Lalit Mohan Das vs Advocate-General, Orissa

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 176 of 1956; Petition No. 165 of 1955

Decision Date: 29 November 1956

Coram: S.K. Das, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha

In this matter the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 29 November 1956. The bench was composed of S.K. Das, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati and Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha. The petitioner was Lalit Mohan Das and the respondent was the Advocate‑General of Orissa. The case was reported as 1957 AIR 250 and 1957 SCR 167. The statutory framework concerned the Legal Practitioners Act (XVIII of 1879), specifically sections 13 and 14, which provide for disciplinary proceedings against members of the Bar.

The factual background recorded that the pleader had an already strained relationship with the Munsif and, in open court, he made remarks that were deemed objectionable because they suggested that the Munsif was partial and unfair. Acting on those remarks, the Munsif instituted disciplinary proceedings under sections 13 and 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act and forwarded a report to the High Court through the District judge. The pleader then applied to the Additional District judge for a period of one month in order to move the High Court and obtain an order that the matter be heard by a judicial officer other than the Munsif who had prepared the report. The Additional District judge granted the one‑month period, but subsequently returned the record to the Munsif.

In an effort to resolve the dispute, the Additional District judge arranged that the pleader should apologise and that a resolution be passed by the members of the local Bar Association. Accordingly, the pleader appeared before the Munsif, filed a written apology and expressed his regret, after which the Munsif dropped the disciplinary proceeding. Later it emerged that the resolution was not passed in the terms suggested by the Additional District judge and that the settlement terms were not fully complied with. Consequently, the proceeding was reopened, the report was resubmitted to the District judge who gave his opinion and again forwarded the report to the High Court. The High Court then imposed a suspension of five years on the pleader.

The appellant contended that there was no valid ground for reviving the proceeding after it had been dropped on the basis of the apology and expression of regret. The Court held that a report filed under section 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act is a report that must be submitted to the High Court. When any civil judge subordinate to a District judge makes such a report, it must be transmitted through the District judge and must be accompanied by that judge’s opinion. Once the report has been made, the District judge is not permitted to return the record to the subordinate civil judge, and no order of the subordinate civil judge can terminate or bring the proceeding to an end. Only the High Court possesses the authority to pass final orders on the report. The Court further observed that a member of the Bar is an officer of the Court; while he owes a duty to his client and must present all matters that can fairly and reasonably be submitted on the client’s behalf, he also owes a duty to the Court to preserve its dignity and decorum. Making accusations of partiality and unfairness against a subordinate civil judge in open court was characterised as scandalising the Court and polluting the very source of justice, and such conduct was not regarded as a private dispute between an individual member of the Bar and a member of the judicial service.

The Court explained that once a report under section 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act has been made to the High Court, the District Judge does not have the authority to return the record to the Subordinate Civil judge, and any order issued by the Subordinate Civil judge cannot terminate or otherwise bring the proceeding to an end; only the High Court has the power to pass a final order on such a report. The Court further observed that a lawyer is an officer of the Court who, while obligated to advocate zealously for his client and to present all matters that can fairly and reasonably be raised on the client’s behalf, also owes a paramount duty to the Court to preserve its dignity and decorum. Consequently, any expression of partiality or accusation of unfairness against a Subordinate Civil judge made openly in Court was characterised by the Court as scandalising the Court and contaminating the very source of justice; such conduct was held not to be a private dispute between an individual member of the Bar and a member of the judicial service. Regarding disciplinary action against a lawyer, the Supreme Court affirmed that it would ordinarily be reluctant to interfere with a High Court order unless clear mitigating circumstances were shown.

