Bimbadhar Pradhan vs The State Of Orissa
Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 49 of 1954
Decision Date: 13 March, 1956
Coram: Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Syed Jaffer Imam
In this matter, the Supreme Court considered the appeal of Bimbadhar Pradhan against the State of Orissa, the judgment being delivered on 13 March 1956 by a bench comprising Justice Bhuvneshwar P Sinha and Justice Syed Jaffer Imam. The case was cited as 1956 AIR 469 and 1956 SCR 206 and involved provisions of the Indian Penal Code of 1860, specifically sections 120-B, 409, 477-A and 109, together with the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898, sections 225 and 537. The factual background recorded that the appellant, who held the position of District Food Production Officer, and four other persons who were agricultural sub-overseers under his supervision, were tried before the Assistant Sessions Judge of Sambalpur for alleged offences of criminal conspiracy, criminal breach of trust in respect of Government property and falsification of accounts with a view to defraud the Government. During the trial, another agricultural sub-overseer, identified only as P., was examined as an approver, meaning he turned approver and gave testimony incriminating himself and others.
The Assistant Sessions Judge convicted the appellant on all three charges and, exercising the benefit of doubt, acquitted the four sub-overseers. Upon appeal, the High Court allowed the appellant’s appeal with respect to the charges under sections 409 and 477-A, thereby setting aside those convictions, but it upheld the conviction and sentence under section 120-B, the charge of conspiracy. The High Court justified its decision by observing that the approver’s evidence was corroborated by other independent evidence, and therefore the conviction for conspiracy could stand. The appellant then obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, raising the principal question of whether the precedent established in Topan Das v. State of Bombay ([1955] 2 S.C.R. 881) was applicable, given that in the present case the appellant was the sole person among the accused to have been convicted of the offence of conspiracy under section 120-B.
The Supreme Court held that the case of Topan Das v. State of Bombay was clearly distinguishable from the present circumstances. In Topan Das, only the persons placed on trial were alleged to have been guilty of the conspiracy, and there was no allegation that any other individual, whether or not placed on trial, had participated in the criminal plan. Consequently, after the acquittal of the remaining accused, only one person remained convicted, which the Court explained could not lawfully sustain a conviction for conspiracy, as a person cannot conspire with himself. By contrast, in the instant case, the findings of the lower courts identified, besides the persons who stood trial, an approver who had implicated himself equally with the other accused and a number of prosecution witnesses as having been privy to the conspiracy. This factual difference meant that the present case was not on all fours with Topan Das, and the earlier ruling did not control the outcome. The Court further noted that the provisions of section 225 of the Criminal Procedure Code were directly applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case, affirming their relevance to the matters before it.
In the earlier case, the record showed no evidence that any persons who were not placed on trial had been involved in the offence. The findings of that case indicated that after the acquittal of all other accused, only a single individual remained who was found to have participated in the crime and was convicted of the conspiracy charge. Because a person cannot be said to have conspired with himself to commit an offence, the Supreme Court accepted the argument that, based on the findings, the evidence and the specific charge, the conviction could not be maintained. By contrast, the present matter was different. The findings of the lower courts disclosed that, besides the persons who were actually tried, an approver had also implicated himself on the same basis as the other accused and that several prosecution witnesses testified that the approver had been privy to the same conspiracy. Consequently, the factual matrix of the instant case did not match, in every respect, the situation described in Topan Das v. State of Bombay.
