Jumman And Ors. vs The State Of Punjab

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 15 November, 1956

Coram: Govinda Menon

In the case titled Jumman and others versus the State of Punjab, the judgment delivered on 15 November 1956 by the Supreme Court of India was authored by Justice Govinda Menon. The matter originated in Sessions case number 41 of 1955 before the Additional Sessions Judge at Amritsar. The accused comprised Jumman, Darshu and Chanan, who were the sons of Ishar; Sohan, also known as Sohni, who was the son of Thakar; Bansa, another son of Ishar; and Hazara Singh, the son of Jetha. All six individuals were charged with offenses under Section 302 in conjunction with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, as well as with the offense of rioting under Section 148 of the Code. In addition, Jumman, Darshu, Chanan and Sohni faced separate charges under Section 302 for the alleged murders of Tara Singh, Lakha Singh and Sangha Singh. Bansa and Hazara Singh were charged under Sections 307 and 34 for the alleged attempts to murder Mohindar Singh, Kartar Singh and Nand Singh. The prosecution also listed other charges, which the record deemed unnecessary to detail. Upon trial, the learned Sessions Judge found each of the six accused guilty. He sentenced Jumman, Darshu, Chanan and Sohni to death, and sentenced Hazara Singh and Bansa to life imprisonment for the offenses currently described under Section 302 and Section 149, and additionally imposed a five‑year term of imprisonment on Hazara Singh and Bansa for the offenses under Section 307 and Section 34. Following these convictions and sentences, criminal appeals were filed. Chanan, Darshu and Sohni lodged Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 1956 before the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh. Separate appeals, numbered 30 and 32 of 1956, were filed by Jumman (Criminal Appeal No. 30 of 1956) and by Jumman together with Darshu, Chanan, Sohni, Bansa and Hazara Singh (Criminal Appeal No. 32 of 1956). The High Court heard all the appeals together and issued a single judgment. The High Court upheld the convictions of all the appellants, but it modified the sentence of death imposed on the fourth accused, Sohni, reducing it to life imprisonment on the ground of his youth; the sentences of the remaining accused were left unchanged. Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted special leave to appeal to Jumman, Darshu and Chanan, thereby giving rise to Criminal Appeal No. 129 of 1956, and also granted special leave to Bansa in Criminal Appeal No. 153 of 1956. Hazara Singh applied for special leave to appeal by way of Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 568 of 1956, and the Supreme Court, for the reasons recorded at the time of hearing, granted that leave as well. As a result, the appellant Sohni was no longer before the Court, and the matters to be considered involved only the remaining five accused. The four brothers—Jumman, Darshu, Chanan and Bansa—shared a common paternal lineage, while Hazara Singh was reported to be a relative of their father. The incidents that gave rise to the prosecution occurred in the village of Attargarh at approximately 8:30 a.m. on 25 February 1955, and, according to the prosecution, three persons identified as Lakha Singh, Tara Singh and Sangha Singh lost their lives in the confrontation.

The prosecution case recorded that three persons identified as Singh, Tara Singh and Sangha Singh lost their lives in the incident. The background to the offence was described as follows: in August 1954 two brothers, Hazara Singh and Surti, who were relatives of Jumman and his brothers, were murdered. For that murder Lakha Singh, who was deceased, Jagir Singh identified as PW‑18 and a brother of Lakha Singh, and a person named Gulzari were tried, but all of them were acquitted in January 1955. The acquittal of Lakha Singh naturally inflamed the brothers of Hazara and Surti and, anticipating further trouble, the police placed both parties before a magistrate at Amritsar for proceedings under Section 107 and Section 151 of the Criminal Procedure Code. After inquiring into the matter, the magistrate posted the case for orders on 25 February 1955 at Amritsar.

The prosecution side, which consisted of the three deceased persons and PW‑19 to PW‑21, proceeded to the court in compliance with the directions to appear, and the accused side also came for the same purpose. In order to reach Amritsar, the party had to travel to Attari to catch a motor‑bus. According to the prosecution, when the three deceased individuals and PW‑19 to PW‑21 reached a bridge over a water‑course, the six accused emerged from a khal that was then dry. It was alleged that Hazara Singh was holding a gun, Bansa a pistol, Sohani and Chanan spears, Darshu a kirpan and Jumman a dattar. The allegation was that the accused party was lying in wait for their rivals to pass and then sprang upon them unawares. It was further alleged that on seeing the prosecution party, the accused raised a lalkara declaring that none should be spared. Consequently, Jumman and Sohni opened an attack on the deceased Lakha Singh, Darshu began attacking Tara Singh and Chanan attacked Sangha Singh. After Lakha Singh fell with injuries, Jumman attacked Sangha Singh and Sohni attacked Tara Singh, inflicting various injuries on the victims.

