Raja Bhairebendra Narayan Bhup vs The State Of Assam

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 310 and 311 of 1955

Decision Date: 11 April 1956

Coram: Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Syed Jaffer Imam, C. Das

In the matter of Raja Bhairebendra Narayan Bhup versus the State of Assam, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 11 April 1956. The case was heard before a bench consisting of Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Justice Natwarlal H. Bhagwati and Justice Syed Jaffer Imam. The petitioner was Raja Bhairebendra Narayan Bhup and the respondent was the State of Assam, the case also involving a connected appeal. The citation for this decision is recorded as 1956 AIR 503 and 1956 SCR 303. The matters at issue related to the Assam State Acquisition of Zamindaries Act 1951 (Assam Act XVIII of 1951) as amended by Assam Act VI of 1954, and raised questions of constitutional competence, the effect of the newly promulgated Constitution, and the validity of provisions alleged to be discriminatory and violative of fundamental rights contained in Articles 31(2) and 14 of the Constitution. The relevant statutory framework also involved the Government of India Act 1935, specifically sections 75 and 76, and constitutional provisions Articles 389, 395, 31(A) and 31(2). The headnote summarizes that the appellants, through two suits heard by a Full Bench of the Assam High Court, challenged the constitutional validity of the amended acquisition act. The legislative history showed that the Assam Legislative Assembly passed the original Bill on 28 March 1949, after which it was presented to the Governor. The Governor reserved the Bill for the Governor General’s consideration; on 25 January 1950, anticipating forthcoming constitutional changes, the Governor General returned the Bill to the Governor with a suggestion that it might be further reserved for the President’s consideration. Before the Bill could reach the Governor, the Constitution came into force. Subsequently, the Governor again reserved the Bill for the President, who returned it suggesting certain alterations. The State Legislative Assembly incorporated those alterations and passed the amended Bill, which received the President’s assent on 27 July 1951, thereby becoming law. On 11 September 1951, the Assembly passed a further amending Bill, which also obtained the President’s assent. The amended Act was brought into force on 15 April 1954, and the State Government issued a notification under the impugned Act declaring that the properties of the appellants and others would vest in the State. The appellants contended that the Act was beyond the competence of the State Legislature, was not enacted in accordance with law, and infringed their fundamental rights under Articles 31(2) and 14. The High Court rejected these contentions, a decision that was upheld on appeal. The Supreme Court held that the impugned Act had been passed in accordance with law, that its forty‑four provisions were constitutionally valid, and that the challenges to its competence and alleged violations of fundamental rights could not be sustained.

In this case the Court affirmed the decision of the High Court. It explained that the repeal of the Government of India Act, 1935 by Article 395 of the Constitution did not extinguish a Bill that, immediately before the Constitution came into force, was pending before the Governor‑General or the Governor who represented His Majesty the King, a member of the Provincial Legislature; consequently the Bill was also pending before the Provincial Legislature and the State Legislature of Assam was competent, under Article 389, to continue its consideration. The Court observed that although the Governor‑General may not have complied strictly with section 76 of the Government of India Act, 1935 when he suggested that the Bill might be reserved for the President’s consideration, his suggestion did not constitute a formal withholding of assent because there was no positive declaration to that effect, and therefore it could not terminate the Bill contrary to his express intention that the Bill should remain pending. Under the Government of India Act, 1935 His Majesty the King was an integral part of the Legislature, and when a Bill was presented to the Governor or the Governor‑General under sections 75 or 76, if neither gave nor withheld assent in the name of His Majesty the Bill remained pending both legally and in reality before His Majesty and consequently before the Legislature, allowing the State Legislature to lawfully continue it after the Constitution commenced. The Court held that the Governor acted within his powers in reserving the Bill for the President and that the subsequent enactment of the Bill complied with the Constitution. It further noted that the term “Legislature” is not used uniformly in different constitutional provisions; its precise meaning must be determined by reference to the subject‑matter and context, and in Article 389 it is employed in a broad sense to include the whole legislative machinery, including His Majesty represented by the Governor‑General or the Governor, rather than merely the legislative chamber or chambers. The Constitution therefore intended to preserve not only Bills that were literally before a legislative chamber but also those that had reached the final stages of the legislative process and were awaiting assent of the Governor‑General or the Governor acting on behalf of His Majesty. The Court referred to Visweshwar Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1952] S.C.R. 1020 in support of this view. It then held that the impugned Act was a law providing for the acquisition of estates by the State within the meaning of Article 31‑A of the Constitution, that it was fully protected by that article, and that its validity could not be challenged on the ground of any violation of the provisions of Part III dealing with fundamental rights. Finally, the Court stated that the Act could not be questioned in the absence of any issue concerning legislative incompetency.

