Hansraj Moolji vs The State Of Bombay

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 93 of 1956

Decision Date: 12 February, 1957

Coram: Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, B. Jagannadhadas, Syed Jaffer Imam, P. Govinda Menon, J.L. Kapur

In this case, the Supreme Court of India rendered a judgment on 12 February 1957 in the matter of Hansraj Moolji versus the State of Bombay. The judgment was authored by Justice Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, and the bench comprised Justices Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, B. Jagannadhadas, Syed Jaffer Imam, P. Govinda Menon, and J. L. Kapur. The petitioner was Hansraj Moolji and the respondent was the State of Bombay. The citation of the decision is reported in 1957 AIR 497 and 1957 SCR 634. The legal issues involved the duration and operation of an ordinance promulgated under emergency powers, the declaration of the termination of the emergency, and the effect of the ordinance after the emergency had ended. The relevant statutes mentioned were the Government of India Act, 1935 (sections 25 and 26, Chapter 42), specifically Schedule 9, section 72, the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940 (sections 1(3) and 3), and the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946 (Ordinance No. III of 1946), sections 4 and 7. The headnote set out the provision of section 72 of Schedule 9 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which allowed the Governor‑General, in cases of emergency, to make and promulgate ordinances that would, for a period not exceeding six months from their promulgation, have the same force as an Act passed by the Indian Legislature. Section 1(3) of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, provided that, with respect to ordinances made between 27 June 1940 and the date that His Majesty might by Order in Council declare the emergency to have ended, the words “for the space of not more than six months from its promulgation” would be treated as omitted. The appellant, Hansraj Moolji, had been prosecuted for alleged contravention of section 4 of the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946 on 11 July 1953. The ordinance itself had been promulgated by the Governor‑General on 12 January 1946. However, on 1 April 1946 an Order in Council was published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary declaring that the emergency defined by the 1940 Emergency Provisions Act had terminated on that date. The defence submitted that the ordinance could not be in force on the date of the alleged offence because it was originally issued under emergency powers and therefore ceased to exist automatically on 1 April 1946 when the emergency was declared to have ended. The defence further argued that, since section 72 of Schedule 9 of the Government of India Act, 1935, had been restored to its original wording from 1 April 1946, the court must interpret its terms as they existed at the time of promulgation to determine whether the ordinance could continue after that date. The Court ultimately held,

It was observed that the removal of the phrase “for the space of not more than six months from its promulgation” from Section 72 of the Ninth Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935, by subsection 1(3) of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, caused Ordinances issued between 27 June 1940 and 1 April 1946 to be treated as if they were Acts enacted by the Indian Legislature, without any time limit on their continuance, and therefore they remained in force until they were expressly repealed. Although Section 72 of the Ninth Schedule was restored to its original wording after 1 April 1946, the question of whether the particular Ordinance under consideration continued to operate after that date had to be answered by looking at the provisions as they existed at the time of the Ordinance’s promulgation, because nothing in the restoration authorised a retrospective application of the revived wording. The decision in J. K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Co. (Rampur) Ltd. and others v. King Emperor, [1947] F.C.R. 141, was relied upon for this principle.

The criminal appellate jurisdiction concerned Criminal Appeal No. 93 of 1956, taken on special leave from the Bombay High Court judgment dated 14 April 1955 in Criminal Appeal No. 156 of 1955 and Criminal Revision Application No. 435 of 1955, which themselves arose from the judgment of the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay dated 3 January 1955 in Case No. 9/P of 1954. Counsel for the appellant were appointed, while counsel for the respondent included the Solicitor‑General of India and additional advocates. The appeal was decided on 12 February 1957, and the judgment was delivered by Justice Bhagwati.

