New Prakash Transport Co. Ltd vs New Suwarna Transport Co. Ltd

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 74 of 1956

Decision Date: 30 September 1956

Coram: Sinha J.

In the matter of New Prakash Transport Co. Ltd versus New Suwarna Transport Co. Ltd, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 30 September 1956, with the petitioner identified as New Prakash Transport Co. Ltd and the respondent as New Suwarna Transport Co. Ltd. The case arose under the road‑transport regulatory scheme, specifically concerning an application for a stage‑carriage permit, the impact of a police report on that application, procedural questions about whether an appellate authority could adjourn a proceeding suo motu, and alleged violations of natural justice pursuant to the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, sections 47, 48, 64 and 68. The headnote of the judgment explained that the rules of natural justice are not uniform but depend upon the constitutional framework of the statutory body and the legislative rules that govern its functions; consequently, any claim that such rules have been breached must be examined in the context of the specific statutory provisions applicable in the case. It was noted that sections 47, 48, 64 and the rules made under section 68 of the Motor Vehicles Act clearly indicate that a Regional Transport Authority and an Appellate Authority, when hearing an appeal, operate in a quasi‑judicial capacity rather than as courts of law, and they are not obliged to record oral or documentary evidence. Their duty, however, is to consider rival applications for stage‑carriage permits in a manner that is fair and just, while the Act itself provides ample safeguards for the interests of the parties involved, as discussed in the precedent Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd [1952] S.C.R. 583. The factual scenario described a situation where the Regional Transport Authority denied a permit to the petitioner on the ground of an adverse police report, whereas the Appellate Authority later granted the permit based on a subsequent police report that withdrew all material allegations against the petitioner and made no statements against the rival that would require rebuttal. At the hearing of the appeal, the Chairman read the contents of the later police report, no party objected, and no request for adjournment was made. A Division Bench of the High Court, hearing an appeal against a single‑judge decision rendered under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, held that the rules of natural justice had been violated because the Appellate Authority failed to adjourn the proceeding suo motu, thereby denying the rival claimant an opportunity to meet the revised police report; consequently, the High Court set aside the decision as erroneous. The Court further held that the Chairman’s reading of the police report at the hearing satisfied the requirements of natural justice, since the rules did not mandate furnishing a copy of the report to the parties. The judgment was issued in civil appellate jurisdiction as Civil Appeal No. 74 of 1956, filed by special leave against the earlier judgment and order of the Nagpur High Court.

On 22 September 1955 the Nagpur High Court, sitting under the Letters Patent, issued an order in Letters Patent Appeal No. 2 of 1955. Counsel for the appellant comprised the Solicitor‑General for India and two additional advocates, while counsel for respondent No. 1 was provided by the Attorney‑General for India together with another advocate. The judgment was delivered by Sinha J. This appeal was taken by special leave from that judgment and order, which had reversed an earlier decision of a single judge of the same court dated 13 December 1954 that had refused to grant a writ of certiorari. The material facts of the matter could be summarized briefly. The Suwarna Transport Company Limited, identified in the judgment as the first respondent, possessed seven permits to operate buses on the Buldana‑Malkapur route and was the sole operator on that corridor. It subsequently applied for an additional permit for the same route. The appellant, New Prakash Transport Co. Ltd., together with another applicant, Navjivan Transport Service, also sought a permit on that route. On 26 May 1953 the three applicants were heard before the Regional Transport Authority of Amraoti, which served as the third respondent in this case, regarding their respective permit applications. Although consideration of the applications was deferred, the authority adopted a resolution stating that no single service should enjoy a monopoly on the Buldana‑Malkapur route. A later meeting of the Regional Transport Authority on 30 March 1954 resulted in the first respondent being awarded the permit, while the appellant’s application was rejected on the basis of an adverse police report. The appellant appealed this decision to the Appellate Authority constituted under Rule 73 of the Motor‑Vehicles Act, Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur, identified as the second respondent. In the appeal the appellant contested the correctness of the police report and petitioned the District Superintendent of Police to verify the facts contained in the original report that had led to the rejection. A subsequent police report was prepared and placed before the second respondent, and the chairman of the appellate authority read this report to the parties during the hearing, where no objection was recorded. By its order dated 29 July 1954, the second respondent set aside the earlier order of the third respondent, allowed the appeal and directed that the permit be issued to the appellant. The first respondent then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Nagpur High Court, primarily on two grounds: first, that the order of the second respondent contained an error apparent on the face of the record; and second, that the order violated the principles of natural justice.

