Raja Rajinder Chand vs Sukhi (And Connected Appeals)

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 196 to 201 of 1953

Decision Date: 23 October, 1956

Coram: B. Jagannadhadas, S. K. Das

In the matter titled Raja Rajinder Chand versus Sukhi and the connected appeals, the Supreme Court considered a petition filed on 23 October 1956 by the appellant, who claimed to be the proprietor of the Nadaun Jagir and sought a declaration that pine trees standing on lands within the Jagir but possessed by the respondents were his property as an ala malik, that is, a superior landlord, rather than belonging to the respondents who were described as adna maliks, or inferior landlords. The factual backdrop presented to the Court traced the origin of the Jagir to the territory of the former rulers of Kangra, who as sovereigns were entitled to the pine trees. In the years 1827‑28 Maharaja Ranjit Singh conquered the Kangra region and subsequently granted Nadaun as a Jagir to Raja Jodhbir Chand, who was the illegitimate son of Raja Sansar Chand, the last independent ruler of Kangra. Following the first Sikh War in 1846 the area fell under British dominion, and the British authorities issued a Sanad in favour of Raja Jodhbir Chand in recognition of his services. After the second Sikh War, a fresh Sanad concerning the Jagir of Nadaun was granted by the British in 1848. Thereafter, several settlements were carried out, namely O’Brien’s settlement of 1892‑93, Anderson’s settlement of 1899‑1900, and the settlement of Messrs Middleton and Shuttleworth of 1910‑1915, together with a number of entries in the Wajib‑ul‑arz that were said to support the Raja’s title to the pine trees. The appellant, a direct lineal descendant of Raja Jodhbir Chand, advanced three bases for his claim: first, that he represented the independent Kangra rulers; second, that the grant made by the British Government conferred the right; and third, that the entries in the Wajib‑ul‑arz established his entitlement.

The Court held that the sovereign right of the independent Kangra rulers over the pine trees had passed by conquest to the Sikh rulers and subsequently to the British, and that Raja Jodhbir Chand had been only a Jagirdar under the Sikhs and the British; consequently, the appellant could not rely on the sovereign right of the former independent rulers to assert ownership of the trees. Regarding the 1848 grant, the Court observed that, when properly construed, the grant was primarily an assignment of land revenue and, although it might have embodied other rights, it did not include the right to all pine trees on the proprietary and cultivated lands of the respondents. The Court reiterated the settled principle that grants made by a sovereign are to be interpreted most favourably for the sovereign; however, where the sovereign’s intention is clear, a fair and liberal construction must be applied so that the operative part, if plainly expressed, takes effect notwithstanding any qualifications in the recitals. In situations where a grant is made for valuable consideration, the interpretation favours the grantee, in deference to the honour of the sovereign, and when two constructions are possible—one valid and the other void—the valid construction must be preferred for the sake of the sovereign’s honour. The Court further explained that the Wajib‑ul‑arz, being a village‑administration record of existing rights not expressly provided for by law and of customary usage concerning rights and liabilities, is presumed true under section 44 of the Punjab Land‑Revenue Act 1887, but it cannot be employed to create new rights or liabilities. Accordingly, the entries in the Wajib‑ul‑arz concerning the Raja’s alleged right to pine trees on the cultivated and proprietary lands of the adna maliks did not demonstrate any existing custom that would support the appellant’s claim.

In interpreting a grant, the Court explained that the operative part of the grant, when it is expressed clearly, must be given effect even if the recitals contain qualifications. When the grant is made for valuable consideration, the construction favours the grantee while still preserving the honour of the sovereign. If two possible constructions exist—one that is legally valid and another that is void—the valid construction must be preferred because respecting the sovereign’s honour is considered more important than the sovereign’s profit.

The Court then turned to the nature of the Wajib‑ul‑arz, describing it as a village‑level record that reflects existing rights not expressly created by law and the customs and usage concerning rights and liabilities within an estate. Although section 44 of the Punjab Land‑Revenue Act, 1887 presumes the correctness of entries in the Wajib‑ul‑arz, the Court held that such entries cannot be used to create new rights or liabilities. The entries concerning the Raja’s right over chil trees situated on the cultivated and proprietary lands of the adna‑maliks did not demonstrate any existing village custom or usage; rather, the right in question was a sovereign right. Consequently, the appellant could not rely on those entries as proof of a grant, surrender, or relinquishment of a sovereign right by the Government in his favour. The expressions “ala malik” and “adna malik” were clarified in the context of the settlement reports relating to the Nadaun Jagir, and the Court referred to the authorities Venkata Narasimha Appa Bow Bahadur v. Rajah Narayya Appa Bow Bahadur ([1879] L.R. 7 I.A. 38), Dakas Khan v. Ghulam Kasim Khan (A.I.R. 1918 P.C. 4) and Gurbakhsh Singh v. Mst. Partapo ([1921] I.L.R. 2 Lah. 346) in support of its analysis.

The judgment concerned civil appeals numbered 196 to 201 of 1953, arising from decrees of the Punjab High Court dated 30 December 1949 in regular appeals numbered 1567, 1568, 1569, 1570, 1573 and 1574 of 1942. Those decrees themselves derived from judgments of the District Judge, Hoshiarpur, dated 31 July 1942 in appeals numbered 104/35 of 1941‑42, 101/32 of 1941, 103/34 of 1941‑42, 15/73 of 1941, 102/33 of 1941‑42 and 120 of 1941, which were based on decrees of the Subordinate Judge, 4th Class, Kangra, dated 24 July 1941 in suits numbered 544, 548, 545, 547, 546 and 549 of 1940. The appellant was represented by counsel, as was the respondent, and the Advocate‑General for Punjab along with two other counsel appeared for the intervenor, the State of Punjab. The judgment was delivered on 23 October 1956 by Justice S. K. Das. The case involved six separate appeals brought by the plaintiff, Raja Rajinder Chand, who held the position of superior landlord (alamalik) of the Nadaun Jagir in the Kangra district. He had instituted six suits in the Subordinate Court of Kangra seeking a declaration that he owned all pine (chil‑pinus longifolia) trees standing on the lands of the defendants within the jagir and requesting a permanent injunction to prevent the defendants from interfering with his ownership and from extracting resin from those trees. He also claimed specific sums as damages for losses he alleged resulted from the defendants’ tapping of the pine trees from 24 March 1940 up to the filing of the suits. The defendants, identified as the adna‑maliks (inferior landlords), contended that they possessed the lands on which the trees grew, that the trees were their property, and that the plaintiff had never exercised any right of possession over them.

