Baldeo Singh And Ors. vs The State Of Bihar And Ors.

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 2 April 1957

Coram: A.K. Sarkar, S.K. Das

In this matter, the Supreme Court of India considered an appeal that had been granted special leave pursuant to article 136 of the Constitution. The appeal arose from a summary dismissal order issued by the High Court of Patna on 20 July 1954. That dismissal had been made in response to an application filed under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The factual background disclosed that a plaintiff named Uma Shankar Prasad had instituted criminal proceedings against eight individuals, three of whom—Baldeo Singh, Ramdeo Singh and Sheodhar Singh—were the appellants before this Court. The plaintiff alleged that on 1 October 1953, at approximately ten o’clock in the morning, the three appellants had forcibly cut and removed crops of urad and kodo from his field situated in the village of Darwan. He claimed to have objected to the act but that he was threatened with assault. The case was originally heard before the Gram Cutcherry of Bankat, which lies in the district of Champaran and operates under the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act 1947 (Bihar Act 7 of 1948), hereinafter referred to as “the Act.” During the trial, four witnesses were examined, two for the prosecution and two for the accused. The defence of some of the accused asserted that the land from which the crops had been taken belonged to a person named Yogi Sahni, who had conveyed ownership to one of the accused, Sunder Singh, on 25 September 1953. On 28 December 1953, the Gram Cutcherry bench acquitted all of the accused. Unsatisfied, the plaintiff appealed the acquittal under section 67 of the Act on 7 January 1954. The appeal was heard on 24 June 1954 before a full bench of the Gram Cutcherry. By a majority decision, with three members dissenting, the bench found the three appellants guilty of an offence punishable under section 379 of the Indian Penal Code and imposed a sentence of fifteen days' imprisonment on each. The appellants subsequently approached the High Court of Patna invoking articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, resulting in the summary dismissal noted above. After that dismissal, the appellants applied to this Court and were granted special leave to appeal.

The counsel representing the appellants raised several arguments before the Court, the foremost of which was that certain provisions of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act were discriminatory and therefore violated article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law. To elucidate this claim, the counsel identified specific sections of the Act that were alleged to be discriminatory. In particular, attention was directed to section 62 of the Act, which outlines the criminal jurisdiction of the Gram Cutcherries. The provision reads: “Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and subject to the provisions of this Act, a bench of the Gram Cutcherry shall have jurisdiction concurrent with that of the Criminal Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the bench is situated for the trial of the following offences as well as abetment of and attempts to…” The counsel argued that this clause, by granting the Gram Cutcherry a concurrent jurisdiction that could conflict with the regular criminal courts, created a class of persons who were subject to a different legal process, thereby constituting discrimination prohibited by article 14. The Court was thus asked to examine whether the language and effect of section 62, taken together with the circumstances of the present case, impermissibly breached the constitutional guarantee of equality.

In this case, the Court examined the provisions of Section 62 of the Act, which assigns criminal jurisdiction to a bench of the Gram Cutcherry. The provision states that, notwithstanding any rule contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and subject to the Act itself, a Gram Cutcherry bench shall exercise jurisdiction concurrent with that of the ordinary criminal Court situated within the same local limits for the trial of specified offences and for the abetment of, or attempts to commit, those offences when such conduct occurs within the bench’s territorial jurisdiction. The offences enumerated include a long list of sections of the Indian Penal Code, namely sections 140, 143, 145, 147, 151, 153, 160, 172, 174, 178, 179, 269, 277, 279, 283, 285, 286, 289, 290, 294, 323, 334, 336, 341, 352, 356, 357, 358, 374, 379, 380, 381, 403, 411, 426, 428, 430, 447, 448, 461, 504, 506 and 510. In addition, the section incorporates offences punishable under the Bengal Public Gambling Act, 1867; offences under sections 24 and 26 of the Cattle Trespass Act, 1871; offences under the Act itself or any rule or bye‑law made thereunder, except where the Act provides otherwise; and any other offence prescribed by the Government under any other enactment.

The provision further imposes a specific limitation regarding the bench’s power to take cognizance of offences under sections 379, 380, 381 or 411 of the Indian Penal Code. The bench may not proceed where the value of the alleged stolen property exceeds fifty rupees, or where the accused has previously been convicted of an offence punishable under Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code with a term of imprisonment of three years or more, or has previously been fined for theft by any Gram Cutcherry bench, or is a registered member of a criminal tribe under section 4 of the Criminal Tribes Act, 1924, or has been bound over to keep good behaviour pursuant to sections 109 or 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.

The Court noted that Section 62 contains two significant qualifications. The first qualification is the non‑obstante clause that opens the provision, expressly stating that the provision operates notwithstanding any rule of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The second qualification follows the phrase “subject to the provisions of this Act,” which means that the jurisdiction granted under Section 62 is limited by any other provision contained in the same Act. Subject to these two qualifications, Section 62 confers a concurrent jurisdiction on a Gram Cutcherry bench with that of the ordinary criminal Court within the local limits of the bench’s location for the offences specified.

The Court further explained that Section 63 vests the Gram Cutcherry bench with powers equivalent to those of a Magistrate of the third class. Section 64 was deemed irrelevant for the purpose of the present analysis and therefore was not examined. Section 65 establishes an exclusive civil jurisdiction for a Gram Cutcherry bench in certain classes of suits, subject to specified provisos, while Section 66 excludes particular suits from the bench’s jurisdiction. Section 67 provides for the mechanism of appeals from decisions of the Gram Cutcherry bench. Finally, the Court highlighted the importance of Section 68, describing it as “very important for our purpose and must be quoted in extenso – ‘No court’.”

