Bhagwan Datta Shastri vs Ram Ratanji Gupta and Ors

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Appeal (civil) 204-205 of 1955

Decision Date: 17 February 1956

Coram: V. Bose, B. Jagannadhadas, B.P. Sinha, S.J. Imam, N.C. Aiyar

In the case titled Bhagwan Datta Shastri versus Ram Ratanji Gupta and others, the judgment was rendered on 17 February 1956 by a bench consisting of Justices V. Bose, B. Jagannadhadas, B. P. Sinha, S. J. Imam and N. C. Aiyar. The appeal, recorded as Civil Appeal Nos. 204‑205 of 1955, was filed by Bhagwan Datta Shastri against Ram Ratanji Gupta and the other respondents. The judgment appears in the 1960 volume of the All India Reports, Supreme Court series, at page 200. The opinion was delivered by Justice Jagannadhadas, who explained that the matter before the Court comprised two appeals filed by special leave against two separate orders issued by the Election Tribunal of Vindhya Pradesh at Rewa on 26 April 1954 and 31 May 1954 respectively. These orders stemmed from the election to the Lok Sabha from the Shahdol‑Sidhi constituency of Vindhya Pradesh, a constituency that elected two members: one general seat and one seat reserved for a candidate belonging to the scheduled tribes of the State.

The electoral process began with twelve nominations filed for the general seat and three nominations for the reserved seat. After scrutiny, the Returning Officer accepted five of the twelve general‑seat nominations as valid and rejected the remaining seven. For the reserved seat, the officer declared only the nomination of Randaman Singh to be valid, rejecting the other two, and consequently announced Randaman Singh as elected unopposed. Of the five candidates whose nominations for the general seat were upheld, two withdrew before polling, leaving three candidates to contest the election. Voting took place at various polling stations in the constituency between 11 January and 19 January 1952. The vote totals recorded were 71,589 for Bhagwan Datt Shastri, 56,585 for Ram Ratan Gupta and 34,990 for Puranmal. Based on these results, Bhagwan Datt Shastri was declared elected, and his election was published in the Gazette on 14 February 1952. Following the declaration, two election petitions were filed on 24 April 1952, each challenging the validity of the election. The first petition, Election Petition No. 185 of 1952, was presented by four voters and sought to set aside the election of the appellant and to declare Ram Ratan Gupta as the properly elected member. The second petition, Election Petition No. 187 of 1952, was filed by three other voters and also requested that the appellant’s election be nullified; additionally, it asked that the unopposed election of Randaman Singh to the reserved seat be set aside, citing similar grounds as the first petition together with an additional substantial ground concerning the alleged erroneous rejection of three nominations for the general seat.

For the general‑seat election the Returning Officer had rejected several nomination papers on the ground that they were invalid. The petitioners specifically contended that the rejections of the nominations of three candidates—Baboo Lal Udaniya, Deep Narain and Rajkishore Shukla—were erroneous both in fact and in law, and that such error had materially affected the result of the election. Because of this allegation the relief sought in the second petition was not limited to setting aside the election of the appellant; it also asked that the entire election be declared void, which would consequently remove even the reserved‑seat candidate who had been returned unopposed.

Common evidence was taken in both petitions with the consent of the parties. Each petition raised a large number of issues, many of which overlapped. While many of those issues were decided in favour of the appellant, only three issues in the first petition were found against him. Those three issues related respectively to (1) undue influence, (2) the use of vehicles for transporting voters to the polling station, and (3) an appeal to voters on the basis of caste, race, community or religion. In the second petition, the Tribunal reached the same adverse findings on those three matters and, in addition, held that the wrongful rejection of certain nomination papers had materially affected the election. As a result of these findings the Tribunal set aside the election of the appellant. The additional relief claimed in the first petition—that Ram Ratan Gupta should be declared elected—was rejected, and the additional relief claimed in the second petition—that Randaman Singh should be unseated—was also rejected. Consequently, the Tribunal upheld the election of the reserved‑seat candidate but ordered a fresh election for the general seat.