In this case the first respondent challenged the order of the second respondent on two distinct grounds, namely that the order was tainted by an error apparent on the face of the record and that it violated the principles of natural justice. The first ground rested on an allegation that the second respondent had misread the police report, while the second ground alleged that the revised police report had not been shown to the petitioner, thereby depriving the petitioner of a real and effective opportunity to address the report, to meet any relevant allegations contained therein, and to study the report and make submissions before the appeal was decided. Both the appellant and the second respondent were required to show cause against the rule issued by the court. While showing cause, the appellant admitted that the third respondent had rejected its application on the basis of a police report dated 27 March 1954, a report described by the appellant as “full of mistakes and falsehoods.” The appellant further disclosed that it had approached the District Superintendent of Police personally to verify the contents of that report and that a fresh report, submitted by the police after verification, had absolved the appellant of the misconduct allegations contained in the first report. The appellant also contested the contention that any mistake was apparent on the face of the record. The fresh report prepared after verification at the appellant’s request was received by the second respondent, and the Chairman read the report during the hearing of the appeal; consequently the appellant argued that it was incorrect to suggest any failure of justice. The second respondent, in its show‑cause submission, corroborated the appellant’s statement that the first police report had subsequently been modified by the District Superintendent of Police through a report dated 13 May 1954, which indicated that the earlier report was “based on some misunderstanding.” The second respondent further confirmed that the Chairman read this modified report to the parties while the appeal was being heard. The petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution by the first respondent was heard by a single judge, Justice V. R. Sen, who, by his order dated 13 December 1954, discharged the rule and awarded costs. In his judgment the learned judge, after referring in detail to the orders of the authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act—namely the second and third respondents—observed that there was no substance in the contention that the procedure adopted by the Appellate Authority was contrary to the principles of natural justice or that it operated to the prejudice of the first respondent, and that no error was apparent on the face of the record. The judge also noted that when the report was brought to the notice of the first respondent, the latter did not indicate any intention to controvert the report. Thereafter the first respondent preferred an appeal under the Letters Patent, reiterating its grounds of attack against the orders of the Appellate Authority, and that appeal was subsequently heard by a Division Bench.

The appeal was heard by a division bench composed of the Chief Justice, Hidayatulla, and Justice S P Kotwal. The bench appeared inclined to reject the contention that there was an error apparent on the face of the record. Although the language employed by the second respondent was described as ambiguous and not entirely precise, the bench held that a reasonable interpretation could be that the second respondent had, in fact, taken the later police report into consideration when it observed that the police had, in practical terms, absolved the appellant of all blame except for a minor question, a point that the court chose not to elaborate further. On the second ground, the division bench departed from the conclusion of the earlier single judge, finding that the Appellate Authority had erred by rushing through the proceedings without affording the appellant a proper and effective opportunity to present its case. Consequently, the bench issued a writ quashing the order of the Appellate Authority and directed that the appeal be reheard, taking into account the observations made in the judgment. The appellant subsequently applied to the High Court for a certificate of fitness to appeal to this Court; that application was dismissed. Undeterred, the appellant sought and obtained special leave to appeal before this Court. The sole issue now before this Court is whether the procedure adopted by the Appellate Authority resulted in a failure of natural justice. This question has produced a marked divergence of opinion at the two stages of the High Court proceedings. Counsel for the appellant argued that the Nagpur High Court’s appellate bench erred in concluding that the circumstances of the case amounted to a failure of justice, contrary to the view expressed by the earlier single judge. The appellant’s counsel further contended that there are no clearly defined criteria for determining such a failure; rather, the determination depends on the statutes that establish the statutory body and the obligations imposed by those statutes. If the statutory body has complied with every legal requirement, the counsel argued, it cannot be said to have failed in discharging its statutory duty. In support of this position, reference was made to sections 47, 48 and 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, read together with the relevant rules framed under section 68 of the Act. Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, maintained that the appellant had been denied an opportunity to examine the subsequent police report and to make submissions based on it, thereby constituting a breach of natural justice because the appellant was deprived of a fair and full hearing. Although the High Court on appeal did not base its decision on the separate issue of whether an error apparent on the face of the record existed, the matter was raised, and the High Court’s reasoning on that point was not the foundation of its ultimate judgment.