Raja Rajinder Chand, the plaintiff, asserted that the defendants were interfering with his ownership rights in the pine (chil‑pinus longifolia) trees standing on the lands that formed part of the Nadaun Jagir, and that they were also preventing him from extracting resin from those trees. In addition, he claimed specific sums as damages for the loss he suffered due to the defendants’ tapping of the pine trees from 24 March 1940 up to the date on which the suits were instituted. The defendants, who were the adnamaliks – that is, the inferior landlords – pleaded that they were the owners in possession of the lands on which the trees were situated, that the trees themselves were their property, and that the plaintiff had no right whatsoever to the trees nor had he ever exercised any possession over them. From the pleadings of the parties, three questions emerged for determination. The first question was whether every pine tree standing on the lands described in the suits belonged to the plaintiff, the present appellant. The second question concerned the limitation period applicable to the suits. The third question dealt with the quantum of damages that the appellant claimed. The learned Subordinate Judge, who heard the suits at first instance, held that the appellant had failed to prove his ownership of the trees and consequently concluded that the suits were barred by limitation. Regarding damages, the judge observed that if the appellant’s claim to ownership were established, a few of the defendants in four of the suits would be liable for modest sums of damages; however, because his findings on ownership and limitation were adverse to the appellant, he dismissed the suits. The appellant then filed appeals against the judgment and decrees of the Subordinate Judge, and these appeals were heard by the learned District Judge of Hoshiarpur. The District Judge reversed the Subordinate Judge’s finding on ownership, holding that the appellant had indeed established his right to the trees in question. He also reversed the finding on limitation, although he accepted the Subordinate Judge’s assessment of damages. Accordingly, he allowed the appeals, set aside the earlier judgment and decrees, and granted the appellant the declaration and permanent injunction he had sought, together with damages in the four suits as assessed by the Subordinate Judge. The defendants subsequently filed second appeals before the Punjab High Court. On the principal issue of ownership, the High Court judges differed from the District Judge and, aligning with the Subordinate Judge, held that the appellant had not proved his right to the trees. On the limitation issue, they concurred with the District Judge. In view of their finding that the appellant failed to establish ownership, the High Court allowed the appeals and dismissed the appellant’s suits. The High Court then issued a certificate that the cases satisfied the requirements of sections 109(c) and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The six appeals were filed on a certificate issued under sections 109(c) and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and they have now been placed before this Court. All six appeals were heard together because the factual and legal questions that arose in each case were identical. Consequently, the judgment that follows will apply uniformly to each of the six appeals. The central issue for determination is whether the appellant has successfully established his entitlement to every pine (chil) tree that stands upon the lands of the defendants that are described as suit lands. This issue carries significance because a decision on the matter will affect the property rights of the ala and adna maliks who hold interests in the Nadaun Jagir. The respondents have not challenged the correctness of the finding of two lower courts that the suits were not barred by limitation; therefore, the question of limitation is no longer live and will not be revisited in this judgment. Although the principal issue appears concise, a proper answer requires an examination of the historical creation of the Nadaun Jagir, the successive land‑revenue and revisional settlements that have been made with respect to that Jagir over time, and the various entries that were entered in the record of rights during those settlements. Before turning to that historical background, it is necessary to set out the nature of the claim asserted by the appellant. The plaints filed in the six suits were extremely brief and failed to provide detailed particulars of the appellant’s claim. For illustration, the plaint in Suit No. 544 of 1940 may be considered. In paragraph 1 of that plaint it was stated that the land in dispute lay in the tappa of Badhog and that the appellant was the superior landlord of that land. Paragraph 2 then read as follows: “The land is situated in Nadaun Jagir. All the pine trees standing on the aforesaid land belong to the plaintiff. He alone enjoys the benefit of those trees. This has always been the practice throughout.” A later statement of replication dated 26 October 1940 supplied additional particulars of the appellant’s claim. The learned Subordinate Judge, who conducted the trial of the suits at first instance, observed that the appellant’s claim to ownership of the trees rested on three principal foundations. First, the appellant asserted that the land on which the trees stood had formerly belonged to his ancestors, who were the independent rulers of Kangra, and that while they transferred the land to the ancestors of the adna maliks, they retained ownership of all pine trees. Second, the appellant contended that after the British conquest of Kangra, the rights to the pine trees vested in the British Government, and that those rights were subsequently assigned to Raja Jodhbir Chand, the initial grantee of the Nadaun Jagir. Third, the appellant relied on the contention that his right in the trees had been “vouchsafed” by entries made in the Wajib‑ul‑arz and had been recognized in several judicial decisions. The lower courts examined the appellant’s claim on the basis of these three grounds, and this Court will now consider each of those grounds in the order in which they have been presented.

In addressing the appellant’s claim, the Court first noted that it would examine the three grounds relied upon by the appellant in the sequence in which they had been presented. The Court then indicated that a review of the historical formation of the Nadaun Jagir was essential for assessing the first two grounds. It was acknowledged that the land which formed the subject of the suit was situated in the Badhog and Jasai tappas, both of which were part of the Jagir of Nadaun located in the district of Kangra. The Court recorded that the last independent ruler of Kangra had been Raja Sansar Chand, whose death occurred in 1824. Raja Sansar Chand belonged to the Katoch Rajput family and had fathered children by two women. From his properly married Katoch wife he had a son named Raja Anirudh Chand, while from a woman of the Gaddi tribe he had another son named Raja Jodhbir Chand. The Court observed that the antiquity of the Katoch royal line was well established and that the historical account of the Kangra State up to its conquest by the Sikh forces under Maharaja Ranjit Singh was documented in the Kangra District Gazetteer of 1924‑25, pages 52 to 76. The Court clarified that it would not consider the period preceding Raja Sansar Chand’s reign. The Gazetteer, on page 75, described Raja Sansar Chand as having been the paramount lord of the hills for twenty years and a formidable rival to Maharaja Ranjit Singh, but it also noted that his aggressive disposition eventually led to his downfall. With his death, the prestige of the Katoch lineage faded, leaving his son Anirudh Chand with little more than a name. The Court recounted that Anirudh Chand had been summoned on several occasions to the Sikh camp and, on his third visit, had encountered an unacceptable demand, as Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s chief officer Raja Dhian Singh of Jamun proposed that one of Raja Sansar Chand’s two daughters be married to his son Hira Singh. Although Anirudh Chand perceived this proposal as an insult to his family honour—because tradition dictated that a daughter of a Katoch king could marry only someone of equal rank, namely another king or heir apparent—he was nevertheless compelled by circumstances to acquiesce. Anirudh Chand, a legitimate king and descendant of a long line of monarchs, contrasted with Dhian Singh, who held the title of Raja only by virtue of the favour of his sovereign. After a period of hesitation, Anirudh Chand resolved to preserve his family’s honour at any cost; he clandestinely relocated his family and property across the Sutlej River and, upon learning that Maharaja Ranjit Singh was advancing from Lahore toward Nadaun, he fled into British‑controlled territory. Subsequently, Maharaja Ranjit Singh arrived at Nadaun, and Raja Jodhbir Chand presented his two sisters to the Maharaja, an act that led to Jodhbir Chand’s creation as a Raja with Nadaun and its surrounding region granted to him as a Jagir.

