Baldeo Singh And Others vs The State Of Bihar And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 145 of 1955

Decision Date: 22 April 1957

Coram: S.K. Das, Syed Jaffer Imam, P. Govinda Menon, A.K. Sarkar

The case was styled Baldeo Singh and Others versus the State of Bihar and Others and was decided on the twenty-second day of April, 1957 by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by Justice S K Das and the bench consisted of Justice S K Das, Justice Syed Jaffer Imam, Justice P Govinda Menon and Justice A K Sarkar. The petitioners were Baldeo Singh and others, and the respondents were the State of Bihar and others. The citation of the decision is reported in the 1957 volume of the All India Reporter at page 612 and in the 1957 Supreme Court Reports at page 995. The matters under consideration involved the Gram Cutcherry criminal jurisdiction as provided under the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (Bihar Act 7 of 1948), particularly sections 60, 62, 68, 69, 70 and 73, and the question of whether the enactment was discriminatory in character within the meaning of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

The appellants had been convicted of an offence under section 379 of the Indian Penal Code by a full bench of a Gram Cutcherry that had been constituted in accordance with the provisions of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1947. They argued that the conviction was invalid because section 62 of the Act conferred concurrent jurisdiction on ordinary criminal courts and on the Gram Cutcherry, thereby allowing a party to choose either forum. They further contended that the procedural regime followed by ordinary criminal courts differed substantially from that followed by a Gram Cutcherry, making the Act discriminatory and in breach of Article 14. The Court held that the impugned provisions were not discriminatory. It explained that the scheme of the Act mandates that a case cognizable by a Gram Cutcherry should be tried by that body unless the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Munsif exercising jurisdiction decides to take action under section 70 or section 73. The reference to concurrent jurisdiction in section 62 is clarified by the provisions of sections 69, 70 and 73, which provide for the transfer or withdrawal of a case from the Gram Cutcherry and the cancellation of its jurisdiction, thereby preserving the authority of ordinary criminal courts to try the matter where appropriate.

The criminal appeal arose under Criminal Appeal No. 145 of 1955 and was entertained by special leave from an order dated July 20, 1954, of the Patna High Court in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 228 of 1954. Counsel for the appellants was instructed to present the case, while counsel for the respondents represented the State. The judgment was delivered on April 22, 1957. The Court noted that the appeal before it was filed after the High Court of Patna had summarily dismissed the petition upon an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The factual backdrop was that one Uma Shankar Prasad had instituted a criminal case against eight persons, including the three appellants, before the Gram Cutcherry of Bankat in Champaran district, which had been formed under the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1947. The present judgment therefore set out to consider the correctness of the conviction and the validity of the statutory scheme governing the jurisdiction of Gram Cutcherries in relation to ordinary criminal courts.

Baldeo Singh, Ramdeo Singh and Sheodhar Singh were alleged to have forcibly cut and removed urad and Kodo crops from the field of Uma Shankar Prasad in the village of Darwan on 1 October 1953 at about ten o’clock in the morning, and the complainant stated that he objected to the intrusion but was threatened with assault. The case was instituted before the Gram Cutcherry of Bankat, situated in the district of Champaran, which had been constituted under the provisions of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (Bihar Act 7 of 1948), hereinafter referred to as the Act. In the trial a total of four witnesses were examined, two for the prosecution and two for the accused persons. The defence of some of the accused persons was that the land on which the crops stood belonged to a person named Yogi Sahni, who had sold the land to Sunder Singh, one of the accused, on 25 September 1953. On 28 December 1953 a bench of the Gram Cutcherry acquitted all of the accused persons. Dissatisfied with the acquittal, Uma Shankar Prasad filed an appeal under section 67 of the Act on 7 January 1954. The appeal was heard on 24 June 1954, and the full bench, by a majority, with three dissenting panches, held the three appellants guilty of an offence punishable under section 379 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced each of them to imprisonment for fifteen days. The appellants thereafter moved the High Court of Patna under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, resulting in the order previously mentioned. Subsequently the appellants approached this Court and obtained special leave to appeal under article 136 of the Constitution. Counsel for the appellants advanced the principal contention that certain provisions of the Act were discriminatory in nature and thus violative of article 14 of the Constitution. In order to address that contention, it was necessary to set out those provisions of the Act which, according to counsel, were discriminatory. Section 62 of the Act, which deals with the criminal jurisdiction of Gram Cutcherries, reads as follows: “Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and subject to the provisions of this Act, a bench of the Gram Cutcherry shall have jurisdiction concurrent with that of the Criminal Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the bench is situate for the trial of the following offences as well as abetment of and attempts to commit any such offence, if committed within the local limits of its jurisdiction, namely: (a) offences under the Indian Penal Code, sections 140, 143, 145, 147, 151, 153, 160, 172, 174, 178, 179, 269, 277, 279, 283, 285, 286, 289, 290, 294, 323, 334, 336, 341, 352, 356, 357, 358, 374, 379, 380, 381, 403, 411, 426, 428, 430, 447, 448, 461, 504, 506.”