This appeal, entertained under Article 136 of the Constitution, raised the issue of whether the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946 (Ordinance No. III of 1946), promulgated by the Governor‑General of India on 12 January 1946, was still in force on 11 July 1953, the date on which the appellant was alleged to have committed an offence punishable under Section 7 read with Section 4 of that Ordinance. The appellant, who had been recorded as Accused No. 1 before the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate’s Court in Bombay, was charged along with Accused Nos. 2, 3, 5 and 6 with having, on or about 12 July 1953, sold ten high‑denomination bank notes of Rs 1,000 each to a person named Velji Lakhamshi Joshi for a total of Rs 1,800, i.e., at a price of Rs 180 per note, thereby violating Section 4 of the Ordinance and committing an offence under Section 7 of the Ordinance in conjunction with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant’s counsel raised a preliminary objection, contending that the Ordinance was not operative at the time the alleged offence occurred and consequently the prosecution could not be sustained. The learned Presidency Magistrate rejected this objection, and the trial proceeded.

The trial concluded with the conviction of the appellant together with the co‑accused for the offence with which they had been charged. The appellant received a sentence requiring the payment of a fine of eight thousand rupees, and the statute provided that, if the fine were not paid, the appellant would suffer six months’ rigorous imprisonment. The co‑accused were each awarded fines of varying amounts, but those sentences were not the focus of the present discussion. Dissatisfied with the judgment, the appellant lodged an appeal before the High Court of Judicature in the year 1955. In the same year the State of Bombay, who was the respondent, filed a criminal revision application numbered 435 of 1955 seeking an enhancement of the appellant’s sentence. The co‑accused also filed separate appeals challenging their convictions and the fines imposed upon them. All of these appeals, together with the State’s revision application, were heard jointly by a Division Bench of the High Court. The High Court concurred with the findings of fact recorded by the learned Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, holding that the appellant had indeed transferred by sale ten high‑denomination bank notes of one thousand rupees each into the possession of Velji Lakhamshi Joshi, and that this act fell squarely within the prohibition set out in section 4 of the Ordinance. The High Court also rejected the argument advanced before it that the Ordinance had ceased to be in operation before the alleged date of the offence, namely 11 July 1953, and therefore confirmed the conviction recorded by the Magistrate. Regarding the penalty, the High Court found no reason to increase the sentence and therefore affirmed the original sanction of a fine of eight thousand rupees with the alternative of six months’ rigorous imprisonment in default. Subsequent to the High Court’s decision, the appellant applied for a certificate under article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution, but the High Court dismissed that application. Consequently, the appellant sought and obtained special leave to appeal to this Court under article 136 of the Constitution. The issue on appeal turned on the interpretation of section 72 of the Ninth Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935 (25 and 26 Geo. V ch. 42), and section 1(3) of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940 (3 and 4 Geo. VI ch. 33). Section 72 of the Ninth Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935 reads as follows: “The Governor‑General may, in cases of emergency, make and promulgate ordinances for the peace and good Government of British India or any part thereof, and any ordinance so made shall, for the space of not more than six months from its promulgation, have the like force of law as an Act passed by the Indian Legislature; but the power of making ordinances under this section is subject to the like restrictions as the power of the Indian Legislature to make laws; and any ordinance made under this section is subject to the”.

The Court explained that Section 72 of the Government of India Act, as set out in the Ninth Schedule, allowed the Governor‑General to make ordinances in emergencies, but such ordinances could be disallowed in the same way as an Act passed by the Indian Legislature and could be overridden or superseded by any such Act. Section 1(3) of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, modified that provision by stating that, with respect to ordinances made during the period specified in Section 3 of the same Act, the words “for the space of not more than six months from its promulgation” were to be treated as omitted. The section further provided that, notwithstanding the limitation that ordinance‑making was subject to the same restrictions as the Legislature, ordinances could, during the emergency period, affect the Army Act, the Air Force Act or the Naval Discipline Act, and that Section 111 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which exempted certain British subjects from Indian laws, would not apply to any ordinance made under Section 72 during that period.

Section 3 defined the emergency period as beginning on the date the Emergency Provisions Act was passed, namely 27 June 1940, and ending on a date that His Majesty might declare by Order in Council as the termination of the emergency. The India and Burma (Termination of Emergency) Order, 1946, was issued by His Majesty’s Order in Council on 1 April 1946 and declared that the emergency had ended on that day. Consequently, the emergency period established by Section 3 extended from 27 June 1940 to 1 April 1946.