In the earlier period, the Raja held Nadaun and the surrounding territory as his jagir. Mian Fateh Chand, who was the younger brother of Raja Sansar Chand, proposed the marriage of his granddaughter to Raja Hira Singh. In return for this proposal, Mian Fateh Chand received the grant of a jagir known as the Rajgiri Jagir and also obtained a lease of the remainder of the state on favourable terms. However, his son later failed to pay the amount that had been agreed. Consequently the state was annexed by the Sikh kingdom, and only the Rajgiri Jagir remained reserved for the royal family. By the years 1827‑28 the principality of Kangra had effectively ceased to exist as an independent entity and had, for all practical purposes, become part of the Sikh kingdom. The descendants of Mian Fateh Chand and of Raja Jodhbir Chand thereafter held only the status of jagirdars under the Sikhs. The present appellant, Raja Rajinder Chand, is a direct lineal descendant of Raja Jodhbir Chand and is the fourth generation in that line. After these events the Sikh wars broke out and British rule was established in Kangra. The first Sikh war concluded in March 1846 with the occupation of Lahore and the cession to the British Government of the Jullunder Doab and the hills lying between the Sutlej and the Ravi. In 1848 the second Sikh war began, and Raja Parmudh Chand, a son of Raja Anirudh Chand, raised a rebellion in Kangra, which ultimately failed. During this period Raja Jodhbir Chand distinguished himself by his loyalty to the British Government; he rendered valuable service to the British both during the Sikh war and the Katoch insurrection. In recognition of his loyalty he obtained a sanad from the British Government in 1846. While the original sanad was not produced, a copy of a later sanad dated 11 October 1848, which renewed and clarified the earlier grant, was produced on behalf of the present appellant. The Court noted that it would refer to the contents of this 1848 sanad at a later stage. Having outlined briefly this early history concerning the creation of the Nadaun jagir in favour of Raja Jodhbir Chand, the Court then turned to examine the first two grounds advanced by the appellant.

The High Court, after considering the submissions and in concurrence with the subordinate judge, concluded that the appellant was not entitled to claim the sovereign authority that had once belonged to Raja Sansar Chand, the former independent ruler of Kangra. The Court articulated two principal reasons for this determination. Firstly, it observed that Raja Jodhbir Chand, from whom the appellant claimed descent, was born out of wedlock and therefore could not inherit the legitimate succession rights of Raja Sansar Chand. The Court stated that legitimacy was a necessary condition for the transmission of sovereign prerogatives. Secondly, the Court held that the very existence of any sovereign rights in Kangra ceased at the moment when the territory was annexed by the Sikh kingdom. When the annexation took place, the only right that passed to Raja Jodhbir Chand was an assignment of land revenue, specifically an amount of thirty thousand rupees, granted through the issue of the Nadaun jagir by Maharaja Ranjit Singh. No other sovereign powers, such as the authority to govern or to own royal trees, were transferred. The Court found these explanations to be well‑founded and persuasive, and accordingly accepted them as adequate grounds for dismissing the appellant’s claim that he had succeeded to the sovereign rights of the independent rulers of Kangra.

The Court observed that the right to all royal trees, including pine trees, within the Nadaun Jagir had passed to the holder of the grant. For the purpose of this appeal the Court was prepared to accept, on the basis of some historical material, that Raja Sansar Chand possessed a proprietary right over every royal tree, pine trees included, within his territory. However, the Court found it clear that neither Raja Jodhbir Chand nor the present appellant succeeded to the sovereign rights of the independent rulers of Kangra. Raja Jodhbir Chand, the Court noted, held his interest as a grantee under a grant first issued by Maharaja Ranjit Singh and later confirmed by the British Government. The exact terms of Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s grant are not known, but the terms of the grant issued by the Governor‑General on 11 October 1848 are recorded in the Sanad dated that day. Consequently, the appellant’s legal position cannot be superior to that of Raja Jodhbir Chand, and the appellant’s claim that he had succeeded to the rights of the independent rulers of Kangra was held to be unfounded. In addressing this portion of the appellant’s claim, the learned District Judge, who had decided in favour of the appellant, relied upon observations quoted on pages 365 and 378 of the Kangra District Gazetteer (1924‑25). Those observations, also cited by counsel for the appellant, were taken from Mr Lyall’s Settlement Report. Mr Lyall wrote that under the old Katoch Rajas the theory of land ownership was that each Raja was the landlord of his entire raj or principality, a position even stronger than the general principle in India that the State is, in a sense, the landlord. He explained that each principality was a single estate divided for management into a number of circuits. The waste lands, whether large or small, were the Raja’s waste, while the arable lands consisted of separate holdings occupied by his tenants. Rent from each field was payable directly to the Raja unless he chose to remit it as a favour, assign it in jagir to a third party in lieu of payment, or grant it as a subsistence allowance. Mr Lyall further stated that every distinct interest in land—whether the right to cultivate fields, to graze exclusively on waste plots, to operate a water‑mill, to set a net for game or hawks on a mountain, or to install a fish‑weir in a stream—was held directly from the Raja as a separate holding or tenancy, and that the holder usually described such an interest as a “warisi” (inheritance) rather than “maliki” (lordship). He added that all rights were deemed to arise from the Raja; some rights, such as land holdings, derived from his grant, while others, such as common rights, stemmed from his permissive tolerance. A summary of these conditions of land tenure is provided on page 377 of the Gazetteer.