Section 62 continued by listing further categories of offences. It stated that the bench of the Gram Cutcherry also had jurisdiction over offences under the Bengal Public Gambling Act, 1867; over offences defined in sections 24 and 26 of the Cattle Trespass Act, 1871; and over, except where otherwise provided, any offences covered by this Act or by any rule or bye-law made under it. In addition, the provision allowed the bench to try any other offence created by any other enactment, provided that the Government had empowered the bench to do so. However, the provision imposed a limitation on the bench’s power to take cognizance of certain theft-related offences. The bench could not take cognizance of any offence punishable under sections 379, 380, 381 or 411 of the Indian Penal Code when the value of the stolen property exceeded fifty rupees, or when the accused satisfied any of the following conditions: first, the accused had previously been convicted of an offence punishable under Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment of three years or more; second, the accused had previously been fined for theft by any bench of the Gram Cutcherry; third, the accused was a registered member of a criminal tribe under section 4 of the Criminal Tribes Act, 1924; or fourth, the accused had been bound over to keep good behaviour in proceedings instituted under sections 109 or 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.

The Court observed that the section contained two significant qualifications. The first qualification arose from the non-obstante clause that prefaced the section, and the second qualification was expressed by the words “subject to the provisions of this Act.” The Court noted that the relevance of the second qualification would become clear when other provisions of the Act were examined. Subject to those two qualifications, section 62 granted a bench of the Gram Cutcherry jurisdiction that was concurrent with the jurisdiction of the ordinary criminal court located within the same local limits for the trial of all offences enumerated in the section. Section 63 conferred upon the bench the powers of a magistrate of the third class. The Court found that section 64 was not material to the matter before it and therefore need not be considered. Section 65 dealt with the exclusive civil jurisdiction of a Gram Cutcherry bench in certain classes of suits, subject to specific provisos, while section 66 stipulated categories of suits that the bench could not entertain. Section 67 dealt with the procedure for appeals.

Section 68 was described as highly important for the purpose of the present case and was reproduced in full. It provided that no court could take cognizance of any case or suit that was cognizable under the Act by a bench of the Gram Cutcherry unless an order to the contrary had been issued by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Munsif concerned, in accordance with the provisions of the Act or any other law then in force. Section 69 gave the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Munsif the authority to transfer a case or suit pending before a magistrate or a Munsif to a Gram Cutcherry bench that possessed jurisdiction to try the matter. Finally, section 70 empowered the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Munsif to withdraw any case or suit that was pending before a Gram Cutcherry bench and to transfer it elsewhere.

Section 71 of the Act stipulates, among other things, that no legal practitioner is permitted to appear, plead, or act on behalf of any party in any suit or case before a Gram Cutcherry. Section 73 confers upon the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and the Munsif the authority to take necessary action whenever there has been a miscarriage of justice or there is an apprehension that such a miscarriage may occur. Sub-section (2) of Section 73 further provides that, if an order under sub-section (1) has been issued with respect to any suit or case, the complainant or plaintiff may institute the same suit anew before the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or a Munsif possessing the appropriate jurisdiction. These provisions together create a mechanism for correcting procedural defects and for ensuring that justice is not compromised by the functioning of the Gram Cutcherry system.