The judgment recorded that this appeal fell within the civil appellate jurisdiction, being Civil Appeal No. 176 of 1956 together with Petition No. 165 of 1955, and that it was taken on special leave from the Orissa High Court’s judgment and order dated 15 March 1955 in Civil Reference No. 4 of 1954. The appeal was presented by counsel for the appellant and counsel for respondent No. 1. The judgment was delivered on 29 November 1956 by Justice S.K. Das. The appellant, Shri Lalit Mohan Das, was described as a pleader with roughly twenty‑five years of practice who normally appeared before the courts at Anandapur in the Mayurbhanj district of Orissa. The Munsif of Anandapur, identified as Shri L. B. N. S. Deo, had instituted a proceeding under sections 13 and 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, alleging that the pleader had engaged in grossly improper conduct while performing his professional duties. The Munsif submitted a report to the High Court through the District Judge of Mayurbhanj on 12 December 1953, and the District Judge, together with his opinion, forwarded the report to the Orissa High Court on 9 March 1954. The Munsif’s recommendation was that the pleader be suspended from practice for one year. After hearing the reference, the High Court, by its order dated 15 March 1955, concluded that the pleader was guilty of grave professional misconduct and imposed a suspension of five years, effective from 15 March 1955. Shri Lalit Mohan Das subsequently obtained special leave from this Court to appeal the High Court’s judgment and order, and he also lodged a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, although the petitioner’s counsel did not pursue the petition further.

The petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution was not pursued further, and no additional discussion of that petition was necessary. The Court therefore turned to the appeal that had been granted special leave. The appeal concerned several charges made against the appellant. The first charge related to an incident on July 15, 1953, when the appellant appeared as counsel for the defendant in Suit Number 81 of 1952 before the Munsif of Anandapur. On the same day, two other suits were also pending before the same Munsif, and petitions for time had been filed in all three matters. The Munsif decided to hear the oldest suit first, which was Suit Number 54 of 1952, and he examined five witnesses for the plaintiff in that case. Consequently, the hearing of Suit Number 81 of 1952 was adjourned to August 18, 1953, and the appellant, who was representing the defendant in that suit, was informed of the postponement. After receiving this information, the appellant made a remark in open court, within hearing of the Munsif, saying, “If the Peshkar is gained over, he can do everything.” He then left the courtroom. The Munsif was surprised by this comment and sent a letter to the appellant on the same day requesting an explanation of his conduct. The appellant did not reply to that first letter, prompting the Munsif to send a second letter on July 18, 1953. In response to the second letter, the appellant sent a written reply that read in part, “Dear Sir, I am painfully constrained to receive memo after memo for some imaginary act of mine not in any way connected with my affairs for which if any explanation is at all warranted officially. For your second memo I felt it desirable as a gentleman to reply. Further I may request you to be more polite while addressing letters to lawyers. Yours faithfully, Sd. L. M. Das. Pleader.” The language of this reply was clearly improper and significantly strained the relationship between the Munsif and the appellant.

At the time of these events, the appellant served as President of the Anandapur Sub‑Divisional Bar Association, an organization that comprised approximately fourteen legal practitioners. On July 21, 1953, Shri B. Raghava Rao, who had previously held the office now occupied by Shri Deo, visited Anandapur as a guest of the Sub‑Divisional Officer, Shri A. V. Ranga Rao. Shri N. C. Mohanty, a pleader from Anandapur who was related to the appellant, extended an invitation to both Munsifs to attend a luncheon celebrating a house‑warming ceremony. Upon learning of the dispute between Shri Deo and the appellant, Shri B. Raghava Rao intervened. Through his intercession, the appellant was persuaded to visit the Sub‑Divisional Officer’s residence and express regret for the incident that had occurred in court on July 15, 1953, asserting that he had not intended to insult Shri Deo. Shri Deo, according to the record, accepted this apology, and the conflict between the two parties was, for the time being, smoothed over.

On September 25 1953 the appellant appeared for a defendant in a suit that had been scheduled for hearing on September 21 1953. Because the earlier date was a holiday, the matter was taken up on September 22 1953. On the same day another suit was also listed, but a pleader for the defendants in that second suit requested a delay on the ground that one of the defendants was ill; the request was supported by a medical certificate. In the appellant’s case the defendants also sought an adjournment, alleging that their witnesses were ill; however, because no medical certificate was produced and no witnesses had been called, the Munsif refused to grant any further time. One of the defendants’ counsel, the appellant’s junior, agreed to proceed with the hearing. The hearing was therefore conducted over two days, on September 22 and 23 1953, and at the request of the defendants’ lawyers the argument was postponed to September 25 1953. On that day the appellant entered the courtroom accompanied by his junior counsel to argue on behalf of the defendants. At the very start of his argument he made the following statement: “The Court is unfair to me, while the Court was fair to the plaintiff’s counsel. The Court is accommodating and granting adjournments to the plaintiff’s counsel while it was not accommodating me.” The Munsif objected to these remarks, but no further disruption occurred and the appellant completed his argument.

