Dharmanand Pant vs State Of Uttar Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 50 of 1955

Decision Date: 30 January 1956

Coram: B. Jagannadhadas, Syed Jaffer Imam, Govinda Menon

In the matter titled Dharmanand Pant versus State of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment on 30 January 1956. The case was reported in 1957 AIR 594 and 1957 SCR 321. The bench hearing the appeal comprised Justices Menon, P. Govinda, Jagannadhadas B., Imam, and Syed Jaffer Kapur. The petitioner was Dharmanand Pant and the respondent was the State of Uttar Pradesh. The legal issue concerned the propriety and procedure for examining prosecution witnesses on commission under sections 503 and 506 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The headnote of the decision explained that, as a general rule in criminal proceedings, the witnesses whose testimony is essential to establishing the case against the accused must be examined in open court. The issuance of a commission for examining witnesses should be limited to formal witnesses or to those whose presence cannot be obtained without unreasonable delay or inconvenience. Recording evidence in the presence of the accused ensures that the accused may effectively cross-examine the witnesses and that the presiding officer can observe the witnesses’ demeanor. Consequently, examination on commission should be reserved for extreme cases of delay, expense, or inconvenience, and the use of interrogatories should be limited to situations that are truly unavoidable. Before the amendment of section 503 by section 97 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act 26 of 1955, only a District Magistrate or a Presidency Magistrate could issue a commission; a subordinate magistrate had to apply to the District Magistrate for such an order. The Court thus held that where important witnesses were examined on commission through interrogatories by a magistrate who lacked authority to issue the commission, the conviction and sentence must be set aside and a retrial ordered.

The appeal was Criminal Appeal No. 50 of 1955, taken on special leave from a judgment dated 7 June 1954 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1115 of 1952. The High Court’s decision arose from a judgment and order dated 14 April 1952 of the Court of the Judicial Officer I and Magistrate 1st Class at Almora in Criminal Case No. 271/19 of 1950. Counsel for the appellant were S. P. Sinha and P. K. Chatterjee, while the State was represented by G. C. Mathur and C. P. Lal. The judgment was pronounced on 30 January 1956 by Justice Govinda Menon.

The factual background began with a police charge-sheet dated 13 November 1949. The charge-sheet alleged that the appellant, who served as the Head Clerk of the Civil Surgeon’s office at Almora, had misappropriated a sum of money entrusted to him while performing his duties as Head Clerk. Although the charge-sheet did not specify the exact amount alleged to have been misappropriated, the subsequent framing of the charge under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code clarified that, between 26 September 1947 and 11 February 1948, the appellant, in his capacity as a public servant, was entrusted with Rs 1,118-10-9 and allegedly committed criminal breach of trust in respect of that amount. The trial magistrate had recorded the amounts in column 3 of question 2 that was put to the accused. The trial court observed that the accounts in the Civil Surgeon’s office were kept in an improper and unsatisfactory manner, a condition for which both the accused and two successive Civil Surgeons were responsible. Because of this poor state of the accounts, the court found that no offence could be conclusively attributed to the accused and consequently acquitted him. The State appealed this acquittal to the Allahabad High Court, which, by its judgment dated 7 June 1954, set aside the acquittal, found the accused guilty of an offence under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code, and imposed a sentence.