When the three deceased individuals were being attacked and fell, PW‑19 to PW‑21 started running toward a nearby field. While they were running, Bansa and Hazara fired at them with the pistol and gun; when the weapons misfired, the pursued turned, pounced upon the firing party and PW‑19 seized the gun from Hazara while PW‑20 snatched the pistol from Bansa. Observing this, the other four accused, who had by then felled the three deceased, threatened to attack the witnesses who fled, and the accused also retreated. After this, the witnesses returned to the place of the murder and discovered that the bicycle which PW‑19 had with him had been taken away by the retreating assailants.

It was established that the three victims named Lakha Singh, Tara Singh and Sangha Singh had died as a result of the incident. The prosecution conceded that the deceased Lakha Singh possessed a small sword measuring roughly four feet in length and that Tara Singh owned a large knife, which the prosecution’s party had employed against the accused. As a consequence, Darshu and Jumman sustained injuries inflicted by Lakha Singh and Tara Singh, and the blood resulting from those injuries was subsequently wiped away. After the confrontation, the witness identified as P.W. 19 proceeded to the police station at Gharinda carrying the gun and pistol that he and P.W. 20 had taken from Hazara Singh and Bansa during the melee. At approximately ten‑thirty in the morning, that is, within two hours of the occurrence, P.W. 19 lodged a First Information Report designated Ex P. B/1. The report provided a concise narrative of the events, stating that the accused’s party had raised a warning signal declaring that no member of the prosecution’s side would be spared. In response, Jumman and Sohni, who were armed with the large knife and a club, attacked Lakha Singh; Darshan assaulted Tara Singh with a sword, and Chanan, who carried a club, assaulted Sangha Singh. The three victims attempted to flee in order to preserve their lives, but the assailants surrounded them and inflicted injuries. The report further recorded that Bansa and Hazara, who were armed respectively with a pistol and a gun, attempted to fire at the prosecution witnesses, but the cartridges misfired. Consequently, P.W. 19 grappled with Hazara and seized the gun from his hand, while Kartar Singh (identified as P.W. 20) seized the pistol from Bansa. The FIR also mentioned that the bicycle belonging to P.W. 19 had been taken by the assailants as they retreated. The seized gun and pistol were later produced by P.W. 19 and Kartar Singh as evidence. The report also outlined a motive for the murders and the ensuing disturbance.

Further investigation based on the FIR was undertaken by the police, who subsequently prepared a charge‑sheet against the six accused and presented it before a committing magistrate. The magistrate, finding that a prima facie case existed, committed the matter to the Court of Session. The trial judge there found all six accused guilty of the offences charged and imposed the sentences previously recorded. The appellate proceedings before the High Court have already been referenced. Regarding the medical evidence, Dr. H. Chandra, the civil surgeon of Amritsar, who performed the post‑mortem examinations, testified about the nature of the injuries sustained by the three deceased. He reported that Sangha Singh exhibited five injuries, the first of which was fatal. Tara Singh sustained sixteen injuries, of which the sixth injury alone was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, and several other injuries were classified as grievous. Lakha Singh bore eleven injuries; the first injury and a perforating wound of the heart recorded as injury number six were both necessarily fatal.

In this case, the Court noted that there could be no doubt that the person who inflicted the injuries on the three deceased had intended to cause death. It was then pointed out that, among the accused who were taken into custody on 2 March 1955, two individuals—Jumman and Darshu—suffered injuries themselves, and these injuries were described by the ninth witness, Dr Ugger Sain, Assistant Surgeon at the Civil Hospital in Phillaur, who examined them on 3 March 1955 at ten in the morning. Dr Sain reported that Jumman bore six wounds; the first wound was a contused injury measuring two inches by one‑quarter inch by one‑quarter inch on the left side of his head, there were three incised cuts above the left ear, and five additional injuries were abrasions. According to Dr Sain, the injuries that Jumman sustained had been caused by a blunt instrument. Darshu, the other accused, displayed two injuries: an incised wound measuring one‑half inch by one‑quarter inch by one‑half inch on the back of the neck and an abrasion. The first injury on Darshu was said to have been inflicted by a sharp‑edged weapon, while the second resulted from a blunt weapon.