A third incident occurred on September 29 1953 and brought the dispute to a climax. On that date the appellant represented the defendants in a suit in which a preliminary question concerning the court’s jurisdiction and the sufficiency of court fees had been raised. An earlier officer, who had previously dealt with the same point, had decided against the appellant’s client, and a civil revision of that decision had been rejected by the High Court. Nonetheless, the appellant pressed the same preliminary issue again, and the Munsif dismissed the preliminary objection on September 29 1953. When the order was shown to the appellant, he rose abruptly and shouted at the top of his voice, “On behalf of the Bar Association, Anandapur, I challenge the order of the Court. The Court has no principle as it is passing one kind of order in one suit and another kind of order in another suit.” The Munsif, apparently disgusted by the appellant’s conduct, rose from his seat, left the courtroom, and instructed the bench clerk to send a telegram to the District Judge informing him of the incident.

After the incident in the court, a telegram was dispatched to the District Judge requesting his presence in Anandapur. The District Judge, upon receipt, asked for a detailed report, which was forwarded on 1 October 1953. Subsequently, on 5 October 1953 the Munsif instituted a proceeding against the appellant under section 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act, referencing the three incidents previously described. The appellant was directed to file a written explanation by 26 October 1953. On 3 November 1953 the appellant repudiated the charges and contended that the Munsif lacked jurisdiction to conduct the enquiry because the Munsif himself was positioned as a complainant. The appellant also advanced an alternative account of the events. Regarding the incident of 15 July 1953, he alleged that a different client had approached him concerning a criminal case pending in another court, and that he had merely suggested that the client obtain an enquiry from the Peshkar concerning the fixed date. Concerning the incident of 25 September 1953, the appellant offered a complete denial. Concerning the last incident, he asserted that the Munsif behaved rudely, appeared intent to assault him, and that he had consequently filed a petition with the Governor of Orissa on 30 September 1953 seeking sanction for the prosecution of the Munsif. On 8 October 1953 a resolution, numbered Resolution 6 and purportedly representing the Bar Association of Anandapur, was passed. The resolution condemned the Munsif’s conduct on 29 September 1953, describing his rising from the chair, thumping the table, shouting loudly, and addressing the Bar Association president with the words “shut up” as unprecedented, undesirable, detrimental to the Bar’s prestige, and potentially unsettling to the public seeking fair justice. Later, some members of the Bar dissociated themselves from this resolution. The proceeding under the Legal Practitioners Act, initiated on 5 October 1953, saw the appellant file his written statement on 3 November 1953. On 5 November 1953 the Munsif forwarded the record to the District Judge in response to the appellant’s request that the enquiry be conducted by another judicial officer. The District Judge, however, held that sections 13 and 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act required the enquiry to be conducted by the Munsif himself, and therefore returned the records to the Munsif. Following this determination, the appellant failed to cooperate and did not appear at the enquiry despite receiving more than one communication urging his attendance. The enquiry was eventually concluded after the appellant’s non‑appearance.

