Sukha And Others vs The State Of Rajasthan

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 133 of 1955

Decision Date: 5 April 1956

Coram: Vivian Bose, B. Jagannadhadas

In the matter of Sukha and others versus the State of Rajasthan, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment on 5 April 1956. The opinion was penned by Justice Vivian Bose, who was joined on the bench by Justice B. Jagannadhadas. The petitioners were identified as Sukha and others, and the respondent was the State of Rajasthan. The case is reported in the 1956 AIR 513 and 1956 SCR 288. The principal legal issue concerned the provisions of the Indian Penal Code, specifically sections 34 and 149, relating respectively to common intention and unlawful assembly. The headnote of the judgment explained that although the concepts of common intention under section 34 and common object under section 149 may sometimes overlap, they are distinct and must be kept separate. It was noted that a prosecution under section 149 does not require a prior concerted meeting of minds; it suffices that each participant shares the same object, that at least five persons are involved, and that they act as an assembly to achieve that object. The Court further observed that when a crowd gathers, creates an uproar, and results in deaths and injuries, it is natural for additional individuals to join the scene, possibly seizing any weapons they find. Some of those who join may act with an unlawful motive while others may not, making it impossible to infer that all acted with a common intention established by prior concert. Accordingly, the Court instructed that a trial court should, from the evidence, ascertain which individuals possessed an unlawful object or originally had a lawful purpose that later turned unlawful, and whether five or more such persons acted together, thereby constituting an unlawful assembly. The judgment continued that where the factual record allowed the trial court to deduce that an unlawful object developed among more than five persons after the fighting began, there is no reason to set aside the trial court’s concurrent findings. The Court also warned that it would be reluctant to entertain a claim of prejudice when the record is incomplete, and that failure to raise an objection at an early stage would be taken into account. The case arose on criminal appeal number 133 of 1955, filed by special leave against a judgment and order dated 10 January 1955 of the High Court of Judicature at Jodhpur, which had heard criminal appeals numbered 57 and 83 of 1953. Those appeals were themselves derived from a judgment and order dated 26 May 1953 of the Sessions Judge at Merta in Criminal Original Case number 1 of 1952. Counsel for the appellants included representatives of the petitioners, while counsel for the respondent represented the State. The Court’s opinion was delivered by Justice Bose, who began by recounting that four persons had been killed at approximately 11 p.m. on the night of 21 July 1951, with several others injured, an incident described as a riot in the village of Dhankoli.

In July 1951 a violent disturbance took place in the village of Dhankoli, in which four persons lost their lives and many others sustained injuries. The incident was reported as a riot. As a result, thirty‑six individuals were committed to trial. During the proceedings two of the accused died, leaving thirty‑four persons to face charges. All of the remaining defendants were charged under section 325 in conjunction with section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, and a subset of eleven were additionally charged under section 302 together with section 149. The learned Sessions Judge acquitted twenty‑five of the defendants of the offence under section 325 / 149 and convicted nine of them on that charge. Regarding the eleven defendants charged under section 302 / 149, the judge acquitted all of them on the murder charge but, for nine of those, entered a conviction under section 325 / 149. The State chose not to challenge the acquittals of the twenty‑five persons found not guilty of the section 325 offence, nor to appeal the acquittals of the two of the eleven who were cleared of the section 302 charge. However, the State did lodge an appeal against the acquittals of the remaining nine who had been convicted under section 325 / 149. Those nine convicts filed separate appeals as well. Consequently, the High Court was confronted with two sets of appeals: one filed by the State seeking to set aside the acquittals of the nine persons on the section 302 / 149 charge, and another filed by the same nine persons contesting their convictions under section 325 / 149. The High Court dismissed the appellants’ challenge and allowed the State’s appeal. The effect of the judgment was that the convictions of the nine persons were altered to culpability for murder under section 302 / 149, and each was sentenced to the lesser punishment of transportation. Both the prosecution and the defence acknowledged that there existed deep‑seated animosity in Dhankoli between a caste identified as the Baories on one side and three other castes—Jats, Dhobis and Khaties—on the other. According to the prosecution, the hostility stemmed from a dispute over a piece of land owned by some Jats, a dispute that had already produced court proceedings in which Parsia, a Baori who was later killed, had appeared against the Jats. The accused individuals—Sukha, Gumana, Begla and Govinda—were particularly interested in that field and, as a result, harboured a grudge against Parsia. The defence, however, put forward another motive for the enmity, asserting that the villagers had stopped employing Baories for watch‑and‑ward duties because they were suspected of involvement in a series of thefts. Consequently the other castes performed those duties in rotation, which the Baories resented. The defence alleged that the Baories instigated the fight by attacking other villagers, but maintained that none of the appellants had taken part in that incident. For clarity, the narrative that follows is organized into a series of numbered steps. The first step describes how, on the day in question, two Baories named Chhotiya and Parsia had gone to a neighbouring village to place a bid…