The charge-sheet did not disclose the precise sum that had been misappropriated, but the charge framed under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code specified that between 26 September 1947 and 11 February 1948, while serving as a public servant and having been entrusted with Rs 1,118-10-9, the appellant committed a criminal breach of trust with respect to that amount. This allegation was corroborated by the figures recorded in column three of question 2 that the learned trial Magistrate had put to the accused. The trial court observed that the accounts of the Civil Surgeon’s office were maintained in a defective and unsatisfactory manner, a condition for which responsibility rested not only on the accused but also on two successive Civil Surgeons. Because of this irregular accounting, the court concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove the offence against the accused and consequently acquitted him. The State appealed this acquittal to the Allahabad High Court, which, by its judgment dated 7 June 1954, set aside the trial court’s order, found the appellant guilty of an offence punishable under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code, and imposed a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for three months. An application for special leave to appeal to this Court was filed under article 136(1)(c) of the Constitution and was granted by order dated 30 July 1954; the present appeal arises from that special leave. For clarity, a brief summary of the preceding events is necessary. The alleged misappropriation came to light in March 1948 when Messrs May & Baker Ltd. sent a reminder to the Civil Surgeon of Almora indicating that certain bills remained unpaid and outstanding. The then-incumbent Civil Surgeon, Dr Kar, investigated the claim and discovered that the appellant, who had been Head Clerk at the time he assumed charge, was on leave. An intimation was sent to the appellant requiring an explanation, and on 5 March 1948 he responded by letter (Exhibit P. 8) containing statements that the prosecution later contended demonstrated his criminal misappropriation. According to the prosecution, the amount alleged to have been misappropriated was subsequently recovered from the appellant and, in March 1948, paid to the firms whose bills had been shown as settled in the accounts. The matter was referred to the police for investigation only in June 1949, when the Deputy Commissioner of Almora directed the Deputy Superintendent of Police to look into it. Following the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed on 13 November 1949. The case was finally submitted by the Superintendent of Police, Almora, on 10 July 1950 and later received by the court, though the exact date of receipt is not evident from the records. A case was formally registered in the court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Almora, on 7 August 1950, against the accused under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code.

The accused was charged under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code. After the charge was framed, the authorities issued summonses for witnesses, but for an extended period no witness was actually examined. The order-sheet dated 7 November 1950 records that when the case file was presented, the Sub-Inspector-Officer, the accused and the counsel appeared before the Magistrate. Because certain required documents had to be obtained from the Accountant General’s office, the Magistrate adjourned the proceedings to 14 November 1950 and directed the Sub-Inspector-Officer to submit, by that date, a list of the documents to be requisitioned. No further action appears to have been taken on 14 November, and the matter was again postponed, this time to 30 November 1950. On that date the District Government counsel, who was handling the prosecution, informed the court that the documents held by the Accountant General’s office would need to be summoned and examined. The Magistrate, considering the request to be indefinite, placed the file under section 249 of the Criminal Procedure Code in the record room, ordering that it be withdrawn only when the required documents became available. The Court has not been shown how section 249 of the Criminal Procedure Code could be correctly applied to a matter of this nature, nor is that provision ordinarily applicable to cases falling within the chapter that deals with warrant cases. What is evident is that after 30 November 1950 the case lay dormant for a considerable length of time, suggesting that the prosecution was either unprepared or perhaps not seriously pursuing the matter.

Subsequently, on 4 June 1951, the District Government counsel made an application to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate seeking the summons of certain witnesses for examination on 15 June 1951, and the Magistrate ordered the summons. The proceedings were then transferred to the Judicial Officer of Almora, who commenced the examination of witnesses on 16 June 1951. The Judicial Officer examined the first witness, P. W. I (Shib Lal Tewari), on that same day. The second witness, P. W. II (Bishun Singh), and the third witness, P. W. III (Mohan Singh), were examined on 21 August 1951. On 25 October 1951 the Judicial Officer examined two further witnesses, P. W. IV (Shiv Lal Sah) and P. W. V (D. N. Pandey). The sixth witness, Hira Lal (P. W. VI), was examined on 10 November 1951.

In the interim, on 1 September 1951 the District Government counsel applied to the court for the examination of three additional prosecution witnesses—Dr. D. M. Kar, Sri R. P. Kapoor and D. N. Pandey. The Magistrate directed that summonses be issued to these persons on the same day. The court records show that on 7 September 1951 the Magistrate received a letter from the Civil Surgeon at Allahabad. The letter stated that a Magistrate’s certificate, required under section 507(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code and section 33 of the Evidence Act, was essential because the personal attendance of the medical officer was deemed desirable, and that a commission should not be issued for the examination of those witnesses. The correspondence further indicated that, should a commission be arranged, it could be used to record the testimony of the medical officer.

