Dr. N. B. Khare vs Election Commission Of India

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 915 of 1957

Decision Date: 14 October 1957

Coram: S.K. Das, J.L. Kapur

In the case titled Dr. N. B. Khare versus Election Commission of India, decided on 14 October 1957, the Supreme Court of India entertained a petition filed by Dr. N. B. Khare, who described himself as an intending candidate for the presidential election. The petition was presented under article 71(1) of the Constitution of India and challenged the validity of the election that had resulted in the declaration of Shri Rajendra Prasad as President on 6 May. The petitioner alleged that there had been violations of constitutional provisions and, consequently, that the election was not valid. The relief sought in the petition was that the grave doubts existing in connection with the presidential election be examined, resolved and decided, and that the entire proceedings of the presidential election be declared void. The Registrar of the Supreme Court returned the petition, holding that it did not conform to the requirements of the Presidential and Vice‑Presidential Elections Act, 1952 (XXXI of 1952) and the Supreme Court Rules contained in Order XXXVII‑A. On appeal, the appellant contended that (i) the petition was founded upon doubts as to the validity of the election and therefore was not covered by the Act or the Rules, (ii) the Act and the Rules were void because they infringed the jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court by article 71(1), and (iii) as a citizen the petitioner possessed a right to approach the Court for relief whenever an election was held in breach of constitutional provisions. The Court held that article 71(1) merely designates the Supreme Court as the forum for enquiring into doubts and disputes relating to the election of the President and Vice‑President, while the substantive right to move the Court and the procedure for doing so are governed by the Presidential and Vice‑Presidential Elections Act, 1952 as authorized by article 71(3). Accordingly, the Court affirmed the validity of the Act and the Rules and concluded that the petitioner had no right beyond that provided by the statute to file an application for setting aside the election. The judgment was delivered in the original jurisdiction of Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 915 of 1957, with counsel R. V. S. Mani and Ganpat Rai appearing for the petitioner, and the opinion was authored by Justice Venkatramaiyar. The bench that heard the matter comprised Justice Venkatramaiyar, Justice T.L. Venkatram, Justice Bose, Justice Vivian Das, Justice Sudhi Ranjan (Chief Justice), Justice Das, Justice S.K. Kapur and Justice J.L. The case is reported as 1958 AIR 139 and 1958 SCR 648.

The petitioner prayed that “in connection with the Presidential election be enquired into, resolved and decided” and that “the entire proceedings of the Presidential election be quashed as void”. The Registrar of the Supreme Court returned the petition because it did not conform to the Presidential and Vice‑Presidential Elections Act, 1952 (Act XXXI of 1952) and it failed to meet the procedural requirements laid down in Order XXXVII‑A of the Court Rules. Section 14 of Act XXXI of 1952 stipulated that an election could be challenged only by an election petition filed in the Supreme Court in accordance with the Act and with the Rules made by the Court under Article 145 of the Constitution. That provision further required that the petition be presented either by any candidate who had contested the election or by at least ten electors. The Court‑made Rules relevant to this matter were contained in Order XXXVII‑A, where Rule 3 mandated the payment of a court‑fee of Rs 250 on the petition and Rule 12 required the petitioner to deposit a cash security of Rs 2,000 to cover any costs that might become payable. The petitioner was not a person entitled to file a petition under Section 14 of the Act, and the petition also omitted the required court‑fee and security, thereby violating Rules 3 and 12. Because of these deficiencies, the Registrar returned the petition, and the petitioner subsequently filed the present appeal against that order. Counsel for the petitioner argued that the petition fell outside the scope of Act XXXI of 1952 and Order XXXVII‑A, contending that the Supreme Court possessed inherent jurisdiction to inquire into any doubt or dispute arising out of or in connection with the election of the President. The counsel further maintained that the Act and the Rules applied only when a specific dispute regarding the election existed, and that a petition based solely on doubts about the validity of the election was not covered by either the Act or the Rules. The Court rejected that contention, observing that once an election had been held, any doubt concerning its validity constituted a ground for setting aside the election, and that the prayer in the petition was precisely to set aside the election. Consequently, the Court held that the petition was, in substance, a petition calling the election into question and therefore had to satisfy the requirements of Act XXXI of 1952 and the Rules contained in Order XXXVII‑A. The counsel then contended that the Act and the Rules were void because they allegedly infringed upon the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to inquire into all disputes and doubts arising out of or in connection with the election of the President or Vice‑President. The counsel relied on Section 18 of the Act, arguing that the election could be set aside only on certain specified grounds, and that this limitation curtailed the Court’s constitutional jurisdiction.

In this case, the Court explained that clause (b) allowed an election to be set aside only when it was shown that the result had been materially affected, and that this limitation was a restriction on the jurisdiction created by Article 71(1), which the Court held to be beyond the constitutional power. The Court further clarified that Article 71(1) merely identified the forum in which disputes connected with the election of the President and Vice‑President were to be examined; it did not lay down the conditions that a petition for setting aside an election must satisfy. According to Article 71(3), Parliament alone was empowered to make laws concerning any matter relating to or connected with the election of the President or Vice‑President, and the Parliament had exercised that power by enacting Act XXXI of 1952 in compliance with this provision. The Court observed that the rights to stand for election and to move for setting aside an election were not rights derived from common law; rather, they had to be created by statute and could be enforced only under the conditions specified in that statute. Consequently, the contention that the Act and the Rules infringed upon the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Article 71(1) was rejected. The Court held that the petitioner possessed no authority to seek the setting aside of the election except in the manner provided by Act XXXI of 1952. Finally, the petitioner’s claim that, as a citizen, he could approach the Court under Article 71(1) whenever an election was conducted in violation of constitutional provisions was examined and dismissed for the reasons already articulated. The Court reiterated that the authority to file an application for setting aside an election was determined solely by the statute that created it, namely Act XXXI of 1952 enacted under Article 71(3). Accordingly, the petitioner was required to operate strictly within the limits of that statute and possessed no additional rights. The Court concluded that the order being appealed against was correct, dismissed the appeal, and dismissed the petition.