In the period when the Katoch Rajas ruled, two distinct rights in the soil were recognized. The first was the paramount right of ownership, which was vested in the Raja himself and extended over the entire principality. The second was a right of cultivation, which was granted by the Raja to individual cultivators; this right was limited to the specific parcel mentioned in the grant, although it also included ancillary common rights over neighboring waste land. It was observed that this system of land tenure remained essentially unchanged until the advent of British administration, and even during the intervening Sikh domination the structure was not substantially altered. The learned District Judge relied upon these observations to conclude that the appellant possessed ownership of all royal trees in accordance with the land‑tenure system that existed under the former Rajas. The Court, however, found the District Judge to be mistaken on this point of the appellant’s claim. It was noted that Mr. Lyall commenced his settlement work in 1865 and issued his report on 30 July 1872, continuing and revising the earlier settlement efforts of Mr. Barnes. Importantly, neither Mr. Barnes nor Mr. Lyall carried out any actual settlement operations in the area of Nadaun, although Mr. Lyall did collect valuable historical information regarding the land‑tenure conditions that prevailed in the Kangra district under the old Katoch rulers. While it is one matter to state that the land‑tenure system of the Katoch era persisted despite the Sikh interregnum, it is another matter entirely to assert that Raja Jodhbir Chand, a grantee of a Jagir, succeeded to the rights formerly held by the independent Katoch rulers. The rights of the last independent Katoch ruler, under the prevailing tenure system, first passed to the Sikhs who became the rulers of Kangra and subsequently to the British after the Sikh wars. The District Judge failed to distinguish between the sovereign rights of an independent ruler and the rights of a grantee created by a grant from that sovereign. The Court therefore referred to Lord Dunedin’s observations in Vajesingji Joravarsingji v. Secretary of State for India, wherein it was held that when a territory is acquired by a sovereign state—whether by conquest, treaty cession, or occupation—the new sovereign may recognise only those rights that it, through its officers, elect to acknowledge, and that rights enjoyed under previous rulers do not automatically survive the change of sovereignty.

The Court noted that Mr Douie, writing in the Punjab Settlement Manual (1899) at page 69, observed that “the Sikhs drove the hill Rajas of Kangra into exile or degraded them into mere Jagirdars, and the British Government when it took over the country did not restore them to their old position.” The Court explained that the central issue was whether the sovereign ruler, who possessed a right over all royal trees, had expressly conveyed that right to Raja Jodhbir Chand, or whether the sovereign had relinquished the right in favour of Raja Jodhbir Chand or any of his successors‑in‑interest. The answer to that issue, the Court said, would depend on the precise terms of the grant or on any other evidence demonstrating that the right had been surrendered to the appellant or to his predecessors‑in‑interest. The Court stated that this question would be examined later. The Court further held that the learned District Judge had erred in concluding that, under the land‑tenure system that prevailed either under the former Rajas or under the Sikhs, Raja Jodhbir Chand acquired any right to all pine trees situated within the Nadaun Jagir. The Court cited the authorities at [1924] L.R. 51 I.A. 357, 360, and then turned to the second ground of the appellant’s case, which required a detailed consideration of the Sanad dated 11 October 1848, the document on which the appellant also based his claim.

The Court reproduced the operative portion of that Sanad, which read: “Fresh Sanad re: Settlement upon Raja Jodhbir Chand Katoch of the villages named hereinafter, situate in Taalluqa Nadaun, possessed by him. Whereas the mountainous country together with the Doaba tract had come under the occupation of the British Company in pursuance of the treaty which took place between the British Government and the Sirkar of Lahore on 9 March 1846: The Jagir of Choru, Bara, etc., situate in the Ilaqa of Nadaun, the name of each Tappa together with the number of its villages and its Jama is given herein below and the total Jama whereof was Rs 26,270/10/3 per annum approximately, i.e., as much of the Ilaqa of Nadaun as was in the possession of the said Raja at the time of the commencement of the tumult of battle whether less or more than the present one, has been granted in perpetuity, generation after generation, to Raja Jodhbir Chand and his male legitimate descendants who are not from the womb of a slave girl under the orders of the Most Generous Gracious, Exalted and Excellent Nawab Sir Henry Hardinge G.C.B., Governor‑General, ruler of the territory of India, communicated in writing in English bearing the signature of Mr Edward, Deputy Chief Secretary to His Excellency, in reply to the Commissioner’s report No 147, dated 24 July 1847, and also as contemplated in the previous order of the Nawab Governor‑General dated 7 August 1846, subject to the following conditions: 1. In no way shall criminal jurisdiction in respect of the said Ilaqa vest in the Raja Sahib. The entire administration and power of hearing every sort of complaint between the Riaya (subjects) and the said Raja shall remain in the hands of the British Government’s officers. 2. The Raja…”. The Court indicated that these conditions formed part of the grant and would be examined in the further analysis.

The document states that the Raja shall not be permitted to collect any revenue on the pretext of Mahsul for any commodity from any Mahajan, trader, or from the subjects by way of Zakat, octroi, or any excise or intoxicants. His revenue may be drawn only from the subjects residing in the villages that form his jagir, and such revenue must be assessed in accordance with the rules of practice laid down by the British Government. If the Raja or his descendants breach these rules, the Government will determine a cash amount that the Raja must pay as a penalty. After the Raja’s death, the jagir shall be divided among his legitimate sons in the manner traditionally followed by Hindus, and it shall not pass to any descendants whose mother was a slave girl. The Raja is also required to construct, at his own expense, public roads of eleven cubits in width throughout his territory. Moreover, the Raja must always be ready to serve the Government with loyalty and maintain good moral character; consequently, he is forbidden from setting foot beyond the borders of his own jagir. The Sanad issued to him is to be regarded as an absolute grant. Earlier, on 22 September 1846, a Sanad had been issued by the Governor‑General Henry Montgomery‑Lawrence from Simla without a thorough inquiry and without listing each village. That earlier Sanad recorded the total Jama as approximately Rs 32,000 and, according to the Raja’s officials, the amount included sums for excise, Bhum Chari (cattle grazing) and similar charges—an assertion later found to be incorrect. The present Sanad, however, lists each tappa and village within the jagir of Nadaun and specifies the Jama for each tappa. The present question before the Court is whether this Sanad confers only the right to land revenue or whether it also grants other royal rights, such as the right to all pine trees, which is the subject of the six suits brought by the appellant. The Court observes that the ordinary rule applied to grants made by a private individual does not govern grants made by the sovereign; grants issued by the sovereign are to be interpreted most favorably to the sovereign. Nevertheless, this general principle may be relaxed in favour of the subject where appropriate. The Court notes that when the intention of a grant is clear, a fair and liberal construction must be given to enable the grant to operate, and that the operative portion, if plainly expressed, can take effect despite any qualifications in the recital. In cases where the grant is made for valuable consideration, it is to be construed in favour of the grantee out of respect for the sovereign’s honour, and if two possible constructions exist—one valid and one void—the valid one should be preferred because the sovereign’s honour is to be upheld over the sovereign’s profit. The Court further points out that, as regards lands occupied by tenants or subjects, the Sanad did not confer any right other than the right to receive revenue; clause two of the Sanad expressly limits the grantee to receiving only revenue from the subjects living in the villages of his jagir in accordance with the British Government’s rules of practice, and expressly forbids the grantee from collecting any Mahsul on any pretext.