The Court further observed that the First Information Report, designated as Exhibit P.B./1 and filed by the nineteenth witness, made no reference at all to any injuries sustained by either Jumman or Darshu. When the accused were arrested on 2 March 1955, the police recovered a bicycle belonging to the nineteenth witness, as well as certain garments that the accused were wearing at the time of their arrest. On 8 March 1955, based on information supplied by an individual identified as Chanan, the authorities also recovered a spear marked as number 13 from the scene. The Court remarked that the recovery of the spear had not been recorded in the proceedings of the Committing Magistrate, and therefore the Court chose not to comment further on that point.

The prosecution’s case, as presented, was therefore contrasted with the defence’s position, which consisted of a categorical denial by the accused of any participation in the incident. Before the Court proceeded to analyse the evidence upon which counsel relied, it deemed it necessary to address a procedural circumstance that required comment. The Court explained that, together with the appeals filed by the accused, the Sessions Judge had made a reference under Section 374 of the Criminal Procedure Code to the High Court, seeking confirmation of the death sentences that he had imposed. Under Section 375 of the same Code, the High Court possessed the authority to order further inquiry or to take additional evidence in such matters. Section 376 empowered the High Court either to confirm the sentence, to impose any other sentence justified by law, to set aside the conviction and to convict the accused of any offence for which the Sessions Court might have found him guilty, to order a fresh trial on the same charge or an amended charge, or to acquit the accused. Finally, Section 377 provided that when the High Court confirmed a sentence or order, the confirmation had to be signed by at least two judges when the bench consisted of more than one judge.

The law mandated that any order issued by a Court composed of two or more judges had to be prepared, approved, and signed by at least two of those judges. It was clear, after reviewing the relevant statutory provisions, that in such a situation the entire matter remained before the High Court and, in effect, represented a continuation of the trial of the accused using the same evidence as before, together with any additional evidence that might be produced. For this reason the High Court was vested with the authority to admit fresh evidence if it deemed it appropriate. In a normal appeal governed by Section 41 of the Civil Procedure Code, an appellate Court was required to determine whether the decision of the lower court was correct on both factual and legal grounds. However, a distinction arose when a reference was made under Section 374 of the Criminal Procedure Code or when an appeal was being disposed of under Section 423 of the same Code. In those criminal matters the High Court was obliged to satisfy itself that the prosecution had proved the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt, especially where the penalty of death was at stake. Consequently, the proceedings before the High Court amounted to a re‑examination and re‑assessment of the whole factual matrix and the applicable law, so that the High Court could be confident, on the basis of the material before it, of the guilt or innocence of the accused persons. Accordingly, the High Court was duty‑bound to consider every aspect of the material, to form an independent conclusion, and not to be bound solely by the view expressed by the Sessions Judge. While the opinion of the Sessions Judge could be taken into account as assistance, the statutory provisions required the High Court to arrive at its own independent judgment. Bearing these circumstances in mind, the Court examined the judgment under appeal and observed that, apart from a brief narration and a summary of the evidence presented before the Sessions Court, the High Court’s judgment appeared to suffer from a defect: it did not demonstrate that the High Court had exercised its own independent judgment on the material facts before it. A careful review of the High Court’s judgment revealed that the only reasons given for its decision appeared towards the very end of the judgment and were expressed in a meagre and inconclusive manner. In view of these deficiencies, the Court would ordinarily have remanded the entire proceedings to the High Court for a fresh hearing, for disposal, and for a reasoned explanation of the conclusion reached. However, the Court considered that such a step would cause unnecessary delay and hardship, particularly because most of the appellants were sentenced to death. Both sides indicated their readiness to argue the case on the evidential record, and although, in a special leave appeal, the Court was usually bound by the factual findings of the High Court, in this instance the High Court had not