The Court observed that section 225 of the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly applied to the facts and circumstances of the present case. No material was advanced to demonstrate that the failure to name the approver in the charge under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code had misled the appellant or produced any miscarriage of justice. Likewise, the provisions of section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were equally relevant. Since the appellant did not raise, before the High Court, any allegation that the charge was illegal or irregular, the Explanation to section 537 required the conclusion that the omission in the charge did not cause a failure of justice. The appellant’s contention that, because the alleged conspirators had been acquitted, a guilty verdict against him would be repugnant—asserting a criminal agreement between him and the others while denying any agreement among them—was found to be without merit. The Court explained that the English rule allowing an acquittal of an alleged conspirator where the conspiracy was claimed to exist only between two persons rests on a procedural principle that a contradiction on the face of the record may invalidate a conviction. However, such a contradiction alone is not sufficient to set aside a conviction in India, where both the substantive offence and the procedural regime are governed by statute. No statutory provision in Indian law permits interference with a conviction merely on the ground of a repugnant record. The Court therefore rejected the appellant’s reliance on the authorities Topan Das v. State of Bombay, The Queen v. Manning, The Queen v. Thompson, The King v. Plummer, and Kannangara Aratchige Dharmasena.
The Court noted that the authorities cited included The King (1951 A.C. 1), I. G. Singleton v. The King-Emperor (1924 29 C.W.N. 260), Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab (1954 S.C.R. 145) and Kapildeo Singh v. The King (1949-50 F.C.R. 834). The appeal arose under Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction as Criminal Appeal No. 49 of 1954, filed by special leave against the judgment and order dated 7 October 1953 of the Orissa High Court at Cuttack in Criminal Appeal No. 108 of 1952. The High Court judgment itself concerned the order dated 14 November 1952 of the Court of Assistant Sessions Judge at Sambalpur-Sundergarh in Sessions Trial No. 7/4 (5) of 1922. Counsel for the appellant comprised S. C. Isaacs, R. Patnaik and R. C. Prasad, while counsel for the respondent was Porus A. Mehta together with P. G. Gokhale. The judgment was delivered on 13 March 1956 by Justice Sinha. The principal issue framed for determination was whether the precedent set in Topan Das v. State of Bombay applied to the present case, particularly because the appellant alone among the accused had been convicted under Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code for the offence of criminal conspiracy. The factual background disclosed that the appellant, who held the position of District Food Production Officer in Sambalpur, and four other respondents were tried before the Assistant Sessions Judge of Sambalpur on charges under Sections 120-B, 409, 477-A and 109 of the Indian Penal Code. These charges related respectively to criminal conspiracy, criminal breach of trust concerning government property, and falsification of accounts with intent to defraud the Government. The four co-accused were agricultural sub-overseers who served under the appellant’s authority, and a further sub-overseer, Pitabas Sahu of the Bargarh centre, was examined as witness 25 and was designated as the approver. According to the prosecution, the government’s “Grow More Food” scheme provided a subsidy for oil-cake manure, selling it to cultivators at Rs 4-4-0 per maund while the actual expenditure was Rs 7-12-0 per maund. The appellant allegedly conspired with his subordinate staff, including the agricultural sub-overseers, to misappropriate the funds earmarked for the procurement and distribution of oil cake. To conceal the fraud, they purportedly created fictitious purchase and distribution transactions and falsified related accounts, vouchers and other documents, thereby misappropriating a sum of Rs 4,943-4-0 of government money. The trial witnessed the presentation of a substantial volume of oral testimony and documentary evidence in support of the prosecution’s case, and the three assessors assisting at trial formed the opinion that…
