Ram Chandra Palai And Others vs The State Of Orissa And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 20 January 1956

Coram: Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, B. Jagannadhadas, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Syed Jaffer Imam

In the matter titled Ram Chandra Palai and Others versus the State of Orissa and Others, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 20 January 1956. The opinion was authored by Justice Natwarlal H. Bhagwati. The bench that considered the petition consisted of Justice Natwarlal H. Bhagwati together with Justices B. Jagannadhadas, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha and Syed Jaffer Imam. The case is reported in the All India Reporter at page 298 of the 1956 volume and also appears in the Supreme Court Reports, volume eight, page 28. The parties before the Court were the petitioners, identified as Ram Chandra Palai and other stage-carriage proprietors, and the respondents, identified as the State of Orissa together with the statutory authorities that had issued the impugned legislation. The official citation of the decision appears as 1956 AIR 298 and also as 1956 SCR (8) 28, reflecting its publication in the All India Reporter and the Supreme Court Reports respectively. The bench was recorded as comprising Justice Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Justice B. Jagannadhadas, Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Justice Syed Jaffer Imam, and additionally mentioned as including Justice Natwalal H. Das and Justice Sudhi Ranjan Jagannadhadas in certain reports. The matter was presented as a petition challenging the constitutional validity of statutes that regulated stage-carriage and public carrier services in the State of Orissa. The petitioners sought relief on the ground that the enactments infringed several guarantees of the Constitution, including the right to equality, the right to property, the freedom to trade and the freedom of commerce.

The petitioners were proprietors of stage-carriage services who possessed permits that had been granted under the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939. The Government of Orissa, relying on its policy of creating a nationalised state transport system, enacted the Orissa Motor Vehicles (Regulation of Stage Carriage and Public Carrier's Services) Act of 1947, designated as Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947, and thereafter amended it by the Orissa Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act of 1948, known as Orissa Act I of 1949. Both statutes contained provisions that authorised the State to issue notifications directing owners of stage-carriage services operating distinct routes within Orissa's districts that, effective from 1 January 1955, either the Orissa Road Transport Company Limited or the State Transport Service established under the two Acts would have exclusive rights to run those routes. The petitioners challenged the validity of these Acts, asserting that they were violative of their fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India. They contended that the two Acts, each containing materially different provisions, discriminated against private stage-carriage owners in favour of the newly created transport entities and were applied arbitrarily across different zones, thereby contravening Article fourteen of the Constitution. The petitioners further argued that the statutory provisions and the rules framed thereunder imposed restrictions on their rights to hold property and to carry on trade or business, thereby infringing Articles nineteen-one-f and nineteen-one-g. They maintained that the notifications, which effectively removed their transport operations, amounted to a confiscation of property without the payment of compensation, in breach of Article thirty-one-two. Finally, the petitioners claimed that the Acts violated the constitutional guarantee of freedom of inter-state and intra-state trade secured by Article three-hundred-one. The Court observed that owners of stage-carriage services who operated on a particular route or within a defined geographical area constituted a distinct group or class by virtue of their common interests. Accordingly, the Court held that so long as each