Counsel for the appellants argued that Section 62, by granting only concurrent jurisdiction, permits a party to choose either the ordinary criminal courts or a bench of the Gram Cutcherry, and that this duality gives rise to discrimination because the procedural regime followed by the ordinary criminal courts differs substantially from that prescribed for the Gram Cutcherry under Section 60. Section 60 provides that, subject to the Act and any rules or directions issued by the Government, the bench of the Gram Cutcherry may follow any procedure it deems just and convenient and is not bound to apply the ordinary laws of evidence or procedure, except as prescribed by the Act. The Court observed that this contention overlooks the remaining provisions of the Act, particularly Section 68, which expressly makes Section 62 subject to other sections of the Act. Section 68 declares that no court shall take cognizance of any case or suit cognizable under the Act by a Gram Cutcherry bench unless an order to the contrary has been issued by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Munsif under the provisions of the Act or any other law then in force. A proper construction of Sections 62 and 68 demonstrates that there is no actual discrimination; a case cognizable by a Gram Cutcherry must be tried there unless the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Munsif, exercising judicial discretion under Section 68, orders otherwise. The authority to pass such an order is contained in the subsequent sections already referenced. Consequently, the overall scheme of Chapter VII of the Act mandates that a case or suit cognizable under the Act by a Gram Cutcherry should be tried by a bench of the Gram Cutcherry, except in the limited circumstances provided for in Sections 70 and 73.

In the present matter, the Court observed that the only circumstances in which the provisions of sections 70 and 73 could be set aside were the exceptional cases expressly provided for therein. The reference to concurrent jurisdiction contained in section 62 was explained by the Court on the basis of the mechanisms laid down in sections 69, 70 and 73, so that when a case was transferred or withdrawn from a Gram Cutcherry bench, or when the jurisdiction of that bench was cancelled, it could not be said that the ordinary criminal courts were divested of jurisdiction to try the matter. For this reason, the Court held that the challenged provisions of the Act were not discriminatory, and consequently rejected the first contention advanced before it. The Court then turned to the second contention raised by the counsel for the appellants, which relied upon rules 60 and 61 of the Bihar Gram Cutcherry Rules, 1949. Rule 60(2) required that the decision of a full bench be signed by all members and that, in the event of a dissenting judgment, the minute of dissent be recorded under the signatures of the dissenting members. The Court found that these procedural requirements had been satisfied in the case under consideration and that no material had been placed before it indicating any breach of rules 60 or 61. The third and final contention asserted by the appellants concerned the convictions of two appellants, Ramdeo Singh and Sheodhar Singh, on the ground that no evidence had been led against them. The Court noted that the two prosecution witnesses had positively identified Baldeo Singh and two other persons who had been acquitted, but had failed to identify any further individuals who had participated in the forcible cutting and removal of the crops. The Court further examined the statement of Ramdeo Singh, in which he asserted that he had removed the crops from his own field, and concluded that this admission, standing alone, did not constitute proof of guilt. Accordingly, the Court agreed with the counsel for the appellants that the evidence was utterly insufficient to sustain the convictions of Ramdeo Singh and Sheodhar Singh, describing those convictions as manifestly erroneous on the face of the record. The High Court had been approached for the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, and the Court held that it was likewise entitled to exercise such power on appeal. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal as it pertained to Ramdeo Singh and Sheodhar Singh, set aside their convictions and sentences, and ordered their discharge on bail. Regarding Baldeo Singh, the Court affirmed that his conviction was justified, but held that incarcerating him for a short term would not serve any useful purpose; therefore, the Court reduced his punishment to a fine of thirty rupees, with a default term of imprisonment in the event of non-payment, as directed by the full bench of the Gram Cutcherry. The appeal was thus disposed of in accordance with these directions.