Section 68 of the Act provides that no court shall take cognizance of any case or suit that is cognizable under the Act by a bench of the Gram Cutcherry unless an order to the contrary has been issued by the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate or the Munsif concerned, acting under the provisions of the Act or any other law that is presently in force. Section 69 confers upon the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate or the Munsif the authority to transfer a case or suit that is pending before a Magistrate or a Munsif to a bench of the Gram Cutcherry that has jurisdiction to try the matter. Section 70 gives the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate or the Munsif the power to withdraw any case or suit that is pending before a bench of the Gram Cutcherry and to transfer the same to the ordinary courts. Section 71 provides, inter alia, that no legal practitioner shall appear, plead or act on behalf of any party in any suit or case that is before the Gram Cutcherry. Section 73 empowers the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate and the Munsif to take necessary action when there has been a miscarriage of justice or when there is an apprehension of such a miscarriage. Sub‑section (2) of Section 73 further stipulates that when an order under sub‑section (1) has been made with respect to any suit or case, the complainant or the plaintiff, as the situation may be, may institute the case or suit afresh in the court of the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate or a Munsif who has competent jurisdiction.

The learned counsel for the appellants argued that because Section 62 confers only concurrent jurisdiction, a party is free to approach either the ordinary criminal courts or a bench of the Gram Cutcherry, and that this situation creates the possibility of discrimination. The counsel contended that the procedure followed in the ordinary criminal courts differs substantially from the procedure applied by a Gram Cutcherry bench. The procedure applicable to a Gram Cutcherry bench is set out in Section 60, which reads: “Subject to the provisions of this Act and to any rules or directions that may be made or issued by the Government in this behalf, the procedure to be followed by a bench of the Gram Cutcherry shall be such as it may consider just and convenient and the bench shall not be bound to follow any laws of evidence or procedure other than the procedure prescribed by or under this Act.” The argument that this creates discrimination was rejected because it failed to consider the other provisions of the Act that have already been discussed. Section 62, the judgment noted, is expressly subject to the remaining provisions of the Act; consequently, it is subject to Section 68, which requires that no court take cognizance of a cognizable case or suit before a Gram Cutcherry bench unless an order to the contrary has been issued by the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate or the Munsif under the appropriate statutory provisions or any other law in force. On a proper construction, the combination of these sections demonstrates that the law does not permit a choice that would lead to discrimination, because a case cognizable by a Gram Cutcherry bench must be tried there unless a specific order to the contrary is made in the exercise of judicial discretion by the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate or the Munsif, as contemplated by the latter part of Section 68.

In examining sections 62 and 68 of the Act, the Court observed that the statutory language makes clear that there is no genuine discrimination in the allocation of jurisdiction. A matter that falls within the competence of a bench of the Gram Cutcherry must ordinarily be tried before that bench, unless a superior authority—namely the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate or the Munsif—issues an order to the contrary while exercising judicial discretion, as contemplated by the latter part of section 68. The authority for such an order is found in the subsequent provisions of the Act, which have already been identified by the Court. The overall design of Chapter VII is to ensure that any case or suit cognisable under the Act by a Gram Cutcherry is dealt with by its bench, except in the limited and exceptional circumstances enumerated in sections 70 and 73. The reference to “concurrent jurisdiction” in section 62 is explained by the provisions contained in sections 69, 70 and 73, which provide that when a case is transferred away from the Gram Cutcherry, or when the bench’s jurisdiction is withdrawn, the ordinary criminal courts retain the power to try the matter. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the challenged provisions of the Act do not create a discriminatory scheme and that the first contention raised by the petitioners lacks merit.

The Court then turned to the second contention, which relied on rules 60 and 61 of the Bihar Gram Cutcherry Rules, 1949. Rule 60(2) mandates that the judgment of a full bench be signed by all members and that any dissenting opinion be recorded with the signatures of the dissenting members. The Court found that these procedural requirements were satisfied in the present proceedings and that no material had been placed before it indicating a breach of rules 60 or 61. Turning to the third and final contention, the petitioners alleged that the convictions of two appellants, Ramdeo Singh and Sheodhar Singh, were unsupported by any evidence. The prosecution’s witnesses testified that they had seen Baldeo Singh and two other individuals who were acquitted, but they could not identify any further persons who had participated in forcibly cutting and removing the crops. Moreover, Ramdeo Singh’s own statement admitted that he had removed crops from his own field, which the Court held did not amount to a confession of guilt. The Court agreed with the petitioners that there was no evidence to sustain the convictions of Ramdeo Singh and Sheodhar Singh, deeming the judgments to be manifestly erroneous on the face of the record. Finally, the Court noted that the High Court had been approached for the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under the relevant article.

In this matter, the Court observed that under Article 227 the appellate court possessed the authority to supervise the decision of the lower tribunal, and that such supervisory power could be exercised in the present appeal. Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal insofar as it concerned the two appellants named Ramdeo Singh and Sheodhar Singh. For those two individuals the Court set aside both the conviction and the accompanying sentence that had been imposed by the lower court. The order further directed that they be released from the conditions of bail that had previously been imposed. With respect to the third appellant, Baldeo Singh, the Court affirmed that his conviction was legally correct and that the findings of the trial court against him were supported by the evidence. Nevertheless, the Court expressed the view that imposing a period of incarceration on him would not achieve any substantial purpose, given the short length of the term that was contemplated. Consequently, the Court modified the original punishment by substituting a monetary penalty of thirty rupees in place of the custodial sentence, with the alternative of default imprisonment if the fine were not paid, in accordance with the direction issued by the full bench of the Gram Cutcherry. The Court then recorded that the appeal was disposed of in accordance with these orders, and reiterated that the appeal was thereby concluded.