The Court observed that the High Court had not dealt with the appeal in the manner required, and therefore it would hear the appeal on the evidence. The only portion of the High Court judgment that expressed the conclusions of the learned judges after evaluating the evidence was the following statement. The quoted passage read: “In my opinion there is no improbability in the prosecution story that the prosecution witnesses had snatched the gun from Hazara and pistol formants. As the arms misfired the witnesses got emboldened and snatched the arms from the accused. Giving the matter my very best consideration I find that the accused have been rightly convicted.” Later in the same judgment the Court provided reasons why the testimony of the prosecution eye‑witnesses could not be accepted in its entirety, because the witnesses offered no explanation for the injuries sustained by the two accused. The first issue for determination was whether the accused’s party had formed an unlawful assembly with the common object of committing a crime and had lain in wait for the prosecution witnesses and the deceased to pass along that route. The Court then considered whether the accused intended to surprise them and inflict the injuries recounted by the prosecution witnesses. Certain facts were not in dispute, namely that on the day in question both the accused and the prosecution witnesses together with the deceased had to be present at the Magistrate’s Court in Amritsar at about eleven o’clock in the morning. Because they were all required to attend that court, it was natural for each of them to travel in the direction of the court, which in this case meant proceeding along the Grand Trunk Road. The Court also noted that each party could have anticipated meeting the rival faction on that road, and that such an eventuality might have caused each side to fear trouble. For that reason it was reasonable for both groups to arm themselves in order to protect themselves against any possible attack. The Court examined the testimony of eyewitnesses numbered 19 to 21 and found no indication that the accused’s party had prior knowledge of the route that the prosecution party would take. The first eyewitness, PW‑19, stated that when he and his companions reached a water‑course, six accused persons emerged from a khal. The second eyewitness, PW‑20, gave a similar description, and the third eyewitness, PW‑21, added nothing further to clarify the circumstances. Neither the judgment of the Sessions Judge nor the judgment of the High Court provided any additional details that would allow the inference of a pre‑concerted plan by the accused. Consequently, the Court concluded that it was reasonable to infer that the two groups met incidentally on the road while each was proceeding to the court, and that neither group was motivated by a pre‑arranged intention to commit an offence or to provoke a riot. The judgment then proceeds to the next paragraph, introducing it with the words “A careful” to signal the start of further analysis.

After a careful examination of the testimony of the eye‑witnesses, the Court found that there was absolutely no doubt that the individuals named Jumman, Chanan, Darshu and Sohni were each carrying the weapons that the witnesses had described. The evidence showed that these four persons moved together and surrounded the three victims who later died. Each of the three victims received the wounds that were recorded in the post‑mortem certificates, and those wounds, as shown by the medical report, were the direct cause of their deaths. In addition, the Court was satisfied that the persons identified as Hazara and Bansa were also members of the group that was accused of the offences. Having reached the conclusion that there was no pre‑planned intention to cause injuries to the members of the prosecution party, the Court turned to the question of whether Hazara and Bansa shared a common purpose with the other four accused. The material placed before the Court did not reveal any evidence of an unlawful assembly whose members possessed a shared object of committing a crime. The testimony of the prosecution witnesses numbered 19, 20 and 21, who described the beating and the injuries inflicted on the three deceased, was considered sufficient to hold the accused responsible for those acts. Specifically, the evidence established that Darshu struck Tara Singh, Chanan struck Sangha Singh, and both Jumman and Sohni attacked Lakha Singh using the weapons they carried. The cross‑examination of witnesses 19 and 21 did not produce any fact that would make the portion of the prosecution case relating to each accused’s conduct unbelievable. Accordingly, the Court accepted that part of the prosecution’s case and held that the three victims lost their lives as a direct result of the injuries inflicted by the respective accused mentioned above. The precise nature of the offence committed by them was noted to be a matter for later discussion.

The Court then considered the appeals lodged by Hazara and Bansa. According to the facts set out earlier, Hazara was in possession of a gun and Bansa of a pistol at the time of the incident. While the prosecution witnesses numbered 19, 20 and 21 were attempting to flee the scene, each of them discharged the firearm they were holding, but both weapons mis‑fired. After the mis‑fires, the persons who were being pursued turned back with the intention of seizing the firearms. Witness 19 is recorded as having snatched the gun from Hazara, and witness 20 as having taken the pistol from Bansa. The Court examined whether this version of events could be accepted. It was undisputed that both firearms were unlicensed, making it difficult to determine their ownership. Although the prosecution witnesses attributed the weapons to Hazara and Bansa, the Court observed that it was possible the firearms actually belonged to the witnesses themselves and were presented to the police in order to avoid prosecution for possessing unlicensed weapons. In the Court’s opinion, it was not unlikely that the weapons, being in the possession of the prosecution witnesses, were produced at the police station as a means of escaping liability for illegal possession. Once the witnesses had produced the firearms before the police, they were compelled to give an explanation for their presence, a point that the Court noted for further consideration.