The trial judge, after hearing the evidence, found that none of the four agricultural sub-overseers who had been charged was guilty. In agreement with the three assessors who had assisted at trial, the learned Assistant Sessions Judge therefore acquitted those four sub-overseers, granting them the benefit of doubt. In contrast, the judge disagreed with the assessors concerning the chief accused, the district food-procurement officer, and convicted him on every charge that had been framed. He imposed a rigorous imprisonment of four and a half years together with a fine of two thousand rupees under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code, and also sentenced the appellant to rigorous imprisonment of two years each under sections 120-B and 477-A, directing that all the imprisonment terms run concurrently. In delivering his judgment, the judge explained that having considered the entire body of evidence, the prosecution had fully proved that the appellant, Bimbadhar Pradhan, had conspired to embezzle government money. The judge held that the appellant, with the assistance of Pitabas Sahu, had misappropriated an amount of Rs 4,943-4-0 and had actively helped Sahu falsify government records by making false entries, thereby conclusively proving all three charges against him. Regarding the other four accused, the judge observed that they were relatively inexperienced and that the evidence against them was doubtful; consequently, he gave them the benefit of doubt, although he did not approve of their conduct in the matter. The judge further remarked that the case demonstrated how a person in charge of the entire administration of agricultural and G.M.F. development in a district had not only corrupted his own hands by embezzlement but had also introduced corruption throughout the department, damaging the careers of the young officials employed under him. The appellant appealed to the High Court of Orissa. A Division Bench of that court allowed his appeal in part, setting aside the convictions and sentences under sections 409 and 477-A of the Indian Penal Code, while upholding the conviction and sentence under section 120-B for conspiracy. The Supreme Court did not need to examine the correctness of the trial court’s findings concerning the acquittal of the four sub-overseers, nor the High Court’s reasoning for acquitting the appellant on the charges under sections 409 and 477-A. The High Court had held that, although the appellant had withdrawn the sum of Rs 27,000 from the government treasury with the intention of subsidising the procurement of oil cake, the prosecution had failed to prove that any entrustment of that amount had been made to the appellant; consequently, the charge under section 409 could not be sustained. Regarding section 477-A, the High Court acquitted the appellant on the ground that the documents alleged to have been falsified were numerous, had not been specifically mentioned in the charge, and the charge contained only a vague description of a broad range of records such as accounts, cash books, stock books, petty cash sale registers, cash memos, applications from cultivators, receipts, bills, vouchers, papers, documents, letters and correspondence as having been falsified.
In reviewing the decision of the High Court, the Court observed that the appellant had been acquitted of the charge under section 477-A because the documents alleged to have been falsified were numerous, were not specified in the charge, and the charge sheet contained only a vague description that “accounts, cash books, stock books, petty cash sale register, cash memos, applications from cultivators, receipts, bills, vouchers, papers, documents, letters, correspondence, etc. had been falsified.” The Court therefore found the charge to be insufficiently particularised and dismissed the charge.
Concerning the charge of conspiracy under section 120-B, the High Court noted that the principal witness for the prosecution was the approver identified as P.W. 25. This witness gave a detailed account of a conspiracy that allegedly occurred on either the 23rd or the 25th of September 1947, in which the appellant and several sub-overseers, including the approver himself, allegedly conspired to fabricate purchases and to falsify the distribution records of large quantities of oil cake. The Court further observed that most of the other prosecution witnesses who were called to corroborate the approver’s testimony were themselves accomplices in the alleged conspiracy.
Despite the compromised status of many witnesses, the High Court held that the approver’s testimony received adequate corroboration from other independent witnesses. The Court recorded that this corroboration was the strongest support for the view that the appellant was the principal architect and the intellectual force behind the entire fraud. The judgment stated that the appellant had sought to misuse his official position and had persuaded his subordinates to join him in presenting false procurement and distribution figures for oil cake.
Consequently, the High Court concluded that the approver’s version of events, which portrayed the appellant as the leading figure in the conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust by misappropriating funds withdrawn from the treasury and by fabricating procurement and distribution records, was true. The Court emphasized that there was independent corroboration of the approver’s evidence, which was inconsistent with the alternative view that the appellant was merely a negligent senior officer who had been deceived and defrauded by dishonest subordinates. The Court also addressed a discrepancy in the charge sheet, which fixed the date of the offence as October 1947, whereas the evidence of P.W. 5 placed the conspiracy at Bargarh between 23rd and 25th September 1947. The Court held that this discrepancy was immaterial and had not prejudiced the appellant.
