Kartar Singh and Others vs The State Of Punjab

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 49 of 1955

Decision Date: 26 April 1956

Coram: Natwarlal H. Bhagwati

Kartar Singh and others filed a petition against the State of Punjab, and the matter was heard by the Supreme Court of India on 26 April 1956. The judgment was authored by Justice Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, who sat on the bench together with Justices Aiyar N. and Chandra Sekhara. The official citation for the decision appears as 1956 AIR 541 and 1956 SCR 476. The case concerned the application of section 9 of the Punjab Security of the State Act, 1953 (Punjab Act XII of 1953) to members of a procession who shouted slogans that were alleged to be defamatory toward government ministers. The petitioners, identified as Kartar Singh and others, were prosecuted under the said provision, and the central issue before the Court was whether the prosecution was justified. In the headnote, the Court recorded that the appellants participated in a protest procession organized to oppose the Punjab Government’s policy of nationalising motor transport. During the protest, the appellants raised the slogans “Jaggu mama hai hai” (interpreted as “Jaggu, maternal uncle be dead”) and “Khachar Khota hai hai” (interpreted as “mule‑cum‑donkey be dead”). These expressions were directed respectively at the Transport Minister, Hon’ble Shri Jagat Narain, and the Chief Minister, Hon’ble Shri Bhim Sen Sachar, and were deemed defamatory. The Court observed that the statements did not constitute a threat to the security of the State, nor did they impair friendly relations with foreign states, amount to contempt of court, nor represent defamation that could prejudice state security. Moreover, the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the appellants’ conduct undermined public order, decency, morality, or amounted to incitement of an offence detrimental to the maintenance of public order. Consequently, the Court held that the prosecution under section 9 was not justified. The judgment further suggested that public officials might be better served by disregarding such vulgar criticisms rather than giving them prominence through prosecution. The Court referred to earlier authorities, including Seymour v. Butterworth ([1862] 3 F. & F. 372, 376, 377), B. v. Sir B. Carden ([1879] 5 Q.B.D. 1), and Kelly v. Sherlock ([1866] L.R. 1 Q.B. 686, 689; 35 L.J. Q.B. 209), to support its reasoning.

The appeal was filed as Criminal Appeal No. 49 of 1955 by special leave from an order dated 9 July 1954 of the Punjab High Court at Simla, which had arisen from Criminal Revision No. 778 of 1954. That revision itself stemmed from the judgment and order dated 30 June 1954 of the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar, in Criminal Appeal No. 409 of 1954. Counsel for the appellants comprised Ram Das and Raghu Nath Pandit, while the respondent was represented by counsel Jindralal and P. G. Gokhale. The Court’s judgment, delivered by Justice Bhagwati, described the case as involving the interpretation of section 9 of the Punjab Security of the State Act, 1953. The factual backdrop detailed that the appellants were members of the Amritsar District Motor Union, which organized a procession on 23 March 1954 to protest the government’s decision to nationalise motor transport. The procession, which started from Gul Park and proceeded on lorries and jeeps before stopping near Chitra Talkies and continuing on foot, reached the vicinity of Prabhat Studio where the appellants raised the aforementioned slogans. The first slogan was alleged to target Transport Minister Shri Jagat Narain, and the second to target Chief Minister Shri Bhim Sen Sachar. The authorities deemed these utterances objectionable and charged the appellants before the First‑Class Magistrate in Amritsar, alleging that their conduct, apart from being indecent, amounted to defamation and was prejudicial to the security of the State and the maintenance of public order, thereby constituting an offence under section 9 of the Security of the State Act. The appellants pleaded not guilty and contested the propriety of the trial. The Court’s analysis ultimately concluded that the prosecution did not satisfy the legal threshold required under the Act, leading to the reversal of the conviction.