On December 11 1953 the Munsif completed the enquiry and filed his report, which was transmitted to the High Court through the District Judge on December 12 1953. Subsequently, on December 22 1953 the appellant applied to the Additional District Judge for a respite in order to approach the High Court and seek an order that the matter be heard by a different judicial officer. The Additional District Judge granted a one‑month extension, but for reasons not clearly explained he returned the record to the learned Munsif. During this interval the Additional District Judge appears to have attempted a conciliatory effort. On December 23 1953 he met the members of the Bar Association and the Munsif at the inspection bungalow in Anandapur while travelling to Mayurbhanj. At that meeting a draft resolution prepared for consideration by the Bar Association, Anandapur, was read aloud. The draft resolution stated: “This Association regards very much that an incident relating to the bench clerk of the Civil Court should have led to the subsequent unhappy differences between the Bench and the members of the Bar. As in the interest of the litigant public it is felt not desirable to allow these strained feelings to continue further, this Association unanimously resolves to withdraw Resolution No 6 dated October 8 1953, passed against the Court and communicate copies of the same to the addressees previously communicated. It is further resolved to request the Court to see to the desirability of withdrawing the proceedings that had been started against the various members of the Bar and their registered clerks on their expressing regret to the Court individually in connection with those proceedings. It is further resolved that the members of the Bar involved in the proceedings be requested to take immediate steps in this direction. The Association hopes that the bench clerk who has to some extent been the cause for this friction between the Bench and the Bar would be replaced by a person from a different place at an earlier date.” On January 8 1954 the appellant appeared before the Munsif, submitted a written apology, and expressed his regret; his signature was entered on the order‑sheet, which recorded: “Sri L. M. Das, pleader, appears and expresses his regret. So the proceeding No 2 of 1952 is dropped. Intimate Additional District Judge.” No resolution in the terms suggested by the Additional District Judge was passed. However, on January 19 1954 two resolutions were adopted. The first declared that, in view of the fact that earlier misunderstandings between the Munsif and members of the Bar caused by the bench clerk incident had been removed by an amicable settlement, the Bar Association unanimously resolved that Resolution No 6 dated October 8 1953 was withdrawn. The second resolution ordered that copies of the withdrawn resolution be sent to the addressees previously communicated in Resolution No 6 of October 8 1953.

The learned Munsif, apparently wishing to examine the minute book of the Bar Association in order to determine the precise wording of the proposed resolution, requested its production. This request gave rise to a further dispute between the Munsif and the appellant concerning the furnishing of the minute book. Ultimately the minute book was produced, and on 2 February 1954 the Munsif expressed the opinion that the resolution that had been passed did not fully implement the terms of the settlement suggested by the Additional District Judge. Consequently the proceeding was reopened and the record was again forwarded to the District Judge. The District Judge then transmitted the report of the Munsif, together with his own opinion, to the High Court. The High Court considered that report and gave a decision, the result of which has already been noted in the judgment.

Counsel for the appellant, Mr N C Chatterji, argued that there was no proper basis for reviving the proceedings against the appellant after the matter had been dismissed on 8 January 1954 by the appellant’s written apology and expression of regret. He submitted that, in substance and effect, the appellant had complied with the settlement terms proposed by the Additional District Judge. According to Mr Chatterji, the appellant’s expression of regret was made before the Anandapur Bar Association passed the two resolutions on 19 January 1954, and the bench clerk had already been transferred from Anandapur. Therefore, the resolutions of 19 January could not be identical to the terms suggested by the Additional District Judge; nevertheless, when read together with the individual regret expressed on 8 January, the two resolutions satisfied the essential requirements of the draft resolution that the Additional District Judge had formulated on 23 December 1953. Mr Chatterji further contended that the High Court had not given proper consideration to this view. He maintained that, in view of the order entered by the learned Munsif on 8 January 1954, the proceeding against the appellant should have been deemed terminated on that date. In addition, he drew the Court’s attention to ground VI in the petition for special leave dated 9 May 1955, in which the appellant asserted his willingness to present before the Court unreserved expressions of regret and apology for any error of judgment or indiscretion in the discharge of his professional duties.

The Court could not accept Mr Chatterji’s contention that the order of the learned Munsif dated 8 January 1954 effected the termination of the proceedings against the appellant. The High Court judges were correct in observing that the report of the Munsif dated 12 December 1953 was a report that had been submitted to the High Court. Consequently, the authority to make a final determination in the matter rested solely with the High Court after that report had been filed. The Court therefore rejected the argument that the earlier order by the Munsif conclusively ended the case.