On the night in question, two Baori labourers, Chhotiya and Parsia, attended an auction in a neighbouring village where the disputed field was being sold, as alleged by the prosecution. They returned to their own village at approximately eleven o’clock at night and encountered the accused individuals Sukha and Gumana, both identified as Jats. When challenged, the two Baoris identified themselves, and the accused immediately shouted “kill them” because they had gone to bid for the field. Sukha then produced a firearm that he was carrying and discharged it, striking Parsia in the legs. The impact caused Parsia to collapse. According to the testimony, Gumana then struck Parsia on the head with a sword and likewise attacked Chhotiya on the head with a sword, causing Chhotiya to fall as well.

Both Parsia and Chhotiya cried out for assistance. Their cries, together with the sound of the gunshot, attracted a sizable crowd to the scene. The witnesses gave varying estimates of the number of people who gathered: one witness reported thirty to thirty‑five persons, another estimated fifty or sixty, two others placed the figure at thirty to forty, and another suggested one hundred to one hundred and fifty. Although the precise count is uncertain, it is clear that a crowd assembled. The prosecution asserted that roughly thirty to forty persons participated in the assault, and that several Baoris were present among those who were attacked. The narration emphasizes that the majority of those who gathered did not assemble for an unlawful purpose and therefore did not constitute an unlawful assembly; the task is to distinguish those who formed an unlawful assembly from those who did not. Counsel for the accused argued that the evidence does not establish the existence of an unlawful assembly because it is impossible to identify who came to attack and who came for other reasons. The Court noted this contention but proceeded to set out the prosecution’s version of events. After the initial gunshot and the falling of Parsia and Chhotiya, a large number of individuals rushed to the location, and among them approximately thirty to forty were armed. Those named as carrying firearms (pharsies) were Kamla, Balia, Todia and Bhawana, all identified as Jats. Individuals named as carrying swords were Gumana, Govinda and Jodbiya, also Jats. The remainder of the armed group, comprising Jats, Dhobis and Khaties, were equipped with lathis. This armed contingent continued to assault Chhotiya and Parsia. The cries of the injured Baoris attracted additional Baori individuals—Mana, Govinda, Pemla, Rambuxa and Gangli—to the scene. The same crowd of thirty to forty turned against Mana and Govinda and assaulted them. Sultan then discharged his firearm a second time, striking Mana on the left hand. While these attacks were in progress, Ganesh and his wife Seruri, both Baoris, arrived and pleaded “don’t beat, don’t beat.” Sukha and Gumana responded that they too should be beaten, and the assembled group of thirty to forty persons proceeded to beat Ganesh and Seruri, causing them to fall.

Subsequently, Parsia's wife, Lacbhuri, reached the location of the disturbance, and approximately ten or eleven of the original thirty to forty persons who had taken part in the fray began to pursue her. Lacbhuri, however, succeeded in running away from her pursuers and escaped with only a minor beating, avoiding serious harm. During this chase, the five Baories who had previously been felled to the ground—namely Parsia, Ganesh, Mana, Govinda and Seruri—began to cry out loudly. The ten or eleven individuals who had chased Lacbhuri returned when they heard the cries, and Sukha and Gumana urged that those who were crying should be killed outright. The eleven aggressors subsequently divided themselves into three separate groups and assaulted the five persons lying on the ground as described below. In the first group, Parsia was struck by Sukha, who used a pharsi, by Jeewana, who wielded a dangri, and by Chokla, who also employed a dangri. In the second group, Mana and Govinda suffered blows from Gumana, who used a sword; from Balia, who carried a pharsi; and from Jankiya and Naraina, who each brandished a lathi. In the third group, Ganesh was struck by Bhawana, who used a dangri; by Govinda, who employed a sword; by Kumla, who wielded a pharsi; and by Begla, who also used a dangri, and all four victims died on the spot. The prosecution initially framed charges against a cohort of twenty‑five individuals under sections 325 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code for the intentional beating of the same victims, along with the additional accused named as Chhotiya, Seruri, Parsia, Mana, Govinda and Ganesh. Subsequently, a supplemental clause was added indicating that the acts were performed as members of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of its common intention; however, the twenty‑five accused were ultimately acquitted, and their verdict is unrelated to the incidents recounted in steps six and seven.

