Niranjan Singh vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeals Nos. 60 and 61 of 1956

Decision Date: 3 October 1956

Coram: P. Govinda Menon, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Syed Jaffer Imam, S.K. Das

The case titled Niranjan Singh versus The State of Uttar Pradesh was decided by the Supreme Court of India on 3 October 1956, and the judgment was reported as 1957 AIR 142 and 1956 SCR 734. The bench comprised Justice P. Govinda Menon, Justice Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Justice Syed Jaffer Imam, and Justice S.K. Das. The dispute concerned a criminal trial arising out of an alleged dacoity, and the principal issue was whether the accused had taken part in that dacoity, a question that depended largely on the identification of the accused by the prosecution. The investigation was conducted under the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations, specifically Rule 109, which requires that when the day‑long investigation is closed the police officer note the time and place of closure and forward the case diary to the Superintendent of Police on every day that any investigative steps are taken. The investigating officer, however, failed to transmit the diary daily; instead the diary was submitted in a single compilation at the conclusion of the investigation. The appellants contended that the diary could not be relied upon because the omission of daily transmission permitted the officer to make alterations during the investigation, and they argued that the breach of Rule 109, which they said caused prejudice, vitiated the entire trial. The Court held that Rule 109, being an executive instruction rather than a statutory provision, does not form a basis for invalidating a trial when its requirements are not complied with, and that a failure to submit the diary daily does not, by itself, render the diary unreliable. The Court approved the principle laid down in Hafiz Mohammad Sanii and others v. Emperor (AIR 1931 Patna 150) and followed the observations made in Tilkeshwar Singh and others v. The State of Bihar ([1955] 2 SCR 1043). The Court further observed that, in the absence of compelling reasons to doubt the diary’s authenticity, the lower courts’ acceptance of its genuineness was sufficient to uphold its evidential value. The judgment concerned Criminal Appeals Nos. 60 and 61 of 1956, which were filed by special leave from the Allahabad High Court’s judgment and order dated 4 August 1955 in Criminal Appeal No. 298 of 1955, along with the connected appeals numbered 299 and 307 of 1955.

The Court noted that the appeals arose from the judgment and order dated 28 February 1955 of the Sessions Judge at Meerut in Criminal Sessions Trial No 142 of 1954, which were recorded as Reference No 31 of 1955 together with connected Criminal Appeals Nos 299 and 307 of 1955. The appellants in Criminal Appeal No 60 of 1956 were the accused numbered 4, 7, 1, 3, 5 and 2, namely Niranjan Singh, Tikam Singh, Kharak Singh, Harpal Singh, Sardar Singh and Satpal Singh, while the appellant in Criminal Appeal No 61 of 1956 was the accused numbered 6, Udaibir Singh, all belonging to the same Sessions trial. Counsel for the appellants in Criminal Appeal No 60 of 1956 were instructed, and counsel for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No 61 of 1956 also appeared, while counsel for the respondents represented the State in both appeals. The judgment of the Court was delivered by Justice Govinda Menon. The Court recalled that on 6 September 1955 it had granted special leave to appeal under article 136(1) of the Constitution from the Allahabad High Court judgment and order dated 4 August 1955 in Criminal Appeal No 298 of 1955 (Reference No 31 of 1955), together with the connected appeals, limiting the scope of the appeal to the question whether the failure to comply with the rules relating to the submission of the police case diary vitiated the entire trial and what the consequences of such a failure would be. Pursuant to that limited leave, Criminal Appeal No 60 of 1956 was lodged by the six accused listed above, and Criminal Appeal No 61 of 1956 was lodged by accused 6, Udaibir Singh, both arising from the same Sessions trial. The Court recorded that appellants 1 to 3 in Criminal Appeal No 60 of 1956—namely Niranjan Singh, Tikam Singh and Kharak Singh—had been sentenced to the extreme penalty of death, while the remaining appellants in that appeal had been sentenced to imprisonment for life. The appellant in Appeal No 61 of 1956, accused 6, Udaibir Singh, had also been sentenced to death. The factual background was that on the night of 28 February to 1 March 1954 a dacoity occurred at the house of Atal Singh in the village of Akheypur, involving about twenty dacoits who looted substantial property and, during the incident, shot dead four members of Atal Singh’s family, including Atal Singh himself, and wounded several others, some of whom later died in hospital. The prosecution case asserted that the seven accused in the two appeals were among the dacoits involved and that accused 1 (Kharak Singh), accused 4 (Niranjan Singh), accused 6 (Udaibir Singh) and accused 7 (Tikam Singh) were armed with guns and bore responsibility for the shootings and murders.

