Raja Ram Chandra Reddy and Anr vs Rani Shankaramma and Ors

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Appeal (civil) 193 of 1955

Decision Date: 11 February, 1956

Coram: S.R. Das, N.H. Bhagwati, B. Jagannadhadas, B.P. Sinha, S.J. Imam

In this matter, the case titled Raja Ram Chandra Reddy and Anr versus Rani Shankaramma and Ors was decided on 11 February 1956 by the Supreme Court of India. The appeal, identified as Civil Appeal 193 of 1955, was filed by the petitioner Raja Ram Chandra Reddy and his associate against the respondents Rani Shankaramma and others. The appeal challenged the judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of Hyderabad dated 12 August 1952, a decision from which leave had been granted by that court under Article 133(1) of the Constitution on 8 October 1952. The judgment was authored by Justice Jagannadhadas.

The dispute originated in a long-running controversy that began around the year 1930 between the widow of the late Raja Durga Reddy, namely Rani Lakshmayamma, who appears as the second appellant, and Raja Durga Reddy’s daughter, Rani Shankaramma, who is the first respondent. Raja Durga Reddy died on 2 April 1900 leaving a substantial estate that included the Jagir Samashtanam of Papannapet. At the time of his death, his widow was approximately sixteen years old and his daughter was about one year old. Following his death, the Court of Wards assumed control of the entire estate pursuant to Government notifications published in the Hyderabad Gazette on 21 May 1900 and on 4 June 1900.

Subsequent succession proceedings concerning the Jagir Papannapet Samasthanam culminated in a Firman issued by the Nizam on 29 May 1903, which sanctioned succession in favour of the daughter, Rani Shankaramma. The relevant passage of that Firman reads: “As regards succession, it should be sanctioned in favour of Durga Reddy’s daughter. The boy that may be born of his daughter will be recognised as entitled to the Samasthan after her, provided Durga Reddy’s daughter is married to a boy by the sanction of the Government. Till Durga Reddy’s daughter attains her age of discretion, his widow shall be regarded as the legal guardian of her daughter; but supervision over the revenue and expenditure of the Samasthan will be exercised by the Court of Wards. The Court of Wards will, however, have the power to allow the widow to take part in the management of the Samasthan when and to the extent it thinks fit.”

Six years later, on the basis of the Nizam’s approval, Rani Shankaramma was married to Venkata Pratap Reddy, who was the brother of Rani Lakshmayamma, by a Firman dated 15 October 1909. Rani Shankaramma reached the age of majority in 1920. On 22 January 1920, an application was filed on her behalf seeking the release of the estate from the control of the Court of Wards. In response, the Nizam issued another Firman on 24 December 1920, which continued the supervision of the Court of Wards. The operative portion of that Firman states: “There is nothing in the Firman of his last Highness which would necessitate the release of the estate from the supervision of the Court of Wards as a matter of course after the late Durga Reddy’s daughter attaining majority. Although the girl is now twenty-one years old and has been married by sanction of the Government, as she has no issue, it was recently necessary to remove from the estate such self-interested persons as Abdul Hai, etc.; it is not advisable to lift the supervision of the Court of Wards from the estate in its present state. The supervision shall be allowed to continue. The case may be considered in the future if Durga Reddy’s daughter begets a son.”

The Court observed that the Firman issued by the late Highness, which is understood to be the Firman of 1903, did not contain any provision that would automatically require the estate to be released from the supervision of the Court of Wards upon the attainment of majority by the daughter of the late Durga Reddy. Although the daughter had now reached the age of twenty-one years and had been married with the sanction of the Government, she had no issue, and it had recently become necessary to remove from the estate persons who were acting in a self-interested manner, such as Abdul Hai. Nevertheless, the Court found that it would not be advisable to withdraw the supervision of the Court of Wards from the estate in its present condition, and therefore the supervision should be allowed to continue. The Court further noted that the supervision could be reconsidered in the future if the daughter of Durga Reddy were to bear a son. This position was reiterated in a later Firman dated 9-11-1922, which was issued on a memorial presented by Rani Lakshmayamma seeking release of the estate in favour of her daughter, who by then was approximately twenty-four years old. The 1922 Firman stated that “so long as no son is born to the daughter of Durga Reddy, and he attains majority, the Samasthan cannot be released in favour of a woman. The supervision of the Court of Wards is to be maintained as before. Therefore the orders issued prior to this by my deceased father in this connection point to the same effect. Hence the applicant be informed of my order and the proceedings be closed.” The record further shows that the question of handing over all estates whose administration continued to be kept by the Court of Wards even after the wards had attained majority was referred to a special Commission by a general Firman of the Nizam dated 5-5-1927. The Commission’s opinion, dated 17-4-1928, held that all such estates, including the Samasthan of Panpannapet, should be released. However, before the Commission’s recommendation could be acted upon, Venkata Pratap Reddy, the husband of Rani Shankaramma, died after a short illness on 19-3-1928, leaving no issue. Following his death, the mother of Rani Shankaramma expressed the desire that the Samasthan should, for the time being, remain under Government supervision. Accordingly, a Firman dated 6-8-1928 was issued by the Nizam, which declared: “Durga Reddy’s estate be, for the time being, retained according to custom under the supervision of the Court.” With the prospect of a son by the daughter having disappeared, both Rani Lakshmayamma and Rani Shankaramma subsequently filed a joint application on 22-7-1947 requesting permission to adopt a boy in order to continue the ancient Samasthan, which the Government had preserved and maintained for eight generations. Their prayer sought adoption in accordance with the provisions of Dharam Shastra, asking that a suitable boy be identified, presented, and, after interview and selection, sanctioned by the Government, so that the adoption could be recognised and the Samasthan could be perpetuated.

The law referred to as the Atiyat law of Hyderabad, which governs Crown Grants including Jagir Grants, stipulates that the essential source of title to such property is the formal recognition granted by the Nizam. The record, which is undisputed, confirms that any adoption intended to affect succession to Jagir property must receive the Nizam’s sanction at every procedural stage. First, the prospective adopter must obtain permission to adopt; second, the selection of the child must be approved; third, permission must be granted for the actual performance of the adoption ceremony; and fourth, the adoption, once properly carried out, must be formally recognised by the Nizam. The joint application filed by the two women was made in strict conformity with this established practice. After the filing, however, a serious disagreement emerged between the mother and the daughter. The dispute grew increasingly acute and has persisted without resolution. During the hearing, the Court suggested that the long-standing litigation might be concluded through a private settlement between the parties. Despite this encouragement, the parties and their counsel were unable to reach any settlement, even at the latest stage of the proceedings.

From 1929 to 1934 the mother and daughter contended over who was entitled to obtain the Nizam’s permission to adopt and whether any adoption that might be effected would be recognised and confirmed by the Nizam. The material placed before the Court from this period is extensive and includes, in addition to the Nizam’s Firmans, numerous petitions, counter-petitions, appeals, notes, opinions and recommendations submitted by various officials handling the matter. Some of these documents expressly or implicitly discuss the nature of Rani Shankaramma’s rights in the Jagir Papannapet Samasthan and the rights that the adopted boy would acquire. For the purpose of the present case, it is unnecessary to examine every document; it suffices to note a few pivotal points. The initial step was the joint petition for permission to adopt, already referenced. After a series of opinions exchanged among officials, the Nizam issued a Firman on 19 February 1931 stating: “Lakshmayamma, the widow of the late Raja Durga Reddy be given permission to adopt.” Acting on this order, Rani Lakshmayamma, assisted by a specially appointed committee, selected a young boy named Ramachandra Reddy, who is before this Court as the first appellant. She filed an application on 5 December 1931 seeking permission to adopt the boy and to perform the adoption ceremony. Subsequently, Rani Shankaramma submitted an application dated 18 December 1932 challenging her mother’s right to adopt and requesting that the previously granted permission be revoked and that she herself be authorised to adopt, claiming her status as the Maashdar of the Jagir.