Following the concurrent convictions and sentences imposed on the appellant under section 120-B, the appellant was granted special leave to appeal to this Court. The counsel for the appellant raised four principal points in support of the appeal: (1) that all other accused persons charged with conspiracy had been acquitted, and therefore the appellant’s conviction and sentence for that charge could not be sustained; (2) that the appellant himself had been acquitted of the substantive offences under sections 409 and 477-A, and consequently should not be convicted of conspiracy to commit those offences; (3) that the prosecution’s witnesses, whose credibility had been rejected with respect to the other accused, should not have been relied upon to convict the appellant of conspiracy; and (4) that the requirements of section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had not been fully complied with, because important circumstances in the prosecution evidence had not been placed before the appellant for his examination under that section.
The appellant contended that, having been acquitted of the substantive offences under sections 409 and 477-A of the Code, he could not be convicted of conspiracy to commit those very offences. He further argued that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, which had been disbelieved with respect to the other accused, should not have been relied upon to sustain his conviction for conspiracy. In addition, the appellant submitted that the provisions of section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had not been fully complied with because important circumstances revealed in the prosecution evidence had not been put to him during his examination by the court under that section.
The Court held that none of the appellant’s contentions possessed any substantive merit and therefore set out the reasons for its conclusion. Regarding the first contention, the appellant’s counsel heavily relied on the recent decision of this Court in Topan Das v. State of Bombay (1) and on the authorities cited in that case. The appellant also cited The Queen v. Manning (2), The Queen v. Thompson (3) and The King v. Plummer (4) in support of the proposition that when all accused persons except one are acquitted on a charge of conspiracy, the conviction of the remaining accused on that charge cannot be sustained. In that connection, the Court mentioned the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Kannangara Aratchige Dharmasena v. The King (5), although it had not been raised at the Bar. In the Privy Council case, it was held that where only two persons are implicated in a conspiracy, a retrial ordered against one must necessarily be ordered against both, because the logical alternatives are that either both are guilty or both are innocent.
The Court observed, however, that the recent decision of this Court, which the appellant sought to apply, was unmistakably distinguishable from the present case. In that precedent the only persons alleged to have participated in the conspiracy were those who stood trial; there was no allegation or evidence that any other individuals, who were not on trial, were involved in the crime. The Court therefore emphasized that, to establish a charge of conspiracy, it is essential to bring the agreement home to the accused persons, proving that two or more persons agreed to commit an offence. In the cited case, after the acquittal of the other accused, only one person remained convicted of conspiracy. Since a person cannot conspire with himself, the Court gave effect to the argument that, on the basis of the findings and the evidence, the conviction could not be sustained.
The Court observed that, unlike the earlier case where the conviction could not be sustained on the charge, the present matter presented a different factual matrix. The findings of the lower courts showed that, in addition to the individuals who were put on trial, there existed an approver who had implicated himself on an equal footing with the other accused persons and a number of other prosecution witnesses as having been privy to the alleged conspiracy. The evidential material concerning the approver was held by the subordinate courts to have been substantially corroborated both regarding the unlawful agreement itself and regarding the identity of the persons who participated in the conspiracy. The First Information Report dated 28 June 1948 specifically named the approver, Pitabas Sabu, who was one of the agricultural sub-overseers, together with the other five accused as participants in the conspiracy. Subsequently, the same individual, hereinafter referred to as Pitabas Sahu, was granted a pardon on the condition that he would make a full and true statement of the facts of the case. He was then examined as an approver, and the case against the accused rested principally on his testimony. The Court noted that his testimony was further supported by dealers in oilcake who had supplied the commodity that formed the subject matter of the alleged conspiracy. Consequently, the Court concluded that the present case could not be said to be identical in all respects with the recent decision of this Court that had been previously cited. Nevertheless, counsel for the appellant argued that the charge framed against the appellant alleged a conspiracy only with the other accused persons and not with the approver jointly with those persons.