According to section fourteen of the Legal Practitioners Act, a report prepared by a Munsif had to be sent to the High Court by the District Judge together with the judge’s own opinion. The Additional District Judge therefore did not have the authority to return the record to the Munsif. Although the Additional District Judge acted with good intentions, the Court observed that once the Munsif had submitted his report to the High Court, only the High Court possessed the competence to issue the final orders in the matter. Setting that procedural defect aside, the Court expressed dissatisfaction that the settlement terms proposed by the Additional District Judge had not been fully observed. The appellant had indeed expressed regret, and in that limited respect the settlement was partly carried out. However, the resolutions passed on 19 January 1954 cancelled an earlier resolution dated 8 October 1953, and the crucial element of the settlement – that the Bar Association should publicly express regret for what had occurred – remained unfulfilled. Resolution No. I of 19 January 1954 was worded so that it suggested the misunderstanding between the Munsif and the appellant arose solely from the bench clerk and that, with the removal of that misunderstanding, Resolution No. 6 of 8 October 1953 should be withdrawn. The later resolution contained no admission that the appellant bore any fault, a fault that he was supposed to have atoned for by expressing regret. Moreover, the earlier resolution of 8 October 1953 had already been communicated to a large number of persons and authorities, and the diluted wording of the later resolution could scarcely erase the damage already caused by the earlier one. On the merits, the Court agreed with the High Court that the appellant was unquestionably guilty of serious professional misconduct. A member of the Bar owes a duty to his client to present to the Court all matters that can fairly and reasonably be submitted on the client’s behalf, and may even argue that a particular order is incorrect or seek its review. At the same time, a lawyer is an officer of the Court and must uphold the dignity and decorum of the Court, refraining from any conduct that could bring the Court into disrepute. The appellant, in the present case, had grossly exceeded the proper limits of propriety when he openly accused the Munsif of partiality and unfairness in Court. By alleging that the Munsif had acted without any principle in his orders, the appellant added insult to injury, even though the Munsif had merely upheld his predecessor’s order on the preliminary question of jurisdiction and court fees – an order that the High Court had confirmed on review. Such scandalising of the Court, the Court noted, polluted the very source of justice; the appellant’s conduct was not a private dispute between a lawyer and a judicial officer but an action that tarnished the whole administration of justice. Consequently, the Court described the appellant’s behaviour as highly reprehensible. The appellant had an opportunity to present evidence supporting his version of events but chose not to do so. The only remaining issue, therefore, was the question of appropriate punishment. The Court indicated a reluctance to interfere with the High Court’s disciplinary decision, while also observing two mitigating circumstances, one of which was that the learned Munsif himself had recommended a suspension of practice for only one year.

The Court observed that the order concerning fees had been upheld by the High Court on revision. It held that scandalising the Court in such a manner polluted the very fountain of justice. The conduct in which the appellant engaged was not a mere dispute between a member of the Bar and a judicial officer; rather, it brought the entire administration of justice into disrepute. From this perspective, the Court described the appellant’s conduct as highly reprehensible. The appellant had the opportunity to present evidence supporting his version of the incidents but chose not to do so. Consequently, the only remaining issue for the Court to consider was the appropriate punishment.

The Court indicated that, in cases of this nature, it would be reluctant to disturb the High Court’s order regarding disciplinary action against a lawyer who had been found guilty of professional misconduct. Nevertheless, the Court identified two mitigating circumstances. First, the learned Munsif himself had recommended a suspension of practice for only one year. The appellant’s suspension from practice had taken effect on 15 March 1955 and had, by the time of this consideration, extended to a little more than one year and eight months. Second, the appellant had submitted a written apology and expressed regret to the learned Munsif on 8 January 1954. The Court noted that it was unfortunate the appellant did not adopt a more contrite attitude before the High Court. Although the appellant contended that the proceedings against him should not have been revived, he nevertheless indicated a willingness to offer an apology and express regret.

Having regard to all the circumstances, the Court thought that the punishment originally imposed was excessive. Accordingly, the Court reduced the period of suspension to two years. In the result, the petition under Article 32 was dismissed, and the appeal was also dismissed, subject to the reduction of the suspension period as indicated above. The Court ordered that no costs be awarded and that the appeal be dismissed.