The procession began at the Park and proceeded on lorries and jeeps, then halted near Chitra Talkies before continuing on foot. Upon reaching the vicinity of Prabhat Studio, the appellants are recorded as having shouted the slogans “Jaggu mama hai hai” and “Khachar Khota hai hai.” The first slogan was alleged to have been directed against the Honorable Shri Jagat Narain, then Transport Minister of Punjab State, while the second slogan was said to target the Honorable Shri Bhim Sen Sachar, then Chief Minister of Punjab State. The utterance of these slogans was deemed objectionable, and the appellants were charged before the First‑Class Magistrate of Amritsar on the basis that, on or about 23 March 1954, while participating in the procession, they raised the aforementioned slogans, which were described as indecent, defamatory, and prejudicial to the security of the State and the maintenance of public order, thereby constituting an offence punishable under section 9 of the Punjab Security of the State Act. The appellants entered a plea of not guilty and asserted that they should be tried, also presenting evidence in their defence. The learned Magistrate, however, rejected their defence, accepted the prosecution’s evidence, and concluded that the appellants had indeed raised the slogans. In the Magistrate’s view, the slogans constituted abuses directed at the Transport Minister and the Chief Minister, which were indecent, defamatory, and harmful to public order. The appellants appealed this finding to the Additional Sessions Judge of Amritsar, but the appeal was dismissed. The Additional Sessions Judge affirmed the conviction, holding that the slogans were highly objectionable, fell within the ambit of section 9 of the Act, and undermined public order, decency, and amounted to defamation; consequently, the conviction and the three‑month rigorous imprisonment imposed by the Magistrate were upheld. The appellants subsequently filed a revision application before the High Court of Punjab at Simla, which was summarily dismissed by the Chief Justice. Thereafter, the appellants obtained special leave to appeal to this Court, and the appeal now stands for final determination. On the record, there is no dispute that the appellants were participants in the procession and that they uttered the slogans against the Transport Minister and the Chief Minister. The remaining issue is whether the utterance of those slogans constitutes an offence under section 9 of the Act, whose provision states that any person who makes a speech or, by any words spoken or written, signs, visible or audible representations, or otherwise publishes any statement, rumor or report, which undermines the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or amounts to contempt of court, defamation, incitement to an offence prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, or tends to overthrow the State, shall be liable to imprisonment up to three years, a fine, or both.

The provision of section 9 of the Act stipulated that anyone who made any speech, or by words spoken or written, or by signs, visible or audible representations, or otherwise published any statement, rumor or report that undermined the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or amounted to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, or tended to overthrow the State, was punishable with imprisonment of up to three years, or with fine, or with both. The Court observed that the appellants had, by spoken words, published statements concerning the Transport Minister and the Chief Minister of the Punjab Government. A futile argument was advanced before the Court by counsel for the appellants that the condition of the statute was not satisfied; however, the Court did not consider that argument further. The sole issue for determination was whether such statements (i) undermined the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality; (ii) amounted to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order; or (iii) tended to overthrow the State.

The appellants were undoubtedly affected by the Punjab Government’s policy of nationalising motor transport, and they regarded the Transport Minister and the Chief Minister as responsible for that policy. Their protest therefore targeted both individuals, and in the demonstration they expressed violent opinions against them, using slogans that were clearly objectionable. The slogan “Jaggu mama hai hai” could be translated as “Jaggu, whose sister is my father’s wife, is dead; woe betide him,” which constituted a vulgar abuse directed at the Transport Minister. The slogan “Khachar khota hai hai” could be translated as “The mule‑donkey is dead; woe betide him,” a phrase that caricatured the name of the Hon’ble Shri Bhim Sen Sachar, the Chief Minister, by equating his name with a mule and a donkey, thereby constituting another vulgar abuse aimed at the Chief Minister. The Court held that the appellants’ conduct in this regard could not be justified. While they were entitled to voice grievances, they were required to do so in a decent and dignified manner and were not justified in hurling such vulgar abuses, irrespective of any prejudice to their own interests or to the nationalised motor‑transport policy. No reasonable citizen should have uttered such slogans, and the State authorities were within their rights to proceed against the appellants.