The charge under section 120-B was quoted in the following terms: “First, that you, on or about the month of October, 1947 in the district of Sambalpur agreed with Hemchandra Acharya and other accused persons to do or cause to be done an illegal act by illegal means and that you did some acts in pursuance of the said agreement, namely, the offence of criminal breach of trust under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code and falsification of accounts under section 477-A, punishable with rigorous imprisonment for more than two years, and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, which is within the cognizance of the Court of Sessions.” From the language of the charge, it appeared that the approver was not expressly named as one of the conspirators, unless he could be subsumed within the expression “other accused persons.” The Court therefore had to determine the meaning of those words and whether the approver fell within that description. Counsel for the appellant maintained that the approver was not included, whereas counsel for the State Government argued the opposite. The discussion then turned to the structure of an English indictment, which consists of three parts: the commencement, the statement of the offence, and the particulars of the offence. The historical technical rules governing English indictments have been codified in the Indictments Act, 1915 (5 & 6 George 5, Chapter 90), specifically in Rule 2 of Schedule 1 of the Act.
In England the form of the commencement of an indictment has been fixed by the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 1933, as amended, and the form of the statement of the offence is set out in Rule 4 of that Act. Rule 5 then requires that the “particulars of offence” follow the statement. These provisions correspond closely to the provisions of Chapter XIX of the Code of Criminal Procedure in India. Section 221 of the Code of Criminal Procedure mandates that the charge must state the offence with which the accused is charged, and it must give the specific name of the offence if the law that creates the offence provides such a name. In the present case the offence is criminal conspiracy, which is defined by section 120-A of the Indian Penal Code. Under subsection (5) of section 221, stating the name of the relevant section is equivalent to affirming that every legal element required to constitute the offence of criminal conspiracy has been satisfied. Section 222 of the Code further requires that the charge set out the particulars of the time and place of the alleged offence and identify the person or thing against which the offence was committed, if any. Notably, the statute does not expressly require that the names of co-conspirators be mentioned in a conspiracy charge. Consequently, English law permits an indictment to state that the accused, together with other persons unknown, committed the conspiracy. Although Indian statute does not obligate the naming of all conspirators, it is considered advisable to include such particulars so that the accused receives reasonable notice of the individuals with whom he is alleged to have conspired, whether named or unnamed. In the present matter the charge under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code listed only the five accused as conspirators and failed to name the approver as a participant in the conspiracy. This omission is evident from the charge framed against the other four accused, who were later acquitted by the trial court. The charge reads: “That you, on or about the month of October 1947 in the district of Sambalpur, agreed with Bimbadhar Pradhan to do or cause to be done an illegal act by illegal means ….” The trial court’s record shows that the proceedings were not conducted with the required thoroughness or circumspection, and the date of the offence mentioned in the charge differs from the date established by the evidence.
The High Court had observed that the discrepancy in the date of the offence mentioned in the charge, when compared with the date established by the evidence, did not prejudice the accused. In a similar vein, the High Court concluded that the charge under section 477-A had not been drafted with sufficient particularity, which led to the appellant’s acquittal of that charge on appeal. The Court noted that if the charge under section 120-B had incorporated the words “and other persons, known or unknown,” the appellant would have had no ground for grievance. Nevertheless, the Court held that the provisions of section 225 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were clearly applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. No material was shown to demonstrate that the omission of the approver’s name from the charge under section 120-B misled the appellant or caused a failure of justice. The prosecution case, as outlined in the petition of complaint, alleged that the appellant, together with his subordinates in the Food Department, had conspired to misappropriate funds allotted for the purchase of oil-cake with the intention of assisting agriculturists by providing manure to increase crop yields. The approver had been present throughout the alleged conspiracy, and the courts below had found his testimony to be the principal pillar of the prosecution’s case. In addition, other corroborative evidence, as noted in the lower courts’ judgments, supported the prosecution’s allegations. The provisions of section 537 were also attracted to the present matter. It was relevant to observe that, although the other accused had been acquitted by the trial court and the appellant was the sole appellant before the High Court, he had not raised any objection concerning alleged illegality or irregularity in the charge before that court. Applying the Explanation to that section, it could not be argued that the omission in the charge resulted in a failure of justice. The appellant’s counsel drew the Court’s attention to the observations of Mr Justice Mathew at page 243 of Queen v Manning, wherein it was described as “an imperative rule of law” that in a conspiracy charge involving two defendants, if the jury was not satisfied of the guilt of either, both must be acquitted. Lord Coleridge, Chief Justice, although not expressing it with the same force as Mr Justice Mathew, regarded it as “the established rule of practice.” Counsel for the appellant also relied upon the case of The King v Plummer, which discussed the effect of the acquittal of the only alleged conspirators on the possibility of finding the appellant guilty, suggesting a similar repugnancy might arise in the present case.