Rani Shankaramma argued that the permission previously granted to her mother should be revoked and that she herself should be allowed to adopt, claiming that she was the Maashdar of the Jagir. In response, the Nizam issued a Firman on 13-7-1933 directing the Atiyat (Crown Grants) department to conduct a formal enquiry into the dispute between mother and daughter over who was entitled to adopt, and to forward its opinion to him. The Atiyat Committee subsequently reported in favour of the mother, Rani Lakshmayamma, in a decision dated 4-1-1934. An application filed by Rani Shankaramma seeking a review of that decision was dismissed by the same committee on 14-2-1934. Before the matter reached the Nizam, Rani Shankaramma presented a memorial contesting the Atiyat Committee’s report. After considering all the material, the Nizam rendered his final decision in a Firman dated 22-3-1934, stating: “In this connection the opinion of the Nazim-e-Atiyat is approved. Rani Lakshmayamma be given permission to adopt, the sanction for which has already been accorded by my order dated 19-2-1931. However, Rani Shankaramma, through the Court of Wards, can independently obtain permission to adopt for the spiritual benefit of her husband, which will have no connection with the Atiyat Shahi (Crown Grant).” Accordingly, the formal adoption was effected and on 6-4-1934 Rani Lakshmayamma executed a deed of adoption in favour of Ramachandra Reddy, the first appellant, who was a twelve-year-old boy at the time. Subsequent proceedings were undertaken to obtain formal recognition of this adoption by the Nizam, during which further petitions and counter-petitions were filed. A regular enquiry was conducted by the Subedar of Medak, who took evidence, and the matter was then appealed to the Nazim Atiyat and thereafter to the Executive Council (Atiyat Appeals Branch). These steps culminated in another Firman dated 26-8-1934, wherein the Nizam recognised the adoption of Ramachandra Reddy with respect to the Crown Grant Maash, subject to the payment of one year’s income as approved by the Subedar of Medak and the Atiyat Committee.

Ramachandra Reddy attained the age of majority in 1947. The present case is concerned only with events that occurred after he reached majority, although a brief reference to earlier developments is helpful. After the adoption was recognised in 1934, Rani Lakshmayamma sought to assert the rights of her adopted son through two applications. The first application, dated 21-4-1937, requested the reopening of the succession enquiry concerning her late husband, Durga Reddy, and asked that the estate be released in her favour, presumably as guardian of the minor adopted son. The second application, dated 12-6-1937, sought an Inam enquiry into the Maash of the late Raja Durga Reddy involving the petitioners Rani Lakshmayamma and Ramachandra Reddy, and asked that the appropriate Muntaqabs be prepared in her name. These earlier attempts form the background against which the subsequent post-majority matters are now considered.

The proceedings concerning the estate of Durga Reddy were to be initiated against the petitioners, namely Rani Lakshmayamma and Ramachandra Reddy, and the Muntaqabs were to be prepared in the name of Rani Lakshmayamma. This reference appeared to relate to earlier actions taken by the Revenue Department, under which, on 12-8-1927, the office of the Nazim Atiyat issued a notification stating that Rani Shankaramma, daughter of Raja Reddy and holder of the Papannapet Samasthan of Medak Taluk, had applied for an Inam inquiry and for the restoration of grants concerning sovereign lands situated in government and jagir territories. The notification listed the specific parganas involved, namely Haweli Medak, Takmal, Utlar, Sirpur Patti of Medak district, and Aman Bole of Nalgonda district, and attached a village-wise detailed statement. The notice further directed that any person who had a claim to the disputed grant could present documentary objections within six months from the date of the notification; failing such objection, the Inam inquiry would proceed against the claimant, a judgment would be rendered, and a Muntaqab would be formally issued to restore the grant, after which no further pleas would be entertained. The record did not indicate the subsequent action taken on this notification, but it was considered probable that Muntaqabs relating to the mentioned properties were eventually issued in favour of Rani Shankaramma. The application dated 12-6-1937, filed by Rani Lakshmayamma and Ramachandra Reddy, appears to have concerned the same properties referred to in the earlier notification. An objection was filed by Rani Shankaramma, and the matter was examined in detail by the Nazim Atiyat, who dismissed the claims in a judgment dated 20-10-1937. The aggrieved parties, Rani Lakshmayamma and Ramachandra Reddy, appealed this decision, but the Appeal Committee upheld the dismissal on 27-2-1938. During the period from 1934 to 1948, Rani Shankaramma simultaneously pursued efforts to have the estate released from the jurisdiction of the Court of Wards, maintaining persistent agitation, although none of these attempts succeeded. Two firmans issued during this period illuminate the administrative stance of the time. The first firman, dated 24-11-1934, stated that, in view of the facts detailed in the Arzdasht, the council’s opinion was correct that the estate should remain under the supervision of the Court of Wards due to special circumstances, but the Court of Wards would consult Rani Lakshmayamma on important matters affecting the adopted son’s interests. The second firman, dated 22-4-1936, affirmed that the distribution of budgetary items, as established over a long period, should continue unchanged and was deemed appropriate. Consequently, up to the time when the first appellant, Ramachandra Reddy, attained majority, despite the competing claims and attempts by both Rani Shankaramma and Ramachandra Reddy to obtain actual possession of the property and the jagir, the properties remained unreleased and continued to be administered by the Court of Wards.

The police operation in Hyderabad occurred in September 1948. After the operation ended, the Military Governor exercised powers granted by a Firman of the Nizam dated 20-9-1948 and introduced a series of legislative measures. One of those measures was the Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, 1358 F (Regulation No. LXXIX of 1358 F), which became effective on 15-8-1949. By virtue of this Regulation, all Jagir lands were merged into State lands as of the appointed date, and the administration of every Jagir was transferred to a Jagir Administrator appointed by the Government, as provided in sections 5 and 6. From that date forward, the former Jagirdars, Hissedars, and other maintenance holders were entitled only to receive cash payments calculated from the net annual income of the Jagirs, according to the provisions of section 6. These cash payments were to be made as an interim maintenance allowance until a final commutation of the Jagirs could be determined, as prescribed in section 14. The Regulation further stipulated that, if a Jagirdar or Hissedar died, his share in the net income would pass to his heirs according to his personal law, thereby overturning the earlier rule that succession to a Jagir depended solely on recognition or regrant by the Nizam (section 6(8)). The same section (6(7)) made clear that such a share could not be alienated without prior sanction of the Government. Moreover, section 4 expressly prohibited the appointment or recognition of any person as a Jagirdar after the Regulation’s commencement, whether by succession or by any other means. In effect, the original tenure of the Jagir was abolished, and a hereditary but inalienable personal right to a portion of the net income, payable as interim maintenance, replaced it.

