Dharman vs State of Punjab

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 13 September 1956

Coram: Govinda Menon

In this case, the appellant Dharman, who was identified as the son of Dhani Ram and designated as accused number two, filed an appeal by special leave against the order of the High Court of Punjab at Simla that had dismissed his earlier appeal. The dismissal by the High Court had the effect of confirming both the conviction and the sentence of life transportation that had been imposed on Dharman by the Sessions Judge of Rohtak. The background of the prosecution arose from a dispute over a vacant parcel of shamilat land. On one side of the dispute stood the party of the accused, while on the opposite side stood the party of the deceased. The accused maintained that the disputed land was under their possession, whereas the deceased’s party asserted that they had erected a lime-crushing machine on the same plot and that they had exercised possession of the land for many years. On 13 June 1953 the deceased’s party constructed a temporary kacha wall adjacent to the lime-crushing machine, and that wall effectively blocked the entrance to a pucca gher that belonged to the accused’s side. The incident prompted the Sub-Inspector of Police to invoke Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and the Sub-Inspector subsequently applied to the Magistrate for both parties to be bound over under Section 107 of the same Code. The proceedings were scheduled for the pronouncement of orders on 31 July 1953, and they remained pending when a further violent incident occurred on 30 July 1953.

On 30 July 1953 the party representing the accused demolished the lime-crushing machine, an act that was interrupted by two women named Marwan and Nathian, who were relatives of the deceased. The accused responded by assaulting the two women, and during the assault the women suffered injuries inflicted with sharp-edged weapons. At the same time a young boy of eleven years, identified as Surja, hurried to the location where the deceased Mansa Ram was engaged in his work and reported the occurrence. Upon receiving the information, Mansa Ram arrived at the scene together with Rup Chand, identified in the record as PW 3, and Chaman Lal, identified as PW 4. A physical confrontation quickly ensued, and during the melee Mansa Ram sustained fatal injuries while Rup Chand also incurred injuries. The investigation that followed led to the trial of the accused before the Sessions Judge of Rohtak. During the investigation the injured Mansa Ram gave a statement to the police; after his death that statement was admitted as a dying declaration. In that declaration Mansa Ram alleged that Dharman had stabbed him in the chest with a spear. Both the Sessions Judge and the learned Judges of the High Court reached a concurrence regarding the respective degrees of guilt of each of the accused. When this Court considered the special-leave appeal, it observed that it would not ordinarily be appropriate to re-examine the correctness or justification of the factual findings that had been arrived at by the lower courts.

The lower courts observed that the two violent episodes did not share a common purpose. Accordingly, they concluded that the injuries suffered by Mansa Ram, Rup Chand (identified as PW 3) and Chaman Lal (identified as PW 4) were not inflicted to achieve a shared objective. Because of that conclusion, the courts held that, with respect to the second episode, each accused individual was liable only for his own conduct and for no further joint intention. In the trial court the accused raised the defence of self-defence, but the learned Sessions Judge found that the defence had not been established. The same defence was apparently raised again before the appellate court. The High Court judges examined the prosecution’s case in detail and found it to be more probable and persuasive than the accused’s version, noting that the prosecution narrative was supported by the surrounding circumstances. Consequently, the High Court held that there was no justification for accepting the self-defence claim. Its principal finding was that the second episode, during which Mansa Ram received the lethal injuries inflicted by Dharman, was essentially a free fight rather than a pre-planned assault.

The issue then narrowed to whether Dharman could be convicted of murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned High Court judges, in the view of this Court, determined that the facts fell within the scope of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Code. The State’s counsel, Mr Jindra Lal, argued that after Dharman and his brother learned of the attack on their women by Surja, they came to the scene with the intention of retaliating against the deceased’s party, thereby suggesting pre-meditation. That argument conflicted with the High Court’s finding that the second episode was merely a fight, and therefore pre-meditation did not arise. The Court held that the injury to Mansa Ram was inflicted without prior planning, in the heat of a sudden fight that broke out after Dharman and his associates arrived. This conclusion could not be disputed, nor could the assertion that Dharman struck Mansa Ram in the heat of passion and a sudden quarrel. The remaining question was whether Dharman had taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner in causing the injury, a point that required further consideration.

In the testimony of Dr. Randhawa, identified as plaintiff-witness number two, the Court observed that the appellant sustained injuries that were described as minor in nature, whereas the other accused individual sustained incised wounds that could only have been caused by sharp-edged weapons. The evidence presented by the witnesses further established that the party of the deceased was also armed with weapons that were dangerous. Consequently, when two opposing groups, each equipped with sharp-edged weapons, engaged in an uncontrolled fight and injuries were inflicted upon members of either side, it could not be said that either side acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Such a conclusion would be different only if the deceased and his companions had been unarmed or had been carrying weapons that were not lethal or dangerous while the accused’s side used sharp weapons; in that hypothetical situation the accused would be deemed to have acted cruelly or unusually. The present case lacks any of those elements. Based on the findings of the learned High Court judges, the matter against the appellant falls squarely within Exception Four to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code.

Counsel for the appellant, Mr Jindra Lal, argued that the defence had not raised this point before the High Court. However, the Court noted that when the issue for determination is the precise nature of the offence that can be inferred from the proven facts, the question is one of pure law. Accordingly, even if the lower courts had not expressly clarified the point, the Supreme Court is not barred from deciding the exact offence based on a careful examination of the findings. In the Court’s view, applying the High Court’s findings, the appellant cannot be found guilty of murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. Instead, he is entitled to rely on Exception Four, which reduces the charge to culpable homicide under Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code. The next issue was to identify the appropriate paragraph of Section 304 that applied. The Court concluded that at the moment the appellant caused the injuries, he acted with the intention of causing death or with the knowledge that the bodily injury was likely to cause death. Accordingly, the offence corresponded to Part I of Section 304. Consequently, the conviction under Section 302 was set aside, and the appellant was instead convicted under Section 304, Part I, and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for seven years.