In this case the Court observed that a challenge based on alleged legislative incompetence could not succeed as a colourable use of legislative power merely because the Act provided for the payment of compensation, and any dispute about the amount of compensation was barred by Article 31‑A of the Constitution. The Court referred to C Gajapati Narain Deb v. State of Orissa, [1954] S.C.R. 1. It further held that Article 14 could not aid the appellants, since precedent made it no longer possible for them to argue that the State was arbitrarily selecting some estates for acquisition while excluding others. The Court cited Biswambhar Singh v. State of Orissa, [1954] S.C.R. 842 and Thakur Amar Singh v. State of Rajasthan, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 303. According to the Court, the Act did not discriminate because its application was limited to Lakheraj estates that fell within the boundaries of permanently settled estates, a distinct class whose acquisition furthered the purpose of the Act. Moreover, the provision setting different compensation scales for different estates was not discriminatory, as there was a rational basis for classifying proprietors according to their income groups. The judgment concerned civil appellate jurisdiction, specifically Civil Appeals Nos. 310 and 311 of 1955, filed under Article 132 of the Constitution against the judgment and order of 6 April 1955 of the Assam High Court in Title Suits Nos. 1 and 3 of 1955. Counsel for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 310 of 1955 and counsel for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 311 of 1955 were instructed to appear for the petitioners. Counsel for the respondent in both appeals, including the Attorney‑General for India and the Advocate‑General of Assam, represented the State of Assam. The judgment was delivered on 11 April 1956 by Chief Justice D A S Das.

The Court then set out the factual background. On 6 December 1954 the appellant Raja Bhairabendra Narain Bhup of Bijni filed T S No. 27 of 1954 before the Subordinate Judge of Lower Assam District at Dhubri. He sought, inter alia, a declaration that the Assam State Acquisition of Zamindaris Act, 1951 (Assam Act XVIII of 1951), as amended by Assam Act VI of 1954, was not validly enacted, was not law, and was ultra vires and void. He further asked that the Act be held inapplicable to his properties and that the notification issued under section 3(1) of the Act concerning his properties be declared illegal, ultra vires and void. Subsequently, on 23 December 1954 the appellant Mrs Bedabala Debi, acting as trustee of the Chapor Trust estate, filed T S No. 34 of 1954 in the same court, challenging the constitutionality of the same Act. Unlike the first suit, she did not contend that the Act, if valid, failed to apply to the estate she represented. Both suits were later transferred to the Assam High Court by orders made under Article 228 on 21 January 1955 and 16 February 1955, and were renumbered as T S No. 1 of 1955 and T S No. 3 of 1955 respectively. The State of Assam filed written statements contesting the pleadings in both suits, and the High Court framed eleven issues, of which the issues common to the two suits concerned the competence of the State Legislature to enact the Assam State Acquisition of Zamindaris Act, 1951 and its amendments.

S. No. 34 of 1954 was filed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Lower Assam District at Dbubri, and it likewise challenged the constitutionality of the Assam State Acquisition of Zamindaris Act, 1951 as amended. In this suit the plaintiff did not raise the same contention that, even if the Act were valid, it would not apply to the estate over which she served as Trustee, a point that had been argued in the Raja’s suit. By two separate orders issued under article 228 of the Assam High Court on 21 January 1955 and on 16 February 1955, the two suits were transferred to the High Court and were subsequently renumbered as T. S. No. 1 of 1955 and T. S. No. 3 of 1955 respectively. The State of Assam filed written statements in both proceedings, expressly disputing the contentions set out in each plaintiff’s plaint. The High Court then formulated eleven questions for determination in the Raja’s case, T. S. No. 1 of 1955. The questions common to both suits were as follows: (1) whether the Assam State Acquisition of Zamindaris Act, 1951 (Assam Act XV111 of 1951) and its amendments fell within the legislative competence of the State and were enacted in accordance with law; (2) whether Notification No. Rt./24/54/21 dated 19 July 1954, published in the Assam Gazette on 21 July 1954 and issued under the aforesaid Act, was valid; (3) whether the Act and its amendments infringed the plaintiff’s fundamental rights under article 31(2) and article 14 of the Constitution, or whether the legislation was protected under article 31A and article 31(4); (4) whether the provisions of the Act and its amendments could be enforced against the properties in suit even if the legislation were held valid; and (5) what relief, if any, the plaintiff was entitled to. Both parties, through their counsel, agreed that the pure questions of law that did not depend on disputed facts should be decided first, leaving any other issues for later determination if necessary. The two cases were heard by a Full Bench of the Assam High Court. The Judges answered questions 1 and 3 against the plaintiffs, though for different reasons, and also answered question 2 against the plaintiffs, subject, in the Raja’s case (T. S. No. 1 of 1955), to the answer to question 4. Regarding question 4, the Bench held that, because the Act and the Notification were valid, they could be enforced against Sm. Bedabala, the plaintiff in T. S. No. 3 of 1955. In the Raja’s case, the Bench observed that the issue of whether the properties that had been notified constituted an “estate” within the meaning of the impugned Act was a factual question; consequently, question 4 could be resolved only on the basis of evidence presented between the Raja and the State. Ultimately, the Bench dismissed Sm. Bedabala’s T. S. No. 3 of 1955, awarded costs, and ordered that the records of the Raja’s T. S. No. 1 of 1955 be sent down to the lower court for trial and disposal on the determination of question 4 and any remaining issues.

