Brij Bhukhan And Ors. vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 9 November, 1956

Coram: B.P. Sinha, Imam J.

In this matter, the appellants had obtained special leave to appeal from this Court against a judgment of the Allahabad High Court that had affirmed their convictions. The convictions were under Section 302 read with Section 149, and under Section 449 read with Sections 149 and 147 of the Indian Penal Code for the principal accused, and under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code for one appellant, Sheo Ram. Regarding punishment, the High Court had upheld the death sentence imposed by the Sessions Judge on appellant Brij Bhukhan, while it had altered the death sentences of the remaining accused to life imprisonment with transportation.

The Court recorded that the deceased, Ram Prasad, was unquestionably killed in an incident that occurred at the village of Churyani on 14 September 1954 at about five to five‑thirty in the evening. According to the prosecution’s narrative, Ram Prasad had travelled to Fatehpur in connection with a revenue matter, departing at approximately eight o’clock in the morning and intending to return to his home in Churyani at five or five‑thirty p.m. His son, Santosh Kumar, had also gone to Fatehpur that morning to attend college, and both father and son had agreed to travel back together by bus, with Santosh Kumar meeting his father at the bus stand. Ram Prasad had instructed his servant, Buddhu, to meet the bus when it arrived so that Buddhu could bring his belongings home from the stop near the village. Both Ram Prasad and his son reached the Churyani bus stand at about five p.m., where Buddhu was waiting. They proceeded a short distance toward their house when they were assaulted by the appellants. During the assault, Ram Prasad fled into the house of Babu Lal Kayastha, pursued by the attackers. The appellants entered Babu Lal’s residence, forcefully dragged Ram Prasad out, and assaulted him on the threshold. An inhabitant of the house, Srimati Jagarnathi, attempted to protect Ram Prasad and sustained injuries. The alarm raised by Ram Prasad, Santosh Kumar, and Buddhu attracted several neighbours who witnessed the attack, but the appellants then fled. Ram Prasad was lifted onto a cot supplied by Srimati Jagarnathi, carried roughly seventy to eighty paces to his own house, and died shortly thereafter. The first information report was lodged at Ghazipur police station at seven p.m. by Buddhu, naming the appellants. The defence, as presented by appellant Brij Bhukhan, claimed that he had been attacked by Ram Prasad and three unknown persons who arrived at his home at seven‑thirty that evening, and that he had used his weapon in self‑defence, causing injuries to his wife, Din Dayal, Khuda Bax, and Shanker Lal. The other accused denied any participation, while Sheo Ram and Ramu alleged an alibi. Brij Bhukhan’s version suggested a claim of private defence.

Both the trial court and the appellate court accepted the prosecution’s version of events and determined that the incident had taken place at Babu Lal’s house. They rejected the defence narratives in unequivocal terms. Before addressing the principal submission made by counsel for the appellants, the Court found it necessary to note certain factual circumstances. When Brij Bhukhan was apprehended and produced at the police station, he was observed to have sustained injuries on his person. These observations were recorded on 16 September 1954.

According to the defence, Brij Bhukhan asserted that on the evening of 7.30 he was assaulted by Ram Prasad together with three unknown persons who had entered his house. He claimed that he responded by using his weapon in self‑defence. In the course of that incident, Brij Bhukhan and the individuals who came to his assistance—namely his wife, Din Dayal, Khuda Bax and Shanker Lal—sustained injuries. The other accused denied any participation in the alleged assault, while the appellants Sheo Ram and Ramu pleaded an alibi. On the basis of Brij Bhukhan’s statement, the defence placed reliance on the right of private defence. The trial court and the appellate court both adopted the prosecution’s version of events, holding that the assault took place at Babu Lal’s house, and they rejected the defence narrative in unequivocal terms.