In this case the Court observed that the counsel for the appellant and the counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh were unable to explain how the statutory provisions mentioned in the Civil Surgeon’s letter applied to the matter. The letter, written by the Civil Surgeon at Allahabad, had indicated that a certificate under section 507(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code and section 33 of the Evidence Act was required to show that the personal attendance of the medical officer was desirable, and that a commission should not be issued for the examination of those witnesses. The Court also noted a second letter, this one from the Accountant-General of Uttar Pradesh dated 14 September 1951, which was a reply to a letter dated 3 September 1951. That correspondence stated that R. P. Kapoor, the senior auditor of the Accountant-General’s office, had been directed to appear before the court on 19 September 1951, but that he was not authorised to give evidence derived from unpublished records of the Accountant-General’s office, a privilege claimed under section 123 of the Evidence Act. On 16 October 1951 the appellant filed an application before the Magistrate asserting that the proceedings had been ongoing since March 1948, that the prolonged litigation caused great hardship, and that a prompt final decision was therefore required. In response, the District Government counsel filed an application on 26 October 1951 seeking permission to examine three witnesses on commission, while also noting the long pendency of the case. That petition specifically emphasised the necessity of the personal presence of Dr. D. M. Kar and Mr. R. P. Kapoor for the recording of their evidence. The learned Magistrate, on the same day, issued an order directing that a commission be issued for the examination of those two witnesses.

Subsequently, on 29 October 1951 the prosecution submitted interrogatories for the examination of Dr. B. R. Jain and Srimati Malti Devi Joshi. Further interrogatories were filed on 14 November 1951 for the examination of Sri G. R. K. Tandan, Sri Lakahmi Shaiikar, Sri Biswanath and M. N. Dube. Interrogatories relating to Dr. D. M. Kar were entered on the court record on 10 November 1951. On 12 November 1951 the accused filed an application objecting to questions numbered five, six and nine that were proposed to be put to Dr. D. M. Kar, contending that they were leading questions and therefore unsuitable for examination-in-chief. The accused further requested that Dr. D. M. Kar and Sri R. P. Kapoor appear personally before the court so that their evidence could be recorded and they could be cross-examined. The application stated that if personal appearance was not possible, the cross-interrogatories attached to the petition should be sent along with the interrogatories. The learned Magistrate ordered that the questioned items be re-phrased in different language. Cross-interrogatories for those witnesses were later filed, though the record does not specify the exact dates. The Court also noted a prosecution application, accompanied by an order dated 14 November 1951, which sought to have four additional witnesses examined in person, arguing that the accused was eager for an early judgment and that personal examination of those witnesses was necessary. The prosecution reiterated the request that those four witnesses be summoned for personal examination, and the Magistrate issued an order accordingly.

In this case the prosecution asked that four witnesses be examined in person because it claimed that the accused was eager for a swift judgment and therefore wanted the witnesses to be called for direct testimony. The prosecution repeated its request that the four named witnesses be summoned and examined before the court. In response the Magistrate issued an order stating that at the previous hearing it had been agreed that all remaining prosecution witnesses would be examined on commission, and on that basis the questions for Sri Kapoor had been supplied on the day of the order. The Magistrate added that if the prosecution considered Sri Kapoor’s evidence to be essential, he would be given only one chance to appear in court. Accordingly, Sri Kapoor was to be notified by telegraph to be present on 30-11-1951, and if he could not attend for any reason his interrogatories were to be sent immediately. The Magistrate observed that the case had been pending for a very long time and that only Sri R. P. Kapoor could be called on the next day of hearing; for all other witnesses a commission could be issued because they were situated far from Almora.

The effect of these directions was that the important witnesses, including the two civil surgeons who were in office during the period alleged to involve misappropriation and the auditor, were examined on commission by way of written interrogatories, even though both the prosecution and the accused had expressed a desire that at least the most crucial of these witnesses be examined in open court. The accused submitted cross-interrogatories that corresponded to the matters raised in the examination-in-chief questions. The interrogatories were answered by the witnesses before the officer to whom the commission had been issued, and on the basis of the evidence thus obtained the accused was convicted. The High Court, in its judgment, recorded that the defence contended that the amounts which had not been disbursed were kept in the office safe and were handed over at later dates, although the cash books recorded earlier dates for the disbursements. In essence, the defence argued that although the cash books showed entries for disbursements on specific dates, the actual payments were made later and, during the intervening period, the money remained in the safe without the appellant having any dominion or possession of it; if this were true, no criminal misappropriation would exist. The High Court judges rejected this argument and, relying on the admissions contained in Exhibit P. 8, concluded that there had been a temporary misappropriation of the sums. The Supreme Court, after considering the arguments presented before it and the facts drawn from the record, found it unnecessary and, in fact, inappropriate to express any opinion on the truth or falsehood of either the prosecution’s version or the defence’s case. At the stage when the important prosecution witnesses had been directed to be examined on commission, the Court noted that the pleadings of the accused could not be fully assessed because the evidence had been taken outside the courtroom.