The lower court was directed to receive the suit numbered 1 of 1955 and to conduct a full trial, disposing of the case after it had determined issue 4 together with any other issues that might arise. Because the matters raised before the High Court were regarded as significant, the bench exercised its authority under article 132 and granted leave to the plaintiffs in both suits to appeal to this Court, which gave rise to the present appeals. During the hearing before this Court, counsel advanced arguments concerning issues 1, 2 and 3; consequently, the Court chose to address the issues one after another for clarity. With respect to issue 1, the Court observed that the matter comprised two distinct components. The first component concerned whether the State Legislature possessed the authority to enact the impugned legislation, while the second component dealt with the question of whether the impugned Act had been enacted in accordance with the law. Since counsel for the appellants placed greater emphasis on the second component, the Court elected to consider that portion first. The factual background relevant to this part can be summarized as follows. On 11 August 1948 a Bill titled the Assam State Acquisition of Zamindaris Bill was published in the Assam Gazette. Subsequently, on 23 September 1948 the Bill was introduced in the Legislative Assembly of Assam, which at that time constituted the sole legislative chamber of the State. The Assembly passed the Bill on 28 March 1949. Pursuant to section 75 of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Governor of Assam reserved the Bill for the consideration of the Governor‑General. In view of the imminent commencement of the Constitution of India, the Governor‑General, on 25 January 1950, returned the Bill to the Governor of Assam with a directive that it be reserved for the President’s consideration. The Constitution came into force on 26 January 1950, and two days later, on 28 January 1950, the Governor of Assam actually received the returned Bill. The Governor then again reserved the Bill for the President and transmitted it to him. In October 1950 the President sent the Bill back to the Governor of Assam, recommending certain alterations. The Bill, together with the suggested amendments, was placed before the Legislative Assembly, which examined the proposals and passed the Bill duly amended. The amended Bill was again forwarded to the President and, on 27 July 1951, obtained the President’s assent, becoming Assam Act XVIII of 1951, and was subsequently published in the Assam Gazette on 8 August 1951. Later, on 11 September 1951, the Assembly passed a Bill amending Assam Act XVIII of 1951 in specific respects; this amendment Bill, after being reserved by the Governor for the President’s consideration, received the President’s assent on 25 March 1954 and was enacted as Assam Act VI of 1954. The Acts were then brought into force on the date specified in the subsequent notification.

In this case, the Government of Assam issued a notification on 9 June 1954 stating that the Act would take effect from 15 April 1954. Subsequently, on 19 July 1954 a further notification was published in the Assam Gazette under section 3(1) of the challenged Act. That Gazette notice declared that the properties identified in the Act, including those that formed the subject matter of two pending suits, would vest in the State free of all encumbrances with effect from 15 April 1955. The two suits, from which the present appeals arise, were filed in December 1954. The second portion of the dispute centers on the contention that the challenged Act was not enacted in accordance with law. The petitioners advanced six specific grounds to support this contention. First, they argued that the Bill had been introduced in the Assam Legislative Assembly without obtaining the prior sanction of the Governor, a sanction that Section 299(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 required. Second, they maintained that when the Bill was presented to the Governor‑General for assent and the Governor‑General did not grant assent, the assent should be deemed withheld, and that the Governor‑General’s suggestion that the Bill be reserved for the President’s consideration was void and without legal effect. Third, they contended that the Bill was not pending before the Legislature at the moment the Constitution came into force, and therefore it could not be reserved for the President’s assent. Fourth, they asserted that a Legislature operating under the Constitution lacks the power to consider amendments suggested by the President or to pass such amendments. Fifth, they submitted that the Bill, having been passed by the Legislative Assembly and then reserved for the Governor‑General’s consideration under the Government of India Act, 1935, lapsed when the Government of India Act was repealed and the Constitution was promulgated, because the Governor‑General had taken no constitutional action on the Bill as required by the 1935 Act. Sixth, they claimed that the subsequent actions of the Governor, the Legislative Assembly, and the purported assent of the President were all unconstitutional and void. These arguments may be summarized briefly. The challenged Act unmistakably provides for compulsory acquisition of land, and therefore it was required to satisfy the provisions of Section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which was the governing legislation at the time the Bill was first introduced in the Assam Provincial Legislature. Sub‑section (3) of that section expressly forbids the introduction of any Bill that makes provision for the transfer of land to public ownership in either chamber of the Federal Legislature without the prior sanction of the Governor‑General, and similarly prohibits such introduction in a Provincial Legislature without the prior sanction of the Governor. The petitioners alleged that the Governor of Assam had not granted this prior sanction before the Bill, which eventually became the impugned Act, was introduced in the Legislative Assembly. This allegation was contested, and the Advocate‑General of Assam produced before the High Court the minutes of the official proceedings relating to the Bill.