Before addressing the principal submission of counsel Sethi on behalf of the accused, the Court set out several factual points. When Brij Bhukhan was taken into custody and produced at the police station, he was observed to have a number of injuries. On 16 September 1954, Dr Shukla, the Medical Officer of the District Jail at Fatehpur, examined him and recorded five injuries, none of which were serious. The High Court, after reviewing these findings, concluded that the nature of the injuries was such that it would have been highly improbable for Brij Bhukhan himself or anyone acting for him to have inflicted them. The prosecution had offered an explanation that the injuries might have occurred when Brij Bhukhan, attempting to evade arrest, stumbled over a cart and fell. The High Court found this explanation unconvincing. During cross‑examination, the defence suggested that the injuries could have resulted from a beating by the police at the time of his arrest. Counsel Sethi vigorously argued that, if the testimony of Police Officer Karan Singh—who had made that suggestion—is accepted, the High Court’s inference that the injuries were caused by police violence was mistaken. Contrary to the High Court’s view, the defence maintained that the injuries to Brij Bhukhan and his companions were caused by an assault inflicted by Ram Prasad and his associates. After examining the evidence, the Court agreed with counsel Sethi that the High Court had erred in assuming that the defence alleged police‑inflicted injuries at the moment of arrest.

The Court observed that the High Court had misunderstood the defence’s position by assuming that the injuries on Brij Bhukhan were caused at the moment of his arrest. In reality, the prosecution’s case asserted that no assault had been inflicted on Brij Bhukhan during the incident described by its witnesses. Accordingly, the Court held that the prosecution had deliberately concealed the fact that Brij Bhukhan had been assaulted during the occurrence, rendering the testimony of interested eyewitnesses unreliable. Because the prosecution had hidden a material episode, the trial court had not received the full truth about how the incident unfolded. Therefore, the Court considered it necessary to entertain the possibility that Brij Bhukhan might have been assaulted first and that, when he and his companions came to his rescue, they attacked his assailants. Under those circumstances, the Court could not conclude that Brij Bhukhan was guilty of any offence. The individuals who intervened on his behalf were entitled to act in self‑defence on his behalf, and they could not be said to have committed a crime unless it was proved that any of them had exceeded the scope of private defence. Mr Sethi made this argument assuming that the incident occurred at or near the house of Babu Lal, but he did not abandon the defence’s version that the occurrence had taken place near Brij Bhukhan’s own house. On the contrary, he strongly contended that, given the surrounding circumstances, the defence’s version was the more probable scenario.

In response to these submissions, the Court examined the evidence and reviewed the findings of both the High Court and the trial Court. It became evident that the lower courts had concluded that Brij Bhukhan and his companions were the aggressors and that, according to the prosecution’s narrative, neither Brij Bhukhan nor his companions had been assaulted during the incident. While the evidence of Police Officer Karan Singh could not establish that Brij Bhukhan’s injuries were inflicted by the police at the time of his arrest, this deficiency did not automatically imply that Brij Bhukhan or his companions had been assaulted in the incident that occurred at or near Babu Lal’s house. The incident had taken place at approximately 5:30 p.m., and a First Information Report was lodged at a police station three miles away at 7 p.m. by a person named Buddhu. Notably, no FIR was filed by Brij Bhukhan or on his behalf concerning the defence version of events. Brij Bhukhan’s claim that he had lodged a report, which the police allegedly failed to record, was not accepted by the lower courts, and the Court found no satisfactory basis to presume that such a report had indeed been made.