It was submitted that the order issued by the second respondent contained an error because it referred solely to the first police report while implicitly incorporating matters that appeared in the later police report. At the beginning the Court observed that, in its view, the second ground of relief that the learned counsel attempted to revive before this Court on behalf of the respondent lacked any substantive basis. The Court explained that an “error apparent on the face of the record” must be understood as an assumption of facts which are not supported by the material placed before the Court. The Court further clarified that it would not consider other grounds which, in the context of a particular case, might support a claim of error apparent on the face of the record. In the present matter, any such error, if it existed, would relate to the treatment of the two police reports. The Appellate Bench of the High Court had observed that, although the language employed by the Appellate Authority might appear, on a strict grammatical analysis, to refer only to the first police report, it was difficult to conclude that the matters mentioned in the order challenged before the High Court were absent from the subsequent police report submitted at the appellant’s request. The judgment under appeal did not accept the contention that a mistake apparent on the face of the record had occurred, as argued on behalf of the first respondent. The Court noted that it had been referred to the orders of the Appellate Authority as interpreted by the Appellate Bench of the High Court, and in its opinion no such mistake had been demonstrated to have vitiated the orders impugned before the High Court.

Turning to the issue of whether a failure of natural justice had taken place, the Court proceeded to outline the statutory duties imposed on the Appellate Authority when hearing an appeal from the orders of the Regional Transport Authority. Section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act enumerates the considerations that a Regional Transport Authority must address while disposing of an application for a stage‑carriage permit. These considerations include the general public interest, the adequacy of the existing road‑transport service, and the benefits that may accrue to any particular locality. The Authority is also required to take into account any representations made by persons already providing road‑transport facilities along the proposed route, as well as representations from any local or police authority having jurisdiction over the proposed route. Section 48 empowers a Regional Transport Authority, after weighing the factors listed in Section 47, to limit the number of stage‑carriage vehicles and to impose conditions on the permits granted. Section 64 creates a right of appeal against specified orders issued by a Provincial or Regional Transport Authority, directing the appeal to the “prescribed authority.” The provision further states that, in the context of an appeal, the prescribed authority must afford the appellant and the original authority an opportunity to be heard. While Section 64 does not expressly mention a similar opportunity for the persons against whom the appeal is filed, Rule 73, framed under the rule‑making power conferred by Section 68, designates the Chairman and two members of the Provincial Transport Authority as the authority to decide such appeals. The rule further provides that, upon receipt of an appeal, the Chairman shall fix the time and place for the hearing, give not less than thirty days’ notice to the appellant, the original authority, and any other interested persons, and, on the appointed or adjourned date, the Appellate Authority shall hear such persons as may appear. It also, in terms, provides that on an

When an appeal was filed with the prescribed authority, the statute required that both the appellant and the original authority – that is, the authority whose order was being appealed – be given “an opportunity of being heard.” Section 64, which creates the right of appeal, did not expressly provide a similar hearing right to the persons against whom the appeal was filed. However, Rule 73, framed by the Government under its rule‑making power under Section 68, specified that the authority to decide an appeal against the orders of a Regional Transport Authority under Section 64 would be the Chairman and two members of the Provincial Transport Authority. The rule further provided that upon receipt of an appeal the Chairman must fix the time and place for hearing the appeal and must give not less than thirty days’ notice to the appellant, the original authority, and to “any other person interested in the appeal.” On the appointed or adjourned date, the Appellate Authority was required to “hear such persons as may appear and, after such further enquiry, if any, as it may deem necessary, confirm, vary, or set aside the order against which the appeal is preferred and make any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper.” Thus, although the substantive provision creating the right of appeal did not create a hearing right for a respondent, the procedural rules contemplated that sufficient notice be given to “any other person interested in the appeal.” That expression was intended to include persons other than the appellant who might be interested in being heard against the points raised in support of the appeal. Neither the statutory sections nor the rules made any provision for recording oral or documentary evidence in the manner of ordinary courts. In addition to parties interested in the grant of a stage‑carriage permit or in opposing it, the local police authority was also entitled to be heard both at the original stage and at the appellate stage. Consequently, the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules made thereunder, with reference to the Regional Transport Authority and the Appellate Authority, did not envision a regular court‑like hearing. No elaborate procedure had been prescribed for how the interested parties should be heard on the question of who should be granted a stage‑carriage permit. The High Court judgment under appeal quoted extensively from decisions of the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal to support its conclusion that the principles of natural justice had not been sufficiently complied with in the present case because only the subsequent police report had been read out when the Appellate Authority heard the appeal. The learned judges of the Appeal Court observed that