In interpreting a grant, the Court explained that when the operative portion of the instrument is plainly expressed, it may be given effect even though the recitals contain qualifications. The Court further observed that where a grant is made for valuable consideration, it must be construed in favour of the grantee in order to preserve the honour of the Sovereign. Moreover, when two possible constructions exist—one that is valid and another that would be void—the valid construction should be preferred, because the honour of the Sovereign is regarded as more important than any profit that might accrue to the Sovereign. This principle is supported by the authority quoted from Halsbury’s Laws of England, paragraph 670 at page 315, volume VII, section 12, Simonds edition.

The Court then turned to the specific terms of the Sanad in the present matter. It noted that, as far as lands occupied by tenants or subjects were concerned, the Sanad conveyed no right other than the right to receive revenue. Condition No. 2 of the Sanad made it clear that the grantee could collect only the revenue due from the subjects living in the villages of his Jagir, and that this collection had to be in accordance with the British Government’s rules of practice. The condition expressly prohibited the grantee from taking, on any pretext, “mahsul” for any commodity from any Mahajan, trader, or from imposing any octroi upon the subjects. The Court observed that, had the intention been to grant a right to the pine trees standing on the subjects’ lands, such a right would have been mentioned in Condition No. 2. The Court also examined the reference to the Jama in the Sanad. An earlier Sanad had shown the total Jama as Rs 32,000, based on statements that the amount included revenues from cattle grazing and similar sources; this figure was later corrected to Rs 26,270‑10‑3. The present Sanad concluded with the words that it was issued, bearing the name of each tappa, the number of villages, and the Jama thereon, subject to the aforementioned conditions. The recital portion likewise stated that the Jagir comprising the listed tappas, villages, and a total Jama of Rs 26,270‑10‑3 was granted to Raja Jodhbir Chand. The other conditions attached to the grant indicated that no sovereign rights were conferred upon the Jagirdar. In paragraph 69 at page 96 of Mr Lyall’s report, it was recorded that Raja Jodhbir Chand held a perpetual revenue demand (Jama) of Rs 36,079, of which Rs 6,079 represented the assessment of assigned Khalsa lands paid to the Government as nazarana, while Rs 33,000 was the value of the grant and the Raja actually collected Rs 30,000, excluding Khalsa tikas. Those contemporary observations, the Court held, support the view that the grant was essentially an assignment of land revenue and that any other rights, if any, were incidental.

The judgment observed that, although the grant might have included certain rights, it unequivocally did not convey the right to all pine trees standing on cultivated lands belonging to subjects. Consequently, the Court agreed with the High Court that a proper construction of the Sanad could not be interpreted as conferring upon Raja Jodhbir Chand any entitlement to all pine trees situated on cultivated and proprietary lands. The Court then turned to the third ground advanced by the appellant, namely the portion of his claim derived from the entries recorded in the Wajib‑ul‑arz for the years 1892‑93 (Exhibit P‑5), 1899‑1900 (Exhibit P‑6) and 1910‑1915 (Exhibit P‑4), together with other related documents. This segment of the appellant’s claim had proved to be the most contentious and the most difficult to resolve. The learned Subordinate Judge had held that those entries did not aid the appellant because they concerned pine trees located on uncultivated waste lands or on lands that had been recently reclaimed (nautor), and not on pine trees situated on proprietary or cultivated lands. The learned District Judge, on appeal, reversed that view, finding that the Wajib‑ul‑arz of 1892‑93 (Exhibit P‑5) expressly recorded all pine (chil) trees as property of the Government, a situation that gave rise to a dispute between the Raja and the Government. He further noted that the Wajib‑ul‑arz of 1899‑1900 (Exhibit P‑6) and subsequent records contained an entry in favour of the Raja indicating that the Government had relinquished or surrendered its right to those trees. The District Judge therefore disagreed with the Subordinate Judge’s conclusion that the entries pertained solely to waste or reclaimed lands. The learned Judge who delivered the leading judgment of the High Court examined an extensive series of quotations from numerous documents and concluded that the authority of the Wajib‑ul‑arz entries was doubtful and that the Raja had failed to substantiate his claim. However, that Judge did not expressly determine whether the entries related only to waste and reclaimed lands. Counsel for the appellant strongly urged that the District Judge’s view was correct and should have been accepted by the High Court. Counsel for the respondents, on the contrary, argued that the trial Judge and the High Court judges had arrived at a definite finding of fact with respect to the Wajib‑ul‑arz entries and that the present Court should not overturn that finding. The Court noted that these appeals could not be disposed of on the narrow ground that this Court ordinarily does not interfere with a concurrent finding of fact, because no such concurrent finding existed. The trial Judge had held that the entries related to waste and recently reclaimed lands, whereas the High Court had doubted the very authority of the entries. Moreover, the question of whether an inference of surrender or relinquishment of a sovereign right by the Government could be properly drawn from the Wajib‑ul‑arz entries was not a pure factual issue, as it depended on the true scope and legal effect of those entries. Therefore, the Court could not shortcut its analysis and must examine the entries to determine their actual scope and legal effect.

In this segment the Court noted that determining whether a governmental surrender or relinquishment could be inferred from the Wajib‑ul‑arz entries was not a simple factual inquiry, because the issue required an examination of the true scope and legal effect of those entries. The Court therefore refused to employ a shortcut that would avoid a thorough review of the Wajib‑ul‑arz entries and their legal significance. The judgment recalled that Mr. Barnes’ Settlement, carried out between 1850 and 1852, did not involve any actual settlement operations in the area of Nadaun. The next settlement effort concerning Kangra was undertaken by Mr. Lyall, later Sir James Lyall, who was Lieutenant‑Governor of the Punjab. He commenced his work in 1865 and issued his report in 1872, but likewise did not settle Nadaun.