It was observed that the claim that Brij Bhukhan had lodged a report at the police station was not accepted by the Courts below, and there was no satisfactory basis on which to presume that such a report had in fact been filed. When examined under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Brij Bhukhan informed the trial Court that he had travelled to the police station between eleven and twelve o’clock at night on a bullock‑cart with the intention of lodging a complaint. He further stated that he did not convey this fact to the Sub‑Inspector until about three o’clock in the morning, at which time the Sub‑Inspector instructed him to wait. In the interim, Buddhu arrived at the police station, and the Sub‑Inspector was informed that Ram Prasad had died. The Sub‑Inspector, according to Brij Bhukhan’s own account, did not record his information. The Court found it difficult to reconcile the description of Brij Bhukhan’s injuries, as given by Doctor Shukla, with the notion that he required a bullock‑cart to reach a police station only three miles away. No adequate explanation was offered for the considerable delay between the alleged occurrence and Brij Bhukhan’s arrival at the police station. The Court noted that Brij Bhukhan, having previously been convicted in a murder case, must have been aware that if he had been the victim of an unprovoked assault, it would have been imperative to have his version recorded promptly after the incident. Moreover, he had ample time to have his injuries examined by a medical practitioner before proceeding to the police station and to procure a medical certificate in support of his claim. The injuries on his person were still clearly visible on the sixteenth of September, and consequently would have been evident to the police officer present at the station on the fourteenth of September. It was therefore difficult to conceive that a police officer would refuse to record his statement under such circumstances. The prosecution evidence demonstrated that Brij Bhukhan was not arrested until approximately two or three o’clock in the morning, although Police Officer Karan Singh had been searching for him from eight p.m. after failing to locate him at his residence. Ultimately, at about two‑thirty a.m., Karan Singh found Brij Bhukhan outside his house and effected his arrest. The Court could not determine what Brij Bhukhan was doing during the intervening period; he might have sought medical examination at Ghazipur, which was three miles away, but he did not do so. The conduct attributed to Brij Bhukhan led the Court to conclude that it was probable he did not sustain any injury in the occurrence described by the prosecution witnesses. Consequently, the Courts below were justified in accepting the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that neither Brij Bhukhan nor his companions were assaulted in the episode recounted by those witnesses. The assessment of credibility of witnesses is fundamentally a matter for the fact‑finding courts, and in this case the lower courts had acted within their discretion.

The Court observed that an appeal by special leave ordinarily does not warrant interference with the lower tribunal’s discretionary findings, and therefore it would not be appropriate to revisit the factual determination previously made. Although the High Court had erroneously concluded that the defence case alleged Brij Bhukhan was beaten by police at the time of his arrest, the Court held that this mistake did not result in a miscarriage of justice in the present circumstances. After examining the evidence, the Court concluded that neither Brij Bhukhan nor his companions were subjected to assault during the incident described by the prosecution witnesses, and consequently the issue of invoking a right of private defence did not arise. The Court deemed it unnecessary to express any view on the precise manner in which Brij Bhukhan sustained his injuries. One possibility, the Court noted, was that the injuries were inflicted by police officers during his arrest while he was attempting to flee, although Officer Karan Singh did not admit such an occurrence. Another possibility, as suggested by Doctor Shukla, a defence witness, was that the injuries resulted from the hands of friends, a view the High Court had apparently rejected. Regardless of how the injuries were caused, the Court affirmed that they were not inflicted within the course of the incident narrated by the prosecution witnesses. Regarding the injuries to Brij Bhukhan’s companions, the High Court had expressed the opinion that the prosecution’s allegation of fabrication might be true and had disbelieved the defence’s claim that the injuries were caused by Ram Prasad and his associates. Considering the nature of those injuries, the Court was satisfied that the High Court’s assessment was correct.

Mr. Sethi subsequently advanced three additional submissions, which the Court now addressed. He contended that, based on the medical evidence, the offence alleged against the assailants of Ram Prasad could not be classified as murder because none of the injuries had been proven sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death, and therefore the third clause of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code was inapplicable. The Court acknowledged that the medical expert had not asserted that any single injury was capable of causing death in the ordinary course of nature. However, after scrutinising the injuries discovered on Ram Prasad’s body, the Court inferred that the assailants had intended to cause his death. It was significant, the Court noted, that Ram Prasad succumbed very shortly after the assault. The Court found it difficult to imagine how any person could survive the ferocity of the assault and injury identified as injury No 5, described as a contused area measuring seven inches by eight inches over the left buttock and upper left thigh (upper fore‑back) with five contusions of varying lengths, each three inches in dimension. This analysis led the Court to conclude that the intent to cause death was evident despite the medical opinion on individual injuries.