In the Sessions trial, the two individuals identified as Achhpal Singh and Deoki Saran alias Beg Saran, who were listed as accused numbers eight and nine, were acquitted by the Sessions Judge after a thorough examination of the large volume of evidence. The Judge found that all of the remaining appellants had been proved guilty of an offence punishable under section 396 of the Indian Penal Code. Accordingly, the Judge imposed the death penalty on accused numbers one, four, six and seven—namely Kharak Singh, Niranjan Singh, Udaibir Singh and Tikam Singh—and sentenced accused numbers two, three and five—Satpal Singh, Harpal Singh and Sardar Singh—to imprisonment for life, as previously described. The appellants appealed this judgment to the Allahabad High Court, where Judges Asthana and Roy upheld the convictions and the sentences and dismissed the appeals. Leave to appeal to this Court under article 136 was later granted, limited to the specific question identified at the outset of the proceedings. The prosecution’s case described the village of Akheypur as a community split into two rival groups, one led by Narain Singh, the brother of the fourth accused, and the other led by Atal Singh, one of the deceased. According to the prosecution, the dacoity and the murders at Atal Singh’s house were acts of revenge carried out by the rival faction. In brief, the prosecution alleged that the appellants and other participants, some armed with guns, raided Atal Singh’s residence on the night in question, inflicted gun‑shot and other injuries on the occupants, looted valuable property and then fled. The prosecution did not dispute that the factual allegations of a dacoity and the resulting injuries were established by eye‑witness testimony, and therefore an offence under section 396 was proved beyond reasonable doubt. The remaining question for the Court was whether the specific appellants had actually taken part in the criminal act, a point contested by the defence.

The defence, particularly the accused numbers four and seven—Niranjan Singh and Tikam Singh—contended that while the dacoity was in progress they, together with other villagers, went to the enclosure belonging to Sardara Singh and Daryao Singh, which was situated near Atal Singh’s house, armed with guns for the purpose of assisting and protecting the victims. They asserted that from that position they opened fire on the dacoits, forcing the attackers to retreat, and that after the dacoits had left the scene they, along with others, proceeded to Atal Singh’s house where Dharam Singh and other persons requested them to ride a motorcycle to the police station at Kithore to make a report. It was further alleged that both Niranjan Singh and Tikam Singh complied with this request and went to the Kithore police station to give an account of the incident.