In this case the Court explained that when the administration must decide which of the two Acts challenged by the petitioners, or the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 that they sought to amend, should be applied to a particular locality for the sake of administrative convenience, the choice of the appropriate Act, the method of implementing its scheme, and any zonal or territorial distinctions that the administration thought fit for the diverse circumstances of each locality could not be characterised as discriminatory or as violating the guarantee of equal protection of the law. The Court further observed that the status of the permit-holders under the two statutes was not identical; the two groups were materially different and fell into two separate classes, and therefore the requirement to pay compensation under one statute while no compensation was required under the other did not constitute discrimination. The Court then turned to the argument that the statutes created a monopoly in favour of either the Joint-Stock Company or the State by removing private stage-carriage operators from the market and thereby infringing Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. It held that this contention could no longer be sustained because Article 19(6), inserted by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act of 1951, permits reasonable restrictions in the public interest; consequently the decision in Saghir Ahmad v. State of U P. ([1965] 1 S.C.R. 707) was held inapplicable, whereas the principles laid down in Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh ([1955] 2 S.C.R. 589) were applied. The Court further concluded that the provisions of the impugned Acts did not run contrary to Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(2) because the 1947 Act expressly provided compensation for premature termination of licences and the 1949 Act denied any automatic right of renewal, making any deprivation of proprietary rights a matter authorised by law. Regarding the claim that the freedom of inter-state or intra-state trade guaranteed by Article 301 of the Constitution was infringed, the Court held that this freedom is not a fundamental right enforceable under Article 32; additionally, Article 305, as amended by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act of 1955, fully answered the petitioners’ contention. The original jurisdiction comprised Petitions Nos. 604, 605, 647-649, 663, 671 and 692 of 1954 filed under Article 32 for enforcement of fundamental rights. Counsel for the petitioners included a senior advocate and junior counsel, while the Attorney-General of India and his junior counsel appeared for the respondents. The judgment was delivered on 20 January 1956, addressing the challenges raised by the owners of stage-carriage services operating buses in various districts of Orissa against the provisions of the Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 and the Orissa Act I of 1949, and noting that the matters presented a common question of law suitable for adjudication in a single judgment.

The State of Orissa began a programme of nationalised transport and, as an initial measure, passed the Orissa Motor Vehicles (Regulation of Stage Carriage and Public Carrier’s Services) Act, 1947 (referred to as Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947). That legislation altered the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 so that stage-carriage and public-carrier services could be regulated more effectively within the Province of Orissa. The Act contemplated the creation of a joint-stock company in which both the Central Government and the Provincial Government would possess controlling interests, with the purpose of providing, either in phases or in a single step, a more efficient administration of the entire system of stage-carriage and public-carrier services throughout the province. This company was to be empowered to operate stage-carriage and public-carrier services exclusively in the routes and areas over which it exercised its functions, and consequently the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was amended in the manner prescribed by the 1947 Act. Section 4 of the 1947 Act authorized the Provincial Government, whenever it deemed appropriate, to issue a notification that would place in abeyance the powers conferred by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 on a Provincial Transport Authority or a Regional Transport Authority with respect to the issuance, renewal, suspension or transfer of permits for stage-carriage and public-carrier services. Such a notification could be applicable to the whole province, to a specifically identified area, or to particular routes. Upon the issuance of the notification, the powers of the Provincial or Regional Transport Authority were suspended, all permits that had been issued, renewed or transferred by those authorities became inoperative, and the Provincial Government alone acquired the authority to issue or renew permits, to grant temporary permits, or to suspend or transfer permits for stage-carriage and public-carrier services. While the State was still considering the formation of the joint-stock company, the merger of the feudatory states with the Province of Orissa took place on 1 January 1948. Several of those former princely states had operated their own transport services, which were subsequently taken over by the State Government of Orissa. For the purpose of orderly development of road transport, the province was divided into five zones: Sambalpur, Keonjhar, Koraput, Ganjam and Cuttack. The Government resolved to nationalise passenger-service transport in the first three zones, to be administered departmentally on the basis of the core services acquired from the merged feudatory states. To implement this policy, the Orissa Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1948 (Orissa Act I of 1949) was enacted, further amending the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 as specified therein. Section 1(3) of the amendment provided that the remaining provisions of the Act would come into force in the areas designated by the Provincial Government.

The Provincial Government was empowered to designate, by means of a formal notification, any district or group of districts as “specified areas” for the purpose of applying the remaining provisions of the Act. The same authority also enabled the Government, through a subsequent notification, to withdraw those remaining provisions from any area that had previously been specified. Moreover, the legislation stipulated that from the moment the remaining provisions became operative in a specified area, the provisions of Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 would be repealed with respect to that area. Conversely, if the Government later withdrew the remaining provisions from a specified area, the provisions of Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 would be deemed revived in that area, effective from the date on which the withdrawal notification was published.

