Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 250 of 1953
Decision Date: 4 October 1956
Coram: B. Jagannadhadas, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, S.K. Das
In the matter titled Deoki Nandan versus Murlidhar, decided on 4 October 1956, the Supreme Court of India considered a petition filed by Deoki Nandan against Murlidhar. The bench comprised Justices B. Jagannadhadas, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha and S.K. Das, with the judgment delivered by Justice T.L. Venkatarama Ayyar. The case was reported in 1957 AIR 133 and 1956 SCR 756 and involved the application of Hindu law relating to religious endowments, specifically whether a temple constituted a public or a private endowment, the character of a gift to an idol, the identification of beneficiaries, the dedication of property to the public, the construction of a will, the ceremonies associated with the installation of an idol, and the usage of the temple. The Court observed that the question of whether a religious endowment is public or private represents a mixed issue of law and fact, requiring the application of legal concepts of public and private endowments to the particular facts found, and that such a determination was open to Supreme Court review, citing Lakshmidhar Misra v. Bangalal. The Court explained that a private endowment benefits specific individuals, whereas a public endowment benefits the general public or a recognized class of persons. Under Hindu law an idol is treated as a juristic person capable of holding property, yet it cannot possess a beneficial interest in the endowment; the true beneficiaries are the worshippers, because the purpose of gifting property to an idol is to provide spiritual benefit through facilities for those who wish to worship. The Court referred to earlier authorities on this point, including Prosunno Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand Baboo, Maharaja Jagadindra Nath Boy Bahadur v. Bani Hemanta Kumari Debi, Pramatha Nath Mullik v. Pradhyumna Kumar Mullik and Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha v. Bam Lal Maitra. In the factual scenario before the Court, a pious childless Hindu had constructed a temple, managed it personally until his death, and executed a will bequeathing all his lands to the temple while providing for its proper management. The Court had to decide whether the will indicated an intention to dedicate the temple to the public or merely to members of the family. The Court held that the will’s statement that the testator had no sons, together with provisions that the trust would be managed by persons external to the family, signified an intention to dedicate the temple to the public. The Court also cited Nabi Shirazi v. Province of Bengal and noted that the performance of consecration ceremonies (Prathista), the identity of the temple’s users, and other evidence demonstrated that the dedication was for worship by the general public. Consequently, the Court affirmed the decree dated 14 July 1948 in Civil Appeal No. 250 of 1953, confirming that the temple was a public endowment.
The appeal arose from a decision of the Chief Court of Oudh at Lucknow in Second Appeal No. 365 of 1945, which itself was based on a decree dated 30 May 1945 of the District Judge of Sitapur in Appeal No. 4 of 1945 against a decree dated 25 November 1944 of the Additional Civil Judge of Sitapur in Regular Civil Suit No. 14 of 1944. The appellant was represented by counsel, while the respondent was also represented. The judgment was pronounced on 4 October 1956 by Justice Venkatarama Ayyar. The essential question for determination was whether the Thakurdwara dedicated to Sri Radhakrishnaji in the village of Bhadesia, Sitapur district, constituted a private temple or a public one to which every Hindu could claim a right of worship. The temple had been erected between 1914 and 1916 by a devout Hindu resident of the village named Sheo Ghulam, who also oversaw its management until his death in 1928 without leaving any descendants. On 6 March 1919 Sheo Ghulam executed a will in which he bequeathed all his lands to the Thakurdwara; the material provisions of this will are central to the dispute. The testator had been married twice; one wife, Ram Kuar, predeceased him, and the surviving widow, Raj Kuar, succeeded him as Mutawalli under the terms of the will and continued to manage the temple until her death in 1933. After her demise, the first defendant, who was the nephew of Sheo Ghulam, assumed possession of the properties as manager of the endowment in accordance with the will’s directives. The appellant, a distant agnate of Sheo Ghulam, alleged that the first defendant had mismanaged the temple and was denying the public’s right to worship there. Accordingly, the appellant approached the District Court of Sitapur for relief under the Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1920, but the court declined to intervene, holding that the endowment was private. A request to the Advocate‑General for permission to file a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure was similarly denied on the same ground. Undeterred, the appellant instituted the suit from which the present appeal originates, seeking a declaration that the Thakurdwara was a public temple open to all Hindus. The first defendant contested, asserting that both the temple and its idols were private and that the general public had no right to interfere. The Additional Civil Judge, Sitapur, who tried the suit, concluded that the Thakurdwara had been constructed by Sheo Ghulam for the worship of his family and therefore was a private temple; he dismissed the suit. The dismissal was affirmed by the District Judge, Sitapur, and that affirmation was again upheld by the Chief Court of Oudh in the second appeal, although the judges granted a certificate under Section 109(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure indicating that the question involved was of great importance.