The ordinance that was the subject of the appeal had been promulgated on 12 January 1946, which fell within the declared emergency period. The appellant’s counsel argued that once the emergency was declared over on 1 April 1946, the original legal position was restored and the ordinance, having been made under emergency powers, automatically ceased to have effect. In an alternative argument, the appellant submitted that, since Section 72 of the Ninth Schedule was restored as of 1 April 1946, the court should interpret it according to its original terms in order to determine whether the ordinance could continue to operate after that date.

It was necessary at this point to examine the scheme laid down in the Government of India Act, 1935 for the enactment of legislative measures. The Act had contemplated the creation of a Federation of India. Under Part II, chapter 3, the Federal Legislature was to be composed of two chambers, which were named the Council of States and the House of Assembly. The ordinary legislative process required that a bill be passed by both chambers of the Federal Legislature and then receive the assent of the Governor‑General before it could become law. Legislative authority was divided between the Federal Legislature and the Provincial Legislatures. The Federal Legislature possessed the power to make laws for the whole of British India or for any part thereof, and also for any Federated State, with respect to matters listed in the Federal Legislative List as well as matters listed in the Concurrent Legislative List.

In addition, the Act granted the Federal Legislature a further power that could be exercised if the Governor‑General, in his discretion, issued a “Proclamation of Emergency” declaring that a grave emergency existed that threatened the security of India, whether because of war or internal disturbance. Under such a proclamation the Federal Legislature could make laws for a Province or any part of a Province concerning any matter that fell within the Provincial Legislative List. These provisions described the powers of the Federal Legislature to enact legislative measures during emergencies.

The Governor‑General himself was given particular legislative powers in Part II, chapter 4. He could promulgate Ordinances whenever the Federal Legislature was not in session if he was satisfied that circumstances required immediate action. Such Ordinances were to have the same force and effect as Acts of the Federal Legislature that had been assented to by the Governor‑General. However, each Ordinance would cease to operate at the end of six months after the Legislature reconvened. The Governor‑General also possessed a similar authority to promulgate Ordinances when he was satisfied that immediate action was necessary for the purpose of enabling him to discharge his functions, especially where he was required to act in his discretion or to exercise his individual judgment. These Ordinances likewise had the same force as Acts of the Federal Legislature, were to remain in force for a period not exceeding six months as specified in the Ordinance, and could be extended by subsequent Ordinances for an additional period not exceeding six months.

Furthermore, the Act conferred on the Governor‑General the power to make Governor‑General’s Acts whenever he deemed it essential to provide legislation that would allow him to satisfactorily discharge his functions, particularly when his discretion or individual judgment was involved. These special legislative powers could be exercised by the Governor‑General in situations where the normal legislative process could not be employed. All such Governor‑General’s Acts and Ordinances were treated as equivalent to Acts of the Federal Legislature that had received the Governor‑General’s assent.

In this case, the Court explained that when the Governor‑General was required, in the exercise of his discretion or personal judgment, to act, it was necessary that legislation provide for the enactment of Governor‑General’s Acts. Such Acts, once enacted, were to possess the same force and effect as Acts of the Federal Legislature that had been assented to by the Governor‑General. The Court described these as special legislative powers granted to the Governor‑General, powers that could be exercised only when the ordinary legislative process could not be employed. The Court further noted that regardless of the circumstances or the manner in which the Governor‑General exercised these legislative powers, the Governor‑General’s Acts and any Ordinances he promulgated were treated as equivalent to the Acts of the Federal Legislature that bore the Governor‑General’s assent.

The Court then turned to the structure of the governing statutes. Part XIII of the relevant Act contained Transitional Provisions, and a period of time was inevitable between the commencement of Part III, which dealt with the Governor’s Provinces, and the formation of the Federation. Section 317 of the Act kept certain provisions of the Government of India Act in force, together with amendments that resulted from the provisions set out in the ninth Schedule, until the Federation was established.