In the judgment, the Court noted that a document as extensive as the second police report could not be fully read out in a single hearing. The Court further observed that, for the first respondent to present its case effectively, it was not sufficient merely to have the report read aloud; the respondent also needed the opportunity to examine the report in detail so that it could comprehend its contents and then articulate its arguments fully before the Appellate Authority. The Court said that it must now review the various authorities cited by the High Court in order to determine the extent to which those authorities support the High Court’s conclusions. Before undertaking that review, the Court stressed that the question of whether the principles of natural justice have been complied with in any given case must be examined in the context of the constitutional framework of the statutory body that is performing the function. Such a body is required to operate in accordance with the rules enacted by the legislature, and consequently the requirements of natural justice may differ from one statutory scheme to another. The Regional Transport Authority, which is responsible for granting or refusing a stage‑carriage permit, must exercise its discretion while observing the factors listed in section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act. In addition, the police authority that has jurisdiction over any portion of the proposed route is statutorily empowered to make representations to the Regional Transport Authority or to the Appellate Authority. However, the Court explained that a police report submitted in that context is merely an expression of opinion by a body concerned with maintaining law and order, particularly with regard to whether any applicant for a permit has any merits or demerits as a supplier of transport services. Such a report is intended primarily to assist the transport authority in deciding whether to grant or refuse the permit; it is not directed at the individual applicants for their own use. In other words, the police report constitutes information supplied to aid the authority in forming its decision.

In the case before the Court, the Chairman read the later police report to the Appellate Authority. Neither the appellant nor the first respondent, nor any of the other parties present, raised an objection to the admission of that document, nor did any party request a postponement on the ground that they had been surprised by the report or that they needed additional material to oppose its contents. The High Court, in its judgment on appeal, observed that tribunals created under the Motor Vehicles Act are tasked with conducting their business expeditiously. Nevertheless, the High Court suggested that the efficiency of the authority’s business would not have been significantly impaired if a copy of the police report had been provided to the parties concerned and the proceeding had been adjourned for a brief period to allow them to study it. The Court noted that no party had sought such an adjournment, despite being represented by counsel. The High Court further expressed the view that the duty to ensure a fair hearing rests not on the counsel appearing before the tribunal but on the tribunal itself, which must both do justice and appear to do justice. The Court concluded that the Appellate Authority had erred by moving forward without giving the appellant a proper and effective opportunity to present its case.

In this case the record shows that no party asked for a postponement of the hearing, and indeed none of the parties, who were each represented by counsel, moved any application for an adjournment. The High Court, however, later observed that the responsibility for ensuring a fair hearing does not rest with the counsel appearing before the tribunal but with the tribunal itself, which must see that justice is both done and appears to be done, and must observe the basic rule of natural justice that each person concerned is given a fair and proper opportunity to be heard. The High Court went on to say that the Appellate Authority had erred by proceeding too quickly and by denying the appellant a proper and effective chance to present its case. In our view the observations made by the High Court were based on several assumptions that are not supported by the statutory scheme governing the tribunal nor by any general principles of natural justice that would obligate the tribunal to act in the manner described. The tribunal that was hearing the dispute over the grant of a permit was not a court of law, although it was required to deal with the competing applications of the parties in a manner that was fair and just. Nevertheless, even when a tribunal performs a judicial function, it is not required to grant a postponement of its proceedings on its own initiative in the absence of a request made by any interested party. We find no indication that, at the time the hearing was conducted, any of the parties complained about the procedure adopted by the Appellate Authority or raised any grievance concerning the manner in which the police report was handled. The issue of whether an adjournment should have been granted was first raised before the High Court only after the Appellate Tribunal had already decided to issue the permit to the appellant. It is also relevant to note that the subsequent police report did not contain any allegation directly against the first respondent that the respondent would have an interest in contesting. The later report merely withdrew some earlier adverse comments that had been made against the appellant on the basis of a misunderstanding, although it retained a few minor complaints concerning the appellant’s conduct. The Appellate Authority apparently considered those remaining matters to be insufficiently serious to prevent the issuance of the permit, especially in view of its earlier policy decision that the monopoly over the supply of transport facilities should not continue to favour the first respondent. Consequently, we conclude that the applicable rules did not require the police report to be served on any of the parties, and there was no circumstance that compelled the hearing to be adjourned, particularly because no request for such an adjournment was made by either the first respondent or any other party. At the time of the hearing, none of the parties appears to have expressed any objection to the fact that the Chairman read the police report without providing copies, nor did any party ask for a postponement of the proceedings.