Subsequently, a second piece of legislation, the Hyderabad Jagirs (Commutation) Regulation, 1359 F (Regulation No. XXV of 1359 F), was enacted on 25-1-1950. This Regulation provided for the payment of compensation in the form of a commuted value of the Jagir, to be determined by the Jagir Administrator in accordance with specified provisions. The share of the Jagirdar or Hissedar in the commutation sum was declared inalienable without prior Government approval. Consequently, when the two Regulations were read together, the holder of a Jagir acquired the right to receive a lump-sum commutation payment in place of the previous right to enjoy the Jagir itself. Anticipating these statutory changes, which were expected to follow the police action, the first appellant submitted two applications to the Revenue Member of the State, dated 24-3-1949 and 26-4-1949. The first application recounted the adoption of Raja Durga Reddy and the recognition of that adoption by the Firman of the Nizam, and it noted the probable need for compensation should the State finally decide to take over the Jagirs and Samasthans. The appellant prayed that any compensation due to the holder of his Samasthan be paid directly to him alone, and that, if the Samasthan remained under the Court of Wards when the compensation became payable, the amount should be deposited into the Court of Wards for the exclusive benefit of the petitioner. The second application, while also emphasizing the adoption and its recognition, requested two orders: first, that the Virasat of Raja Durga Reddy be sanctioned in his name; and second, that if the estate were to be released, it be released in his name. Between the filing of these two applications, Rani Shankaramma filed her own application on 11-4-1949, also addressed to the Revenue Member, in which she narrated the earlier history and asserted that, having attained majority long ago and being about fifty-two years old and capable of managing her estate, the estate should be released from the Court of Wards and prayed for the relief she sought.

The first appellant, Ramchandra Reddy, submitted two separate applications to the Revenue Member of the State. The first application, dated 24 March 1949, set out that he had been adopted by Raja Durga Reddy and that this adoption had been acknowledged in the Firman issued by the Nizam. In that application he requested that any compensation payable to the holder of his Samasthan be paid to him alone, and that if the Samasthan were still under the control of the Court of Wards at the time the compensation became payable, the amount should be deposited with the Court of Wards for his exclusive benefit. The second application, dated 26 April 1949, again reiterated his adoption and the recognition of that adoption, and it prayed that (a) the Virasat of Raja Durga Reddy be formally sanctioned in his name, and (b) that the estate be released and vested in his name.

Between the filing of these two applications, Rani Shankaramma filed her own petition on 11 April 1949, addressed to the same Revenue Member. In her petition she recounted the earlier history of the estate, stated that she had attained majority many years earlier, and noted that she was then about fifty-two years old and fully capable of managing her property. She therefore requested that the Court of Wards release the Samasthan of Papannpet into her possession without delay, and that all her ancestral and purchased properties, forming the core of her estate, be restored to her together with proper accounts.

The Revenue Secretary subsequently endorsed the first appellant’s application of 24 March 1949 and forwarded it to the Revenue Member with a remark that no action by the Court of Wards was required because the department concerned was not competent to decide the issue; the matter, the endorsement explained, would be determined by the Atiyat Department. The Revenue Member, after receiving the endorsement, rejected Ramchandra Reddy’s application, appending the comment “I agree. The applicant be informed accordingly.” Accordingly, on 22 June 1949 the appellant lodged a formal plaint before the Nazim, Atiyat, naming himself as plaintiff and Rani Shankaramma as defendant, and asserting his claim to the Virasat of the late Raja Durga Reddy. In that plaint he referred to his two earlier applications of 24 March 1949 and 26 April 1949, and he noted that the first of those applications had been returned with instructions to approach the Atiyat Department. He therefore submitted the plaint together with copies of the previous applications. His prayer in the plaint was that the Virasat of the late Raja Durga Reddy be sanctioned in his name and that possession of the estate be granted to him.

The Nazim, Atiyat, ruled against the appellant on 1 February 1950 after hearing his case. In the judgment the authority observed that the Firman of His Excellency the Nizam was clear: succession had been sanctioned in the name of Shankaramma absolutely, and the sanction further provided that any son born to her would also be entitled to succeed. The judgment noted that Shankaramma presently had no children and could not have any in the future, and therefore it was impossible to determine who would succeed after her. The judgment concluded that the succession proceedings concerning Durga Reddy could not be initiated because the sanction had already been granted by the Nizam; there was no mistake, no contrary condition, and no restriction in the sanction. Consequently, the petition could not be entertained under any law or regulation, and the proceedings were ordered to be closed.

In the earlier judgment it was held that the succession proceedings concerning Durga Reddy could not be started at this stage because the sanction for those proceedings had already been granted by H E Highness. The court found that there was no basis for amending the Takhat Virasat, since there was no mistake in the sanction and nothing in it was contrary to law, nor was any condition or restriction imposed upon it. It was further observed that the succession of Shankaramma could not be determined while she was still alive. Consequently, the petition was found to be outside the scope of any applicable law or regulation and the proceedings were ordered to be closed. In response to this decision, Ramachandra Reddy filed two identical appeals on the same day, 23 February 1950, one addressed to the Atiyat Committee and the other to the Revenue Minister, Atiyat-Intezami, challenging the conclusion reached by the Nazim Atiyat. While these appeals were being pursued, Rani Shankaramma had earlier filed a petition on 11 April 1949 with the Revenue Member, and she subsequently filed a nearly identical application on 22 November 1949 before the Nazim of the Court of Wards, apparently for the same purpose. Both applications were likely presented before the Revenue Board Member, who on 19 December 1949 issued an order stating that he wished to hear the parties and that a date should be fixed. The matter was then taken up and the Board Member apparently recommended that the estate be released in favour of Rani Shankaramma. The Government’s Revenue Member confirmed this recommendation on 13 March 1950, stating that he agreed with it. Before any release could be effected, an objection was raised by senior Rani Lakshmayamma, and on 12 June 1950 the Revenue Member ordered that both parties be called and a date be fixed for the counsel’s arguments. Thus, by early 1950 two separate issues were before the authorities: (a) a proposed amendment of the Virasat of the Jagir of the late Raja Durga Reddy, based on two simultaneous appeals—one to the Atiyat Committee and one to the Revenue Minister; and (b) the release of the estate by the Court of Wards in favour of Rani Shankaramma. Subsequently, the position of Revenue Member was abolished and a Revenue Minister assumed the role under constitutional changes. The Revenue Minister considered both matters together and issued a detailed order on 19 June 1951, the substance of which will be set out later. This order of the Revenue Minister was later challenged before the High Court. The appeal filed by the first appellant, Ramachandra Reddy, to the Atiyat Committee on 23 February 1950 was dismissed by that Committee on 24 November 1950, which observed that the parties had already presented their arguments before the Revenue Minister and that the Committee lacked jurisdiction, ordering the file to be closed. After issuing his order on 19 June 1951, the Revenue Minister forwarded the file to the Chief Minister for further direction, and both parties subsequently made submissions to the Chief Minister.