Nevertheless, the Court noted a difficulty for the State authorities: they had misconceived their remedy. Although the conduct of the appellants was provocative, indecent and unbefitting of a responsible citizen, the charge levelled against them fell under section 9 of the Act, and before the prosecution could succeed, they had not

In this case, the Court examined whether the appellants’ statements could be sustained under section 9 of the Act. The prosecution needed to demonstrate not only that the appellants’ utterances were indecent and defamatory, but also that they had the effect of undermining public order, decency or morality, or that they amounted to an incitement to an offence that was prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The learned counsel for the State, however, conceded that the slogans did not threaten the security of the State, did not impair friendly relations with foreign States, did not constitute contempt of Court, and did not amount to defamation that was prejudicial to State security or to an attempt to overthrow the State. While acknowledging that the slogans were reprehensible, the State counsel accepted that they would not produce any of the serious consequences just mentioned. Consequently, the State’s only argument for bringing the slogans within the ambit of section 9 was to assert that the statements undermined public order, decency or morality and were tantamount to an incitement to an offence prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

The Court considered the evidence offered to support that contention. Sub‑Inspector Ram Rakta, identified as PW 2, testified that a sufficient number of members of the public were present and that they felt annoyed by the slogans. He further stated that the police had made adequate arrangements and that, had such arrangements been absent, a dispute might have arisen. Two additional witnesses, Gurdit Singh (PW 3) and Sunder Singh (PW 4), also claimed that many members of the public were present with the procession, that people “took the slogans ill,” and that the slogans “had a bad effect on the public.” The Court noted, however, that the initial report and the diary prepared by Sub‑Inspector Ram Rakta made no reference to any annoyance felt by members of the public. Moreover, during cross‑examination, PW 3 and PW 4 were shown to be associates of the police involved in the investigation and their credibility was consequently called into question. As a result, the propositions that the public had been annoyed by the slogans were discredited. Even assuming that some persons gathered near Prabhat Studio might have been annoyed, the Court held that such annoyance could not be equated with the undermining of public order, decency or morality, nor could it be described as an incitement to an offence prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The only offence that could reasonably be said to threaten public order in this context would be rioting, and the record contained no evidence to infer that the appellants’ slogans, by themselves, would have led to rioting or any other disturbance had the police not been present.

In this case the Court observed that, although the slogans uttered by the appellants were indecent and vulgar and were directed against the Transport Minister and the Chief Minister of the Punjab Government, there was no evidence that those utterances had led, or were likely to lead, to the undermining of public order or to rioting, which would be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The Court noted that the appellants were participants in a procession protesting the scheme of nationalised motor transport, and that the social milieu from which they came was accustomed to using such vulgar language without causing any real impact on those who heard it. While the Court acknowledged that the slogans were certainly defamatory of the two ministers, it held that the grievance arising from the defamation was personal to those individuals and that the State could not invoke section 9 of the Act on their behalf unless the defamation threatened the security of the State or disturbed public order. The Court further observed that the ministers themselves appeared not to have taken any notice of the vulgar abuses and seemed to consider the matter beneath their concern, a behaviour that the Court described as being in line with the best traditions of democracy. It cited the view expressed by Cockburn, C.J. in Seymour v. Butterworth that public office‑holders must not be overly sensitive to comments made about them, and added the dicta of the Judges in R. v. Sir R. Carden, as well as Bramwell, B. in Kelley v. Sherlock, which together state that anyone who occupies a public position must accept attacks as an inevitable, though unpleasant, aspect of the office. The Court suggested that public officials might wisely ignore such vulgar criticisms rather than give them importance by prosecuting the offenders. While condemning the conduct of the appellants in uttering these slogans, the Court concluded that the State’s decision to prosecute them under section 9 of the Act was unjustified because, under the circumstances described, the slogans did not fall within the mischief that section 9 was intended to address. Consequently, the Court felt that the prosecution had failed to establish the appellants’ guilt of the offence with which they had been charged.

Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal filed by the appellants, set aside the convictions and sentences that had previously been imposed on them, and ordered that they be released from custody without delay. The Court further expressed the hope that the observations and reasons recorded in this judgment would serve as a clear warning to the appellants. It was intended that these observations would make the appellants aware of the serious consequences of their conduct and would encourage them to behave more responsibly in the future. By providing this direction, the Court aimed to ensure that the liberty now granted to the appellants would be exercised with due regard for the law and public order, and that they would refrain from repeating the acts that had given rise to the earlier proceedings.