The Court then described the subsequent settlement activities. Alex Anderson became the next official to handle the settlement of Kangra. By Notification No. 25 dated 26 January 1888 a general reassessment of land revenue in Kangra district was ordered, and by Notification No. 26 of the same date a preparation of the record‑of‑rights in the Jagirs of Guler, Siba and Nadaun was initiated. Mr. O’Brien began the settlement work but died on 28 November 1893, leaving the preparation of the final report to Mr. Anderson. Anderson produced two reports: the Forest Settlement Report of 1887 and the Revised Settlement Report of Kangra of 1897. On 27 April 1910 two further notifications were issued directing a revision of the existing record‑of‑rights in Dera and Hamirpur Tehsils, the latter containing Nadaun. Consequently, Messrs Middleton and Shuttleworth carried out a revisional settlement that became known as the Settlement of 1910‑1915. The Court therefore had to consider the entries recorded in O’Brien’s Settlement of 1892‑93, Anderson’s Settlement of 1899‑1900, and the Middleton‑Shuttleworth Settlement of 1910‑15.

Before addressing those specific entries, the Court turned to matters arising from the earlier settlement operations of Barnes and Lyall. The terms “ala‑malik” and “adna‑malik” had been frequently cited in the litigation, and the Court explained their meaning. In Mr. Douie’s Punjab Settlement Manual (1930 edition), paragraph 143 states that when a proprietary right is divided, the superior owner is referred to in settlement literature as “ala‑malik” or “talukdar,” while the inferior owner is called “adna‑malik.” In cases of divided ownership, the proprietary profits are shared between the two classes that hold an interest in the soil. The origin of this distinction, as it applies to the record‑of‑rights in the Jagirs, appears in paragraph 105 on page 60 of Anderson’s report, where Anderson wrote that the first major question for decision was the status of the Raja and the people with respect to land actually occupied by the people, and also with respect to land not occupied but traditionally used for grazing and other acts. Mr. O’Brien decided that the Raja was the superior proprietor or talukdar of all lands in his Jagir, while the occupants were classified as inferior proprietors of their own holdings and of the waste land within those holdings, though the rights in waste outside the holdings were never fully considered.

In this case the Court observed that the judgment of Mr O’Brien had held the Raja to be the superior proprietor, or Talukdar, of every parcel of land forming part of his Jagir, while the occupants of those lands were deemed to be inferior proprietors of their respective holdings and of any waste land that lay within those holdings; the Court noted that the rights in waste land situated outside the occupants’ holdings were never fully taken into account. The Court explained that the general principles underlying that decision could be derived from Mr Lyall’s Settlement Report and from the orders that appeared in the Siba Summary Settlement Report. The Court therefore reproduced at length the principles on which Mr O’Brien based his determination of the occupants’ status, not only because it was necessary to set out the action he had taken, but also so that civil courts that would later be called upon to decide questions relating to proprietary rights could understand the foundation upon which the present record was constructed.

Mr Anderson subsequently quoted an extract from Mr O’Brien’s assessment report to clarify the position: “In places where the possession of the original occupants of land was undisturbed, they were classed as inferior proprietors; but where they had acquired their first possession on land already cultivated at a recent date, or where the cultivators had admitted the Raja’s title to proprietorship during the preparation and attestation of the Jamabandis, they were recorded as tenants with or without right of occupancy as the circumstances of the case suggested… In deciding the question, old possession was respected. Where the ryots had been proved to be in undisturbed possession of the soil they have been recorded as inferior proprietors.” The Court noted that the same principles had been applied in the settlement of Nadaun, where long possession, whether or not it was supported by a patta or a lease from the Raja, served as the test for recording a ryot as an inferior proprietor, also known as an adna‑malik.

Keeping in view the distinction between an ala‑malik (superior owner) and an adna‑malik (inferior owner), the Court proceeded to examine the actual entries made in the Wajib‑ul‑arz for the years 1892‑93 (Exhibit P‑5), 1899‑1900 (Exhibit P‑6) and 1910‑15 (Exhibit P‑4). In Exhibit P‑5, the relevant entry in paragraph 11 stated: “The owners shall, however, have no right to pine trees. They can neither cut them nor get the same without permission, for it has been laid down in the Forest Settlement Reports that the Raja Sahib gave leases to reclaim such lands whereon the Government jungles, i.e., the Government pine trees exist. For this reason, the Government maintained their right to the pine trees.” (see paragraph 78 of the English report regarding jungles). In Exhibit P‑6 the entry read: “Except the chil (pine) trees, all the trees situated in the Khata of any person in the Tikas of the Jagir are the property of the owner of the Khata. The chil trees growing in such Khatas in the Tikas of the Jagir are the property of Raja Sahib.” Finally, in Exhibit P‑4 the entry declared: “Excepting the pine trees, all the trees standing in the Khata of any person in the Tikas of the Jagir, save those proprietary lands whose trees have been held belonging to the Government during the recent settlement, are the property of the owner of the Khata.”

In the settlement records that have been referred to above, the entries state that the trees mentioned there are the property of the owner of the Khata. The same records further say that, in the Tikas of the Jagir, all pine trees standing in such Khatas, except those located on proprietary lands that have been recognized as Government property during the recent settlement, are the property of the Raja Sahib. The Court was asked to determine the true scope and legal effect of these entries. Specifically, the question was whether the entries confer a grant of a right to the chil (pine) trees, or, equivalently, constitute a surrender of that right by the Government in favour of the Raja. The matters under consideration do not involve trees on public waste lands or forest trees. As the High Court observed, it is not established whether the lands in dispute were originally private waste lands or have been recently reclaimed. The evidence of the Jamabandis demonstrates that the lands are proprietary and cultivated lands of the adna‑maliks. Consequently, the issue before the Court is the right to chil trees on proprietary and cultivated lands that are in the possession of the adna‑maliks.

The Court noted that there is no dispute that, under section 31 of the Punjab Land‑Revenue Act, 1887, the Wajib‑ul‑Arz forms part of the record of rights, and that entries made therein in compliance with the law and the provisions of Chapter IV of the Act and the corresponding rules are to be presumed true pursuant to section 44. The Wajib‑ul‑Arz, also known as the village administration paper, is a record of existing customs concerning rights and liabilities within the estate; it is not intended to create new rights or liabilities. This principle is supported by paragraph 295 of the Punjab Settlement Manual (1930 edition, pages 146‑147). The Court further referred to Appendix VIII of the Settlement Manual, Section E, which contains instructions relating to the Wajib‑ul‑Arz. Instruction No. 2 provides that “The statement shall not contain entries relating to matters regulated by law, nor shall customs contrary to justice, equity or good conscience, or which have been declared to be void by any competent authority, be entered in it. Subject to these restrictions, the statement should contain information on so many of the following matters as are pertinent to the estate:” and then lists, among other matters, (h) “The rights of cultivators of all classes not expressly provided for by law (for instance, rights to trees or manure, and the right to plant trees) and their customary liabilities other than rent,” (j) “The rights of Government to any nazul property, forests, unclaimed, unoccupied, deserted, or waste lands, quarries, ruins or objects of antiquarian interest, spontaneous products, and other accessory interest in land included within the boundaries of the estate,” and (l) “Any other important usage affecting the rights of landowners, cultivators or other persons interested in the estate, not being a usage relating to succession and transfer of landed property.” In the present cases, the appellant did not base his claim on custom, even though his plaint referred to his right as “this has been the practice throughout.” The Court observed that the appellant’s reference to “practice” was intended to invoke the land system that prevailed under the former independent Katoch rulers, a point that would be considered further in the subsequent analysis.