The Court observed that the Revenue Department’s file numbered RT 17/48, dated 21 July 1948, contained a memorandum addressed to “H.E.”, which unmistakably referred to His Excellency the Governor. The memorandum sought, among other matters, the Governor’s sanction for introducing the Assam State Acquisition of Zamindaris Bill, 1948, in accordance with section 299(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. At the bottom of the memorandum the initials “A.H.” were written over the date 21 July 1948. It was undisputed that the initials stood for Akbar Hydari, who was then serving as the Governor of Assam. Although the phrase “sanction granted” was not expressly written on the note, the Court held that the presence of the Governor’s initials on the document unequivocally signified his approval for the Bill’s introduction in the Legislative Assembly. Moreover, the Court noted that section 109 of the same Act provided that, provided no other defect existed, an Act could not be declared invalid solely on the ground that the Governor had failed to give prior sanction for the Bill’s introduction. Consequently, the Court concluded that the first ground advanced to challenge the validity of the impugned Act – namely, the alleged lack of the Governor’s prior sanction – possessed no legal force and had to be rejected. The remaining grounds, labeled (b) through (f), were said to be conveniently addressed together. The Court recalled that after the Bill had been passed by the Assam Legislative Assembly on 28 March 1949, it was presented to the Governor under the powers conferred by section 75 of the Government of India Act, 1935. Under that provision the Governor could, at his discretion, either assent to the Bill in the name of His Majesty, withhold assent, reserve the Bill for consideration by the Governor‑General, or return the Bill to the Legislature with a message requesting reconsideration of the Bill or of specific provisions. In the present case the Governor chose to reserve the Bill for the Governor‑General’s consideration and accordingly forwarded it. Section 76 of the same Act then empowered the Governor‑General, at his discretion, to either assent to the Bill in the name of His Majesty, withhold assent, reserve the Bill for the pleasure of His Majesty, or direct the Governor to return the Bill to the Provincial Legislature together with a message as contemplated in the preceding section. The Court noted that, in view of the imminent constitutional changes, the Governor‑General on 25 January 1950 returned the Bill to the Governor of Assam, advising him to reserve the Bill for the President’s consideration. The Bill remained in transit, and the Governor had not yet received it when the Constitution came into force on 26 January 1950.

The Bill had not yet been formally received by the Governor when the Constitution became operative on 26 January 1950; the Governor actually took charge of the Bill on 28 January 1950. The Court examined article 395 of the Constitution, which expressly repealed the Indian Independence Act, 1947 and the Government of India Act, 1935, together with every enactment that amended or supplemented the latter Act, the only exception being the Abolition of Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949. It was observed that article 395 contained no saving clause, and therefore the repeal was total and effected the complete removal of the statutes mentioned. The judgment referred to the well‑known observations of Tindal, C. J., in Kay v. Godwin (1) and to the dictum of Lord Tenterden, C. J., in Surtees v. Ellison (2), as well as to the commentary in Craies’ Statute Law, 4th Edition, pages 347‑348, and Crawford on Statutory Construction, pages 599‑600, all of which were cited by Justice Fazl Ali in Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay (3). On the basis of those authorities, it was contended that the effect of the repeal of the Government of India Act, 1935, was to obliterate that Act as if it had never been enacted or existed, save for the limited purpose of actions that had already been commenced, prosecuted, or concluded while the Act was in force. Because the Bill in question had not become law before 26 January 1950, the argument advanced was that the Bill should be considered extinguished by virtue of the repeal. However, the Court noted that this line of reasoning would carry persuasive force only if no other constitutional provision preserved the Bill. Article 389 of the Constitution provides that a Bill which was pending in the Legislature of the Dominion of India or in the Legislature of any Province or Indian State immediately before the commencement of the Constitution may, subject to any contrary provisions that may be made by Parliament or by the Legislature of the relevant State, be continued in Parliament or in the Legislature of the corresponding State as if the proceedings on the Bill had taken place in the latter body. Consequently, if the Bill that is the subject of this case was pending in the Legislature of Assam at the moment the Constitution came into force, it would have been correctly continued in the Legislature of the corresponding State. From this, two questions arose for determination: first, whether the Bill was pending at all at the moment of the Constitution’s commencement; and second, if it was pending, whether it was pending in the Legislature of Assam.