Section 72, quoted earlier, formed part of that ninth Schedule under the heading “Indian Legislature.” It conferred on the Governor‑General the authority to make and promulgate Ordinances for the peace and good government of British India or any part thereof in cases of emergency. The Court stated that Ordinances issued by the Governor‑General under this authority were to remain in operation for no more than six months from the date of their promulgation and were to carry the same legal force as Acts passed by the Indian Legislature. By virtue of the normal legislative procedure laid down in the Government of India Act, those Ordinances were also regarded as equivalent to Acts of the Indian Legislature.

Even though the Governor‑General’s Acts and his Ordinances were equated with the Acts of either the Federal Legislature or the Indian Legislature, the Court emphasized that the duration of such statutes had to be determined. It observed that any statute without a time limit was called a perpetual Act, and its duration was prima facie perpetual, continuing until it was repealed. The Court cited Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edition, p. 374, and Halsbury’s Laws of England, Hailsham Edition, Vol. XXXI, p. 511, para. 664, for this principle. Conversely, when an Act contained a proviso limiting its operation to a specified period, it was classified as a Temporary Act. The Court explained that this classification followed not only from the wording of the Act but also from the intention that the measure was temporary. The same reasoning had been applied to emergency measures, which remained in force only while the emergency persisted and ceased once the emergency ended.

It was asserted that any Ordinance issued under the emergency authority granted to the Governor‑General would remain effective only while the emergency situation persisted and would automatically become ineffective when the emergency was formally declared to have ended. In the case presently considered, the Ordinance that was the subject of dispute had been issued by the Governor‑General while exercising the emergency powers conferred by section 72 of the Ninth Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935. The opposing party argued that this Ordinance should cease to have any legal force after the emergency was officially terminated on 1 April 1946 by the India and Burma (Termination of Emergency) Order, 1946, even though the original limitation clause stating “for the space of not more than six months from its promulgation” had been removed from section 72 by section 1(3) of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940.

To support this position, reliance was placed on the observations made by Chief Justice Vardachariar in the case of King‑Emperor v. Benoari Lall Sharma and others, where it was said that legislation issued by Ordinance possessed the same effect as ordinary legislation and covered the same subject‑matter. However, the judgment also identified two fundamental distinctions that were relevant to the present issue. First, the language of section 72 of the Ninth Schedule expressly limited the operation of such an Ordinance to a period of six months, a limitation that remained in effect even after the specific six‑month wording had been omitted, indicating that the Ordinance was intended only as a temporary measure. Second, the provision was described as the exercise of a special power that was meant to address an emergency situation.

Similarly, Justice Zafrulla Khan expressed a comparable view in King‑Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee, stating that while the legislature could enact measures that could remain in force indefinitely, the power to make Ordinances was constrained in two ways: firstly, by the circumstances that permitted its exercise, namely the existence of an emergency, and secondly, by the period for which any Ordinance so made could remain operative. He emphasized that the existence of an emergency was a prerequisite for invoking the Ordinance‑making power and that the courts could not question the declaration of an emergency made by the authority exercising that power. The judgment further clarified that the Ordinance‑making power was designed to be used only during an emergency, unlike ordinary legislation which was not subject to such a condition, and that every Ordinance was necessarily of limited duration, whether issued under section 72 or under the terms of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940.

An argument was therefore presented before the Court that, although the Ordinance in question had been promulgated within the time frame specified in paragraph 3 of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940—namely between 27 June 1940 and 1 April 1946—the omission of the six‑month limitation from section 72 did not extend the life of the Ordinance beyond the date when the emergency was officially declared to have ended.