In this case the Court explained that the reference to “practice” in the petitioner's claim referred to the land system that existed under the former independent Katoch rulers. The Court reiterated its earlier finding that the appellant did not acquire the sovereign authority that once belonged to the independent Katoch rulers, and that the grant dated 1848 did not confer any right to the royal trees on his part. The entry recorded in the Wajib‑ul‑arz for the year 1892‑93 (Exhibit P‑5) was examined and found not to be favorable to the appellant. That entry declared that trees of every kind were the property of the owners, identified as adna‑maliks, yet it simultaneously stated that the owners possessed no right to pine trees. To justify the latter part, the entry referred to paragraph 78 of Anderson’s Forest Settlement Report. Paragraph 78, however, plainly observed that no orders concerning trees on cultivated fields had been issued because the inquiry at that time dealt only with waste land. Consequently, the Court observed that the Wajib‑ul‑arz entry extended far beyond the content of paragraph 78 and created confusion between government jungles, newly reclaimed land, and proprietary land. Moreover, the entry could not be regarded as a statement of an existing custom because it explicitly relied on the Anderson report, and it failed to demonstrate any surrender or relinquishment of a sovereign right by the Government in favour of the Raja. The Court found it difficult to conceive how a surrender of such a right could arise from a village custom or be captured within a revenue entry.

The original grant to Raja Jodhbir Chand had been made by a Sanad, and the Court noted that any subsequent grant or surrender would ordinarily be documented in a similar instrument. If the Government had intended to surrender a sovereign right to the Raja, the Court asserted that such an intention would have been expressed in clear and unambiguous language. The Court pointed out that in Khalsa villages the Government had indeed surrendered its right to trees on Shamilat lands owned by adna‑maliks, as evidenced by Letter No. 347 dated 6 January 1867. Even when the Court adopted the most favourable interpretation for the appellant, it concluded that the entries in the Wajib‑ul‑arz merely reflected the views of certain revenue officials regarding the Raja’s rights or the Government’s intention, and that the opinions of revenue officials on the construction of a grant do not settle the matter nor bind the civil courts, citing the precedent of Rajah Venkata Narasimha Appa Row Bahadur v. Rajah Narayya Appa Row Bahadur. The same analysis was applied to the Wajib‑ul‑arz entries for the years 1899‑1900 (Exhibit P‑6) and 1910‑15 (Exhibit P‑4). Those entries likewise asserted that pine trees on lands listed in the Khatas of adna‑maliks were the property of the Raja Sahib, but they did not specify the basis on which that claim rested. The Court observed that if the revenue officials had based their entries on the old Katoch land system or on the 1848 Sanad, their entries would be erroneous. Conversely, if a genuine surrender of the right by the Government had taken place, the Court would expect such surrender to be unmistakably recorded in the entries and reflected in the Jamabandis of the adna‑maliks, which, however, do not exhibit any restriction on the adna‑maliks’ rights concerning trees on their lands.

The Court observed that none of the entries clarify the basis on which the right to chil trees situated on the proprietary and cultivated lands of the adna‑maliks is to be deemed the property of the Raja Sahib. It held that if the revenue authorities had made the entries relying on the land system of the former Katoch rulers or on the Sanad of 1848, such entries would be plainly erroneous. Conversely, if the Government had actually surrendered the right in favour of the Raja, the surrender would have to be expressed in unmistakable terms in the entries; the Court further expected that the same surrender would be reflected in the Jamabandis (Exhibits D‑7 and D‑8) of the adna‑maliks. The Jamabandis, however, do not exhibit any limitation on the rights of the adna‑maliks concerning the trees growing on their lands. The Court then referred to another document, Exhibit D‑2, which is an extract of paragraph 12 of the Wajib‑ul‑arz for the years 1892‑93 and deals with the rights of the ala‑maliks and adna‑maliks. That extract records that the Raja Sahib was to receive fifteen per cent of the net revenue from the entire land owned by the adna‑maliks as talukdari dues, the dues having been fixed to compensate the Raja for various obligations such as banwaziri, domiana and similar liabilities. The Court found it implausible that, after fixing such talukdari dues, a further grant of the right to chil trees on the adna‑maliks’ lands could be made without being specifically mentioned in paragraph 12 of the Wajib‑ul‑arz, which particularly deals with the rights of the ala‑ and adna‑maliks. Learned counsel for the appellant drew the Court’s attention to Exhibit D‑6, an extract of paragraph 11 of the Wajib‑ul‑arz for the years 1914‑15, which bears a note at its foot stating that the Zamindars (the adna‑maliks) were present, that every paragraph had been read to them and that the entries were correct. The appellant argued that this note amounted to an admission by the adna‑maliks that the Wajib‑ul‑arz of 1914‑15 was accurate. The Court could not accept that argument. Firstly, the Court held that the endorsement at the foot of Exhibit D‑6 does not constitute an admission by the adna‑maliks that the entries in other paragraphs of the Wajib‑ul‑arz, for example paragraph 10 (Exhibit P‑4) concerning the Government’s rights over nazul lands, are correct. Secondly, even assuming that the endorsement were an admission, the Court found that it is neither conclusive nor decisive of the right claimed by the appellant. The Court pointed to Exhibit P‑2, dated 27 May 1886, which showed that as early as that date, some of the adna‑maliks had lodged complaints that the Raja’s men had cut and removed certain chil trees from their lands. The Court considered it highly improbable that, after making such a complaint, the adna‑maliks would thereafter admit the Raja’s right to the chil trees on their lands.