Sub‑Inspector Dalbir Singh, identified in the record as PW‑28, was the officer in charge of the police station at Kithore. Acting on his direction, the two accused persons proceeded to the police station at Garhmukteshwar in order to give the information that had been obtained. The defence put forward the contention that these two accused individuals were acting as good Samaritans who attempted to assist the family of Atal Singh during a moment of extreme danger, and that they were not the persons who carried out the assault. The other appellants, however, denied the charge that had been brought against them. It was considered unnecessary, in view of the identical conclusions reached by both the trial court and the learned judges of the High Court, to restate in elaborate detail the facts of the incident that culminated in the dacoity and the murders. In addition to the corroborating pieces of evidence already on record, there were several eye‑witnesses who identified some or all of the accused at the scene of the crime, and it may also be noted that a number of the victims had sustained injuries at the hands of the miscreants. A dying declaration, Exhibit P‑50, had been recorded by PW‑20, a magistrate, who also documented the statements of Ganga Saran (PW‑2) and Ranbir (PW‑18) when they were in a serious condition and were believed possibly not to survive, although they ultimately recovered. The earliest information concerning the crime, reproduced as Exhibit P‑1, was supplied by Samey Singh (PW‑1) at the Kithore police station at approximately two o’clock in the morning on 1 March 1954. That information contained no detailed description of the incident; it merely stated that a dacoity was in progress at the house of Atal Singh in the village and that the informant had hurried from the village to make a report. The record also notes that the firing of guns was mentioned in that early report. PW‑28, Sub‑Inspector Dalbir Singh, who at that time also served as the Station House Officer of the Kithore police station, received the information and arrived at the scene of the dacoity at about two‑thirty in the morning. Upon his arrival, Jhamel Kaur (PW‑4) handed over to him the list of looted property, which is reproduced as Exhibit P‑2. According to her testimony, the Sub‑Inspector immediately examined PW‑2 together with other witnesses present at the spot and recorded their statements. The injured persons were subsequently taken to the hospital, and inquests were conducted over the dead bodies of Rohtas Singh, Tejpal Singh, Atal Singh and Charan Singh in the presence of witnesses. Between two‑thirty in the morning and approximately seven to seven‑thirty in the morning, PW‑28 reported that he performed a considerable amount of work, including recording the statements of all available witnesses, sending the injured to the hospital after taking their statements, holding inquests over the deceased, inspecting the scene of the dacoity, discovering lead shot and wads at the site, and taking such items into custody, among other tasks. By about seven to seven‑thirty in the morning, the Senior Superintendent of Police, the Deputy Superintendent of Police and other police officials arrived at the location of the incident on account of the dacoity, and, according to PW‑28, he had completed the preliminary investigations by the time of their arrival.

He further testified that the parchas of the case diary covering the period from 1 March to 7 March 1954 were transmitted to the Superintendent of Police only on 7 March, rather than being sent each day as required by the applicable rules once the day’s entries were completed. The Court indicated that it would consider the arguments raised by counsel on this point at a later stage.

The prosecution’s case rests principally, if not entirely, on the identification of each accused by one or more prosecution witnesses, together with a dying declaration (Exhibit P. 50) and corroborating statements made by P.W. 2 (Exhibit P. 49) and P.W. 18 (Exhibit P. 48). The Court summarised the identification evidence as follows: P.W. 2, identified as Ganga Saran, positively identified Kharak Singh, Harpal Singh, Niranjan Singh, Sardar Singh and Tikam Singh. P.W. 3, Dharam Singh, identified accused No. 6, Udaibir Singh, among the dacoits and also stated that Atal Singh had informed him that accused No. 7, Tikam Singh, had shot him with a gun. P.W. 4, Mst. Jhamel Kaur, besides providing a list of the looted property (Exhibit P. 2), identified accused Nos. 2 and 6, namely Satpal Singh and Udaibir Singh. P.W. 5, Richpal Singh, testified that the group of dacoits comprised accused Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7, that is Satpal Singh, Niranjan Singh, Sardar Singh, Udaibir Singh and Tikam Singh. P.W. 7, Om Pal, identified accused Nos. 2, 6 and 7. P.W. 9’s deposition indicated that he identified accused No. 6, Udaibir Singh, and likewise reported that Atal Singh had told him that accused No. 7, Tikam Singh, had shot him. P.W. 10, Jagbir Singh, identified accused No. 1, Kharak Singh. All of the appellants were identified by P.W. 11, Ganga Bal, while P.W. 18, Rdnbir, was able to identify accused No. 6, Udaibir Singh.

From this analysis the Court observed that each accused was identified by at least one prosecution witness. Specifically, accused No. 1 (Kharak Singh) was identified by P.W. 2, P.W. 10 and P.W. 11; accused No. 2 (Satpal Singh) by P.W. 4, P.W. 5, P.W. 7 and P.W. 11; accused No. 3 (Harpal Singh) by P.W. 2 and P.W. 11; accused No. 4 (Niranjan Singh) by P.W. 2, P.W. 5 and P.W. 11; accused No. 5 (Sardar Singh) by P.W. 2, P.W. 5 and P.W. 11; accused No. 6 (Udaibir Singh) by P.W. 4, P.W. 5, P.W. 7, P.W. 9, P.W. 11 and P.W. 18; and accused No. 7 (Tikam Singh) by P.W. 2, P.W. 5, P.W. 7, P.W. 9 and P.W. 11. The learned Sessions Judge accepted the testimony of these witnesses and rejected the version presented by the accused. This assessment was affirmed by the High Court, which concurred with the Sessions Judge’s findings.