The Government of India Act, 1935 contained provisions that allowed Bills to be introduced in the chambers of the Federal Legislature, and section 73 specifically dealt with the introduction of Bills in the chambers of a Provincial Legislature. Section 32 of the same Act required that a Bill which had been passed by the Federal Legislative chambers be presented to the Governor‑General, while section 75 mandated that a Bill passed by a Provincial Legislative chamber be presented to the Governor. In general terms, a Bill began to be “pending” at the moment it was introduced in the relevant Legislative chamber and it ceased to be pending when certain events occurred: (a) the Bill could lapse under the provisions of section 73(4); (b) the Governor could give assent in the name of His Majesty, in which case the Bill would become an Act; (c) the Governor could withhold his assent, causing the Bill to fail; (d) if the Governor reserved the Bill for the Governor‑General’s consideration, the Governor‑General could declare assent in His Majesty’s name, thereby making the Bill an Act; (e) the Governor‑General could, after reservation, declare that he withheld assent, which would also cause the Bill to fail; (f) the Governor‑General could, after reservation, ask the Governor to announce by public notification that His Majesty had assented, which again would turn the Bill into an Act; and (g) if no such notification was issued within twelve months from the date of presentation to the Governor, the Bill would automatically come to an end. In essence, a Bill remained pending so long as it neither lapsed nor was turned into an Act by receiving the required assent, and so long as it was not terminated by the withholding of assent. The appellant argued that, in the present case, the Bill had been reserved by the Governor under section 76 for the Governor‑General’s consideration and that the Governor‑General, instead of declaring assent, returned the Bill to the Governor. The appellant claimed that this return should be treated as a withholding of assent by the Governor‑General. However, section 76 made clear that the Governor‑General had only three possible courses of action: he could declare assent in His Majesty’s name, he could withhold assent, or he could reserve the Bill for the signification of His Majesty’s pleasure, or he could return it to the Governor for re‑presentation to the chamber. No other action was within his authority. Consequently, the return of the Bill to the Governor, accompanied by a suggestion that it be placed before the President, could not be interpreted as a withholding of assent, because the Governor‑General retained the option to keep the Bill alive for further consideration.

The Court rejected the contention that the Governor‑General’s suggestion to place the Bill before the President was wholly unauthorized and therefore amounted to withholding his assent. The Governor‑General was aware that a formal declaration of withholding assent would terminate the Bill and preclude any further action. By returning the Bill to the Governor with the proposal that it be reserved for the President’s consideration, the Governor‑General clearly demonstrated an intention to keep the Bill alive, because a terminated Bill could not subsequently be reserved. Consequently, the Court could not infer, whether explicitly or by implication, that the Governor‑General had withheld his assent. The factual record shows that the Governor‑General neither assented to the Bill nor withheld assent from it. Although his action might be regarded as unconstitutional, it does not constitute a declaration of withholding assent, which requires a conscious and positive statement that assent is being refused. The very suggestion that the Bill be reserved for the President’s consideration contradicts any view that the Governor‑General had, either expressly or tacitly, withheld assent. This suggestion indicates his intention that the Bill remain pending so that the President could later either assent to it or reject it. Therefore, the Bill did not cease to be pending because of any alleged withholding of assent, and it remained pending at the moment when the Constitution came into force.

Addressing the second point, counsel for the appellant argued that even if the Bill was pending, it was not pending before the Legislature of Assam. To resolve this, the Court examined the nature of the legislature that existed in the Province of Assam immediately before the Constitution’s commencement, requiring reference to the Government of India Act, 1935. That Act was a statute enacted by the British Parliament, whose composition included the Sovereign and the three Estates of the Realm: the Lords Spiritual, the Lords Temporal, who together sat in the House of Lords, and the elected representatives who sat in the House of Commons. Under British constitutional practice, a Bill that has passed both Houses of Parliament, or has passed the House of Commons in the manner prescribed by the Parliament Act, 1911, becomes ready to receive Royal assent. No Bill may become law or be entered in the Statute Book without obtaining that Royal assent. This framework demonstrates that, under British constitutional theory, the Sovereign is an integral component of Parliament. The same principle is reflected in sections of the British North America Act concerning the Canadian Parliament and its provincial legislatures, and it was also adopted in the Government of India Act, 1935. Section 18 of that Act originally provided for a Federal Legislature composed of His Majesty represented by the Governor‑General and two chambers known as the Council of States and the House of Assembly. Additionally, Section 60 established a Legislature for each Province, consisting of His Majesty represented by the Governor, and in certain provinces, a bicameral structure.