The counsel for the appellant argued that because the only alleged conspirators were acquitted, a guilty verdict against the appellant could not be rendered without creating a logical inconsistency. The argument was that such a verdict would imply the existence of a criminal agreement between the appellant and the others, while simultaneously denying any agreement between the others and the appellant. The appellant’s counsel likened this situation to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in I. G. Singleton v. The King-Emperor, where Justice Mukerji explained the distinction between Indian and English law. Under English law, when two persons are tried jointly for a conspiracy that is alleged to exist only between them, the acquittal of one is a matter of procedural practice: a conviction that contradicts the acquittal is repugnant and therefore the conviction must be set aside. This principle in England rests on the rule that a record showing a direct contradiction is a ground for annulling a conviction. In India, however, the same principle does not automatically apply because the offence and the procedural steps are governed by statutes, and there is no statutory provision that allows a conviction to be interfered with solely on the basis of repugnancy in the record. This does not mean that Indian courts ignore an obvious inconsistency where one person is convicted of conspiracy on the very same evidence that led to another’s acquittal. When the record provides no material to differentiate the two cases, courts have the authority to set aside the conviction, as illustrated in the decision of this Court in Topan Das v. State of Bombay (1). Thus, while English practice treats repugnancy as a decisive ground, Indian law requires a statutory basis, and the existence of a mere inconsistency is insufficient on its own to quash a conviction.
The appellant further contended that, irrespective of the evidential findings, his acquittal was justified because the charge framed against him did not mention an approver. He maintained that the rule supporting his acquittal was rooted in principle rather than mere practice. The Court examined whether the trial court’s acquittal of the co-accused was legally sound or supported by the evidence presented. It observed that the trial court had not rejected the prosecution’s evidence; rather, it had extended the benefit of doubt to the accused it chose to acquit, relying on grounds that might not withstand close scrutiny. Consequently, the Court expressed uncertainty as to whether the acquittal of the co-accused was properly founded in law or adequately justified by the evidence. While acknowledging the appellant’s submission, the Court refrained from passing further judgment on the matter, noting that the specific issues concerning the acquitted individuals were not before it for determination.