Both parties appear to have filed written representations opposing the Revenue Minister’s order with the Chief Minister and to have requested a hearing. The record, however, shows that no hearing was conducted by the Chief Minister, who issued an order on 4-10-1951 stating: “Having perused the judgment of the Revenue Minister and the representation made by Rani Shankaramma and Ramachandra Reddy, I see no reason to interfere with the orders passed by the Revenue Minister which are hereby confirmed.” Following this confirmation, Rani Shankaramma approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking a writ to set aside the Revenue Minister’s order on the ground that it was rendered without jurisdiction, and also seeking a writ of mandamus directing the Government to release the estate in her favour. The High Court, by its judgment and order dated 12-8-1952, annulled the Revenue Minister’s order and directed the Government to release the entire estate to Rani Shankaramma. The present appeal challenges that High Court order. It is now necessary to recapitulate the content of the Revenue Minister’s decision that is under attack and the findings of the High Court in the writ proceedings. The proceedings before the Revenue Minister concerned both Atiyat property and non-Atiyat property, the Jagir being the principal Atiyat property. The dispute over the Jagir centred on which party should receive the compensation amount payable by the Government under the Hyderabad Jagirs (Commutation) Regulation. With respect to the non-Atiyat property, the issue was to determine to whose benefit, if any, the properties held by the Court of Wards should be released. The Revenue Minister regarded a resolution of the title dispute concerning the adopted son, Ramachandra Reddy, as material and necessary for deciding both questions. Nonetheless, his order acknowledged that, concerning non-Atiyat property, he possessed no authority to finally adjudicate the title between the parties. In contrast, regarding the Atiyat property, he proceeded on the premise that he had jurisdiction and competence to examine the matter between the parties. Acting on this premise, the Minister undertook a detailed analysis of the adoption and its legal consequences, as well as an interpretation of the various apparently conflicting orders, views, and firmans that pertained to the rights of the two contesting parties, Rani Shankaramma and the appellant Ramachandra Reddy. He examined the issue in the context of both Atiyat law and the personal law applicable to the parties and ultimately reached the following conclusion: “The result of the above discussion is that Ramachandra Reddy, the adopted son of Lakshmayamma, has to be recognised as the person who is legally entitled to be the successor to the late Raja Durga Reddy. It follows naturally from the above finding that he is …”

The decision held that the adopted son, Ramachandra Reddy, was entitled to receive the commutation of the Jagir villages that had formerly formed part of the Samasthana, and that he should be in possession and management of the estate of Raja Durga Reddy, except for those Jagir villages which had already been integrated with the diwani. At the same time, the Court observed that Rani Shankaramma had unquestionably acquired a very strong vested interest in the property left by her father. The Court noted that her mother had been receiving Rs 250 per month, and that Rani Shankaramma herself received Rs 200 per month as mevakhori, a kind of stipend for pocket expenses. In view of these facts, the Court was of the opinion that both the widow of the late Raja Durga Reddy and the daughter of the late Raja Durga Reddy were each entitled to a life-long allowance equal to one-third of the net income of the Atiyat property. This net income comprised the commutation amount, the income from the maqta lands, and the rusum of deshsmukhi realised from the various tahsils, including the former Jagir villages and the sarf-e-khas villages. The Court expressed confidence that the decision rendered after the long discussion of the case was just and fair to all parties.

The Court affirmed that its jurisdiction over the Atiyat property was complete, subject only to confirmation by the Hon’ble Chief Minister, who exercised the powers of His Exalted Highness for final orders in Atiyat matters. Concerning the non-Atiyat property, which consisted of buildings, cash securities and similar assets, the Court gave its decision with the expectation that the parties, exhausted by the protracted litigation, would accept the ruling and bring an end to the dispute. The order recognised that, as a result of the view expressed, the estate could be released from the Court of Wards in favour of the adopted son Ramachandra Reddy, but because of certain difficulties mentioned in the order, the release was deferred for the present. The Revenue Minister summarised his judgment, stating that the petition of Ram Shankaramma seeking release of the estate in her favour was rejected, that the appeal preferred by Ramachandra Reddy was accepted, and that the Nazim Atiyat was directed to prepare an amended succession statement of Raja Durga Reddy, incorporating the present decision that recognised the adopted son as the successor and holding that each of the Ranis was entitled to a life allowance of one-third of the net income after deduction of expenditure. He concluded that this would bring the case into conformity with the Firman of 18-2-1913 and would entitle the adopted son to enjoy possession of Maash immediately as directed above.

The Revenue Minister, by his order, directed that the file now be presented to the Hon’ble Chief Minister for further orders. The Chief Minister, by an order dated 4 October 1951, confirmed the Revenue Minister’s decision. Accordingly, the Revenue Minister’s order sought to determine the title to the disputed property both with respect to the Atiyat portion and the non-Atiyat portion, and then placed the determination under the Chief Minister’s confirmation. The intention was that the decision would become final as to the Atiyat property while remaining tentative with respect to the non-Atiyat property. Whether the Revenue Minister possessed the jurisdiction to make such a determination was a point of contention, but it was noted that the Minister appeared to be attempting a fair resolution of the complicated situation. Rani Shankaramma challenged the Revenue Minister’s order, asserting that it was wholly beyond his jurisdiction and that the Minister was obligated to release the entire estate in her favor. On that basis she filed a petition before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking a writ to set aside the Revenue Minister’s order and to obtain a mandamus directing the release of the property to her. In the High Court proceedings, Rani Lakshmayamma and Ramachandra Reddy were designated as respondents 6 and 7, respectively, while the State of Hyderabad, the Hon’ble Revenue Minister of Hyderabad, the Jagir Administrator, Hyderabad, the Nazim Saheb of the Atiyat Department, the Nazim of the Court of Wards, and other officials were listed as respondents 1 to 5.

The High Court, in considering the writ petition, examined both the substantive merits of the competing claims and the question of the Revenue Minister’s jurisdiction. The Court held that the Revenue Minister lacked jurisdiction to issue the order he had made and that he was bound to direct the Court of Wards to release the estate in favor of Rani Shankaramma. On the merits, the Court found that the evidence before it did not establish that Rani Lakshmayamma’s husband possessed the authority to adopt under Hindu law; consequently, the adoption could not be deemed valid. Because the Virasat had been vested in the name of Rani Shankaramma, the Court concluded that Ramachandra Reddy, during her lifetime, could not claim either the commutation amount or any of the other non-Jagir property. However, the Court added that its findings on the merits would not prejudice the parties’ rights should they pursue further proceedings in any regular court. As a result, the High Court set aside the Revenue Minister’s order and directed the Court of Wards to release the entire estate to Rani Shankaramma. The present appeal before this Court arises from that High Court order, with Ramachandra Reddy and Rani Lakshmayamma as the first and second appellants, respectively, and Rani Shankaramma as the first respondent.

The respondents include the Government and its officers, designated as respondents 2 to 6. The learned Attorney General, representing the appellants, argued that the High Court had erred by delving into the validity of the adoption, a matter beyond the scope of a writ application. He maintained that the Court should have limited its examination to two points directly relevant to the writ: first, whether the Revenue Minister possessed jurisdiction to issue the order in question; second, whether the Court of Wards or the Revenue Minister had a duty to release the estate in favor of Rani Shankaramma, which would justify the issuance of a mandamus. The Attorney General asserted that the High Court’s conclusions on both of these issues were incorrect and that consequently the order of the Revenue Minister ought to be reinstated, leaving the parties to pursue any further relief concerning title or ancillary issues in the appropriate ordinary courts. The learned Advocate General of Hyderabad, appearing on behalf of respondents 2 to 6, while stating that he had no personal interest in the question of title, contended that the Revenue Minister’s order was not beyond his jurisdiction and that the High Court’s decision to set aside that order and to issue a mandatory directive was erroneous. In contrast, Mr. Engineer, counsel for the first respondent Rani Shankaramma, maintained that the Revenue Minister’s order was both devoid of jurisdiction and flawed by evident errors apparent on the face of the record. Engineer argued that the High Court’s reversal of the order was proper and that the Court was correctly empowered to issue a mandamus directing the release of the estate to Rani Shankaramma. Before addressing the alleged errors apparent on the face of the record, the Court noted that it must first consider the basis upon which the jurisdiction of the Revenue Minister was contested by one side and defended by the other. The jurisdictional issue pertains solely to the Atiyat property, principally comprising the Jagir Samasthan Papannapet. The title dispute originates from the circumstances following the death of Raja Durga Reddy, when a Firman of 1903 granted the Virasat of the Jagir in the name of Rani Shankaramma. Subsequently, a Firman dated 26-8-1934 issued by the Nizam sanctioned the adoption of Ramachandra Reddy by Rani Lakshmayamma, describing the adoption as “as regards Crown Grant Maash.” The precise meaning of the phrase “as regards Crown Grant Maash” has not been explicitly clarified in that Firman. Rani Shankaramma’s contention is that the original 1903 Firman appointed her as Jagirdar for her lifetime, thereby precluding any succession to the Jagir during her lifetime, and that the Nizam’s acknowledgment of the adoption concerning Crown Grant Maash cannot affect her vested rights.