The appeal was instituted under section 109(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that the question involved was of great importance, and consequently the appeal came before the Court. The issue that required resolution was whether the Thakurdwara of Sri Radhakrishnaji at Bhadesia constituted a public endowment or a private one, a question described as involving both law and fact. In the precedent Lakshmidhar Misra v. Rang‑Alal(1), the Privy Council observed that the determination of whether certain lands had been dedicated as a cremation ground was “essentially a mixed question of law and fact.” The Council further held that while the factual findings of the lower appellate court must be accepted as binding, the court’s ultimate conclusion that a dedication or loss of grant had occurred should be treated as a legal proposition derived from those facts rather than as a pure finding of fact. In the present matter, the parties acknowledged that a formal dedication had taken place; the dispute therefore turned on the scope of that dedication. This, too, is a mixed question of law and fact, the answer to which must depend upon the application of legal concepts distinguishing public from private endowments to the established facts, and thus the matter was open to review on appeal. It was therefore appropriate first to outline the legal principles governing the classification of an endowment as public or private, and thereafter to assess the facts in the light of those principles. The distinction between a private trust and a public trust rests on the identity of the beneficiaries: a private trust benefits specific individuals, whereas a public trust benefits the general public or a defined class of persons. While the beneficiaries in a private trust are persons who are (1) [1949] L.R. 76 I.A. 271. laid down in the Sanskrit texts. Thus, in his Bhashya on the Purva Mimamsa, Adhyaya 9, Pada 1, Sahara Swami states: “Words such as ‘village of the Gods’ or ‘land of the Gods’ are used in a figurative sense. That is property which can be said to belong to a person, which he can make use of as he desires. God however does not make use of the village or lands, according to its desires. Therefore nobody makes a gift (to Gods). Whatever property is abandoned for Gods brings prosperity to those who serve Gods.” Likewise, Medhathithi, commenting on the expression “Devaswam” in Manu, Chapter XI, Verse 26, explains: “Property of the Gods, Devaswam, means whatever is abandoned for Gods, for purposes of sacrifice and the like, because ownership in the primary sense, as showing the relationship between the owner and the property owned, is impossible of application to Gods. For the Gods do not make use of the property according to their desire nor are they seen to act for protecting the same.” Consequently, according to these texts, the Gods do not enjoy any beneficial use of such properties, and may be described as owners only in a figurative sense.
In this case, the Court explained that a gift of property to an idol is understood in a figurative sense, known as Gainartha, and that its real purpose is not to give any benefit to the deity but to obtain spiritual advantage for those who wish to worship. The Court referred to the decision in Bhupati Nath Smritititha v. Ram Lal Maitra, where it was held that, considering this and other texts, a gift to an idol should not be assessed by the rules that apply to a transfer to a sentient being. Instead, dedication of property to an idol consists of the owner abandoning his dominion over the property so that it may be appropriated for the purposes he intends. Sir Lawrence Jenkins, C. J., observed at page 138 that the pious purpose remains the legate and that the erection of the image is merely the mode by which the pious purpose is effected, adding that “dedication to a deity” may be a concise expression of the pious purposes for which the dedication is designed. Similar observations were made by Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee at page 155. The Court then cited Hindu Religious Endowments Board v. Yeeraraghavachariar, where Justice Varadachariar, relying on the earlier Bhupati Nath decision, stated that the purpose of making a gift to a temple is not to confer benefit on God but to confer benefit on the worshippers by enabling worship to be conducted in a proper and impressive manner, and that in this sense a temple and its endowments are regarded as a public trust. Once it is understood that the true beneficiaries of religious endowments are the worshippers and that the purpose of the endowment is the maintenance of worship for their benefit, the question of whether an endowment is private or public becomes straightforward. The decisive issue is whether the founder intended that only specified individuals have the right of worship at the shrine, or that the general public or a defined portion thereof may worship there. Accordingly, it has been held that when property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, the endowment is private, because only members of that family may worship at the shrine, as reflected in the 1910 decision. Conversely, where the beneficiaries are not members of a family or a specified individual, the endowment is deemed public, intended to benefit the broader body of worshippers. Applying these principles, the Court indicated that the facts of the present dispute must be examined to determine whether the Thakurdwara in question functions as a public temple or a private one.