In the matter before the Court, it was observed that the Court could not be justified in reopening the finding of guilt against the appellants unless a question of law was raised, or unless the earlier conclusion was perverse, contrary to the principles of natural justice, or revolted against judicial conscience. Counsel for the appellants, Mr Jai Gopal Sethi, argued forcefully that the Sub‑Inspector identified as PW 28 had failed to obey paragraph 109 of Chapter XI of the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations. That provision obliges the police, when an investigation is closed for the day, to forward a copy of that day’s case diary to the superior police officers. The counsel asserted that this breach amounted to an infraction of a mandatory rule of law, which had caused prejudice to the appellants. Consequently, he submitted, the findings regarding the guilt of the accused ought to be reopened, and the Court should reassess and examine the evidence afresh to determine whether the guilt of the appellants had been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The central issue, therefore, became whether the Sub‑Inspector’s conduct constituted a violation of a statutory duty imposed upon him.

The discussion then turned to the status of the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations. If those regulations were framed under a statute and possessed the force of law, a breach of any rule therein could be characterised either as an illegality or as an irregularity, which might, but need not, nullify the proceedings. The Court explained that the Police Act of 1861 was enacted to reorganise the police and to render it a more efficient instrument for crime prevention and detection, granting the State Government authority to appoint police officers such as the Inspector‑General. Under section 12 of that Act, the Inspector‑General of Police may, subject to the State Government’s approval, frame rules and orders he deems expedient concerning the organisation, classification and distribution of the police force, the residence of its members, the specific services they must perform, their inspection, the description of arms, accoutrements and other necessities, the collection and communication of intelligence and information, and any other orders necessary to prevent abuse or neglect of duty and to make the force efficient in discharging its duties. The Court clarified that the present regulations were not rules framed by the Inspector‑General under section 12, but rather directives issued by the State Government setting out how officers must conduct themselves and perform their duties. Specifically, Rule 109 of Chapter XI, which deals with the investigation of crimes, requires police officers, when an investigation is closed for the day, to note the time and place of closure and to send the diary daily to the police superintendent, or, if the investigating officer is not in charge of the station, to forward the diary through the officer in charge unless such transmission would cause delay.

The police regulations required that the Police Superintendent receive the case diary on every day on which any proceedings were taken. When the investigating officer was not the officer in charge of the police station, the diary had to be forwarded through the officer in charge unless doing so would cause delay. The regulations also directed the police officer to study carefully sections 162 and 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The rules did not state any statutory authority for the creation of rule 109, nor did they claim that the rule added to any statute, although some other rules were described as statutory. Consequently, the Court observed that rule 109 possessed no statutory foundation and was merely an injunction issued by the executive Government to prescribe how police officers should organise their work and conduct investigations. Counsel for the appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 60 of 1956 and counsel for the appellant‑accused No. 6 in Appeal No. 61 of 1956 presented their arguments before the Court. They contended that the requirement to send the diary daily was intended to ensure the accuracy of statements and to prevent any later alteration by the investigating officer. The Court therefore examined the factual record to determine whether the diary had been dispatched as prescribed by the regulations.

The police officer identified as PW 28 testified that he had recorded the statements of all eyewitnesses before daybreak. He further asserted that if the diary required under section 172, which contains statements recorded under section 162, had been sent to the superior officers each day, the document would have been verified as correct. Consequently, the officer would have been prevented from later altering any of the recorded statements according to his own preference. In the present case, however, the case diary and the daily details of the investigation had not been forwarded to the superior officers for an entire week. The counsel suggested that because the diary was not prepared contemporaneously, it might be a false document that did not contain statements recorded at the time they were made. They argued that this failure deprived the defence of the opportunity to cross‑examine the witnesses and to determine whether the names of the accused had been recorded at the earliest possible stage. According to the counsel, the result was an irreparable prejudice that could not be cured by any subsequent remedy or regularisation. However, the counsel were unable to demonstrate that paragraph 109 of Chapter XI of the Police Regulations possessed the force of law. The Court noted that Chapter XLV of the Code of Criminal Procedure specifically dealt with illegal and irregular proceedings and set out the framework for addressing them. It further observed that section 529 listed irregularities that did not vitiate proceedings, while section 530 listed those that did vitiate proceedings. Section 537 provided that, subject to the provisions of the preceding sections of that Chapter, no finding, sentence or order passed by a competent court could be reversed or altered under Chapter XXVII or on.