The practical consequence of these provisions was as follows: in any district where no notification under section 4(1) of Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 had been issued, the original Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 continued to apply. Where a notification under that section had been issued, the provisions of Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 became applicable, except in those cases where, pursuant to the power preserved in section 1 of Orissa Act I of 1949, a further notification brought the remaining provisions of the 1949 Act into force for that area. In such instances the 1947 Act’s provisions were repealed for the specified area and the 1949 Act’s provisions applied instead. These three possible situations—(i) continued application of the 1939 Act, (ii) application of the 1947 Act, and (iii) replacement of the 1947 Act by the 1949 Act—were the only legal regimes that could exist in any district after the enactment of Orissa Act I of 1949, depending on which notifications had been issued under section 4(1) of the 1947 Act or section 1(4) of the 1949 Act.

The 1947 Act had envisaged the creation of a Joint-Stock Company in which both the Central Government and the Provincial Government would hold controlling interests. In contrast, the 1949 Act introduced the concept of a “State Transport Service,” defined as a service in which the State of Orissa possessed an entire or partial financial interest and which the Provincial Government could, by notification, declare to be a State Transport Service for the purposes of the Act. Accordingly, in 1950 a Joint-Stock Company named the Orissa Road Transport Co., Ltd. was established. The transport operations conducted through this company were referred to as “Rationalised Services,” whereas the operations conducted under the State Transport Service were termed “Nationalised Services.” Pursuing the scheme of Nationalised State Transport, the State Government of Orissa issued official notifications and press notes to inform the owners of Stage Carrier Services that, effective from 1 January 1955, either the Orissa Road Transport Co., Ltd. or the State Transport Service would assume operation of the respective routes on which those owners were presently engaged.

In response to the notification that the State Transport Service or the Orissa Road Transport Co., Ltd. would operate the routes previously served by private stage-carriage operators, the owners of those private bus services filed petitions challenging the constitutionality of Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 and Orissa Act I of 1949. The petitions were not limited only to those routes where the State Government planned to introduce either Rationalised Services or Nationalised Services. The petitions numbered 604 of 1954, 648 of 1954, 664 of 1954, 666 of 1954 and 671 of 1954 sought to contest the nationalisation scheme; the petitioners in those cases contended that the routes on which they operated would be transferred to the State Transport Service. The petitions numbered 605 of 1954, 647 of 1954, 649 of 1954, 663 of 1954 and 665 of 1954 concerned the rationalisation scheme; the petitioners in those matters argued that the routes would be taken over by the Orissa Road Transport Co., Ltd. Petition 692 of 1954 did not specify whether the State Government intended to nationalise or to rationalise the particular route involved. Despite this uncertainty, a common issue emerged for all petitioners: the permits that had authorised them to run their buses on the respective routes for many years were at risk of termination, cancellation, or non-renewal under the new Nationalised Road Transport Services scheme, and the State Government or the Transport Authorities would thereafter grant permits on those routes only to either the Orissa Road Transport Co., Ltd. or the State Transport Service, as appropriate. The petitioners attacked the provisions of the two impugned Acts on several constitutional grounds. They argued that the Acts created discrimination in favour of the State Transport Service and the Orissa Road Transport Co., Ltd., violating the equality clause of Article 14 of the Constitution because the State could not favour itself or the jointly-owned company at the expense of private operators. They further maintained that the Acts imposed zonal and territorial discrimination, which likewise contravened Article 14. Additional grounds of challenge asserted that the Acts and the rules made thereunder infringed Article 19(1)(f) and Article 19(1)(g) by restricting the right to hold property and the right to practice any trade, business, or profession. The petitioners also claimed a breach of Article 31(2), contending that the Gazette Notification issued by the State of Orissa effectively confiscated their motor-transport businesses without providing any compensation for the commercial interests that were being acquired. Finally, they alleged that the Acts violated the guarantee of freedom of inter-State and intra-State trade embodied in Article 301 of the Constitution.

