicated that Mr Bokil had considered the matter and, in his opinion, justice required prosecution. The charge framed at trial corresponded exactly with this incident and no other facts were required to be restated in the sanction. During his examination‑in‑chief, Mr Bokil testified that, upon the police’s request, he granted sanction after reviewing all relevant documents and being satisfied that justice demanded prosecution, and that the sanction was marked as Exhibit 6. In cross‑examination, however, he stated that Exhibit 6 had been prepared by the police and submitted to him by the personnel branch of his office, and that he had not called for any records or inquired about the specific claim cases involved.

In granting the certificate, the learned Judges appeared to rely heavily on Mr. Bokil’s statement that the sanction marked as Exhibit 6 had been prepared by the police and was merely presented to him by the personnel branch of his office, a point underscored by the learned Chief Justice who remarked that it was difficult to imagine the duty of granting a proper sanction being fulfilled simply by affixing one’s signature to a pre‑drafted police document. The Court found, however, that Mr. Bokil’s declaration did not establish that he had only signed a ready‑made sanction without any independent consideration, because although he acknowledged that he had not himself dictated or drafted the sanction, he also unequivocally stated in his examination‑in‑chief that, before accord­ing the sanction, he had carefully reviewed all the relevant papers and was satisfied that justice required the prosecution. The Court saw no reason to distrust this assertion, and observed that the High Court, while granting the certificate of fitness, had likewise accepted Mr. Bokil’s testimony without casting doubt upon it. As a senior officer of the Railway, Mr. Bokil would necessarily have been fully aware that the responsibility for granting a sanction against a subordinate lay with him, making it implausible that an officer of his stature would blindly endorse a pre‑formulated document prepared by the police. The sanction in question already contained the material facts upon which a prosecution could be launched, specifically the alleged acceptance of a bribe by the appellant on 12 May 1952, and when Exhibit 6 was placed before Mr. Bokil, other relevant documents were also submitted for his examination. Although the record shows that Mr. Bokil was not cross‑examined regarding the nature of these additional papers, the absence of any inquiry into them leads the Court to accept his statement that they were pertinent solely to the question of whether he should or should not accord his sanction. He reiterated that, after scrutinising all the papers placed before him and being convinced that sanction was warranted, he proceeded to grant it. The Court noted that Mr. Bokil did not request any records from his office concerning the matter, nor did he seek the connected claim cases or ascertain their status, but it was not his function to determine the truth of the allegations by retrieving such records. The documents provided to him appeared to furnish the necessary material on which he based his conclusion that, in the interests of justice, the sanction should be given. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied upon the precedent set in Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka v. The King (1) (1948) L.R. 75 I.A. 30, finding that the principles articulated in that decision supported the validity of the sanction accorded in the present case.

The Court observed that the authorities cited by the appellant, including the case reported as The King (1) and other cases, were unnecessary to refer to for deciding whether the sanction granted was valid. A careful reading of Morarka’s case (1) (1948) L.R. 75 I.A. 30 shows that the sanction accorded in the present matter does not conflict with the observations of the Lordships of the Judicial Committee in that decision. On the contrary, the Court found that the present sanction is in keeping with those observations. The Court further held that none of the other cases cited by counsel for the appellant assisted in resolving the issue. When the sanction itself and the evidence of Mr Bokil were examined together, the Court concluded that there was little doubt that the sanction was a valid one. The only point argued before the Court was the alleged invalidity of the sanction, which was the expressed reason for the failure to grant the certificate. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and the decision of the High Court upholding the conviction and sentence of the appellant was affirmed.