Ratan Rai vs State of Bihar

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 104 of 1955

Decision Date: 30 January 1956

Coram: Bhagwati J.

In the case titled Ratan Rai versus State of Bihar, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 30 January 1956. The petitioner was Ratan Rai and the respondent was the State of Bihar. The decision was rendered by a Bench of the Supreme Court and concerned the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, specifically section 307 as amended by Act XXVI of 1955.

The headnote recorded that the appellants had been charged under sections 435 and 436 of the Indian Penal Code. They were tried by a jury which returned a majority verdict of guilty. The Assistant Sessions Judge, however, disagreed with that verdict and referred the matter to the High Court. At the hearing of the reference, counsel for the appellants argued only that the charge presented to the jury was defective. Counsel did not place the whole record of evidence before the judges; the judges considered merely the objections raised. Consequently the High Court held the reference to be incompetent, found the appellants guilty and sentenced them.

The Court held that when a reference is made under section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the counsel’s duty is to present the entire evidence and the charge as framed for the jury. It is likewise incumbent upon the High Court to consider that complete evidence, to weigh the opinion of the trial judge and the jury’s verdict, and then to reach its own conclusion on whether to acquit or convict the accused of the offences that the jury could have decided. The High Court was therefore wrong to pass judgment without examining the full evidence. The Supreme Court also observed that it would not be proper for it to substitute the procedure required of the High Court under section 307(3), namely a full consideration of the evidence, and to reach a conclusion that the High Court ought to have made.

The judgment noted references to earlier decisions, namely Akhlakali Hayatalli v. State of Bombay (1954) S.C.R. 435 and Ramanugrah Singh v. The Emperor, A.I.R. 1946 P.C. 151, which were considered relevant. The appeal arose under Criminal Appeal No. 104 of 1955, filed by special leave from the Patna High Court’s order dated 9 September 1953 in Jury Reference No. I of 1952. The reference had originated on 16 February 1952 by the Assistant Sessions Judge of the Second Court at Chapra in connection with Sessions Trial No. 81 of 1951. Counsel for the appellants were represented by S. P. Verma, while the respondent was represented by B. K. Saran and R. C. Prasad. The judgment was delivered by Justice Bhagwati.

The trial had been conducted in the presence of a jury. The jury returned a majority verdict finding the two appellants guilty of the offences charged under sections 435 and 436 of the Indian Penal Code. The Assistant Sessions Judge, however, disagreed with the jury’s conclusion and issued a reference to the Patna High Court under section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The reference was heard by a Division Bench of that High Court. The learned judges of the High Court dismissed the arguments that the charge presented to the jury was defective and held that, in the circumstances, the reference was not competent. Nevertheless, the judges accepted the majority verdict without further inquiry, declared the appellants guilty of the offences under sections 435 and 436 of the Indian Penal Code, and sentenced each of them to six months of rigorous imprisonment. The appellants subsequently obtained special leave to appeal to this Court under article 136 of the Constitution, and the present appeal was filed.

The factual background to the appeal concerned a dispute over ownership of plot number 1100 in the village of Rampur, Tengrahi. Kailash Rai asserted that he owned the plot and that he possessed a Palani (a thatched structure) situated on a portion of the plot as well as a Punjaul, a haystack located nearby. The dispute gave rise to proceedings under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, culminating in a title suit designated T.S. No. 58/8 of 1948/50, filed by Kailash Rai against the appellants concerning the same land. On 16 December 1950, the trial court passed a decree dismissing Kailash Rai’s claim. Kailash Rai appealed against that decree, and the appeal remained pending at the time of the incident in question.

On 4 March 1951, Kailash Rai was seated on the Palani at about three to four in the afternoon when a mob of approximately one hundred to one hundred twenty‑five persons, including the appellants, arrived armed with lathes, bhallas and pharsas. The mob began to demolish the Palani. Kailash Rai protested, and the deceased appellant No. 1 ordered that the Palani be set on fire. Subsequently, appellant No. 2 ignited the Palani with a match‑stick, while appellant No. 3 set fire to the Punjaul. The first information report of this incident was lodged at Gopalganj Police Station at eight o’clock that evening. The officer in charge of the police station investigated the matter and filed a charge‑sheet against the appellants alleging offences under sections 435 and 436 of the Indian Penal Code. The committing court found that a prima facie case existed against the appellants and committed them for trial before the Assistant Sessions Judge, Second Court, Chapra, who conducted the trial with a jury. The jury returned a majority verdict of guilt against the appellants, after which the Assistant Sessions Judge expressed disagreement with that verdict.