In this case the Court observed that the procedural rules created under Chapter IV for the conduct and hearing of appeals that may be preferred under this chapter, specifically section 68(2)(b), do not provide for the parties to be given any additional facilities for presenting evidence for or against their case. The rules do, however, permit the Appellate Authority to undertake any further enquiry it considers necessary. The High Court Bench, however, adopted a different approach. It held that irrespective of whether a rule existed or a request for an adjournment was made, the principles of natural justice required the Appellate Authority to refrain from proceeding until a proper and effective opportunity was given to the first respondent to present its case. The Court noted that there was very little substantive case for the first respondent to present, because every applicant for a permit is presumed to have already pressed its claim before the Appellate Authority. Consequently, the Court said it was necessary to review the authorities cited in the judgment under appeal to determine whether the Appellate Bench was correctly convinced that the rules of natural justice had been breached. The earliest authority referred to was the House of Lords decision in Spackman v. Plumstead Board of Works. That case dealt with a prosecution for violating a parliamentary Act that regulated the “general line of buildings” along a road. The dispute turned on whether the superintending architect, before deciding how the line should be fixed, was required to hear the parties concerned. The Earl of Selborne, speaking as a Law‑Lord, explained that in the absence of specific statutory provisions dictating the manner of decision‑making, the law merely requires that the essential requirements of justice not be violated. He clarified that although the architect was not a judge in the strict sense, he was still obliged to give the parties an opportunity to be heard, to state their case and their views, to receive notice of when the matter would be considered, and to act honestly, impartially and without being directed by any other person who lacked legal authority. He warned that any malversation or conduct contrary to the essence of justice would amount to no decision within the meaning of the statute. The Lord further observed that it was reasonable for the statute to omit formal procedures because the matter did not demand formal litigation; it merely required that the parties be allowed to submit the considerations that would bind them to the decision‑maker. Once those submissions were made, the nature of the case did not demand additional steps such as summoning the parties, which are typical of a judicial process.

In the passage cited, it was observed that once the matters which ought to be considered in a judgment are presented to the person whose decision will bind the parties, no additional steps such as summoning the parties or performing other acts typical of a judicial proceeding are required. The text then turned to a leading authority on the subject, namely the House of Lords decision in Board of Education v. Rice. In that case the Lords examined the obligations of the Board of Education under section 7 of the Education Act 1902. Lord Loreburn, serving as a Law Commissioner, referred to the relevant provisions of the Act and made several key observations. He noted that recent statutes, whether or not they originated the practice, have broadened the duty imposed on government departments or state officers to decide a variety of questions. He explained that the matters brought before the Board may sometimes be resolved by discretion without any reference to law, often being administrative in nature. At other times the questions may involve both legal and factual issues, or may rest solely upon legal principles. In all such instances the Board must determine the applicable law and also ascertain the relevant facts. Lord Loreburn emphasized that, in performing these tasks, the Board must act in good faith and must give a fair hearing to both sides, a duty that he regarded as fundamental to anyone who makes a decision. Nevertheless, he cautioned that the Board is not required to conduct the proceeding as if it were a full trial. The Board does not possess the power to administer oaths, nor is it obliged to examine witnesses. Instead, it may gather information by any method it deems appropriate, provided that it affords the parties a reasonable opportunity to correct or contradict any statement that may prejudice their position.

The discussion then moved to the variability of judicial opinion regarding the doctrine of natural justice, illustrated by the case of Rex v. Local Government Board, Ex parte Arlidge. The procedural posture involved a rule nisi for a certiorari that was initially heard by the judges Ridley, Lord Coleridge, and Bankes. The case concerned the authority of the Local Government Board under the Housing, Town Planning, etc. Act 1909 (9 Edw. 7, c. 44) to refuse to terminate orders that declared a dwelling‑house unfit for habitation, and the procedure for hearing an appeal against such an order. Section 29 of that Act stipulated that an appeal must be heard and disposed of according to the procedure laid down by the Local Government Board, and that the Board’s rules required it not to dismiss any appeal without first conducting a public local inquiry. The Court found that the Board had complied with the statutory procedure by holding the public inquiry, and therefore held unanimously that no further hearing of the appellant or his representative was required, even though the appellant was not afforded a trial‑like hearing or the chance to hear the inspector’s report. The Court relied heavily on Lord Loreburn’s reasoning in Board of Education v. Rice to conclude that the procedural requirements had been satisfied and that the Board had no additional obligation to hear the appellant personally.

The Court observed that the Local Government Board was not obligated to afford the appellant, or any person on his behalf, a hearing after the inspector’s report on the public local inquiry had been received and before the Board dismissed the appeal. At the public local inquiry the owner of the house that was subject to the closing order had been represented, but when the appeal was finally decided there was no hearing of the appellant or his representative in the manner of a court proceeding. The Court rejected the contention that the appellant possessed a right to be heard by the Board and to learn the contents of the inspector’s report that was prepared after the public inquiry. Relying mainly on the judgment of Lord Loreburn, L.C., in Board of Education v. Rice, the Court concluded that the procedure prescribed by the rules made under the statute had been complied with and that the Board had no further duty to hear the appellant personally, through a representative, or through counsel, because the statute contained no provision imposing such a requirement.