The parties advanced opposite arguments concerning the effect of the Crown Grant Maash on the rights of Rani Shankaramma. Rani Shankaramma asserted that the Crown Grant Maash could not in any manner diminish or alter the rights that had been vested in her by the Firman of 1903. She further argued that, because her husband had not given the necessary authority, no valid adoption had taken place that could impinge upon her entitlement. Ramachandra Reddy, on the other hand, contended that the grant conferred by the 1903 Firman on a female jagirdar was expressly provisional, intended to last only until a male heir capable of succeeding to the estate of Raja Durga Reddy appeared. He maintained that the Nizam’s recognition of his own adoption in the Firman dated 26-August-1934 signified the emergence of such a male heir, and that the jagir was therefore meant to descend to the adopted son, giving him a vested right to the property. During the extensive oral submissions, the Court was presented with a large body of documentary material illustrating the divergent interpretations attached to the original 1903 Firman in favour of Rani Shankaramma and the later 1934 Firman favouring Ramachandra Reddy. The material also revealed the various opinions of senior officials and the multiple intermediate Firman issued thereafter, each offering a different perspective on the respective rights of the daughter and the adopted son. The Court, however, expressed no intention to evaluate the conflicting evidence, to decide which portion of the material was admissible, or to determine whose substantive claim should prevail on the basis of that evidence. The matter before the Court was not whether the conclusion reached by the Revenue Minister was correct, but whether the Revenue Minister possessed the authority to conduct the enquiry and arrive at a bona-fide conclusion. The question of jurisdiction arose because the Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, which had already been brought into force, abolished the jagirs themselves. The first respondent therefore challenged the Minister’s jurisdiction. The appellants countered this challenge on two cumulative grounds: first, they claimed that the questions presented to the Revenue Minister derived from a pending enquiry that fell within the proviso to Section 21(2) of the Abolition of Jagirs Regulation; second, they argued that the issues concerned the administrative aspect (Intazami side) of the Atiyat administration. To address these submissions, it became necessary to examine Section 21(2) of the Abolition of Jagirs Regulation, which provides that all claims relating to a jagir or any share in its income, whether arising under the Regulation or otherwise, shall, subject to the Regulation but notwithstanding any existing law, be filed in and decided by the appropriate civil court. The provision further stipulates that any proceeding pending at the commencement of the Regulation before an Atiyat Court, a Commission, or any other authority shall be completed in accordance with the existing law as if the Regulation had not been enacted.

In the same Regulation, the term “existing law” was explained in Section 2(b). It was defined to mean the law that was in force at the moment the Regulation began, and this includes the law of the Atiyat, any custom or usage that had the force of law, as well as any orders that were made under that existing law. The Court then recalled how the questions under consideration had originally been brought before the Revenue Minister. The appellant, Ramachandra Reddy, had filed an application on 22 June 1949 before the Court of Nazim Atiyat, requesting that the inheritance of the late Raja Durga Reddy be sanctioned and that possession of the estate be granted to him. Such an application would clearly fall within Section 21(2) of the Jagir Abolition Regulation, and if it had been filed after 15 August 1949 it would have been excluded by the proviso and therefore would have had to be heard in the ordinary civil courts. However, the application was made earlier, and the Nazim Atiyat decided against it on 1 February 1950. In response, Ramachandra Reddy lodged two appeals on 23 February 1950: one to the Atiyat Committee and another to the Revenue Minister, who also served as the head of the Atiyat Intazami administration. The appeal to the Atiyat Committee was dismissed on 24 November 1950 on the ground that the Committee lacked jurisdiction. The appeal to the Revenue Minister was nevertheless taken up for consideration around August 1950. That appeal arose from the 22 June 1949 application, which was still pending at the time the Jagir Abolition Regulation came into force and therefore appeared, on its face, to fall within the scope of Section 21(2).

The High Court, however, held a different view. It concluded that the order of the Nazim Atiyat dated 1 February 1950 was based on an application filed by the appellant on 24 October 1949, not on the earlier 22 June 1949 application, and consequently it was not a pending proceeding under the Regulation. The High Court relied upon a note made by the Assistant Nazim, Atiyat, which discussed the question raised by the 22 June 1949 application and essentially recommended that the application be dismissed because it was not maintainable. The Nazim Atiyat endorsed this note on 11 September 1949, writing that “prima facie the application is not under any law.” The High Court treated this endorsement as a final disposal of the 22 June 1949 application and regarded the later 24 October 1949 filing as a fresh application, on which the Nazim rendered his judgment on 1 February 1950. The present Court finds that assessment to be based on a misconception. The very purpose of the 24 October 1949 application was to request that the authorities pass orders on the pending 22 June 1949 application after hearing the parties. The judgment of the Nazim dated 1 February 1950 leaves no doubt that the matter under consideration was the original 22 June 1949 petition and that it remained pending at the relevant time.

The records show that the petition filed by Ramachandra Reddy on 22-June-1949 was described as “now pending for disposal”. The authorities granted permission for a hearing so that the petitioner could identify the specific law or order under which his petition should be considered. At the hearing before Nazim Atiyat, and again in later stages, the petitioner maintained that although the application appeared to seek sanction of the succession in the Raja Durga Reddy succession proceedings, it ought to be treated as an application for amendment of the Takhta Virasat. Whether this submission was legally sustainable was not resolved, but it is indisputable that the judgment of Nazim Atiyat dated 1-February-1950 was rendered on the basis that the 22-June-1949 petition remained pending. Consequently, an appeal against that judgment to the Revenue Minister would constitute an appeal in a pending proceeding, provided the appeal was legally competent. The Court therefore could not accept the High Court’s view that no pending proceeding fell within the proviso to Section 21(2) at the time the Revenue Minister considered the matter in August-1950. The central issue then became whether, given the nature of the dispute concerning the Atiyat property raised on the appeal, the Revenue Minister possessed jurisdiction to adjudicate it, or whether, despite the Atiyat Committee’s refusal to assume jurisdiction, the real jurisdiction at that stage lay exclusively with the Atiyat Committee.

