Haripada Dey vs The State of West Bengal and Another

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 86 of 1954

Decision Date: 5 September 1956

Coram: Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Syed Jaffer Imam, P. Govinda Menon

In the matter titled Haripada Dey versus The State of West Bengal and Another, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on the fifth day of September, 1956. The judgment was recorded by Justice Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, who also authored the opinion, and the bench was comprised of Justice Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Justice Syed Jaffer Imam, and Justice P. Govinda Menon. The case is reported in the 1956 volume of the All India Reporter at page 757 and also in the 1956 Supreme Court Reporter at page 639. The appeal was filed under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India, which deals with the jurisdiction of a High Court to issue a certificate for leave to appeal to this Court. The issues addressed involved the scope of that jurisdiction, the possibility of a High Court granting a certificate on a pure question of fact, and the special jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136(1) to intervene in cases where there is a gross miscarriage of justice or shocking findings of fact.

The headnote of the judgment explained that a High Court does not possess the authority to grant a certificate under Article 134(1)(c) when the matter raised is merely a question of fact, and that doing so would improperly convert this Court into an appellate body for factual determinations. While this Court retains the power, under Article 136(1), to intervene in cases of serious procedural error, miscarriage of justice, or findings that shock the conscience of the judiciary, that power cannot be delegated to a High Court. Consequently, any certificate issued on a purely factual question would be ineffective; the High Court should refuse to grant such a certificate and direct the parties to approach this Court directly under Article 136(1). The judgment further observed that the failure to adduce defence evidence lay with the accused, not with the prosecution, and that such a defence might have destroyed the prosecution’s case if it had been presented.

The Court also referred to several precedents, namely Narsingh and another v. The State of Uttar Pradesh ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 238), Baladin and Others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 181), and Sunder Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 411). The judgment concerned Criminal Appeal No. 86 of 1954, which was an appeal under Article 134(1)(c) from the order dated 27 May 1954 of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 158 of 1953. Counsel appearing for the appellant was Mr. Sukumar Ghose, while the State was represented by Mr. D. N. Mukerjee and Mr. P. K. Bose. Additional counsel for the second respondent included Mr. K. L. Arora. The appellant had been charged under Section 411 of the Indian Penal Code for dishonestly receiving or retaining a Hillman car bearing registration number WBD 4514, engine number A1178482, and chassis number WSO, with knowledge or reason to believe that the vehicle was stolen.

The learned Presidency Magistrate of Calcutta found the appellant guilty of receiving stolen property and sentenced him to two years’ rigorous imprisonment. The appellant challenged this conviction and sentence before the Calcutta High Court, where a Division Bench comprising Justice Jyoti Prokash Mitter and Justice Sisir Kumar Sen dismissed the appeal and upheld both the conviction and the punishment. The appellant subsequently applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. According to the practice reported from the Calcutta High Court, this petition was heard by a differently constituted Division Bench, namely the Chief Justice and Justice S. C. Lahiri. That Bench granted the petition and directed that a certificate for leave to appeal under article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution be prepared. In a detailed judgment the Chief Justice observed: “In my view a certificate-of-fitness ought to issue in this case, although the question involved is one of fact.” After examining various aspects of the case with which he was dissatisfied, he concluded: “In my view it is impossible not to feel in this case that there has not been as full and fair a trial as I ought to have been held. In the circumstances, it appears to me that the petitioner is entitled to have his case further considered and since such further consideration can only be given by the Supreme Court, I would grant the certificate prayed for.” Unlike the earlier matter, Criminal Appeal No. 146 of 1956 (Om Prakash v. State of Uttar Pradesh), where no reasons were recorded for granting the certificate, the present judgment contains an extensive discussion of the discretion exercised. The Court, however, found that discussion unpersuasive. It held that the Chief Justice lacked jurisdiction to issue a certificate under article 134(1)(c) where, even if he believed the trial was not fully fair, the issue remained a factual one that required further consideration of the appellant’s case. The inability of the High Court to provide a full and fair trial did not justify converting the Supreme Court into a factual appellate body. No High Court may refer pure questions of fact to the Supreme Court under article 134(1)(c); such power resides exclusively with the Supreme Court and may be exercised, in appropriate circumstances, under article 136(1). The Court therefore concluded that the Calcutta High Court had erred in exercising its discretion and that the certificate it issued was improperly granted.