The Court observed that an appeal or revision could be entertained on the ground of, among other things, any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, proclamation, order, judgment or any other proceeding that occurred before or during trial, or in any inquiry or other proceeding under the Code. An Explanation to this provision was noted, which stated that in deciding whether any error, omission or irregularity in a proceeding under the Code had caused a failure of justice, the Court must consider whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage of the proceedings. The Court found that the objection in the present case had been made before the learned Sessions Judge; consequently, the Explanation was inapplicable. The Court then examined whether a breach of the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations, which are merely directions concerning conduct, could vitiate a trial. It held that the Code of Criminal Procedure, while enumerating omissions or irregularities that either vitiate or do not vitiate proceedings, does not expressly designate a mistake made by a police officer during investigation as an illegality or irregularity. Investigation, the Court noted, is not an inquiry or trial before a court, and Chapter XLV of the Code contains no specific provision addressing omissions or mistakes made during investigation, except with respect to the holding of an inquest. The Court interpreted this omission as indicating that the legislature had not intended any investigative irregularity to be of sufficient importance to invalidate or impair an inquiry or trial. Counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh referred to several decisions suggesting that even violations of the Code do not constitute an illegality. The Court cited the Judicial Committee decisions in Pulukuri Kotayya and Others v. King‑Emperor and Zahiruddin v. King‑Emperor, which held that breaches of sections 162 and 172 of the Code do not amount to an illegality. From this, the Court inferred that if such omissions cannot vitiate a trial, then a failure to follow a rule of conduct prescribed by the State Government for police officers likewise cannot affect the legality of a trial. The Court also relied on Hafiz Mohammad Sani and Others v. Emperor, where it was held that a failure to investigate an offence does not necessarily prejudice an accused, and therefore any mistake or omission in the investigation cannot vitiate a trial. Quoting paragraph 152 of that decision, the Court recorded Justice Adami’s observation: “There can be no doubt that the Sub‑Inspector in his procedure disobeyed certain provisions of the law, and for that he could be punished, if the authorities deemed it fit, but I cannot find that his failure was to the prejudice of the petitioners. Nor can I see how failure properly to conduct an investigation into an offence can vitiate a trial which was started.”

The Court noted that the observations recorded in earlier authorities such as the reports of 1948 in L.R. 74 I.A. 65, the 1947 decision in L.R. 74 I.A. 80 and the 1931 case reported in A.I.R. 1931 Pat. 150 were correct and fully agreed with them. In a more recent decision, Tilkeshwar Singh and Others v. The State of Bihar, reported in [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1043, 1047, 1048, Justice Venkatarama Ayyar expressed that although failure to comply with the requirements of section 161(3) might affect the weight to be given to the testimony of witnesses, such a failure does not render the evidence inadmissible. He referred to the case of Bejoy Chand v. The State, cited in A.I.R. 1950 Cal. 363, and accepted the observations of the Calcutta High Court in that matter. The Court indicated that there was no hesitation in following those observations. Further, reference was made to Gajanand and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in A.I.R. 1954 B.C. 695, 699, which contains statements of law that were helpful for deciding the present case. The Court declined to conclude that because PW 28 did not forward copies of his diary to his superiors each day, the diary should be deemed a suspicious document lacking credibility. The learned judges of the High Court and the court of first instance had already affirmed the authenticity of the case diary, and therefore, absent any compelling reason, the Court could not deem it spurious or doubtful. Consequently, the Court found no justification for holding that PW 28’s omission amounted to a statutory or regulatory violation that would invalidate the trial. Accordingly, the point on which special leave had been granted against the appellants was dismissed, and the appeals were ordered to be dismissed.