Ramachandra Reddy contended, even before Nazim Atiyat, that his application and the ensuing appeal were intended to amend the Takhta Virasat that fell under the Atiyat Intezami side, and therefore the Revenue Minister was authorised to entertain the matter by virtue of Gashti Circular No. 19 of 1332 F dated 19-March-1923. That circular, issued for the organisation of the Atiyat (Crown Grants) Department of the Hyderabad Government, set out that the purpose of forming the directorate of Atiyat was solely to inquire into and dispose of Atiyat cases as quickly as possible in accordance with procedures available in courts of law. Accordingly, only the business of disposing of cases was assigned to the Director (Nazim) and the Additional Director (Nazim) of the Atiyat (Crown Grants) department. All other work, irrespective of its nature, was to remain the exclusive responsibility of the Revenue Department, consistent with prevailing and past practice. In other words, the Atiyat (Crown Grants) Department was not to function as a separate entity but was to be regarded as an integral part of the Revenue Department, with both Directors continuing to discharge their duties within the Revenue Department under the powers conferred upon them by the sanctioned regulations.

The Court observed that the directors of the Atiyat (Crown Grants) department and the officials of the Revenue Department were to continue performing their respective functions within the Revenue Department only pursuant to the authority expressly granted to them by the applicable regulations that had received formal sanction. It further noted that every piece of administrative work pertaining to the Atiyat would, as it had been done previously, be routed through the Revenue Secretary and then presented to the Minister for consideration in accordance with the established procedural rules. In support of this arrangement, the circular attached two annexures, designated as Schedule ‘A’ and Schedule ‘B’, which set out in detail the categories of work that related respectively to the Atiyat (Crown Grants) and the Revenue Departments. These annexures had obtained the approval of His Exalted Highness the Nizam, and therefore the orders contained therein were to be faithfully observed. Schedule ‘A’, the schedule that was the subject of reliance in the present proceedings, comprised fifteen distinct items. The Court’s attention was drawn specifically to items numbered one through four, together with items six and seven, because those entries were thought to have a possible bearing on the matter before the Court. The items were described as follows: (1) Inam enquiry, which was to be dealt with by the Nazim, the Director of the Atiyat (Crown Grants); (2) Succession enquiry; (3) Sanction of adoption; (4) Ascertainment of share, whether the enquiry was conducted by the Atiyat or by the Revenue Department; (6) Issue of Muntakhab (decree), which was to be connected with the Intezami Atiyat, the administrative branch; and (7) Amendment of Muntakhab, which the appellant relied upon to demonstrate that the proceeding for amendment was to be taken in the Revenue Department, that is, the Intezami Atiyat, which was administered under the Revenue Minister.

Regarding the appellant’s contentions, the Court explained that the appellant argued that the only relief sought was an amendment of the Muntakhab, meaning a correction of the decree originally issued after the Virasat proceedings of 1903, by replacing the name of Rami Shankaramma with the name of Ramachandra Reddy. The appellant submitted that such an amendment would follow logically from a proper construction of the successive Firmans that had been issued. The Revenue Minister appeared to accept this view when he assumed jurisdiction over the appeal, stating that “as the order passed by Atiyat is on the Nazim Intezami side, an appeal lies to the Revenue Minister and, therefore, I am competent to hear it.” Nonetheless, the Court expressed its inability to concur that either the language of the petition filed by Ramachandra Reddy on 22 June 1949, or the substantive nature of the claim and the subsequent proceedings, could be characterised merely as a petition for amendment of the Takhta Virasat or of the Muntakhab within the scope of item seven of Schedule ‘A’ of Gashti 19 of 1332 F. The Court found the precise meaning of the various entries in Schedule ‘A’ to be somewhat obscure and noted that the counsel for both sides had been unable to clarify them satisfactorily. However, the Court concluded that the overall intent of the circular was clear: matters that raised serious legal questions concerning the rights of the parties—essentially judicial issues—were to be removed from ordinary administrative machinery and dealt with by the Directorate of Atiyat under judicial procedure, while only purely administrative matters relating to Atiyat grants could be handled by the ordinary Revenue Department machinery.

In the opinion of the Court, matters that involved judicial questions and serious disputes over the legal rights of the parties had to be removed from the ordinary administrative machinery and dealt with by the Directorate of Atiyat according to judicial procedure. Only those matters that could genuinely be described as administrative, such as routine issues concerning the grant of Atiyat, were within the competence of the regular Revenue Department. This distinction was supported by another copy of Circular No 19 of 1332 F, which, contrary to entry 7 concerning amendment of the “Muntakhab” in Schedule A, expressly stated that any dispute should be referred by the Revenue Minister to the Commissioner. Whether that copy was entirely accurate was not essential to the conclusion that, with respect to the Jagir property, the question raised was a serious question of title between the parties. What was essentially sought was the reopening of the Virasat proceedings that had been initiated after the death of Raja Durga Reddy, and a reconsideration of those proceedings in light of a subsequent adoption that, according to the claimants, dated back to Raja Durga Reddy’s death and consequently removed the title from Rani Shankaramma. A careful reading of the Revenue Minister’s order on this part of the case showed that the Minister had indeed accepted this contention. Despite vigorous arguments to the contrary advanced by the learned Attorney General, the Court could not accept the view that the issue before the Revenue Minister was merely an administrative matter of the Atiyat department, which would have placed jurisdiction within his authority. Accordingly, the Court held that the dispute over the Atiyat property and the determination of the question involved lay outside the authority and competence of the Revenue Minister, irrespective of any bona-fide belief on his part that he possessed jurisdiction. The Attorney General then argued, as a crucial point, that even if the Revenue Minister’s order exceeded his competence under Section 13(2) of the Atiyat Enquiries Act, 1952 (which came into force on 1-April-1952), the order would be saved from invalidity because it had been confirmed by the Chief Minister. The Court noted that the preamble of the Atiyat Enquiries Act made clear that the Act was intended to amend and consolidate the law relating to Atiyat grants, enquiries concerning claims to succession, and any rights, titles or interests in such grants, together with ancillary matters. The Act replaced Circular No 10 of 1338 F, as indicated by Section 15, which expressly repealed that circular. Its scheme appeared to be to re-establish the Atiyat Courts that had previously been organised under Circular No 10 of 1338 F, to the extent necessary for further enquiries into Atiyat matters, and to substitute a more

In this case, the Court observed that the purpose of the new legislation was to replace the old procedural requirements with a more suitable method under the revised system and, at the same time, to remove the necessity of obtaining the Nizam’s Firman in such matters. The Act therefore created a hierarchy of new Atiyat Courts, placing the Board of Revenue at the top of that hierarchy and declaring the Board’s decision to be final. Sections 12 and 13 of the Act were identified as particularly important. Section 12 stated that when issues of succession, legitimacy, divorce or any other matters of personal law were decided by a Civil Court, the decision of that Civil Court had to be given effect by the Atiyat Court established under the Act once the decision was brought to the Atiyat Court’s notice by the interested party or otherwise, irrespective of whether the Atiyat Court’s decision was rendered before or after the Civil Court’s decision. Section 13 provided two sub-clauses. Sub-clause (1) declared that, except as expressly provided in the Act, the decision of an Atiyat Court was final and could not be challenged in any other Court of law. Sub-clause (2) declared that orders issued in cases concerning Atiyat Grants, including Jagirs, that were made on or after 18 September 1948 and before the commencement of the Act, by the Military Governor, the Chief Civil Administrator, the Chief Minister of Hyderabad or, by virtue of powers given or purported to be given by the Chief Minister, by the Revenue Minister, were to be deemed the final orders validly passed by a competent authority under the law that was in force at the time of the order and that such orders could not be questioned in any Court of law. The Court noted that the deeming provision in Section 13(2) was strong and conferred upon the orders of the specified authorities the qualities of competency, validity and finality in matters relating to Atiyat Grants, including Jagirs, and expressly barred any court from reviewing those orders. Both parties had assumed, and the Court agreed, that the action taken by the Revenue Minister concerned “a case relating to Atiyat grants including Jagirs.” However, the Court pointed out that the apparent intent of the provision was not to validate an otherwise invalid order of the Revenue Minister. The provision only contemplated orders made by the Revenue Minister in accordance with powers that had been delegated to him by the Chief Minister, and no such delegation had been relied upon in the present case. The learned Attorney General contended that the various proceedings had culminated in an order of the Chief Minister himself, which fell within the scope of the provision. The Attorney General’s suggestion, as understood by the Court, was that the Chief Minister’s order of confirmation should be treated as an adoption of the Revenue Minister’s order, thereby making the Chief Minister’s order, in the terms of the Revenue Minister’s order, the final and effective order in the matter.