In the British constitutional framework, a bill that had been passed by both Houses of Parliament, or, as provided by the Parliament Act 1911, by the House of Commons alone, had to receive the Royal assent before it could become law and be entered in the Statute Book. This requirement demonstrated that, under British constitutional theory, the Sovereign formed an essential component of Parliament. The same principle appeared in the British North America Act, where sections 17, 55 and 56 referred to the Canadian Parliament and sections 69, 71 and 90 referred to the Provincial Legislatures of that Dominion. The Government of India Act 1935 incorporated the same idea. Originally, section 18 of that Act provided for a Federal Legislature consisting of His Majesty, represented by the Governor‑General, together with two chambers known as the Council of States and the House of Assembly. Section 60 dealt with the Legislature of each Province, stating that His Majesty, represented by the Governor, would sit either with two chambers in some provinces or with a single chamber in others. Assam, as noted earlier, possessed only a single chamber, the Legislative Assembly. The procedure for the chambers of the Federal Legislature was laid down in section 30, while the procedure for the chamber or chambers of the Provincial Legislatures was set out in section 73 of the 1935 Act. After a bill had been passed by the appropriate chamber or chambers, the subsequent steps were governed by section 32 for bills of the Federal Legislature and by sections 75 and 76 for bills of the Provincial Legislatures. Although section 18 of the 1935 Act was adapted by section 9 of the Indian Independence Act 1947, section 60, which related to the Provincial Legislatures, was not adapted. The wording of the original sections 18 and 60 made it clear that His Majesty himself was a constituent part of both the Federal and the Provincial Legislatures, being represented by the Governor‑General at the federal level and by the Governor at the provincial level. Because the Sovereign was an integral element of the legislature, when a bill that had been passed by the chambers was presented to the Governor‑General or to the Governor under section 32 or sections 75 and 76, the legislative process continued only after the Governor‑General or the Governor gave or withheld assent in the name of His Majesty. Until such assent was rendered, the bill could not be said to have left the legislature; in law and in reality it remained pending before His Majesty.

In this matter, the Court observed that under the Government of India Act the Governor‑General or the Governor functioned merely as the agent of His Majesty, who was regarded as an essential component of the Legislature.

The Court pointed out that the Act required any declaration of assent or of withholding assent by the Governor‑General or the Governor to be made expressly in the name of His Majesty.

Consequently, the Court held that whether a Bill was physically in the possession of the Governor, the Governor‑General, or moving between them, it was to be considered as pending before His Majesty and therefore before the Legislature.

The Court further explained that the act of giving or withholding assent constituted a continuation of the legislative process, and until such declaration was issued in the name of His Majesty, the Bill remained pending before Him as an integral part of the Legislature.

Applying this principle to article 389 of the Constitution together with the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act, the Court concluded that the Bill could appropriately be continued in the Legislature of Assam after the Constitution came into force.

The Court noted that article 168 of the Constitution provides that every State’s Legislature consists of the Governor and, in some States, two Houses, while in others—including Assam—there is only one House.

Since the Bill had been passed by the Legislative Assembly of Assam before the Constitution’s commencement, the Court said that the only requirement under the Constitution was to carry forward the legislative process in accordance with article 200.

Accordingly, the Court found that the Governor of Assam was competent to reserve the Bill for the President’s consideration, and that the President, invoking article 201, could direct the Governor to return the Bill to the State Legislative Assembly together with the necessary message.

The Court affirmed that the Legislative Assembly was duly authorised to consider the Bill upon its return, and that after the Assembly passed the Bill again, it was proper to present it to the President for his consideration.

The Court observed that the President was within his authority to grant assent to the amended Bill, which he indeed did.

The appellant’s counsel relied on article 31(4) and on a passage from the Court’s earlier decision in Visweshwar Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, arguing that the term “Legislature” in article 31(4) and article 389 should be interpreted to mean only the chamber or chambers, excluding the Governor or Governor‑General.

The Court stated that it would not pass upon the broader issue of the precise meaning of “Legislature” in article 31(4), and that the passage cited by the appellant’s counsel made it clear that the term was intended to encompass a wider sense.

Thus, the Court concluded that the Bill, having been pending before His Majesty as part of the legislative process, could lawfully be continued and eventually received presidential assent.

In this case the Court observed that the term “Legislature” does not have a single uniform meaning throughout the Constitution. The meaning of the word must be determined by looking at the subject‑matter and the context in which it appears, as was explained in the decision reported at 1952 S.C.R. 1020, 1034. Considering the provisions of sections 18, 30, 32 and sections 60, 73, 75, 76 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which were referred to earlier, the Court was of the view that the usage of “Legislature” in article 389 was intended in a broader sense. That broader sense includes every entity that participates in the whole legislative process, namely the elected chambers together with His Majesty’s representative, whether that be the Governor‑General or a Governor, depending on the circumstance. Consequently, the Court found no basis for interpreting the Constitution as limiting the survival of a Bill only to those bills that remained pending before the legislative chambers themselves. The Constitution also protects bills that had already been passed by the chambers and were then placed before the Governor‑General or Governor for the final step of obtaining the sovereign’s assent. Accordingly, the Court concluded, for reasons distinct from those relied upon by the High Court, that the High Court had correctly answered the first part of issue (1). Regarding issue (2), the Court noted that the Act had been duly passed by the Legislature of Assam. Under section 3 of that Act, the Government of Assam lawfully declared that the estates of the tenure‑holders listed in the Notification now vested in the State, free of any encumbrances. There was no allegation that the property of the plaintiff identified as Sm Beda Bala Devi, who was the plaintiff in T.S. No. 3 of 1955, failed to qualify as an “estate” within the meaning of the Act. Hence, the High Court’s decision in favour of the State on that point was affirmed. The Raja, who was the plaintiff in T.S. No. 1 of 1955, argued that his property did not fall within the definition of “estate” in the Act. Because this contention formed part of issue (4), the Court held that the question raised by the Raja remained open pending a resolution of issue (4). Since the High Court had remitted the suit to the Subordinate Judge for determination of the remaining issues, the final answer to issue (2) as it applies to the Raja must await the decision on issue (4) and therefore stays unresolved at this stage.