In this case the Court observed that the challenge also encompassed the right to engage in intra-state trade as embodied in article 301 of the Constitution. The Court turned its attention to the specific provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 together with Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 and Orissa Act I of 1949, all of which dealt with the issuance and renewal of motor-vehicle permits. Under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 the Provincial Transport Authority and the Regional Transport Authority were given the necessary powers to grant such permits. Sections 47 and 55 of that Act set out the factors that the Regional Transport Authority had to consider when evaluating applications for stage-carriage permits and public carrier permits, while section 58 dealt with the period of validity and the renewal of those permits. The Act further provided that, all other things being equal, renewal applications should receive priority over applications for new permits.

When a notification was issued pursuant to section 4(1) of Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947, the Court noted that the powers previously vested in the Provincial Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 were suspended, and the Provincial Government alone acquired the authority to issue or renew permits. In exercising that authority, the Provincial Government was not required to consider the criteria laid down in sections 47 or 55 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Moreover, the notification authorized the Provincial Government to cancel any permit that had been granted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 without observing the procedure prescribed in section 60 of that Act. The only safeguard contained in section 6 of Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 was that, where a permit became inoperative under section 4(2) or was cancelled under section 5 of that Act, the holder of the permit was entitled to compensation as specified in the provision.

The Court further explained that sections 3 and 4 of Orissa Act I of 1949 introduced two additional clauses to sections 47 and 55 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Clause (g) stated that, other conditions being equal, in the interest of proper coordination of transport facilities, it was expedient to give due consideration to a State Transport Service. Clause (h) required the prevention of unhealthy competition on any route or area where the State Transport Service might operate. The Court pointed out that the overall scheme of Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 together with Orissa Act I of 1949 was designed to remove private owners of stage-carriage services from the market and to create a de facto monopoly favouring the Orissa Road Transport Co. Ltd. or the State Transport Service, thereby discriminating against private persons in favour of the joint-stock company or the State. Although the Provincial Government possessed the power to issue or renew permits that had become inoperative under section 4(2)(b) of Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947, the Court observed that this power could be exercised only in accordance with the objective that the State Government had in mind when enacting the Act, and the practical effect would be the issuance of permits solely in favour of the State Transport Service.

The Court observed that under Orissa Act I of 1949 the situation would not improve even though clauses (g) and (h) had been inserted into sections 47 and 55 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Those clauses required giving due consideration to a State Transport Service and preventing unhealthy competition, but the effect of both requirements would be to extinguish the privately owned stage-carriage service entirely and to replace it with the State Transport Service. The Court also noted that the State Government had arbitrarily selected certain districts—such as Ganjam, Puri and parts of Cuttack District—to commence the Orissa Road Transport Co. Ltd., while it introduced the State Transport Service in other districts, namely Sambalpur, Keonjhar, Bolangir and some parts of Cuttack District, without any rational basis. Consequently, Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 was applied to the former districts and Orissa Act I of 1949 to the latter districts. Because the provisions of the two Acts differed materially, the Court held that applying one Act to some districts and the other Act to the remaining districts violated the guarantee of equal protection of the laws guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the owners of stage-carriage services to whom Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 applied enjoyed an additional benefit: compensation under section 6 of that Act, a benefit that was unavailable to owners subject to Orissa Act I of 1949. The Court also identified another advantage for persons covered by Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947. Section 8 of that Act authorised the Provincial Government, upon cancellation of permits, to issue a notification requiring the permit holders or owners to sell any specified vehicle or vehicles and any associated movable or immovable property to the Company at rates assessed in the prescribed manner. This provision did not apply to those governed by Orissa Act I of 1949. The Court recalled that the scheme of nationalised State Transport originated in a White Paper issued by the Government of India in late 1944, which sought to remove obstacles to the proper development of road transport, to provide cheap, efficient and rapid road-transport services, and to eliminate wasteful competition. The matter had been discussed at the Transport Advisory Council meeting of 1945, where the Council drafted a code of principles and practices for regulating the coordination of rail-road transport services, a code later ratified by the State Government.