The Assistant Sessions Judge did not accept the jury’s majority verdict and therefore sent a reference to the High Court. In the letter of reference he stated that, based on the evidence before him, the appellants had lawfully possessed the Palani and the Punjaul but had been dispossessed of both properties sometime before the decree in the title suit was passed on 16 December 1950. He further observed that the appellants were justified in attempting to recover possession of those assets from Kailash Rai on 4 March 1951. Consequently, if the appellants had set fire to the Palani and the Punjaul during that recovery attempt, they had merely destroyed their own property and therefore could not be held guilty of the offence of mischief by fire that the prosecution alleged. The judge also examined how the jury arrived at its verdict. While he concurred with the jury’s factual finding that the appellants had possessed the Palani and the Punjaul, he disagreed with the legal conclusion that the jury applied. On that basis he dissented from the majority verdict.

When the High Court heard the reference, counsel for the appellants argued that the charge framed by the Assistant Sessions Judge for the jury was defective. The counsel further maintained that the judge should have invited the High Court to consider the entire body of evidence and to determine, after giving due weight to the opinions of the Sessions Judge and the jury, whether the appellants should be acquitted or convicted of the offences that the jury could have convicted them of, as required by section 307 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Instead, the High Court considered only the objection concerning the alleged defect in the charge, overruled that objection, accepted the jury’s majority verdict, convicted the appellants and imposed the sentences mentioned earlier. The Court now holds that, by taking that course, the High Court acted in clear error and contravened the provisions of section 307 (3). Section 307 (3) provides that, in dealing with a reference, the High Court may exercise any power it could exercise on an appeal; subject to that, after considering the entire evidence and giving due weight to the opinions of the Sessions Judge and the jury, it may acquit or convict the accused of any offence the jury could have convicted him of under the charge framed, and, if it convicts, may pass a sentence that might have been passed by the Court of Sessions. The Court noted that the same provision had been examined in Akhlakali Hayatalli v. State of Bombay, where it approved the observations of the Privy Council in Ramanugrah Singh v. The Emperor, emphasizing the scope of the High Court’s powers under the subsection.

The Court explained that the powers granted to the High Court by subsection (3) of section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure include any power that may be exercised on appeal, expressly permitting the High Court to call fresh evidence under section 428. Accordingly, the High Court was required to examine the whole case, to give appropriate weight to the opinions of both the Sessions Judge and the jury, and then to either acquit or convict the accused on the charge that had been framed and presented to the jury. In the Court’s view, the foremost consideration for the High Court was whether the interests of justice demanded that the jury’s verdict be set aside. Generally, when the evidence is such that it could properly support either a verdict of guilty or a verdict of not guilty, depending on the perspective adopted by the trial court, and the jury adopts one view while the judge believes the opposite view should have been taken, the jury’s view must prevail because the jury serves as the finder of fact. In such circumstances a reference to the High Court is not justified; the High Court can only accord proper respect to the jury’s opinion by accepting it. However, if the High Court, after reviewing the evidence, concluded that no reasonable body of men could have arrived at the conclusion reached by the jury, then the reference would be justified and the ends of justice would require that the jury’s verdict be disregarded. The Court declared that this approach represented the correct method of dealing with a reference under section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was incumbent upon the High Court, when hearing the reference, to consider the entire body of evidence and to reach its own conclusion as to whether the evidence could properly sustain a guilty verdict against the appellants. If the High Court found that the evidence could indeed allow the jury to reach a guilty finding, even though the trial judge thought a different view should have been taken, the reference would be unwarranted and the High Court should have accepted the jury’s opinion. Conversely, if the High Court was of the opinion that, based on the evidence, no reasonable group of men could have arrived at the jury’s conclusion, the reference would be fully justified and the ends of justice would demand that the verdict be set aside. The Court noted that the High Court, in the present case, limited its consideration to the arguments concerning a defect in the charge addressed to the jury and raised by counsel for the appellants, without examining the entire evidence that lay on the record. By failing to undertake such a comprehensive review, the Court held that the High Court had violated the provisions of subsection (3) of section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the Court concluded that the judgment of the High Court, which accepted the majority verdict, convicted the appellants and sentenced them without a full consideration of the evidence, was clearly erroneous.

The Court therefore determined that the conviction of the appellants and the sentences imposed upon them should be set aside. The Court was invited by counsel for the parties appearing before it to examine the whole evidence and to reach the conclusion that, according to the provisions of section 307 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the High Court should have reached. The Court declined to adopt a different procedure, opted to allow the appeal, and remanded the matter to the High Court with directions to act in conformity with the provisions of section 307 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and to conduct the reference in accordance with law. The appellants were ordered to continue on the same bail that had previously been granted. The appeal was allowed.

The Court observed that sentencing the accused without examining the whole record of evidence was plainly erroneous, and consequently both the conviction and the sentences imposed on the appellants must be set aside. Counsel for the parties requested that this Court review the complete evidence and reach a determination, a step that, according to section 307 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the High Court ought to have undertaken. The Court, however, concluded that it would not be appropriate for it to adopt that procedure. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted to the High Court with directions to proceed in conformity with the requirements of section 307 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and to adjudicate the case in accordance with law. The Court further ordered that the appellants remain on the bail that had previously been granted to them. The appeal was therefore allowed.