The Court observed that the order which was intended to be the final and effective order in the case was that issued by the Chief Minister. On the other hand, the counsel argued that, if the Court’s earlier finding that the Revenue Minister’s order was issued without jurisdiction was correct, then a simple confirmation of that order by the Chief Minister could not transform the Revenue Minister’s order into an order of the Chief Minister. Such a transformation, the counsel said, would in effect validate the Revenue Minister’s order, which the statutory provision was not intended to do. The counsel further pointed out that between 18-9-1948 and 1-4-1952, the existing system of Atiyat courts continued to operate for Atiyat matters. However, those decisions lacked the Nizam’s Firman, which was necessary to give them legal validity and finality, because the Nizam was unable to exercise his prerogative of issuing such Firmans at that time. It was submitted that Section 13(2) of the statute was meant to fill this gap in the old law. According to the counsel, when the provision is read in this light, it should apply only to decisions in Atiyat cases that had been properly reached up to the stage where they had to be presented to the Nizam for his Firman, but that were in fact ultimately approved by the Chief Minister, who was acting de facto for the Nizam in those matters. Consequently, the counsel’s argument on this point was two-fold. First, having found that the Revenue Minister’s order was beyond his jurisdiction, the counsel maintained that the Chief Minister’s order, being merely a confirmation, did not possess a separate legal identity and therefore could not fall within the scope of Section 3(2). Second, the counsel asserted that, in any event, what Section 13(2) could validate was the Chief Minister’s order only when it followed a competent and valid order issued by an established authority in an Atiyat case.

The Court then stated that, in view of the language of Section 13(2), it could not accept the counsel’s submissions. It was clear that the deeming provision was directed at the Chief Minister’s order and not at any other person’s order. Moreover, the effect of the provision was not merely to cure any incompetence or invalidity that might reside in the Chief Minister himself when he issued the order. The wording of the statute was sufficiently broad and strong to remedy the incompetence and invalidity arising from the similar lacunae in the preceding proceedings, of which the Chief Minister’s order represented the culmination. The Court found no alternative interpretation that would give full effect to the language used. Even under the counsel’s suggested view, the Chief Minister’s order was to be regarded as a substitute for the Nizam’s Firman, and the purpose of Section 13(2) was to remove any objection that the Nizam’s Firman in an Atiyat case was an exercise of his personal prerogative that could not be delegated. If, as the counsel contended, the true purpose of Section 13(2) was to supply the missing imprimatur of the Nizam’s Firman, the Court said it was difficult to understand why the operation of the provision should be limited only to those Chief Minister’s orders that were preceded by recommendations of competent authorities.

It was held that the operation of section 13(2) could not be limited only to those orders of the Chief Minister that were preceded by recommendations of competent authorities. The Court reasoned that such a limitation could not have been read into the effect of the Nizam’s Firman at the time when the Nizam himself was still in a position to issue the Firmans. Consequently, the Court was of the view that whenever the intended effective order in a particular case was the order of the Chief Minister, that order would be validated by section 13(2) regardless of whether the authorities who had previously dealt with the matter were competent. The Court then turned to the contention advanced by Mr Engineer, namely that because the Chief Minister’s order was merely a confirmation, the effective order was in fact that of the Revenue Minister. The Court observed that the question of whether the effective order in such cases was the order of the Chief Minister himself or that of the preceding authority whose order was being confirmed must be decided on the facts of each case. The Court noted that this aspect had not received adequate attention in the High Court. The first respondent, Rani Shankaramma, had filed an application before the High Court seeking a writ on the basis that the Revenue Minister’s order was the effective order and therefore required to be quashed for lack of jurisdiction. Although no specific objection seemed to have been taken to that approach, the applicability of section 13(2) to the Chief Minister’s order was raised. The Court observed that, although the final order in the matter was the confirming order of the Chief Minister, the writ application was directed only against the Revenue Minister’s order. The Court further observed that these matters had not been fully dealt with by the High Court, apparently because of a concession made by the Government Advocate, which was reflected in the High Court’s judgment: “Shri Anand Swarup Choudhury, Advocate, on behalf of the Government very candidly conceded before us that if it is held that the Revenue Minister had no jurisdiction, then in that case the sanction of the Chief Minister would not be valid.” The Court held that such a concession did not bind the appellants and therefore required consideration. The Court then stated that where a statute vests the responsibility for making a particular kind of order in a specified authority, but the order is issued by a different authority, the affirmation of the original invalid order by the proper appellate authority does not cure the invalidity of that order. The Court cited the authority of Suraj Narain v. N.W.F. Province, 1942 FC 3 (AIR v. 29) at p. 6 (FC) (A). The Court also observed that the fact that a tribunal’s decision requires the sanction of a higher authority does not necessarily render the sanctioning authority’s order an effective order amenable to writ jurisdiction, referring to the authorities of The King v. Electricity Commissions, 1924-I KB 171 (B) and Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd., 1950 SC 188 (AIR v. 37) at pp. 190, 191 and 198 (PC) (C).

The Court explained that an order which does not constitute an effective order is not subject to the writ jurisdiction of the courts in appropriate cases, referring to the authorities ‘The King v. Electricity Commrs.’ 1924-I KB 171 (B) and ‘Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd.’ 1950 SC 188 (AIR v. 37) at pages 190, 191 and 198 (PC) (C). However, the Court noted that there are instances where, according to the statutory scheme, the intended effective order is the original order itself, not any subsequent appellate or confirming order. In the present matter the situation was different. The revenue enquiry was taken up by the Revenue Minister pursuant to section 20(2) of the Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, which classified the matter as a pending case to be decided with reference to “the existing law” as defined in that Regulation. Under that existing law, for a case of this nature the only effective order would be that of the Nizam himself and not that of any subordinate authority. The Court reiterated that the purpose of section 13(2) of the Atiyat Enquiries Act was to give the Chief Minister’s order the same authority as the Nizam’s firman. This purpose was manifested in the Revenue Minister’s own order, where he expressly stated: “So far as Atiyat properties are concerned it is completely within my jurisdiction subject to confirmation by the Hon’ble the Chief Minister, who now exercises the powers of His Exalted Highness so far as final orders in Atiyat cases are concerned.” This statement shows that although the Revenue Minister regarded the enquiry as within his jurisdiction, he recognized that the effective order could only be the Nizam’s order issued before the police action, or the Chief Minister’s order at the time of the decision, provided the Chief Minister was exercising a validly delegated authority. The submission of the Revenue Minister’s order to the Chief Minister was therefore for the purpose of obtaining an order, not merely for confirmation. The Court observed that, prior to the Chief Minister’s order, both parties had sent representations requesting a hearing before any order was passed. The Nizam, before the police action, possessed the power not merely to accept or veto but to reach an independent conclusion and to dispose of the jagir property—or its monetary equivalent—as contemplated by the Revenue Minister’s order, thereby overriding any prior rights under his firman. Consequently, the Chief Minister, exercising the delegated authority, could likewise make such a disposition, subject only to the question of the validity of the delegation.