The Court then turned to issue (3), which concerned the challenge to the Act and its amendments on the ground that they violated the plaintiff’s fundamental rights under article 31(2) and article 14 of the Constitution. The Court explained that if the legislation were saved by article 31‑A, the alleged infringement of the rights guaranteed by articles 31(2) and 14 would become immaterial, because article 31‑A shields a law that falls within its scope from being invalidated on the basis of those rights. Article 31(4) offers protection only against a breach of clause (2) of that article and does not extend to a breach of article 14. By contrast, article 31‑A provides a broader shield, covering a law even if it is inconsistent with, takes away, or abridges any of the rights set out in Part III of the Constitution. Accordingly, if article 31‑A were applicable, there would be no issue under articles 31(2) or 14, and article 31(4) would not need to be invoked. The Court observed that article 31‑A safeguards a law that provides for the State’s acquisition of an estate or any rights therein, or for the extinguishment or modification of such rights. The impugned Act had been reserved for the President’s consideration and had, in fact, received his assent; therefore the special proviso of article 31‑A that applies to laws pending the President’s approval was not triggered. The remaining question, the Court held, was whether the impugned Act constitutes a law effecting the acquisition of an estate or any rights therein. This question would determine the applicability of article 31‑A and, consequently, the ultimate constitutional validity of the Act.

Article 31‑A, unlike article 14, shields a law even when it is inconsistent with, removes, or narrows any right guaranteed by the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. Consequently, article 31‑A furnishes a broader and more extensive protection than article 31(4). When article 31‑A is applicable, no issue can arise under article 31(2) or article 14, and therefore the protection of article 31(4) need not be invoked. The scope of article 31‑A covers a law that provides for the State to acquire any estate or any right therein, or to extinguish or modify such rights. The impugned Act was reserved for the President’s consideration, obtained his assent, and thus the proviso to article 31‑A—relating to presidential reservation—does not apply. The remaining question is whether the impugned Act qualifies as a law that provides for the acquisition of an estate or any rights therein. Clause 2(a) of article 31 defines “estate” in relation to a local area as having the same meaning as the term or its local equivalent in the existing land‑tenure law applicable to that area. The preamble of the impugned Act states that it is expedient for the State to acquire the interests of proprietors, tenure‑holders, and certain other interests in the permanently settled areas and other estates within the districts of Goalpara, Garo Hills and Cachar in Assam, including interests in forests, fisheries, hats, bazaars, ferries, mines, and minerals. Section 3 of that Act empowers the State Government to issue notifications declaring that the estate or tenure of a named proprietor or tenure‑holder shall be transferred to the State and shall vest there free from all encumbrances. Section 4 specifies the consequences that follow such a transfer. These provisions make it clear that the Act is intended to be a law for the State’s acquisition of estates or tenures. Section 2(k) defines “estate” as land recorded under a single entry in any of the general revenue registers—whether revenue‑paying or revenue‑free—maintained in accordance with the law then in force by the Deputy Commissioner, and it also includes revenue‑free lands not entered in any register. Under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation (Regulation 1 of 1886), the Deputy Commissioner of each district is, by section 48, required to prepare and keep, in the prescribed format, a general register of revenue‑paying estates, a general register of revenue‑free estates, and any other registers directed by the Government. Section 49 provides that until such registers are prepared, the Government may deem existing registers kept by or under the control of the Deputy Commissioner to be registers prepared under section 48.

It was observed that the entries required in the general registers consist of either revenue‑paying estates or revenue‑free estates. Section 3(b) defined the term “estate” to cover six specific categories of land that are enumerated in its six clauses. The statute made clear that this definition was not intended to be exhaustive; rather, it identified particular items that fall within the meaning of “estate.” The Goalpara Tenancy Act, which is Assam Act 1 of 1929, gave the term “estate” exactly the same meaning as the impugned Act, describing it as land that appears under a single entry in any of the General Registers of revenue‑paying or revenue‑free lands that are prepared and maintained by the Deputy Commissioner. The Court noted that the properties belonging to both plaintiff‑appellants had, in fact, been entered in the General Register. Consequently, an “estate” as understood under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation of 1886 is also an “estate” under the Goalpara Tenancy Act and under the impugned Act. Because the impugned Act is a law that provides for the State’s acquisition of an “estate” within the meaning of article 31‑A, its constitutionality or validity could not be challenged on the ground that it violated any provision of Part III of the Constitution dealing with fundamental rights.