The remaining eleven defendants were charged with offenses that can be divided into two parts; the first part, applicable to each of them except Sukha, alleged that they beat the Baories—Parsia, Mana, Govinda, Ganesh, Chhotiya and Seruri—together with other accused, employing swords and lathis or lathis alone. The second portion of the charge describes Sukha’s act of firing at Parsia and Mana, which caused them to collapse, and then asserts that all the victims had fallen as a consequence of these injuries. Thereafter, the indictment separates into three specific groups: the first accuses Gumana, Naraina, Balia and Jankiya of beating the groaning Govinda and Mana with lathis, intending to kill them until death actually resulted. The second group charges Jeewana, Sukha and Chokhla with striking Parsia with lathi blows, intending to murder him until he died. The third group charges Begla, Govinda, Kumla and Bhawana with assaulting Ganesh with lathis, intending to murder him until death occurred. Each of these three charges also contains the concluding clause that the accused acted as members of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of its common intention. Both the Sessions Court and the High Court have expressed confusion regarding these provisions.

The Court observed that the legal concepts of “common intention” and “common object” are distinct, even though they may sometimes overlap. It explained that in matters involving an unlawful assembly or a riot, the relevant notion is “common object”. The Court further stated that any confusion between the two terms had not caused prejudice to the parties. The detailed discussion of the charges was prompted by the argument of counsel for the appellants, who maintained that the prosecution’s case relied on the existence of two separate assemblies. According to the prosecution, one assembly comprised twenty‑five persons who were alleged to have beaten six specific individuals, while a second assembly of eleven persons was said to have killed those individuals in three groups. Counsel for the appellants contended that the first assembly of twenty‑five persons had already been acquitted, and that the only basis for inferring an unlawful assembly in the second case was the alleged instigation by Sukha and Gumana after they had returned from chasing Lachhuri. He further asserted that this alleged second instigation had been disbelieved, and consequently, all the accused should be acquitted. The Court therefore found it necessary to set out the findings of the lower courts for further consideration.

The learned Sessions Judge began by rejecting the testimony of Ruga (P.W. 1), Bodu (P.W. 2) and Bhagwatia (P.W. 3) on the issue of identification of any of the accused, and also rejected the evidence of Arjun (P.W. 4) concerning a conspiracy to beat up the Baoris. However, the Judge held that the evidence of the Baori witnesses—Chhotiya (P.W. 8), Lachhuri (P.W. 10), Ladia (P.W. 11), Seruri (P.W. 12), Gangli (P.W. 13) and Pemla (P.W. 14)—was consistent with respect to the eleven accused who were said to have beaten four persons to death and caused injuries to Lachhuri, Ganesh’s wife, Seruri and Chhotiya. The Judge further observed that, based on the testimony of these Baori witnesses, the eleven accused were involved in the beating of the injured persons, and that it was immaterial whether they formed part of a larger assembly because the Judge had already considered the cases of the other accused and had given them the benefit of doubt. The Judge noted that the group of eleven, being more than five persons, could be regarded as an unlawful assembly. Nevertheless, the Judge accepted only parts of the prosecution’s narrative. He believed the statements of Chhotiya (P.W. 8), Seruri (P.W. 12), Gangli (P.W. 13) and Pemla (P.W. 14) that Sukha possessed a gun and used it against Parsia and Mana, but he did not accept Chhotiya’s claim that Gumana struck Chhotiya with a sword. The Judge also rejected the prosecution’s version that the incidents occurred in two stages—first a larger assembly beating all the accused, followed by a smaller assembly that, after chasing Lachhuri, returned to beat the others to death upon the instigation of Sukha and Gumana. Regarding this part of the case, the Judge concluded that any beating that took place was done immediately after the scuffle involving Chhotiya, Parsia, Sukha, Gumana, Naraina and those who arrived at the scene, and that no instigation was proven.