The Court observed that the period between June 27 1940 and April 1 1946, together with section 72 of the ninth schedule of the Government of India Act 1935, must be read as having omitted the words “for the space of not more than six months from its promulgation.” The omission of those words did not, the Court held, extend the life of the Ordinance beyond April 1 1946. The Ordinance therefore ceased to operate on the date when a declaration was made, on April 1 1946, that the emergency had ended. The Court noted that this line of argument overlooked an important principle: every ordinance issued by the Governor‑General, whether under his special legislative powers or under the emergency power conferred by section 72 of the ninth schedule of the Government of India Act 1935, was treated as equivalent to an act of the Federal Legislature or the Indian Legislature that had been assented to by the Governor‑General. Consequently, if an ordinance or an act itself contained a specific limitation concerning its duration, that limitation would govern. In the absence of any express temporal limitation, the ordinance would remain in force until it was expressly repealed. The Court further explained that, by operation of section 1(3) of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act 1940, the phrase “for the space of not more than six months from its promulgation” was removed from section 72 during the period defined in section 3 of that Act, namely from June 27 1940 to April 1 1946. Because of that removal, there was no statutory ceiling on the duration of the Ordinance in question. The Ordinance, possessing the same force of law as an act passed by the Indian Legislature and lacking any temporal restriction, therefore continued to operate until it was repealed. The Court emphasized that the emergency condition, which empowered the Governor‑General to make and promulgate ordinances for the peace and good government of British India under section 72, was a prerequisite only for the exercise of the power and did not itself impose any limitation on how long such ordinances could remain effective. To determine the duration of an ordinance, one must refer to the substantive provisions of section 72, which, in its original wording, imposed the “not more than six months from its promulgation” limitation. Had those words not been removed by section 1(3) of the Emergency Provisions Act, the ordinances would have been limited to a six‑month lifespan. Once the words were omitted, section 72 of the ninth schedule of the Government of India Act 1935 would read as follows: “The Governor‑General may…”

In the provision that dealt with emergencies, the Governor‑General was authorised to make and publish ordinances for the peace and good government of British India or any part of it, and any such ordinance was to have the same force as an Act passed by the Indian Legislature. However, the power to make ordinances under that provision was subject to the same restrictions that applied to the Indian Legislature’s law‑making power, to the same possibility of disallowance as an Act of the Legislature, and could be controlled or superseded by any such Act. By removing the words that limited the life of an ordinance to six months, the section was read to give ordinances issued between 27 June 1940 and 1 April 1946 the same status as Acts of the Indian Legislature, without any time limitation on how long they could remain in force. Consequently, those ordinances were deemed to be perpetual in duration, continuing to operate until they were expressly repealed. The Federal Court examined this situation in the case of J. K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Co., (Rampur) Ltd. and others v. King‑Emperor, where Justice Spens observed that the ordinances were made under the authority conferred by section 72 of the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution Act, as amended by the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940. Originally, section 72 limited an ordinance to a life of six months from its promulgation. Sub‑section (3) of section 1 of the Emergency Provisions Act, however, stipulated that for ordinances made under section 72 during the period described in section 3 of that Act, the text “for the space of not more than six months from its promulgation” should be treated as omitted. Section 3 defined the period as beginning with the passing of the Emergency Provisions Act on 27 June 1940 and ending on the date that His Majesty might, by Order in Council, declare the emergency that prompted the Act to be over. The emergency was officially declared to have ended on 1 April 1946. The appellants argued that the proper construction of the amended section 72 was to replace the original six‑month limit with the period specified in section 3, so that on the expiry of that period—namely 1 April 1946—any ordinance made after the Act’s passage would automatically cease to operate. The court noted that this argument was not clearly supported and seemed to rely on the suggestion that the power to issue an ordinance under section 72 was confined solely to the existence of an emergency. The court subsequently considered whether such a construction could be justified, given the wording of the amendment and the legislative intent.