The matter may be examined under four separate headings: first, the will of Sheo Ghulam as set out in Exhibit A‑1; second, the manner in which the public uses the temple; third, the rites connected with the dedication of the Thakurdwara and the installation of the idol, especially the rituals known as Sankalpa and Uthsarga; and fourth, any additional facts that speak to the nature of the temple itself. The will, reproduced in Exhibit A‑1, represents the most critical piece of evidence concerning the testator’s intention and the extent of the dedication, and its material provisions are now set out for consideration.
The will opens with a statement that the testator was married to two wives, had no male heirs, had constructed a Thakurdwara, and had installed the idol of Sri Radhakrishnaji within it. The testator further declares that he is disposing of his properties in order to prevent future disputes. Clause I of Exhibit A‑1 stipulates that, after the testator’s death and in the absence of a male issue, all immovable property listed in the will, whether existing at the time or acquired later, shall be endowed in the name of Sri Radhakrishnan. It further directs that the mutation of titles be effected in favor of Sri Radhakrishnan in government records and that the testator’s wives, Mistress Raj Kuer and Mistress Ram Kuer, shall serve as the mutawallis of the waqf.
According to the same clause, half of the income generated by the endowed properties is to be taken by the two wives for their maintenance during their lifetimes, while the remaining half is to continue to be spent on the expenses of the Thakurdwara. The provision implicitly indicates that once the wives have passed away, the entire income is to be applied solely to the purposes of the Thakurdwara. Clause Four provides that, had a son been born to the testator, the properties would have been divided between the son and the Thakurdwara in a specified ratio; because no son was born, this clause never came into operation.
Clause Five imposes several restrictions on the mutawallis: they may not sell or mortgage the property, they must maintain proper accounts, and any surplus after meeting expenses is to be deposited in a secure bank. When sufficient funds are available, the clause directs that additional property be purchased in the name of Sri Radhakrishnaji. Clause Two establishes a committee of four persons to manage the temple and its assets; of these four, two are not related to the testator and belong to a different caste. The clause further provides that, after the death of the two wives, the committee may, by unanimous opinion, appoint the testator’s nephew Murlidhar as mutawalli. This nephew, identified as a divided nephew of the testator, is the first defendant in the present action.
Clause Three deals with the procedure for filling any vacancies that may arise in the committee. Finally, Clause Six reads in part: “If any person alleging himself to be my near or remote heir files a claim in respect of whole or part …” and therefore seeks to preempt any claim by alleged heirs on the waqf property.
In this case the Court examined whether the language of the testator’s deed indicated that the Thakurdwara was intended as a private endowment limited to his family or as a public religious institution. The deed contained a clause stating that any person claiming to be a near or remote heir could not bring a suit over the waqf property, deeming such a suit “improper on the face of this deed.” The Court therefore needed to determine the testator’s intention. The learned Judges of the Chief Court, while affirming lower‑court decisions that the temple was built for the benefit of the family, observed that nothing in the will pointed to a public trust and that its provisions were not inconsistent with a private endowment. The present Court could not endorse that view. It held that, when read in its entirety, the will unmistakably reveals the testator’s intent to dedicate the Thakurdwara to the public rather than merely to his family members. The testator began by declaring that he had no male issue. In the earlier decision of Nabi Shirazi v. Province of Bengal, the question was whether a waqf created by an 1806 deed was public or private; Khundkar J., at page 217, noted that the deed’s recital of the founder having no children or grandchildren suggested that the imambara was not meant to remain a private or family institution, a view echoed by Mitter J. at page 228. The reasoning rests on the ordinary meaning of “family” as referring to children; thus, a settlor’s admission of having no children indicates a dedication intended for the public. Furthermore, clause 2 of the will created a management committee of four persons, two of whom were wholly unrelated to the testator, and clause 3 gave the committee authority to fill vacancies without restricting the identity of future members, meaning that all four could potentially be strangers to the family. It is difficult to conceive that the testator would limit worship rights to his relatives while entrusting management to a body that could consist entirely of outsiders. Clause 6 also demonstrates that the relationship between the testator and his kinsmen was not especially cordial, and under clause 2 even the appointment of the first defendant as manager depended on the committee’s discretion. It is inconceivable that, with such limited concern for his relatives, the testator would have endowed a temple solely for their benefit. If the family were not intended as beneficiaries, the question arises as to who, after the lifetime of his two wives, could claim benefits under the endowment.
In this case, the Court considered whether the endowment could be said to benefit only the members of the family, given that the testator had two wives. The Court observed that if the endowment were limited to family members, it would cease to exist upon the death of the two wives because there would be no remaining objects. However, the provisions of the will clearly showed that the testator intended the endowment to continue beyond the lives of his wives. He directed that the property be bestowed in the name of the deity and that additional lands should be purchased in the deity’s name in the future. He also made provisions for the management of the trust after the wives’ lifetimes. To give effect to this intention, the Court held that the Thakurdwara must be understood as having been dedicated for worship by members of the public, not merely by his family. The Court therefore concluded that the Chief Court’s learned Judges erred by failing to consider these aspects and that their decision was not correct.