After the scuffle that had taken place among Chhotiya, Parsia, Sukha, Gumana, Gumana and Naraina, and after the other accused who had arrived at the scene, the learned Sessions Judge recorded that “nobody instigated anybody” (Para 103). The defence argued that the learned Sessions Judge had altogether discarded the evidence relating to any instigation. The counsel for the State, on the other hand, maintained that the passage referred specifically to the second alleged instigation – that is, the instigation said to have been given after the eleven accused had chased and beaten Lacbhuri and then returned to finish off the other victims who were lying on the ground. The Court found this interpretation to be correct. In paragraph 101 of the Sessions Judge’s judgment, the learned Judge set out the prosecution’s version that the witnesses divided the occurrence into two distinct parts: the first part involved a larger assembly that beat all the injured persons, and the second part involved eleven persons who killed the four deceased persons at the instigation of Sukha and Gumana. In paragraph 102 the learned Judge listed the reasons why he could not accept that version. The first reason was that Ladia (PW 11) had not, in his statement to the police, said that after beating Lachhuri, when ten or eleven persons had returned, the injured were again beaten to death at the instigation of Sukha and Gumana. The Judge then set out four further reasons, after which he arrived at the conclusion stated in paragraph 103. In paragraph 117 he pronounced that, “Leaving Begla and Govinda, I am fully convinced that Sukha, Gumana, Naraina, Kumla, Balia, Jeewana, Chokhla, Bhawana Khati and Jankiya did commit rioting with the common object of beating the Baories.” In paragraph 118 he added that he was not convinced that the intention of all these accused was to murder the entire group of Baories. In paragraph 119 he observed that “the accused did give sound beating to the injured.” From these findings he concluded that no common object to kill could be inferred, although a common object to beat was clearly established. Because he was unable to determine which of the accused had delivered the fatal blows, he convicted all of them under section 302 read with section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court considered that, when read as a whole, the Sessions Judge’s judgment showed a disbelief in any story of instigation at any stage; had he accepted even the first alleged instigation, a common object to kill would have been evident. The Court further noted that it could not obtain substantial assistance from the judgments of the learned High Court judges, who had not analysed the evidence in detail and had failed to reach clear findings on the existence of a common object, partly because they appeared not to have appreciated the distinction between a common object and a common intention. The High Court had held that six witnesses could be relied upon to the extent that “the villagers were armed with guns, swords, farsies and lathis.” Yet the High Court expressed doubt about the completeness of the witnesses’ testimony, stating, “Though, therefore, we do not believe that these eleven persons deliberately murdered the four injured Baories who were lying there.”

In its consideration, the court observed that the six prosecution witnesses identified eleven individuals who had been seen actively participating in the incident. The court affirmed that, based on those witnesses, the incident had occurred substantially as described and that the prosecution’s account was the correct version of events. The court further noted that a large number of villagers, including the nine appellants, had arrived armed with various weapons immediately after the quarrel between Chhotiya and Parsia on one side and Gumana on the other. From this observation, the court inferred that some prior consultation must have taken place and that those persons had come together in pursuit of a common object. The court added that prosecution witnesses testified that when the Baories arrived, some of the accused had incited the rest of the villagers to assault the Baories. Relying on this testimony, the court concluded that an unlawful assembly had been formed with the common object of beating the Baories. The court found this conclusion unsatisfactory because the appellate judges, although allowing the appeal against the acquittal, had not specified which parts of the evidence supported their findings, and their conclusions did not follow logically from the premises. For example, the court pointed out that the finding of prior consultation was misplaced, since a prior meeting is not required when a common object is alleged; the distinction between a common object and a common intention lies precisely in that requirement. Moreover, the six witnesses had reported that a crowd of thirty to forty persons had assembled, and that among this crowd were Baories, because three Baories other than Parsia and Chhotiya were killed and others were injured. It was also evident that some Baories must have been carrying weapons, as three of the accused sustained slight injuries and one suffered a fracture. The evidence indicated that thefts had occurred in the village and that the disturbance broke out at eleven o’clock at night. In such circumstances, it was natural for villagers to rush to the scene and arm themselves with whatever was at hand. While some villagers may have been motivated by unlawful intent, many would not have been, making it impossible to infer a common intention arising from a prior concert. The court emphasized that a common object is distinct, and that the fact-finder may conclude, based on the admitted evidence, that some individuals who arrived at the scene did so with the objective of beating persons they believed to be thieves, rather than merely to apprehend them or defend their property; in other words, some persons individually held an unlawful object. If each of those persons shared the same unlawful objective, then that objective would be common, and the presence of five or more such persons would satisfy the legal definition of an unlawful assembly without any need to demonstrate prior concert.