In the discussion of paragraph 296 of the Punjab Settlement Manual, Mr Douie observed that the Wajib‑ul‑arz prepared in the first regular settlements could be an imposing document, yet its actual usefulness as proof of village custom was not always proportional to its length. He quoted with approval the earlier observations of Sir Arthur Brandreth, who explained that only a few points were clearly ascertained in each case and that, in general, villagers did not know their customs very well. When villagers affixed their seals to the paper they likely regarded it as something grand, although they understood little of its language. Brandreth described two categories of rules: those laid down by the Government or customs that were common to the whole pargana, and the special customs particular to each manor. Both categories together occupied many pages, leaving the villagers confused by the extensive code, and leading them simply to say “yes, yes” and to seal the document, hoping that nothing very dreadful was contained therein. A large number of decisions that examined entries from the Wajib‑ul‑arz—or from the Riwaji‑i‑am—and considered the weight to be given to those entries have been cited before the Court. In some of those cases the entries in the Wajib‑ul‑arz were accepted as correct, while in other cases they were not, despite the statutory presumption that operates under section 44 of the Punjab Land‑Revenue Act, 1887. The Court found that a detailed analysis of all those decisions would not advance the present dispute because the legal position was already well established. As the Privy Council observed in Dakas Khan v. Ghulam Kasim Khan (1), the Wajib‑ul‑arz does not create a title, but it generates a presumption in its favour which remains effective unless that presumption is properly displaced. It is also recognised that the Wajib‑ul‑arz, being part of a revenue record, carries greater authority than a Riwaji‑i‑am, which is a general instrument not prepared for any specific village, as affirmed in Gurbakhsh Singh v. Mst Partapo (1). Whether the statutory presumption attached to a Wajib‑ul‑arz entry has been correctly displaced must be decided on the facts of each case.

Applying that principle to the matters before it, the Court held, for the reasons previously set out, that the entries in the Wajib‑ul‑arz concerning the Raja’s right over chil trees standing on the cultivated and proprietary lands of the adna‑maliks do not demonstrate an existing village custom. The right asserted by the Raja is a sovereign right, and the entries do not plainly show that such sovereign right was surrendered or relinquished in the Raja’s favour. Consequently, the Court concluded that it would be an unwarranted extension of the presumption to treat the Wajib‑ul‑arz entries as creating a grant of a sovereign right to the Raja; to do so would improperly elevate the document beyond its recognized evidentiary status. The Court emphasized that the presumption cannot be stretched to convert a revenue record into a title‑granting instrument, and that the sovereign nature of the ruler’s claim remains unaffected by the entries in question. This reasoning reaffirmed the limitation of the Wajib‑ul‑arz as evidence of custom and clarified that it cannot be used to establish a transfer of sovereign authority.

It was observed that to say the Wajib‑ul‑arz granted a title to the Raja would be incorrect because the document clearly did not confer such a title. The record showed that the Wajib‑ul‑arz for the year 1899‑1900, exhibited as Exhibit P‑6, contained a reference to orders found in letter No 1353 dated 11 March 1897, which had been issued by the Senior Secretary of the Financial Commissioner. The same Wajib‑ul‑arz also indicated that amendments had been made on 26 May 1914 by an order of Mr Shuttleworth, who was the Settlement Officer at that time, and that a subsequent note recorded the cancellation of those amendments on 23 January 1917. In the judgment of the High Court, the learned judge who authored the leading opinion cited these notes and remarked that they revealed a situation that was somewhat confused and fluid at the time. The judge further suggested that each revenue officer might have been expressing his own personal view on the matter. An effort was made before the High Court to obtain certain unpublished original Government documents that could have clarified the entries in the Wajib‑ul‑arz, but the Government of the Punjab asserted a claim of privilege over those documents, and the High Court upheld that claim. The Supreme Court re‑examined the privilege claim, hearing counsel for the State even though the State was not a party to the proceedings. The Court found that the privilege claim was valid under the law as it currently stands. For the purpose of analysis, the Court assumed that the entries in the Wajib‑ul‑arz of 1899‑1900 and those of 1910‑1915 related to cultivated and proprietary lands of the adna‑maliks, although those entries appeared in a paragraph dealing with Government rights over nazul lands, jungles, unclaimed property and similar categories.

Even accepting that assumption, the Court concluded that the entries in the Wajib‑ul‑arz did not support the appellant’s claim that a sovereign right had been surrendered or relinquished in favour of his predecessor. The Court therefore turned to other evidence on record. Counsel for the appellant referred to several judgments presented as Exhibits P‑9, P‑7, P‑8 and P‑4 (the latter mistakenly labelled as Exhibit P‑6). The trial judge, when considering those judgments, observed that it was unclear whether the cited decisions concerned lands that were private waste or reclaimed (nautor) lands. Setting aside that uncertainty, the Court held that those judgments did not advance the appellant’s case any further because they primarily rested on the same Wajib‑ul‑arz entries whose effect had already been examined in detail. The Court noted that no plea of res judicata arose from those judgments; rather, they represented evidence of a similar assertion and determination made by the Raja concerning other lands within the Jagir. Regarding oral evidence, the Court observed that none of the lower courts placed significant reliance on it. The Subordinate Judge, in particular, did not accept the oral evidence offered on behalf of the appellant.

In this case, the District Judge examined the oral evidence offered by the appellant and concluded that it could not be accepted in preference to the extensive historical and documentary material presented by the appellant. The judge acknowledged that some of the appellant’s witnesses appeared to be reliable. The judges of the High Court, however, did not discuss the oral evidence except for a brief mention of the statement made by Salig Ram, the Raja’s attorney, who indicated that the Raja had acquired his rights in the year 1893‑94, without explaining the manner in which those rights were obtained. Counsel for the appellant drew the Court’s attention to the testimony of one Babu Kailash Chander, identified as witness number 2 for the appellant, who served as a Forest Range Officer. He asserted that the trees standing on the land that belonged to the landlords were exclusively owned by the Raja Sahib. During cross‑examination, however, he conceded that he possessed no knowledge of the specific trees that were the subject of the suit and was unaware of the exact parcels of land on which those trees stood. He also admitted that he knew nothing about the respective rights of the Jagirdar and the landlords concerning the disputed lands. The Court found that such testimony did not substantiate the appellant’s claim. Moreover, if the Raja had indeed possessed the pine trees for the extended period he alleged, it would have been reasonable to expect him to produce documents evidencing income or other benefits derived from the trees; no such documents were produced. For these reasons, the Court held that the appellant had failed to establish his claim to the pine trees and affirmed the correctness of the High Court’s decision. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed. The Court also agreed with the High Court’s order that no costs should be awarded either in the High Court or in the lower courts, and it made no order regarding costs for the hearing before this Court. The appeals were therefore dismissed.