The Court affirmed that there was no dispute that the lands forming the trust estate of Sm. Beda Bala Devi, the plaintiff in T.S. No. 3 of 1955, qualified as an “estate” under each of the statutes mentioned, including the impugned Act. The matters concerning whether the amount paid to the Raja, plaintiff in T.S. No. 1 of 1955, constituted revenue or tribute, whether his properties had been properly entered in the General Register of revenue‑paying estates before 1886, and whether those properties fell within the operation of the impugned Act were identified as the issues in point (4). However, the Court held that those questions did not affect the issue of whether the impugned Act was protected by article 31‑A. If the Raja’s properties were not “estate” as defined in the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, the Goalpara Tenancy Act, or the impugned Act, then the notification issued under section 3 of the impugned Act would not affect him. This would be because his properties lay outside the scope of the Act, not because the Act failed to provide for State acquisition of an “estate.” The Court further observed that the definition of “estate” in the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation is inclusive rather than exhaustive, that the Raja’s lands had indeed been entered in the General Register of revenue‑paying lands, and that lands falling within any of the six categories listed in section 3(b) of the Regulation necessarily fall within the broader definition of “estate.”

It was observed that the provisions contained in the impugned Act could not be dismissed as inconsequential. Even though the definition of “estate” employed by the impugned Act extends beyond the six categories enumerated in section 3(b) of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation of 1886, the statute nonetheless remains a law that authorises the State to acquire an “estate.” Accordingly, the Court held that the impugned Act enjoys the full protection of Article 31‑A of the Constitution. Because the Court had already decided the case on the basis of Article 31‑A, it was deemed unnecessary to consider whether Article 31(4) might also be applicable. Nevertheless, the Court indicated that it would briefly address a number of subsidiary points that had been raised by the parties.

One of the contentions advanced was that the impugned Act represented a colourable exercise of legislative power. The argument was that, although the Act purported to lay down the principles and the method for determining and granting compensation, in effect it produced provisions that would lead to either illusory compensation or no compensation at all. The doctrine of colourable legislation, the Court noted, is relevant only where there is a question of legislative competence, as explained in K. C. Gajapati Narain Deb v. State of Orissa. In the present matter, the Court found no issue of legislative incompetence. The core of the grievance concerned the amount of compensation, a question that could not be entertained once the protection of Article 31‑A was applied.

The parties also referred to section 11 of the impugned Act, which provides that, in calculating the gross income of an estate, the gross rent payable by the tenant immediately subordinate for the agricultural years preceding the date of vesting must be included. It was argued that the use of the word “years” in the plural rendered the provision vague and indefinite. The High Court, and the Court in this judgment, agreed that the plural form was a typographical error or oversight and that the word should be read in the singular. Moreover, the provision had been retrospectively amended by section 4 of Assam Act V of 1956, rendering the issue moot.

The Act was further challenged on the ground that it was discriminatory and therefore violated Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court held that, in view of its earlier decision based on Article 31‑A, the appellant could not raise the Article 14 challenge. The submission that the State could selectively choose the estate of one zamindar while excluding others—citing the withdrawal of notifications with respect to the Gouripore and Prabatjoar estates—was rejected. The Court found no merit in that argument, relying on its earlier judgments in Biswambhar Singh v. State of Orissa and Thakur Amar Singh v. State of Rajasthan. Finally, it was submitted that the Act applied only to certain Lakheraj estates—specifically those situated within the boundaries of a permanently settled estate—and not to other Lakheraj estates. The Court noted this claim but did not need to elaborate further, as it had already concluded that the Act was not open to challenge on any constitutional ground under Part III.

The Court observed that acquiring the Lakharaj estates that lie within the boundaries of permanently settled estates clearly serves the purpose of acquiring permanently settled areas, and that those Lakharaj estates situated inside such boundaries form a class that is distinct from other Lakharaj estates that are not so situated; consequently, the allegation of discrimination cannot be sustained against the impugned Act when the principles laid down by this Court are applied. The Court further noted that the claim of discrimination on the ground that different scales of compensation have been prescribed for different estates is not untenable, because a rational basis exists for classifying proprietors according to their respective income groups. The Court added that it need not elaborate on this point, since it has already held that the Act does not invite challenge on any ground of violation of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. In the matter of Raja’s petition numbered T S No 1 of 1955, an injunction was sought to restrain the State from taking possession of his estate; the High Court dismissed that prayer on grounds that the Court found to be cogent and convincing. The Court further stated that, having found no substantial risk of irreparable loss to the Raja, it would be inappropriate to set aside the High Court’s order. Accordingly, for the reasons previously explained, both appeals were dismissed with costs. As the two appeals were heard together, a single set of costs was ordered, to be borne equally by the two appellants. (1) (1954] S.C.R. 842. (2) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 303, 316.