The Court examined the nature and dimensions of the injuries sustained by Ram Prasad, noting in particular a contused area measuring seven inches by eight inches over the left buttock and upper thigh, accompanied by five contusions ranging in length from three inches to two inches and in breadth from three‑quarters of an inch to one inch, together with an abrasion of small size near the scrotum. The Court held that these injuries must have largely contributed to the death of Ram Prasad. It observed that the majority of the injuries were of a type that indicated they had been inflicted on a man who had fallen to the ground. The autopsy report showed that both chambers of the heart were empty, a finding that clearly signified haemorrhage. The Court reasoned that if the numerous injuries were inflicted in the manner described by the prosecution witnesses, there was little doubt that the assailants had the intention to cause the victim’s death. Moreover, the Court noted that even if none of the individual injuries would, in the ordinary course of nature, be sufficient to cause death, the combination of all the injuries was certainly sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, which indeed occurred shortly after the assault. Relying on this assessment of the medical and forensic evidence, the Court concluded that, on acceptance of the prosecution’s evidence, the offence was unmistakably one of murder.

The Court then addressed the contention that the evidence relied upon came solely from interested persons and that corroboration by independent witnesses or by circumstantial evidence was required. In its view, there was abundant corroboration through circumstantial evidence concerning the place where the incident occurred. Blood was discovered at Babu Lal’s house as well as in front of the house, and further bloodstains were found on the bedding and on the clothing of the deceased. Although the Chemical Examiner could not determine the origin of the blood on the ground because the stains had disintegrated, the Court held that the presence of blood at the scene, as described by the prosecution witnesses, strongly corroborated their testimony. The incident had taken place on 14 September, and the ground stains were not examined by the Chemical Examiner until 12 November 1954; consequently, the disintegration of the stains and the inability to identify their source were understandable. Large human blood stains were found on the bedding, on a dhoti and on two sheets, and human blood was also identified on the deceased’s shirt and vest, thereby establishing that the victim had bled profusely and that the ground could have been stained with blood. Regarding independent eyewitnesses, the High Court had considered the testimony of Mst. Jagarnathi, a resident of Babu Lal’s house, as reliable because she herself had suffered injuries during the occurrence. The defence challenged her testimony on the ground that she had been involved in a litigation in which Brij Bhukhan had participated against her. The Court, however, found that the nature of that litigation was not such as to create animosity sufficient to induce false testimony against the appellant. Ms. Jagarnathi’s evidence, the Court observed, clearly corroborated the statements of the prosecution witnesses Santosh Kumar and Buddhu. Accordingly, there existed reliable corroborative evidence supporting the prosecution witnesses Buddhu and Santosh Kumar, and the submission advanced by Mr. Sethi was therefore rejected. The Court then proceeded to consider the final submission.

The last submission of Mr. Sethi argued that, even if the convictions of the accused under sections 302 and 149 were to be upheld, the death penalty should not be retained in the case of Brij Bhukhan because a similar death sentence imposed on the other accused had been reduced by the High Court to transportation for life. The record of evidence demonstrated clearly that Brij Bhukhan had not himself executed any physical assault; at most, he was shown to have instigated the assault. When the actual assailants received the punishment of transportation for life, it appeared unreasonable to impose a harsher punishment of death on Brij Bhukhan. Nevertheless, the Court held that, if the assault occurred in the manner and under the circumstances alleged by the prosecution, Brij Bhukhan was liable for the killing of Ram Prasad and that, without his instigation, Ram Prasad would not have been subjected to such severe blows as to result in death. The Court further observed that the fact that leniency had been shown to the other accused with respect to their sentences did not constitute a valid ground for reducing the punishment imposed on Brij Bhukhan. The prosecution’s evidence established that the attack was brutal and pre‑meditated, motivated by a deep‑seated enmity that Brij Bhukhan harboured against Ram Prasad and his family. Accordingly, the Court declined to interfere with the sentence that had been imposed. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.