The Court explained that it possesses a special jurisdiction under article 136(1) of the Constitution, which it may invoke when a gross miscarriage of justice or a serious departure from legal procedure has vitiated an entire trial. In such circumstances, the Court would intervene and could also intervene if the findings of fact were so shocking as to offend its judicial conscience, granting special leave to appeal under article 136(1). However, the Court emphasized that this special jurisdiction is exclusive to it and cannot be assumed by any High Court. A High Court may not refer a matter that it considers purely factual to the Supreme Court merely because it feels helpless to remedy the grievance. In such a case, the High Court should decline to issue a certificate under article 134(1)(c) and should instead direct the parties to approach the Supreme Court under article 136(1). Accordingly, the Court held that the Calcutta High Court had wrongly exercised its discretion in granting a certificate under article 134(1)(c). The certificate therefore did not constitute a valid certificate and could not be relied upon by the appellant before the Supreme Court.

In support of a special leave application, counsel for the appellant cited earlier decisions of the Court, namely Narsingh and another v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (1), Baladin and Others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (2) and Sunder Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (3). The counsel argued that, although the appellant had not adduced any defence evidence, certain documents on record, if accepted as proved, would have been sufficient to defeat the prosecution’s case. Those documents were mentioned by the learned Chief Justice when he granted the certificate under article 134(1)(c). According to the counsel, the documents demonstrated that, prior to the alleged theft of the car, the appellant had applied to the police in Chandannagar for registration of a Hillman Minx 1951 model bearing the same engine, chassis and tin-plate numbers as the stolen vehicle. The application had been investigated by an Assistant Sub-Inspector whose report would have supported the appellant’s defence. The counsel reiterated the well-settled principle that the prosecution bears the burden of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt and that the accused is under no obligation to present evidence. If the prosecution succeeds, conviction follows; if it fails, the accused is entitled to acquittal. The appellant, having chosen not to present any defence evidence, could not blame the prosecution for the resulting lacuna, and the lower courts, having considered the evidence before them, were justified in concluding that the prosecution had proved its case.

When an accusation is formally framed against a person, the law entitles that person to be acquitted if the prosecution fails to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt. In the present matter, both the lower courts held that the prosecution succeeded in establishing its case. Their conclusion was based on the testimony of the witnesses who were called, which included a motor expert. The motor expert testified that, after applying chemical tests to the engine, he discovered a number on the engine that was identical to the number stamped on the stolen vehicle. On the basis of that evidence, the court considered it the appellant’s absolute duty, if he wished to rebut the prosecution’s case, to present his own evidence in support of his defence. Because the appellant did not adduce any such evidence, the court observed that he could only blame himself for that omission.

The prosecution could not be held responsible for the gap that resulted from the appellant’s failure to produce defence evidence. Moreover, the lower courts recorded their findings on the record as they stood, and they concluded as a matter of fact that the prosecution had proved its case. Consequently, it was improper to argue, as was attempted in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice in the petition for leave to appeal, that evidence which might later become available would have destroyed the prosecution’s case. If the counsel representing the appellant did not, of their own accord, raise the defence as they ought to have done, no blame could be attached to the prosecution nor to the learned Presidency Magistrate who tried the case and rendered a finding adverse to the appellant.

Any sentiment suggesting that the trial was not full and fair, or any lingering suspicion that a miscarriage of justice had occurred, does not justify overturning the concurrent factual findings of the two lower courts, which held that the appellant was guilty. The Court found no ground to interfere with those findings under article 136(1) of the Constitution. Accordingly, the application for leave to appeal was rejected, the appeal was dismissed, the bail bond was cancelled, and the appellant was directed to surrender his bail.