Because there was no deed of endowment creating the Thakurdwara, the plaintiff sought to define the dedication’s true scope from the manner in which the public used the temple. Witnesses examined for the plaintiff testified that villagers worshipped in the temple freely and without interference, and that the Thakurdwara had been built by Sheo Ghulam at the villagers’ request, since the village previously lacked a temple. The trial Judge did not reject this evidence as unreliable, but he inferred from the evidence of P.W. 2 that the public were admitted to the temple only as a matter of grace, not as a matter of right. P.W. 2, a pujari, testified that when Sheo Ghulam’s wife performed puja, he stopped outsiders from entering because she observed purdah. The Court found that this fact alone did not demonstrate that villagers lacked a right to worship there. It is common in well‑known public temples for the puja hall to be cleared when a dignitary visits, and the pujari’s action reflected the villagers’ respect for the founder’s wife, who was a pardanashin lady, rather than a denial of rights. The Chief Court also relied on the Privy Council decision in Babu Bhagwan Din v. Gir Har Saroon, which stated that “the mere fact that the public is allowed to visit a temple or thakurdwara cannot necessarily indicate that the trust is public as opposed to private.” The Court considered this authority in its analysis.
In the matter before the Court, the original grant had been made not for an idol or a temple per se but in favour of an individual named Daryao Gir, who was then maintaining a temple and whose heirs were to receive the grant in perpetuity. The public contended that, after this grant was effected, the family of Daryao Gir ought to be held as having dedicated the temple to the public for the purpose of worship. The public relied upon the fact that members of the community were permitted to enter the temple, to offer worship and to make devotional offerings, and argued that this circumstance proved a dedication to the public. In rejecting that contention, the Privy Council observed that because the grant had originally been made to a private individual, any claim that the family later dedicated the property to the public had to be demonstrated with clear and convincing evidence. The Council held that merely showing that the public was allowed to worship in the temple could not suffice, especially since, as a matter of general Hindu sentiment and practice, worshippers are not normally turned away from a place of worship. The present case, however, involved an endowment that was made directly in favour of the idol itself, and the principal issue for determination was whether such an endowment constituted a private trust or a public religious trust. In circumstances where the public was able to use the temple without any obstruction, the Court considered that such unrestricted use provided strong evidence that the dedication was intended for the public. The Court referred to the decision in Mundancheri Koman v. Achuthan, which had been applied in Babu Bhagwan Din v. Gir Har Saroon, and noted the distinction articulated therein between a user of an institution that was originally proved to be private and one that was not. The quoted passage explained that, had there been sufficient reason to deem the temples and their endowments originally dedicated for the purposes of a private trust, the judges would have hesitated to hold that later admission of the public, perhaps due to changed circumstances, would alter the private character of those trusts. The Court concluded that the learned judges of the High Court were right to infer, from the evidence of public usage, that the temples and their endowments were public religious trusts. Accordingly, the Court expressed the opinion that the evidence of public use of the temple was more consistent with a public endowment. The Court further reiterated settled law that an endowment may be validly created in favour of an idol or a temple even without any specific ceremonial acts, provided that the settlor’s intention to make such an endowment was expressed clearly and unambiguously. While the performance of consecratory ceremonies would serve as valuable corroborative evidence of an endowment, the absence of proof of such ceremonies would not be fatal to the validity of the endowment. In the facts of the present case, it was uncontested that the consecration of the temple and the installation of the idol of Sri Radhakrishnaji had been carried out with great solemnity and in accordance with the Sastras. Moreover, the witness identified as PW 10, who had officiated in the capacity of Acharya, had testified to the proper execution of the rites.
P. W. 10 testified that the consecration ceremony lasted for seven days, beginning with the Kalasa Puja and concluding with the Sthapana or Prathista. He affirmed that all prescribed rites were performed duly and that the idols of Sri Radhakrishnaji, Sri Shivji and Sri Hanumanji were installed in accordance with the instructions contained in the Prathista Mayukha. This testimony did not substantially affect the dispute because the defendants accepted that both the dedication and the accompanying ceremonies had indeed taken place; their only objection was to the characterization of the dedication as being to the public. In the trial court, the appellant argued that the performance of the Uthsarga ceremony at the time of consecration proved that the dedication was public, and relied on P. W. 10’s statement that a Prasadothsarga had been carried out as grounds for declaring the endowment public. The trial judges regarded this issue as a substantial question requiring an authoritative decision, and consequently issued a certificate under section 109(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court examined the relevant Sanskrit authorities and concluded that the appellant’s contention was based on a misunderstanding of the religious rites involved.