The Court noted that there was no question before it concerning the correctness of the Tribunal’s order to uphold the reserved‑seat election or to reject the prayer that Ram Ratan Gupta be declared elected. The sole remaining issue common to both appeals was whether the Tribunal was correct in setting aside the appellant’s election in each of the two petitions. Since only one common question arose, the Court decided to consider both appeals together and to dispose of them by a single common judgment.

The Tribunal’s findings that led to the setting aside of the appellant’s election were detailed. It observed that leaflets identified as Exhibit P‑3 had been circulated in numerous villages of Shahdol district, stating that any member of the Gond community who failed to vote for the appellant would be ex‑communicated. These leaflets were distributed by various red‑capped workers who were members of the Socialist Party and who, in effect, acted as agents of the appellant. This conduct was held to constitute a major corrupt practice of undue influence under the relevant provision of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

In this case the appellant had contested the election as a candidate on the ticket of the Socialist Party. The Tribunal found that workers of the Socialist Party, who distributed political leaflets, acted as the appellant’s agents. One set of leaflets, identified as Exhibit P‑3, was circulated in many villages of Shahdol district and warned members of the Gond community that they would be ex‑communicated if they did not vote for the appellant. Because these leaflets were distributed by persons who were virtually agents of the appellant, the Tribunal concluded that the appellant was guilty of the major corrupt practice of undue influence under proviso (a)(i) and (ii) of Section 123(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. A second series of leaflets, marked as Exhibit P‑6, contained an explicit appeal to voters to vote—or to refrain from voting—on the basis of caste, race, community or religion, and also included a threat of injury. These leaflets were disseminated throughout the whole district of Sidhi and the Tahasil of Mauganj in Rewa district by workers of the Socialist Party, who were likewise treated as the appellant’s agents. The Tribunal held that this conduct constituted another major corrupt practice under the same proviso of Section 123(2) and additionally a minor corrupt practice under Section 124(5) of the Act. Furthermore, on the polling day of 11 January 1952, a number of voters from two villages in the constituency were transported to one polling station in a motor truck that belonged to Achutanand, a fellow Socialist Party candidate contesting the same State Legislative Assembly election. The voters were brought by Achutanand himself and by other Party workers, with the appellant’s knowledge and connivance. The Tribunal found that this act amounted to a major corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(6) of the Act.

The Tribunal also held that the nominations of three persons—namely Baboo Lal Udaniya, Deep Narain and Rajkishore Shukla—had been improperly rejected and that such rejections had materially affected the result of the election. The correctness of all these findings was vigorously contested before the Court on both evidentiary and legal grounds. It was emphasized that each of the findings, if proved, was sufficient on its own to invalidate the appellant’s election. The first three findings related to Sections 123 of the Act and were classified as major corrupt practices; acceptance of any one of them would have justified the Tribunal in setting aside the election under Section 100(2)(b) of the Act. The fourth finding concerning the improper rejection of the three nominations, if sustained, would have rendered the election void under Section 100(1)(a) of the Act.

The Court observed that the issues raised by findings 1, 2 and 3 were primarily questions of fact, although the parties argued that they were intertwined with questions of law. The principal legal questions asserted by the parties with regard to these three findings were as follows: first, concerning the alleged major corrupt practice based on Exhibit P‑3, the election petitions were said not to have supplied the requisite particulars, thereby depriving the Tribunal of jurisdiction to make a finding on that ground; second, as

Regarding the alleged corrupt practices based on Exhibits P‑3 and P‑6, the Court observed that the principal evidence consisted of the testimony of witness 73, and that the appellant had not been given a fair opportunity to challenge this evidence. The Court also noted that for each of the first three findings recorded by the Tribunal, no direct link between the appellant and the alleged wrongdoing was demonstrated. Moreover, the Tribunal’s conclusions were founded on a special theory of agency in election matters, a theory that the Court regarded as erroneous both in fact and in law.