In this case, the Court explained that the Nationalised State Transport scheme, which had been approved by the Government of India, was adopted by the State of Orissa and that the State Government subsequently took a number of measures to give effect to the scheme. The initial measure involved passing Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947. That legislation contemplated the creation of a joint-stock company in which both the Central Government and the Provincial Government would hold controlling shares. However, before such a company could be organised, the feudatory States that had previously existed within Orissa were merged into the Province on 1 January 1948. Following that merger, the State Government assumed control of the transport services that had belonged to those former States; those services were subsequently placed under the management of the State Government of Orissa. The transport operations that the State now owned became the core around which the Government considered an alternative method of implementing the Nationalised State Transport scheme, and consequently Orissa Act I of 1949 was enacted. That later Act provided for a State Transport Service intended to achieve the same objectives as the earlier scheme.

The Court noted that, once the State Government had embraced the two distinct methods of implementation—namely, the formation of a joint-stock company under the 1947 Act and the establishment of a State Transport Service under the 1949 Act—a question inevitably arose as to how these two different approaches could be reconcened so as to fulfil the overall purpose of the scheme. The Government recognised that the transport services already owned by the State had to be employed to the extent that they were available. Accordingly, the State Government decided to apply the 1949 Act to certain districts of Orissa, while leaving the remaining districts to be served under the arrangement envisioned by the 1947 Act. This division of the State’s districts on a zonal, territorial or geographical basis was guided by the pattern of transport services that the Government had acquired from the merged States. The Court emphasized that, provided the division was made in accordance with the actual situation on the ground, no valid ground existed for a challenge based on alleged discrimination or denial of equal protection of the laws.

The Court further stressed that the essential requirement was that owners of stage-carriage services operating on a particular route or within a specific area should not be subjected to differential treatment. If all such owners were governed by the same statutory provision, they could not legitimately claim discrimination. The Court observed that the owners in question effectively constituted a separate class that could be dealt with in a uniform manner, taking into account the practical exigencies of each locality. The Government, being the most knowledgeable authority regarding the circumstances prevailing in each locality, was therefore best placed to decide whether the application of the 1947 Act or the 1949 Act was appropriate for the effective implementation of the Nationalised State Transport scheme. The Court concluded that, where State Transport Services were insufficient in number or unable to meet the desired objectives, the State Government retained the discretion to form a joint-stock company as contemplated by the 1947 Act, or, if that was not feasible within a reasonable time, to allow the pre-existing arrangements governed solely by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, to continue. This discretion, the Court held, was exercised for administrative convenience and could not be faulted merely because different districts or parts of districts were served under different statutory regimes.

When the State Transport Services were not present in sufficient number to fulfil the objectives of the scheme, the Court explained that the State Government possessed full authority to create a Joint-Stock Company in accordance with the provisions of Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947. If, however, the establishment of such a Joint-Stock Company could not be accomplished within a reasonable period, the Government was also entitled to maintain the previous arrangement, whereby the owners of stage-carriage services would remain subject solely to the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939. The choice between these two alternatives depended entirely on considerations of administrative convenience. Consequently, the Court observed that no criticism could be levelled against the Government for adopting one method of implementation in a particular district or part of a district and a different method in another district or another part of the same district, provided that all persons operating on a given route or situated in a specific area or district were treated alike and without any discrimination. The Court further held that such zonal, territorial, or geographical differentiation did not contravene the principle of equal protection of the laws.

The petitioners also argued that Orissa Act I of 1949 had been applied to some stage-carriage owners, and that this Act offered no compensation, unlike the provisions that applied under Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947. They claimed that this disparity amounted to discrimination among the owners of stage-carriage services and therefore violated Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court rejected this contention, noting that under Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 any permit issued or renewed by the Provincial Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority could be rendered inoperative or cancelled by the Provincial Government, and the affected permit holders were entitled to compensation for the premature termination. By contrast, the owners whose permits fell under Orissa Act I of 1949 remained on a different footing: their permits continued for the normal period and, when those permits expired, the renewal process was governed by the provisions inserted in clauses (f) and (g) of sections 47 and 55 of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939. The Court clarified that the decision to renew or not renew these permits could not be equated with the premature cancellation of permits under the earlier Act, and consequently the two groups of permit holders did not belong to the same class for purposes of the equality clause.