In the Court’s analysis, the presence of five or more individuals sharing a single object would create an unlawful assembly even when there was no prior concert among them. The Court then examined the findings of the High Court concerning alleged incitement. The High Court rejected the version offered by prosecution witnesses, holding that the narrative of a second beating appeared to be an improvement and that it doubted the evidence suggesting that the eleven accused had deliberately murdered the four injured Baories. The only evidence of incitement, however, consisted of statements attributed to Sukha and Gumana, who were said to have called upon others to kill Barsia and subsequently to kill the remaining persons. This incitement was explicit in its call to kill rather than merely to beat. If the Court were to discard this evidence, it would be left without any proof of incitement, and the reasoning behind the learned Judges’ conclusions would become unclear. Consequently, the Court was required to determine whether any proper basis existed for upholding the convictions.

The Court understood that the learned Sessions Judge accepted the initial portion of the factual narration, referred to as step No I, while excluding the part that alleged an incitement to kill. The Sessions Judge concluded that a meeting had taken place between Sukha and Gumana on one side and Parsia and Chhotiya on the other. He observed that, according to the witnesses, the altercation began with only a couple of persons fighting; upon hearing the cries, relatives, friends, and other villagers arrived at the scene, and some of those villagers proceeded to beat the Baories. At this stage, the Court noted that there was no unlawful assembly at the commencement of the beating, and it could not be inferred that every individual who rushed to the site—whether the number was thirty or one‑hundred and fifty—formed an unlawful assembly. Therefore, the evidence needed careful scrutiny to determine what transpired subsequently. The finding was that all eleven accused charged with murder had participated in beating the injured persons, satisfying one element of rioting, namely the presence of five or more persons. Nevertheless, this alone was insufficient; the law also required the existence of an “assembly” that possessed a “common object,” and that object had to be “unlawful.” The Court emphasized that a common object differed from a common intention because it did not necessitate a prior concert or a pre‑existing meeting of minds before the attack, and an unlawful object could emerge after the participants arrived. The Court refrained from re‑examining the evidence in the special leave context, stating that the factual circumstances allowed courts of fact to infer that an unlawful object had developed and been shared by more than five individuals once the beating began. Since two lower courts of fact were satisfied that such an unlawful common object existed, the Court found no reason to interfere with those determinations.

The Court observed that individuals who arrived at the scene initially did so lawfully, perhaps believing that thieves were present, and that they could subsequently develop an intention to strike the alleged thieves rather than to apprehend them or protect their property. The Court explained that when five or more persons share such an unlawful intention and act together in the beating, that intention becomes a common object. However, the Court cautioned that this does not mean that every person present belonged to that assembly, because the presumption of innocence barred such a sweeping conclusion. Those who rushed to the location in the circumstances described were to be presumed to have come for a lawful purpose even if they were armed, since apprehending marauders who rove at night and defending person and property are lawful objectives. The Court stressed that once that lawful purpose is exceeded and the persons begin to beat the suspects, the beating becomes unlawful, because private citizens have no greater right than the police to strike and ill‑treat alleged thieves, especially when only suspicion exists. If five or more persons exceed the original lawful purpose, each harboring the same unlawful intention, and they act together in the beating, they in themselves constitute an unlawful assembly. The Court noted that the principle is the same as when the original object is unlawful; the only difference is that such a case is harder to prove and requires more careful scrutiny, which the Court found to be satisfied by the evidence on record.

The Court then examined whether the eleven accused formed an assembly or acted individually without any linking factor. It concluded that the answer was clear: each person, except for Sukha and Gumana who were already present, had come to the spot because they heard the cries of Parsia and Chhotiya and the noise of the fight. This common stimulus created a unifying factor that linked them together as an assembly. Their original purpose in assembling might have been innocent, but the mere fact that a common factor brought them together satisfied the definition of an “assembly,” though the evidence did not, on its own, establish that the assembly was unlawful. The Court proceeded to determine whether any of the members possessed an unlawful object. It found that the object of Sukha and Gumana was unmistakably unlawful. The evidence, which the Court accepted, also showed that the remaining nine individuals actually joined the beating after Sukha had fired his gun at Parsia, causing Parsia to fall, and that they subsequently turned against Parsia’s relatives and friends who came to his aid. Consequently, regardless of each person’s initial purpose, a unity of purpose arose the moment the others joined and continued to assist Sukha and Gumana in the assault, thereby establishing a common unlawful object among the group.