The issue was subsequently taken on appeal in Rex v. Local Government Board, Ex parte Arlidge. The Court of Appeal, by a majority consisting of Vaughan Williams and Buckley, L.J.J., allowed the appeal and held that it was contrary to the principles of natural justice for the Board to dismiss the appeal without disclosing to the appellant the contents of the inspector’s report and without providing the appellant an opportunity to be heard in support of the appeal. Accordingly, the majority set aside the order that had dismissed the appeal. The majority judgment noted that the Act and the rules framed thereunder were silent on procedural matters except for a few specific issues, and that, in the absence of explicit provisions, the non‑disclosure of the inspector’s report violated the principles of natural justice on which English law is founded. The judgment further held that the appellant before the Board was entitled to a hearing and that, because the appellant had not been given a chance to view and consider the report and the documents relied upon by the deciding authority, he was denied a full opportunity to be heard. The majority emphasized that the failure to disclose the report and the documents considered by the Board, even when the appellant requested such disclosure, was itself inconsistent with natural justice. In dissent, Hamilton, L.J., argued that an inspector’s report, as in other government departments, is merely a factual statement prepared for the information of departmental officials and that it should not be assumed that the legislature intended all such reports to be communicated to interested parties unless the statute expressly required it.

In further elaboration, the judgment noted that the usual practice was the reverse of what had been suggested, meaning that the law ordinarily required a clear specification of the manner and the recipients for any communication of such reports, and only then, if at all, a determination of whether the reports were to be communicated. The Court then examined the extent to which the requirements of natural justice had been satisfied. At page 199 the Lord Justice remarked that “It has often been pointed out that the expression (natural justice) is sadly lacking in precision.” He subsequently referred to several authorities that discussed how the meaning of natural justice varied according to the context in which it was invoked. At pages 201 and 202 the Lord Justice observed that the Local Government Board constituted a statutory tribunal, distinct from ordinary common‑law courts, created by the Legislature for a specific class of appeals and empowered to devise its own procedural rules. He further endorsed the dictum of Lord Loreburn in Board of Education v. Rice, stating that the Board must “act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides.” The judgment then recorded that the majority of the Court had set aside the Board’s determination of the appeal, prompting an appeal to the House of Lords. The House of Lords unanimously endorsed the opinion of Hamilton, L, allowed the appeal and reversed the majority decision, as noted in Local Government Board v. Arlidge. In his speech, Viscount Haldane, L.C., observed that when a person is charged with deciding an appeal, that person must act judicially, must consider the matter without bias, and must give each party a full opportunity to present its case. He added that the decision must be reached in the spirit and with the sense of responsibility appropriate to a tribunal tasked with dispensing justice, while also emphasizing that the procedural rules of every tribunal need not be identical. His Lordship again cited Lord Loreburn’s dictum from the leading case of Board of Education v. Rice. Lord Shaw, speaking later, remarked that the majority’s judgments appeared to be overly influenced by the notion that departmental actions should follow the analogy of judicial methods, noting that such methods can be unsuitable in administrative contexts and may cause delay, expense, and injury, and that the department must simply obey the statute. Finally, at page 138, the Court reiterated that assuming the methods of natural justice must automatically mirror those of courts is wholly unfounded; the term applies only to particular procedural steps or forms of pleading, and its meaning must be understood in that limited sense.

Lord Parmoor observed that the expression “a result or process should be just” is a harmless, though lofty, phrase when it merely seeks to convey a sense of fairness. He explained that when the expression attempts to invoke the ancient concept of “jus naturale,” it becomes a confused and unwarranted transfer of a term that originally served other distinctions into the ethical arena. Moreover, he added that if the phrase is employed for purposes beyond its original meaning, it becomes essentially vacuous. Lord Parmoor then reiterated the governing principle for the procedure of a quasi‑judicial tribunal. He stated that when the propriety of procedure is questioned in a hearing before a body that is not a Court of law, there is no requirement to follow the regular forms of legal procedure. It is sufficient, he said, that the matter be heard in a judicial spirit and in accordance with the principles of substantial justice.