In this case, the Court observed that once the witnesses had produced the firearms before the police, they were compelled to offer an explanation for their possession, and the explanation they would normally give would be to attribute the weapons to the party of the accused. The Court noted that the witnesses had ample opportunity to devise such a story because the journey from the scene to the police station required roughly half an hour, during which Mohindar Singh, identified as PW‑19, could readily have fabricated the narrative. Upon examining the prosecution’s evidence regarding the alleged seizure of the firearms by leaping upon Hazara and Bansa, the Court found that, on its face, the account was implausible. The three individuals who were said to have been pursued were not in close proximity, and it was doubtful that they would have had the courage to turn around and assault their pursuers, especially when they were aware that the pursuers were armed. Moreover, it was unlikely that those pursued would have known that the firearms could not be used effectively again. In these circumstances, the Court concluded that the story of the snatching of the guns appeared to be contrived and was probably invented to conceal the unlawful possession of the weapons. Accordingly, the prosecution’s version of events was rejected, and the Court held that it was more probable that the pistol and the gun actually belonged to the witnesses themselves.

The Court then turned to the next issue, namely the lack of any satisfactory evidence and the delayed explanation offered by the prosecution concerning the injuries inflicted on Jumman and Darshu. Counsel for the State of Punjab, Mr Gopal Singh, referred to judgments of the Sessions Judge and the High Court in an attempt to explain the injuries to the accused, but the Court was not convinced that such an attempt succeeded. The First Information Report made no mention of any injuries to Jumman and Darshu, and after it emerged that the two accused had sustained injuries, the prosecution tried to overcome this gap by having witnesses describe the injuries on the two accused. The Court regarded this effort as futile. It appeared more likely that, because both sides were armed when the confrontation occurred, the prosecution witnesses also used weapons against the accused. The Court was certain that in such an armed encounter the three deceased persons suffered the most serious injuries. To this extent, the Court accepted the testimony of PW‑19 and PW‑21, while noting that their omission of the injuries on Jumman and Darshu did not render their evidence wholly unreliable.

Finally, counsel for the appellants, Messrs Harbans Singh and Verma, argued that the specific details of each victim’s attack by the respective accused could not withstand scrutiny because the confusion and melee of the encounter would make it impossible for witnesses to identify precisely which act was performed by which accused. The Court noted this contention in the context of the continuing discussion.

In the circumstances of the encounter, the Court observed that the witnesses could not be expected to describe with precision the exact acts performed by each accused. Counsel for the appellants, Mr Gopal Singh, argued that it was reasonable for witnesses to have observed the incident and that, since all of them attributed the same conduct to the same accused against the same deceased without specifying the exact body parts injured, their testimony remained credible. He further explained the sequence of the assault in three stages: first, the meeting of the parties; second, the infliction of injuries by one or more assailants on the deceased; and third, the subsequent continuation of the clash. The Court noted that if the witnesses had identified the precise locations of the injuries, their statements might have been regarded as unreliable, but because they did not do so, the evidence could be accepted. Accordingly, the Court affirmed its willingness to accept the testimony of prosecution witnesses 19, 20 and 21 to that extent. The Court then concluded that there was no unlawful assembly in which Hazara and Bansa participated, and therefore they were to be acquitted of all charges. Regarding the remaining four accused, the Court accepted the evidence of the same witnesses to the extent that the injuries alleged to have been caused by those accused were proven. The Court further considered that, in a situation where a mutual confrontation arose and there was no dependable evidence indicating how the fight began or which side was the aggressor, the plea of private defence could not be sustained by either side. Instead, the incident was characterised as a sudden fight occurring in the heat of passion, without pre‑meditation, and without either party taking undue advantage or acting in a cruel or unusual manner, even though both parties were armed. Consequently, the Court applied Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, deeming the offence to fall under Section 304(1) of the Code. The Court thus set aside the earlier convictions under Section 302 and the death sentences, substituted convictions under Section 304(1), and imposed a term of ten years’ imprisonment on each of the appellants. The Court noted that Sohni had not filed an appeal and held that the matter was suitable for interference by the State Government under Section 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code.