The Court explained that the ceremonies associated with a dedication are Sankalpa, Uthsarga and Prathista. Sankalpa is a formal declaration of the settlor’s intention to dedicate property. Uthsarga, as described in The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust by B. K. Mukherjee (1952 edition, p. 36), is the founder’s formal renunciation of ownership, thereby placing the property under the trust intended by the dedication. The procedural formulas for Sankalpa and Uthsarga are set out in Kane’s History of Dharmasastras, Volume 11, p. 892, which shows that while Sankalpa states the objects of dedication, it is Uthsarga that actually dedicates the property to the public (Sarvabhutebhyah). Consequently, if Uthsarga is proved, the dedication must be deemed public. However, the Court noted that, according to P. W. 10, the formula recited at the foundation was not Uthsarga but Prasada‑sarga, a distinct rite. Prasada refers to the mandira where the deity is placed before final installation, and the Prathista Mayukha prescribes the ceremonies for installing the idol in the Prasada. The text of Prasadothsarga, as given in the Mayukha, contains only the Sankalpa and lacks any words indicating a public dedication. Moreover, traditional texts prescribe Uthsarga solely for charitable endowments such as tanks or gardens, not for religious foundations. This distinction was highlighted by the authority cited in the Vyavahara Mayukha, Part …
The Court referred to the passage on page 339 of Appendix II, which states that a temple may have an utsarga only when an old temple is being repaired. It also quoted the work “History of Dharmasastras”, Volume II, Part II, page 893, where Mr Kane observes that the appropriate term for temples is prathista rather than utsarga. Consequently, the Court held that one cannot infer a public dedication merely from the performance of an utsarga ceremony in the context of temples. While the appellant correctly argued that an utsarga, when performed, signifies dedication to the public, the Court found his reasoning flawed because he equated prasada‑utsarga with utsarga. The Court further noted that the texts clearly indicate that prathista replaces utsarga for the dedication of temples and that the prathista of Sri Radhakrishnaji, as testified by P.W. 10, was undisputed. In the Court’s opinion, this establishes that the dedication of the shrine was intended for the public.
The Court then turned to several facts that were either admitted or proved by the evidence, all pointing to a public endowment. First, the idol was installed not inside any residential quarters but in a separate structure that had been erected on a vacant site solely for that purpose. In line with the authority cited in Delroos Banoo Begum v Nawab Syud Ashgur Ally Khan, the location of a place of worship—whether in a private house or a public building—is a material factor in determining the nature of the endowment. Second, it was admitted that some idols were permanently placed on pedestals within the temple precincts, a circumstance more consistent with a public rather than a private endowment. Third, the worship services in the temple were conducted by an archaka who was appointed periodically, indicating an organized public worship system. Fourth, the evidence showed that the village previously had no temple and that, according to the plaintiff’s evidence, the Thakurdwara was constructed at the villagers’ request to provide a communal place of worship. This evidence had not been considered by the lower courts, and if accepted, it would be decisive in confirming the public character of the endowment. The Court also observed that the plaintiff’s pleadings expressly described the temple as dedicated “for the worship of the general public,” whereas the first defendant, in his written statement, claimed that the Thakurdwara and its idols were private and did not contend that the temple was founded for the benefit of family members. At trial, witnesses for the plaintiff testified that the temple was built to serve all Hindus, while witnesses for the defendants testified that Sheo Ghulam erected the Thakurdwara solely for his own use and personal puja. The lower court’s view that the temple was dedicated to the family members was therefore not supported by the evidence.
The Court observed that the contention that the temple had been dedicated solely to members of the family exceeded what was pleaded and found that no evidence on record supported such a claim. After a thorough examination of every relevant material and consideration of the arguments presented, the Court formed the opinion that the Thakurdwara of Sri Radhakrishnaji situated in Bhadesia should be characterized as a public temple. In view of this conclusion, the Court set aside the judgments and orders passed by the lower courts, allowed the appeal filed by the petitioner, and granted the declaration sought under paragraph 17(a) of the plaint. Regarding costs, the Court directed that the expenses incurred by the appellant in all the proceedings be recovered from the assets of the trust that holds the temple property. The Court further ordered that the first defendant should personally bear his own costs in every court where the matter was litigated. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and the reliefs as described were granted.