In the circumstances, the Court observed that the Chief Minister, having received a request from both parties to be heard before any order was passed, could have examined all the material afresh and reached an independent conclusion. Nevertheless, the Chief Minister chose to confirm the order of the Revenue Minister and expressly stated that he saw no reason to interfere with that order. By doing so, the Chief Minister effectively adopted the Revenue Minister’s order as his own. The Court held that the fact that the Revenue Minister’s order was detailed while the Chief Minister’s confirmation was brief did not change the legal effect of the confirmation. Consequently, the Court was of the clear opinion that the Chief Minister’s order was a competent, valid and final determination as to the Atiyat and Jagir property. By virtue of section 13(2) of the Atiyat Enquiries Act, a final and valid determination of the rights of the three disputing parties—namely Ramachandra Reddy, Rani Lakshmayamma and Rani Shankaramma—had therefore arisen. The extent of each party’s respective rights was to be measured exactly as specified in the Revenue Minister’s order. The Court further explained that section 13(2) confers finality on the determination of the rights themselves, not on the reasoning or the procedural steps that led to that determination. The Court added that this conclusion did not affect any rights or questions concerning property that was not classified as Atiyat.

The Court then turned to the argument advanced by counsel for the respondent that the Revenue Minister’s order contained errors apparent on the face of the record and that such errors might justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash the order. The Court found that this argument did not require consideration because it would only be relevant if the Revenue Minister’s order were itself the final and effective order in the case and if the Revenue Minister were competent to pass it. Since the Chief Minister’s confirmation had become the ultimate authority, the High Court’s order that had set aside the Revenue Minister’s order with respect to the Atiyat property was therefore untenable. The Court next examined whether the High Court was correct in directing a mandatory order to the Revenue Minister and to the Court of Wards for the delivery of the entire estate to Rani Shankaramma. The Court noted that there was no clear proof before it that Rani Shankaramma possessed title, if any, to the whole estate. Her title, at most, was prima facie limited to the Jagir at the time of the dispute, and it remained a contested issue whether any additional properties owned by Raja Durga Reddy formed part of the Jagir estate or belonged to non-Jagir property. The Court emphasized that even if Rani Shankaramma’s title to the Jagir were assumed, it did not automatically follow that the entire estate under the control of the Court of Wards was held for her benefit. The Court concluded that the High Court had not been presented with material sufficient to infer that the whole estate belonged to Rani Shankaramma, and therefore could not validly order its hand-over to her.

The Court observed that even if it were assumed that Rani Shankaramma continued to hold title to the Jagir estate, such an assumption did not necessarily mean that the whole estate placed under the supervision of the Court of Wards was being held on her behalf. The Court noted that this point required further factual investigation. It further held that the High Court had not before it any material sufficient to conclude that the entire estate belonged to Rani Shankaramma, and therefore the High Court could not rightly direct that the whole property be handed over to her. Moreover, the Court pointed out that, apart from this preliminary observation, the right of Rani Shankaramma to obtain possession of the estate was not as clear as the learned judges had presumed.

Counsel for Rani Shankaramma, identified as Mr Engineer, referred the Court to a large body of material in the record that, according to him, supported her alleged right to obtain a release in her favour. He contended that this material had previously been accepted by several officials. The Court, however, emphasized that despite those expressions of opinion, the estate had never actually been handed over to her. The Court further referred to several firmans issued by the Nizam—specifically the firmans dated 22 January 1920, 9 November 1922 and 24 November 1934, which were reproduced earlier in the judgment—and observed that those firmans clearly expressed an intention contrary to handing the estate over to Rani Shankaramma. Consequently, the Court refused to treat either Rani Shankaramma’s alleged right to possession or the Court of Wards’ alleged obligation to surrender possession as matters beyond dispute.

Mr Engineer then relied on Section 53 of the Hyderabad Court of Wards Act 1350 F (Act 12 of 1350 F), which provides that, except as provided in Section 56, the Court shall release from its superintendence the person and property of a ward when: (a) the ward becomes a major; (b) a civil court decides that the disability has ceased to exist; (c) if the estate has been taken under superintendence under Section VII, clause (1) paragraph (a), a firman is issued; or (d) the government revokes the notification that declared any person disqualified. The provision also states that, subject to government sanction, the Court may at any time release from its superintendence any person or property taken charge of under Section 12.

Mr Engineer argued that sub-section (a) applied because Rani Shankaramma had become a major many years ago, and therefore the Court was bound to release both the person and the property of the ward under that clause. The learned Attorney General, however, correctly pointed out that in the present case clause (c) of Section 53, not clause (a), was the relevant provision. The Court explained that clause (c) refers back to Section 7, clause (1) paragraph (a), which defines disqualified properties as those whose owners, or whose persons and properties, have been placed under the protection, management and superintendence of the Court of Wards. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the appropriate basis for release lay in the issuance of a firman under the earlier statutory provision, not merely in the attainment of majority by Rani Shankaramma.

The property was taken into possession immediately after the death of Raja Durga Reddy and placed under the supervision of the Court of Wards by Government notifications dated 21-5-1900 and 4-6-1900. Subsequently, the inheritance known as the Jagir Samasthan Papannepet was sanctioned in the name of Rani Shankaramma by a Firman issued by the Nizam on 29-5-1903. That Firman expressly committed both the care of the property and the personal protection of Rani Shankaramma to the Court of Wards. Later proceedings treated the Court of Wards’ supervision over the property as having been established by the Nizam’s Firmans. Accordingly, if Section 53 of the Court of Wards Act were to be applied, another Firman from the Nizam would be required to release the Court of Wards’ supervision, and the mere attainment of majority by Rani Shankaramma would not be sufficient. This assumption was reflected in several later Firmans issued by the Nizam concerning the same matter. However, clause (c) of Section 53 became inapplicable after 1950 because a Firman of the Nizam no longer possessed constitutional validity. Moreover, no evidence was presented to show that the President had adapted or modified that clause under Article 372 of the Constitution, nor was any argument made that the clause should be considered abolished or suitably altered in the present circumstances. Consequently, the Court concluded that there was no proof that the Court of Wards was statutorily obligated to transfer possession of the properties under its control to Rani Shankaramma. For that reason, the Court was unable to uphold the portion of the High Court’s order directing that the estate be handed over to her.

The Court observed that the present circumstances produced an anomalous condition in which the Court of Wards could continue to administer the property without a clear termination point. Such continued administration might persist indefinitely until either a party approached the Court to obtain a formal release or the Court itself decided to relinquish its supervision. The Court noted that the party seeking relief could also pursue an interpleader suit as an alternative mechanism to resolve the competing claims over the estate. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that these administrative considerations lay beyond the jurisdiction of the present writ petition and therefore could not be decided at this stage. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the order issued by the High Court must be set aside and that the appeal was allowed. In addition, the Court directed that the costs incurred by all parties in both the High Court and the present proceedings be borne by the estate itself. The Court also reiterated that no statutory duty existed compelling the Court of Wards to surrender possession of the properties to Rani Shankaramma despite her attaining majority. Because of this absence of a legal requirement, the Court could not enforce the High Court’s directive to transfer the estate to the petitioner.