Because the allegations against the persons who were acquitted are not before this Court, the Court found no need to consider that matter further. The appellant’s counsel argued that, since the High Court had acquitted the appellant of the two substantive charges of criminal breach of trust and falsification of documents, the appellant could not be convicted of criminal conspiracy, asserting that the alleged conspiracy was directed toward those very offences. The Court responded by explaining that the offence of criminal conspiracy is defined by the mere agreement of two or more persons to commit a criminal act, regardless of whether the planned offences are eventually carried out, as stated in the cited authority [1955] 2 S.C.R. 881. Consequently, the existence of the conspiratorial agreement itself constitutes the offence, and it is irrelevant whether any overt act in furtherance of the unlawful agreement was performed. In the present case, however, the findings do not establish that government money was not misappropriated or that the accounts were not falsified. The charge under section 477-A for falsification of documents failed because the High Court held that the charge lacked sufficient particulars, thereby prejudicing the accused. Likewise, the charge under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code was set aside by the High Court on the ground that there was “practically no evidence of entrustment with the appellant of the price of 1500 maunds of oil-cakes, a substantial portion of which he was said to have misappropriated.” The Court noted that it was unnecessary to determine how well founded that observation was in law, given the appellant’s official role in handling government expenditures. It was sufficient to observe that the lower courts did not find that the object of the criminal conspiracy had failed to be achieved. On the contrary, the judgments contain ample indication that the object of the conspiracy was largely fulfilled, rendering the appellant’s contention without merit. The appellant further contended that, because the trial court had acquitted the other accused, he should not have been convicted since the evidence against all of them was identical. While that argument would acquire considerable force if the acquittals of the other four accused were wholly correct, the Court found that the required standard of proof was not met in those cases. The Court referred to earlier observations in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab and the Federal Court decision cited in [1954] S.C.R. 145, 156, as well as Kapildeo Singh v. The King, to note that it is not essential for more than one person to be convicted of criminal conspiracy; it is sufficient that the court can find that two or more persons were indeed involved in the conspiratorial agreement.
If the court could determine that two or more persons had actually taken part in the criminal conspiracy, then that factual finding would support a conviction. Conversely, if the lower courts had expressly concluded that the prosecution’s evidence was unreliable, no conviction could have been sustained on such evidence and every accused would have been entitled to acquittal. The judgments of the lower courts, however, do not reflect such a finding of unreliability, and therefore the situation described in the preceding sentence does not apply to the present case. The appellant further contended that the trial judge’s examination of him did not fully comply with the requirements of section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Two specific points were raised in support of that contention. First, it was argued that while the trial court had questioned the other accused, who were later acquitted, about a conspiracy involving the approver Pitabas Sahu, the same line of questioning had not been put to the appellant. The record shows, however, that the court did ask the appellant about his “conspiracy with the other accused persons.” The parties disagreed on the meaning of the phrase “in conspiracy with the other accused persons.” The appellant’s counsel maintained that the question referred only to the persons actually present before the court, whereas the State’s counsel asserted that the reference included every person named in the complaint, the approver included. Various decisions of different High Courts concerning the legal status of an approver—whether he remains an accused after receiving a pardon or whether he becomes only a prosecution witness—were cited. The court, however, chose not to pronounce on those precedents, having already formed its conclusions on the assumption that the charge omitted a specific reference to the approver under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. Second, the appellant argued that the testimony of PW 27, whose evidence had been relied upon by the lower courts to corroborate the approver, had not been specifically put to him, even though the approver’s evidence had been expressly examined. In the court’s view, it is not a general rule that every individual witness’s testimony must be put to the accused under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The appellant was asked whether he had anything to say on the evidence of the witnesses, and the court held that this question was sufficient under the circumstances to bring the prosecution’s evidence to the accused’s attention. As to what is or is not a full compliance with the provisions of that section of the Code must
The Court observed that whether the requirements of the statutory provision were satisfied depended upon the particular facts and circumstances of each individual case. In this matter, the Court formed the view that no prejudice could be attributed to the accused as a result of the manner in which he was examined under the indicated section of the Code. The Court noted that the appellant’s arguments concerning alleged procedural irregularities were wholly unsubstantiated by the record in the present proceedings. Accordingly, having found that every contention raised on behalf of the appellant failed to establish any legal error or material injustice, the Court concluded that the appeal could not be sustained. Consequently, the Court ordered the dismissal of the appellant’s appeal, thereby affirming the decision of the lower tribunal. The Court recalled that the accused had been asked a general question inviting comment on the prosecution witnesses, and found that this procedure satisfied the statutory requirement of drawing the accused’s attention to the evidence. No error was discerned in the manner in which the prosecution evidence was presented, nor was any opportunity for the accused to rebut that evidence denied. Therefore, the appellate jurisdiction to set aside the conviction was not invoked, and the judgment of the trial court remained intact.