When the important witnesses were examined by means of written interrogatories issued on commission, the Court observed that the accused’s defence could not yet have been fully presented before the trial judge, and therefore no prediction could be made about how the proceedings might evolve thereafter. The matter before the Court involved the Head Clerk of a civil surgeon’s office who had been charged with criminal breach of trust for allegedly misappropriating certain sums during a definite period. The Court noted that, if any misappropriation had taken place, it might have been detected much earlier had the senior officers promptly inspected the registers and performed the duties prescribed to them by the applicable rules and regulations governing that office. The Court then considered whether the trial, in which the testimony of the key witnesses had been procured outside the courtroom, complied with the established norms of legal practice and did not infringe any procedural rule. It concluded that, despite the unconventional mode of taking witness statements, the trial remained fully consistent with the accepted rules of practice and did not violate any procedural requirement.

The Court reiterated the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence, which is recognised in every legal system, that evidence against an accused must be recorded in the accused’s presence and in open court. This principle ensures that the accused can challenge any part of a witness’s statement that he wishes to contest, and it also allows the presiding officer to observe the witness directly, assess his demeanour, and form an independent judgment on the truthfulness of the testimony. Moreover, the accused benefits from being able to test the credibility of the witness through cross-examination in a public forum, where the questioning can proceed point by point in response to the witness’s answers. However, the Court acknowledged that on certain occasions the presence of a witness in court may be impracticable for reasons such as unavoidable delay, excessive expense, or inconvenience. In such cases, the Criminal Procedure Code permits examination on commission, allowing the prosecution’s counsel to conduct a direct examination and the accused or his counsel to conduct a cross-examination. The Court referred to Section 503 of the Code, as it existed prior to the 1955 amendment, which authorized a High Court of Sessions, a District Magistrate, or a Presidency Magistrate to dispense with personal attendance of a witness when it was necessary for the ends of justice and when securing the witness’s attendance would cause unreasonable delay, expense, or inconvenience. Under the same provision, subsection (2) allowed any magistrate, other than a District or Presidency Magistrate, to apply to the District Magistrate for the issuance of a commission to examine a necessary witness, with the District Magistrate having the authority either to grant the commission or to reject the application.

The Court explained that when a magistrate determined that a witness could not attend without causing unreasonable delay, expense or inconvenience, the magistrate was required to submit an application to the District Magistrate, setting out the reasons for the request; the District Magistrate could then either issue a commission for the witness’s examination or reject the application. The Court then described one of the statutory methods for conducting such examinations, which was provided in section 506 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Under subsection (1) of that provision, the parties to any proceeding in which a commission had been issued were allowed to forward in writing any interrogatories that the court or magistrate directing the commission considered relevant to the matters in issue. It was held to be lawful for the magistrate, the court or any officer to whom the commission was addressed, or to whom the duty of executing it was delegated, to examine the witness on the basis of those interrogatories. Subsection (2) further permitted any party to appear before the magistrate, court or officer either through counsel or, if not in custody, in person, and to examine, cross-examine and re-examine the witness as the circumstances required. The Court then turned to the effect of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, XXVI of 1955, which amended section 503 by inserting section 97. That amendment replaced the words “District Magistrate or the Presidency Magistrate” in subsection (1) of section 503 with the words “any magistrate” and omitted subsection (2) while adding a proviso to subsection (1). The Court noted that, for the facts of the present case, reference to that proviso was unnecessary. Consequently, before the amendment, only a District Magistrate or a Presidency Magistrate could issue a commission; any subordinate magistrate who found it expedient, necessary or essential to have a witness examined on commission was required to apply to the District Magistrate, who could then either issue the commission himself or reject the request. The Court observed that when the District Magistrate issued a commission or declined a request, he acted in a judicial capacity, and his orders were subject to supervision and control by the appellate or revisional court. Assuming that the commission in the present matter had been duly issued by the District Magistrate as contemplated by the statutory provisions, the Court considered whether there was sufficient justification for departing from the normal practice of examining witnesses in court. The Court found that the record did not demonstrate that the attendance of the two Civil Surgeons, the auditor and the other witness could not have been secured without causing unreasonable delay, expense or inconvenience. No evidence was presented that the two officers who had served as Civil Surgeon of Almora resided outside Uttar Pradesh, nor was there any suggestion of gross inconvenience, delay or expense that would justify keeping them out of court. The Court further noted that, had the magistrate issued summonses to these witnesses, their attendance could have been secured without the need for a commission.