In a later decision of the House of Lords, General Medical Council v. Spackman (1) [1943] A.C. 827, the High Court, whose judgment was under appeal, relied on the Lords’ reasoning. In that case the General Medical Council, a domestic forum created to decide whether a medical practitioner should be struck off the medical register for “infamous conduct in a professional respect,” acted as the appellant before the Lords. The respondent had previously been found guilty of adultery by the Divorce Court. Before the Medical Council, the practitioner sought to introduce fresh evidence concerning the adultery and asked the Council to rehear the issue. The Council declined to reopen the matter, refused to hear the new evidence, and ordered that the practitioner’s name be erased from the register. The Court of Appeal unanimously endorsed the view of the dissenting judge in the first instance, holding that there had been no “due inquiry” as required by section 29 of the Medical Act, 1858. The Appeal Court set aside the majority decision of Viscount Caldecote, C.J., and Humphreys, J., which had concluded that the legal requirements were satisfied by adopting the judgment and decree of the Divorce Court. On further appeal by the Medical Council to the House of Lords, the Lords unanimously affirmed the Appeal Court’s decision, declaring that the statutory requirement of due inquiry imposed by the Act had not been fulfilled. Viscount Simon, L.C., examined the relevant provisions and rules and emphasized that they required the practitioner to state his case and to produce supporting evidence. The Lord Chancellor, in his speech, observed that the General Medical Council was not a judicial body in the ordinary sense, was master of its own procedure, and was not bound by strict rules of evidence; nevertheless, it was bound to satisfy the requirements of the law and the rules made thereunder.

The Council was required to reach a decision on sworn testimony only after conducting a proper inquiry. In doing so, the Council also adopted the language of Lord Loreburn, L.C., as expressed in the previously cited case of Board of Educatian v. Rice (supra). During his address, Lord Atkin observed that the statutory rules mandated that, if a request were made, the Council must listen to all the evidence that the practitioner charged wished to present before it. He further highlighted the contrast between convenience and justice, remarking that “convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms.” His Lordship also drew attention to the differing procedures that may be prescribed for various tribunals created by statutes, stating that “some analogy exists, no doubt, between the various procedures of this and other not strictly judicial bodies, but I cannot think that the procedure which may be very just in deciding whether to close a school or an insanitary house is necessarily right in deciding a charge of infamous conduct against a professional man.” He added that he would therefore demur to any suggestion that the words of Lord Loreburn, L.C., in Board of Education v. Rice (supra) provide a complete guide to the General Medical Council in the performance of its duties. As he explained, it is not correct to say that the Council need not examine witnesses; on the contrary, witnesses must be examined if they are tendered, and the Council’s own rules expressly provide for such examination. He further expressed doubt about the proposition that the Council has no power to administer an oath.

The judgment also noted that the Lords who sat on the case placed particular emphasis on the statutory requirements and the rules framed thereunder. Considering those statutory provisions, they found it necessary to uphold the Court of Appeal’s decision, which had set aside the judgment and orders of the King’s Bench Division that had taken the contrary view that the decree of the Divorce Court constituted conclusive evidence on which the Medical Council could act. Consequently, the case stands as authority for the proposition that the rules of natural justice must be inferred from the nature of the tribunal, the scope of its inquiry, and the statutory procedural rules laid down by law to achieve the statute’s objectives. Moreover, another class of cases holds that when a person is to be deprived of his professional status, he must be heard and given an effective opportunity to meet any allegations concerning his fitness to practice his profession. If a statutory tribunal deciding on an individual’s fitness to pursue a profession reaches a decision against him without affording him an opportunity to address allegations affecting his capacity or qualifications for that profession, it has been held that such a proceeding is improper.

The Court explained that a tribunal which acts in a quasi‑judicial capacity must not prejudice a person by relying on evidence or an adverse report unless that person has been given a chance to meet the relevant allegations made against him. The principle illustrated by this class of cases includes the decision in R. v. Architects Registration Tribunal, where the King’s Bench Division granted a certiorari to set aside the tribunal’s refusal to register an applicant as an architect, as reported in [1945] 2 A.E.R. 131. Similar authority is found in Leeson v. General Council of Medical Education and Registration, cited in [1890] 43 Ch. D. 366, and Allinson v. General Council of Medical Education and Registration, reported in [1894] 1 Q.B. 750. Those cases concerned the power of the General Council of Medical Education, created under the Medical Act (21 & 22 Viet. c. 90), to remove a medical practitioner for unprofessional conduct. In each instance the Medical Council was required to operate as a quasi‑judicial body, following the procedural rules set out in the Act. Consequently, the Council was not to act as a conventional court but as a domestic tribunal established by statute, obligated to apply the statutory rules fairly and without personal interest in the dispute, and to afford the person against whom proceedings were taken a full and fair opportunity to present his case before the tribunal.