The Court observed that the accused helped to beat the other Baories who had come to Parsia’s assistance. This was not a series of isolated, random acts; rather, it demonstrated a continuous purpose in which each participant strived to achieve the same result. That result was either to aid Sukha and Gumana in assaulting Parsia, Chhotiya and those who intervened on their behalf, or to join the assault for their own reasons. The Court held that the commonality of purpose is a factual inference that the courts of fact are entitled to draw. It was irrelevant whether the additional participants joined because of an initial incitement or whether, upon seeing the assault already under way, they entered the fray of their own accord. As long as each individual shared the objective of beating Parsia, Chhotiya and their supporters, that shared objective rendered their purpose common. The Court distinguished the notion of common intention required by section 34 of the Indian Penal Code from the “common object” described in section 149. Under section 149 a prior meeting of minds is not necessary; it suffices that each participant possesses the same object, that there are five or more persons, and that they act together as an assembly to achieve that object. The Court found that all of these elements were present in the portion of the evidence that had been accepted as true. Consequently, the courts of fact could conclude that the assembly’s object was unlawful, although, at that stage, the highest common denominator of the object was merely to beat, not to kill. Accordingly, the Court affirmed that the convictions recorded by the learned Sessions Judge under section 325 in conjunction with section 149 of the Indian Penal Code were firm and could not be disturbed. The Court then turned to the question of whether the convictions imposed by the High Court under section 302 together with section 149 could be sustained. Neither the Sessions Judge nor the High Court had found a common intention to kill. Therefore, any conviction for the more serious offence of murder could be upheld under section 149 only if it could be shown that (1) a killing of any of the persons attacked was a likely consequence of the beating that constituted the common object, and (2) each person convicted was aware that such a result was likely. Regarding Sukha and Gumana, the Court found no doubt that they initiated the fight with deadly weapons. Sukha fired at least two shots and also assaulted two individuals with his teeth. While Sukha might not have intended to kill and the fact that the injuries were inflicted on non‑vital parts of the body could be considered a mitigating factor, any person who carries a firearm at night, uses it, and then continues the fight after an agitated crowd has gathered, especially when at least nine others rush in to join the beating after the first shot, must know that someone is likely to be killed or at least that the cumulative effect of assaults by a large group armed with lathis could cause death from shock.

The Court noted that a single fatal blow, or at least the cumulative effect of blows delivered by several persons armed with lathis, could reasonably be expected to cause death through shock. Riots of this type are frequent and often result in death, so a killing was a likely consequence of such an assault, and Sukha and Gumana, as men of ordinary intelligence, must have known this. The same line of reasoning applies to the other appellants, who rushed in to strike persons already shot at and already lying on the ground. They entered a crowd that could hardly be described as calm or impassive and joined several others in beating the victims further. Any man of reasonable intelligence would have understood that such a melee would likely result in someone being killed. Consequently, the required knowledge that a killing was a probable outcome can be legally imputed to those appellants as well, given the circumstances. Two specific questions continue to require the Court’s careful consideration before a final determination can be rendered in this appeal. The first question concerns the reliability of the portion of evidence that has been accepted by the trial court. The argument repeatedly presented, though lengthy and eloquent, is the familiar contention that when one part of a witness’s testimony is disbelieved, it becomes unsafe to rely on the remaining portions. The Court responded that this line of reasoning is also familiar, noting that judges of fact possess the authority to make such determinations, and that this proceeding is not an appellate review under article 136. Because the findings on this issue are concurrent, the Court follows its usual practice and declines to re‑examine the evidence. The second question raises the allegation that the omission of a particular point from the charge sheet caused prejudice to the accused. The Court notes that it has recently decided to be cautious in entertaining prejudice claims when the necessary details are not supplied and when the objection is not raised at an early stage. There is no indication of prejudice in the petition filed by the appellants in the High Court seeking leave to appeal to this Court, nor was it raised in petition for special leave filed here. The only allegation of prejudice relates to the claim that there was no proper examination under section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Court therefore declines to permit this issue to be raised for consideration in these proceedings, finding the objection unsubstantiated. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the appeal cannot succeed and ordered that it be fully dismissed with prejudice.