In the circumstances where the magistrate or the trial court found that it was difficult to secure the attendance of certain witnesses in the ordinary course of proceeding, the court could have adopted the method of dispensing with the attendance of those witnesses in open court. Before resorting to a commission, the authorities should have made an effort to determine whether the usual practice of calling the witnesses could be complied with. Only after it was established that obtaining the witnesses in the normal manner was impossible should a commission have been ordered.

The record shows that the proceedings were prolonged for an unusually long period, but the reasons for that delay are not clearly set out. The record permits an inference that the senior officials concerned were not prepared to treat the matter with the seriousness required, considering the amount of money that had been recovered. Such a circumstance, however, does not by itself justify the issuance of a commission. At most it reflects a delay in disposing of the case, not a delay in obtaining the testimony of the witness in court.

No justification appears on the record for the issuance of a commission, and even less so for the issuance of mere interrogatories. The power to issue a commission under the Code of Civil Procedure is contained in sections 75 to 78 and Order XXVI, rule 1, which specify the situations in which a court may direct a commission to examine a witness. Generally, when a person resides within the territorial limits of the court’s jurisdiction, is not exempted by the Code from attending, and is not incapacitated by sickness or infirmity, that person should be examined in open court.

According to sections 75 to 78 of the Civil Procedure Code and Order XXVI, rule 4, a commission may be issued when the witness lives outside the local limits of the court’s jurisdiction, when the witness intends to leave those limits before the scheduled date of examination, or when the witness is a government servant who, in the court’s opinion, cannot appear without harming his public duties. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not impose comparable limitations on the use of commissions, but this absence should make the presiding officer exercise heightened care and caution before ordering a commission. As previously noted, every accused person ordinarily has the right to have the evidence against him recorded in open court and in his presence; any departure from this norm should be confined to exceptional cases, and the Criminal Procedure Code outlines the manner and circumstances in which such discretion may be exercised.

In the early precedent of Queen-Empress v. T. Burke, it was held that it is not appropriate to allow the testimony of an important prosecution witness to be taken on commission merely because attending court would be inconvenient for the witness. Sections 503 and 506 of the Criminal Procedure Code embody this principle.

In describing the proper use of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code that allow the issuance of a commission to examine witnesses, the Court observed that such provisions should be employed only in the clearest of cases and that this principle had been articulated in Mohammad Shafi v. Empe (2). The Court further explained that it was unnecessary to rely on earlier case law because the decision must be grounded on the facts of each individual case. As a general rule, the Court said, the testimony of important witnesses on whose evidence the prosecution’s case depends must ordinarily be taken in open court, and the issuance of a commission should be limited to formal witnesses or those whose appearance would cause a delay or inconvenience that is unreasonable in the circumstances. The purpose of examining witnesses on commission, the Court noted, is to obtain the evidence of persons who are not parties with a principal interest, such as a complainant, or whose testimony is essential to prove the prosecution’s case. Accordingly, the Court stated that witnesses in a criminal proceeding should be examined on commission only in extreme situations involving delay, expense, or inconvenience, and that interrogatories should be used only when such circumstances are unavoidable.