In this case, the Court explained that the power to promulgate an Ordinance under section 72 was limited by the existence of an emergency, as indicated by the phrase “in cases of emergency” in the sub‑section, and by the fact that the Act was expressly titled an Act to make emergency provision for the Government of India and Burma and to define the period of emergency. The Court observed that if the appellants’ construction were accepted, no period would be provided for the continued operation of such Ordinances, a result that could not have been intended by the legislature, since the Governor‑General’s ordinance‑making power was recognised as temporary. The Court held that the emergency which authorises the making of an Ordinance is a separate and distinct concept and must not be confused with the emergency that gave rise to the enactment of the Act itself. Consequently, the effect of the words of the Act on section 72 is that Ordinances made under that subsection during the period specified in section 3 of the Act are not subject to any time limit as to their existence or validity, unless a limitation is imposed by the Ordinances themselves or by subsequent amending or repealing legislation, whether by Ordinance or by any other means. The Court therefore concluded that the second Lahore Tribunal did not lose its existence or its jurisdiction in the appeal simply because the period specified in section 3 of the Act expired on 1 April 1946. The Court further endorsed the observations of Spens C.J. as correctly stating the law. It noted that the Ordinance in question had been promulgated between 27 June 1940 and 1 April 1946 and was therefore perpetual in duration, remaining in force until it was expressly repealed. No later Ordinance or Act of the Indian Legislature was shown to have amended or repealed that Ordinance, so it continued to operate on 11 July 1953, the date on which the appellant allegedly committed the offence. This situation was recognised in the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, made under the Constitution of India. The second schedule of that Order listed several Central Ordinances enacted between 1940 and 1946, including the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946 (Ordinance No III of 1946), wherein section II substituted the words “Part A States and Part C States” for “the provinces”. While it was unnecessary to discuss each Ordinance in the compilation, the Court held that all Ordinances promulgated by the Governor‑General under the power conferred by section 72 of the Ninth Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935, were intended to continue even after 1 April 1946, and that the adaptations prescribed in the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, were accordingly applied to them.

In explaining the legal effect of the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946, the judgment first turned to the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (II of 1934). Section 26 of that Act provided that, subject to the provisions of sub‑section (2), every bank note was legal tender at any place in India for the amount shown on the note and was guaranteed by the Central Government. Sub‑section (2) allowed the Central Government, on the recommendation of the Central Board, to issue a Gazette notification declaring that, from a date fixed in the notification, any series of bank notes of any denomination would cease to be legal tender except at the bank’s office or agency and to the extent specified in the notification. At that time, section 1(2) of the Act applied to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946 (Ordinance No III of 1946) declared that bank notes of Rs 500, Rs 1,000 or Rs 10,000 would cease to be legal tender in payment or on account anywhere in British India on the expiry of 12 January 1946. Although the emergency that had justified the Ordinance ended on 1 April 1946, the Ordinance was deemed to have continued in operation after that date, rendering the specified notes ineffective as legal tender throughout India, except that the same effect could not be imposed on Jammu and Kashmir because the Reserve Bank of India Act had not been extended to that State. Subsequently, on 25 September 1956, Parliament enacted the Jammu and Kashmir (Extension of Laws) Act, 1956 (LXII of 1956) to extend certain statutes to Jammu and Kashmir. The Schedule to that Act incorporated the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, omitted the words “except the State of Jammu and Kashmir” from section 1(2), and inserted a new section 26A after section 26. Section 26A expressly provided that, notwithstanding anything in section 26, no bank note of Rs 500, Rs 1,000 or Rs 10,000 issued before 13 January 1946 would be legal tender for the amount expressed therein. By this amendment, the law in Jammu and Kashmir concerning the high‑denomination notes issued before 13 January 1946 was brought into conformity with the law applicable in the rest of India. This alignment was possible only because the court accepted that the 1946 Ordinance had remained in force after 1 April 1946 and continued to operate thereafter.

In the matter concerning the year 1946, the Court observed that the alternative contention raised by the counsel for the appellant did not merit further examination. The simple reason for this was that to read section 72 in the manner proposed would amount to giving that provision a retrospective effect, applying it to the way the section originally stood with respect to Ordinances that had been promulgated between 27 June 1940 and 1 April 1946. The Court found that there was nothing to justify such a retrospective operation. Accordingly, for those Ordinances the period of their duration had to be determined by reference to section 72 as it existed after the words “for the space of not more than six months from its promulgation” had been omitted, during the period specified in section 3 of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940. Because of that omission, the Ordinance in question was not limited to a six‑month term from the date of its promulgation; instead, it was intended to remain in force perpetually until it was expressly repealed. The Court further held that there was no authority to read section 72 with the omitted words restored to their original position after 1 April 1946 when determining the duration of the Ordinances that had been issued between 27 June 1940 and 1 April 1946. Since both of the appellant’s submissions were thus rejected, the Court concluded that the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetization) Ordinance, 1946 (Ordinance No. III of 1946) was still operative on 11 July 1953, the date on which the alleged offence was committed, and that the conviction recorded by the lower courts was correct. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.