The Court also referred to another category of decisions exemplified by the Court of Appeal’s judgment in R. v. Archbishop of Canterbury, reported in [1944] 1 A.E.R. 179. In that case the Archbishop, exercising powers under section 3 of the Benefices (Exercise of the Rights of Presentation) Measure, 1931, declined to approve a clerk presented by a patron to a benefice. The Court rejected the patron’s argument that, because the decision affected property rights, the Archbishop was required to act in a quasi‑judicial manner. Lord Greene, M.R., who delivered the opinion, observed that there was no justification for treating the matter before the Archbishop as akin to a judicial dispute between parties. Accordingly, a proper construction of section 3 of the Measure led to the conclusion that the Archbishop was not obligated to conduct a quasi‑judicial inquiry. This authority establishes that the mere involvement of property rights does not, by itself, compel the body deciding such rights to function as a quasi‑judicial tribunal, unless the statute expressly imposes that requirement. The Court noted that, as previously stated, the Appellate Authority in the present matter was required to act in a quasi‑judicial capacity pursuant to the rules made under the Motor Vehicles Act, which contains extensive provisions for protecting the interests of competing claimants for permits.

In the matter before the Court, the issue concerned the competition among rival claimants for transport permits. The Court noted that the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act had previously been examined in great detail by a bench of five judges in the case of Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd. (1). In that decision the Court had undertaken an elaborate review of the Act’s provisions as they related to the authorities created under the Act to administer the grant of stage‑carriage permits. The Court had also considered the extent to which the High Court, exercising its special power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs, could interfere with the orders issued by those authorities. During the exposition of its judgment, the Court made several observations on page 596 that were regarded as highly relevant to the present case. The Court stated: “Thus we have before us a complete and precise scheme for regulating the issue of permits, providing what matters are to be taken into consideration as relevant, and prescribing appeals and revisions from subordinate bodies to higher authorities. The remedies for the redress of grievances or the correction of errors are found in the statute itself and it is to these remedies that resort must Generally be bad.” Keeping those observations in mind and drawing upon the principles of natural justice articulated in various English authorities, the Court set out to determine how far the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules framed thereunder justified the criticism raised by the High Court. The criticism alleged that the Appellate Authority had not afforded the first respondent a full and effective opportunity to present his point of view before the authority.

The Court observed that the statutory provisions, cited in (1) [1952] S.C.R. 583, did not require either the Regional Transport Authority or the Appellate Authority to record evidence or to conduct proceedings as if they were courts of law. Their function was to assess a number of applicants and to decide which applicant was suitable for the grant of a fresh permit. The authorities were required to consider all relevant matters and to reach a decision, a decision that, in this case, had not been challenged as being partial or perverse. The only ground that survived before the Appellate Bench of the High Court was the allegation that the requirements of natural justice had not been satisfied. The Court therefore needed to decide whether the Appellate Authority was justified in relying on the second report prepared by the police, a report that had not been placed in the hands of the parties. The Court noted that the police report did not contain any direct allegations against the first respondent, and consequently there was nothing in the report that the respondent could be called upon to meet. The effect of the report was that many of the objections initially raised against the appellant’s suitability were withdrawn by the police after further consideration of their records. The Court described the police report as being intended primarily for the information of the authorities responsible for granting permits, rather than as a document to be used by the individual applicants. In the Court’s opinion, therefore,

In this case, the Court held that the mere reading out of the police report by the Appellate Authority satisfied the requirements of natural justice. The Court further noted that during the hearing of the appeal none of the parties, and in particular the first respondent, lodged any objection that the second police report should have been excluded or that they required additional time to examine the report and challenge its contents. The parties did not seek an adjournment of the hearing for the purpose of addressing any statements contained in that report. Nevertheless, counsel for the respondent argued that the principles of natural justice could not be waived by the parties and that the Appellate Authority was obligated to observe those rules. The Court rejected that contention, stating that there was no authority supporting such a proposition. The Court explained that even in a court of law a party cannot, at the appellate stage, claim entitlement to an adjournment that it did not request before the trial court. The Court emphasized that a still greater claim could not be entertained in an appeal from a tribunal, which is a statutory body exercising quasi‑judicial functions rather than a court. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the judgment appealed against was erroneous and required setting aside. The Court also expressed that the judgment of the single judge of the lower court had adopted the correct legal view. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, with costs awarded to the appellant in all stages.