The Court emphasized that the magistrate’s discretion in this regard is a judicial discretion and must not be exercised lightly or arbitrarily. In the present matter, the Court observed that the evidence of two civil surgeons and an auditor formed the foundation of the case against the appellant, and therefore those witnesses should have been examined in open court. The Court concluded that the magistrate had acted improperly by allowing essential witnesses to be examined on commission, resulting in the accused being denied a fair trial. Upon reviewing the proceedings, the Court noted that there was no indication that the trial magistrate had made an application to the district magistrate as required by section 503(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Instead, responding to a request from the district standing counsel, the trial magistrate himself directed on 26 October 1951 that the commission should be issued as desired. Subsequently, an order dated 12 November 1951 required that the alleged leading questions be redrafted in a form and language that would remove their leading character. The order of 14 November 1951 likewise showed no attempt to approach the district magistrate, as the magistrate’s remarks recorded earlier were reiterated. After examining the original records from the lower courts, the Court found that, continuing the order of 26 October 1951, the trial magistrate on 19 November 1951 issued a commission to examine the witnesses in accordance with sections 503 and 506 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

The Court noted that a summons was issued by the Judicial Officer II, Magistrate First Class in Almora, and addressed to the District Magistrate of Lucknow. The summons declared that, for the purpose of the trial, it was necessary to examine a person identified in the margin as a witness for the prosecution. It further appointed the District Magistrate of Lucknow as Commissioner, granting him authority under sections 503 and 506 of the Criminal Procedure Code to examine and cross-examine the witness by means of interrogatories. The summons was then submitted to the District Magistrate of Almora for the purpose of forwarding the commission to the District Magistrate of Lucknow for execution. In the same manner, summonses for examining other witnesses on the same date were also issued and dispatched to the District Magistrate of Lucknow so that the commissions could be complied with. The purpose of appointing the Commissioner was to enable the trial court to obtain testimony from the witness without requiring his physical presence before the trial magistrate. The commission thereby authorized the Commissioner to record the witness’s statements and to permit cross-examination by the parties as prescribed by the Code.

The Court observed that the record did not show any exercise of independent judgment or judicial discretion by the District Magistrate of Almora, as required by the final clause of sub-section (2) of section 503 of the Criminal Procedure Code. According to the Code, when a trying magistrate submits a request for a commission, the District Magistrate to whom the request is made must either issue the commission himself or reject the application. The Code also mandates that the magistrate who makes the application must state the reasons for seeking the commission. The Court found no entry in the record indicating that the District Magistrate of Almora, who under the Code should have been the authority to issue the commission, complied with these mandatory provisions. Rather, the only indication was that the District Magistrate of Almora acted merely as a forwarding officer, transmitting the commission that had been prepared and issued by the trying magistrate. Such a requirement reflects the statutory intent that the district magistrate exercise independent judicial authority before delegating the power to examine a witness. Failure to make a recorded decision deprives the process of the safeguard intended by the legislature to prevent arbitrary issuance of commissions.

The Court consequently held that the District Magistrate of Almora possessed the power either to accept the request and issue the commission or to reject it, and that any order made should have been a judicial decision after full consideration of the matter. Because no such judicial determination was made, the Court found that a basic rule of practice essential for justifying the examination of witnesses on interrogatories had been violated. The Court stressed that this defect was of vital importance because, without compliance with the prerequisite condition for the validity of a commission, any evidence obtained would be improper and could not be used against the accused. The Court concluded that the defect went to the root of the proceedings, rendering the entire trial proceedings vitiated and necessitating that the evidence taken on commission be excluded from the record. Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal, remitted the case for a retrial before the court of first instance, and directed that the retrial be conducted in accordance with the observations set out above. The Court remarked that further action would not be necessary.

In the judgment, the Court observed that the witnesses who had already given testimony in the trial court could not be called again for re-examination unless the Court itself considered such a step to be necessary. The Court emphasized that the general rule prohibited the re-calling of previously examined witnesses, reserving an exception only for situations where the Court, after careful consideration, found a compelling reason to do so. Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal filed by the petitioner, holding that the appellate relief was warranted on the basis of the procedural deficiencies identified in the earlier proceedings. Following the allowance of the appeal, the Court directed that the matter be sent back to the court of first instance for a fresh trial. The remand order required the lower court to conduct a retrial in accordance with the legal standards and observations articulated by the Supreme Court, ensuring that the new trial would adhere to the proper procedures and avoid the errors that had previously tainted the proceedings. The direction thereby set the course for a complete re-examination of the case, but only within the limits prescribed, and it underscored that any further examination of the same witnesses would be permissible solely at the discretion of the trial Court should it deem it essential for the interests of justice.