The Court observed that the provisions of Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 applied to a distinct set of services, and therefore the two situations under consideration were not alike. Permit holders who were governed by Orissa Act I of 1949 did not belong to the same class or group as those whose permits were issued under Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947. Consequently, the Court held that there could be no claim of discrimination between these two categories of permit holders, and it could not be validly asserted that the provisions of the Acts, insofar as they applied to different classes, infringed the equality guarantee embodied in article 14 of the Constitution. The Court further rejected the contention that the impugned statutes were designed to eliminate private stage-carriage services entirely and to create a virtual monopoly for a Joint-Stock Company or for the State. The petitioners had relied heavily on the decision in Saghir Ahmad’s case. However, the Court noted that article 19(6) of the Constitution, as amended by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, provides that “Nothing in sub-clause (g) shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevents the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevents the State from making any law relating to—(i)… (ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise.” This amendment, the Court explained, eliminates any argument that the statutes were intended to oust privately owned stage-carriage services or to create a monopoly in favour of a Joint-Stock Company or the State. Accordingly, the Orissa Road Transport Co. Ltd., a Joint-Stock Company formed under Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947, and the State Transport Services envisioned under Orissa Act I of 1949 were permitted to continue their operations even if such continuation resulted in the total removal of private stage-carriage services, without contravening the fundamental right guaranteed by article 19(1)(g). The petitioners further argued that the amendment of article 19(6) should not affect the position because the Acts had been in force before the amendment and that relief should be granted based on the earlier decision in Saghir Ahmad’s case. A similar line of argument had been raised in Petitions Nos. 189 to 193 of 1955, referred to as the Bhikaji petitions.

In the matter of Narain Dhakras versus the State of Madhya Pra­desh and another, the Court examined the respondents’ argument that, although the amending Act had become void on 26 January 1950 under the decision in Saghir Ahmad’s case to the extent it conflicted with article 19(1)(g), the situation changed after 18 June 1951 when clause (6) of article 19 was amended by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951. The respondents contended that the amendment now permitted a law to create a state monopoly in the motor-transport business and therefore the amending Act was again consistent with the revised article 19(1)(g) and could operate even against the citizens. The Court held that the respondents’ contentions regarding the effect of the First Amendment were well-founded, while the objections raised by the petitioners were untenable and had to be rejected.

The Court found it unnecessary to analyse the petitioners’ further claim that their fundamental rights under article 19(1)(f) and article 31(2) had been infringed. It observed that if the permits granted to the petitioners under the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 were prematurely terminated or cancelled pursuant to the provisions of Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947, the same Act provided for compensation, thereby satisfying any claim of loss. Likewise, where a permit expired after the holder had lawfully operated for the prescribed period and was not renewed under the provisions of Orissa Act I of 1949, the petitioners could not assert a right to renewal because renewal was not a matter of legal right. The Provincial Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority was therefore within its statutory authority to refuse renewal, relying on the amended sections 47 and 55 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939. Even if such refusal resulted in a deprivation of proprietary rights, it would have been effected by legitimate authority of law.

Finally, the Court declined to examine the petitioners’ argument that the impugned Acts violated the guarantee of freedom of inter-state and intra-state trade or business embodied in article 301 of the Constitution. It noted that article 301 does not constitute a fundamental right enforceable through a petition under article 32. Moreover, article 305, both as it stood before the amendment and as amended by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, provided a complete answer to that contention. Consequently, the Court concluded that none of the petitioners’ submissions possessed any substantive merit and that the petitions should remain dismissed, as had already been ordered.