To evaluate the objection concerning the fourth finding, the Court set out the specific reasons why the Returning Officer had rejected the three nominations. The first nomination, that of Baboo Lal Udaniya, was rejected because he served as a lawyer for the State Railway under a standard agreement (Exhibit XA‑2), which the Court held constituted an “office of profit under the State” and therefore disqualified him under Article 58(2) of the Constitution. The second nomination, that of Deep Narain, was rejected because the constituency name was entered as “Shahdol‑Sidhi Mauganj Constituency” instead of the correct description “Shahdol‑Sidhi Districts and Mauganj Tahsil of Rewa District” as required by the Delimitation Order. The third nomination, that of Rajkishore Shukla, was rejected on two grounds: first, the nomination paper was incomplete at the time the candidate signed it, with the proposer’s and seconder’s signatures added later, although the paper presented to the Returning Officer did contain all three signatures; second, the security deposit required under Section 34 of the Act was made by Ram Gopal Varma, and the receipt filed with the nomination did not state that the deposit was made on behalf of the candidate. The Tribunal had held that these rejections were erroneous and, following earlier Tribunal decisions, had presumed that such wrongful rejections materially affected the election result. While counsel for the appellant contested the Tribunal’s view that Baboo Lal Udaniya held an office of profit and challenged the presumption of material effect, the Court was satisfied that the Returning Officer’s rejection of the nominations of Deep Narain and Rajkishore Shukla was indeed erroneous. Consequently, of the four findings of the Tribunal against the appellant, three related to alleged corrupt practices and the fourth concerned the alleged wrongful rejection of nominations.

The fourth finding of the Tribunal related to the alleged wrongful rejection of nominations, while three of the remaining findings dealt with alleged corrupt practices. It was therefore appropriate to first consider the matters concerning the alleged corrupt practices. The Tribunal identified a major corrupt practice involving the wide distribution of pamphlets, which is illustrated by Exhibit P‑3. Several objections were raised against the Tribunal’s finding on this issue. The first objection argued that the allegation made in the election petition was extremely vague and that no particulars had been supplied; consequently, the Tribunal was said to have erred in allowing the allegation to be investigated. The specific allegation appears in paragraph 12(g) of Election Petition No. 185 of 1952 before the Election Tribunal and reads as follows: “The respondent No. 1 himself and through his agents, canvassers, workers and supporters committed the corrupt practice of undue influence in the form of—(g) having circulated leaflets in numerous villages of Shahdol district that every elector belonging to the Gond community who would not vote for respondent No. 1 would be ex‑communicated. The particulars are detailed in List B annexed hereto. (Copy of leaflet annexed hereto).” It was pointed out that List B contains particulars only for sub‑paragraphs (a) to (f) of paragraph 12 and that no particulars at all were furnished for the allegation contained in sub‑paragraph (g). Moreover, the appellant expressly objected to this allegation in paragraph 4 of its written statement, stating: “No particulars have been given for the allegation contained in paragraph 12(g); hence it should be struck off.” Despite this objection, the Tribunal kept the matter in suspense until the final stage, as reflected in the following excerpt from its judgment: “Lastly in para 12(g) it was simply alleged that leaflets were circulated in numerous villages of Shahdol district to the effect that every member belonging to the Gond community who would not vote for respondent No. 1 would be ex‑communicated. No particulars whatsoever about these leaflets, their signatories, or the villages where and the dates on which this form of undue influence was alleged to have been exercised have been given in any paragraph of List B in spite of being so pointed out at the earliest stage by the respondent No. 1 in para 4 of his written statement wherein he pleaded for this allegation to be struck off on this score. At first, we were indeed inclined to strike off this para for want of necessary particulars and to shut out all evidence and arguments adduced thereon.” The Court referred to its decision in Bhikaji Keshao Joshi v. Brijlal Nandlal Biyani, reported in 1955 SCR 428 and AIR SC 610, particularly the passage at page 441 of the SCR (page 616 of the AIR), which states that the requirement of full particulars must be complied with so that the opposite party can meet them fairly and that the enquiry should not become a rambling and roving investigation.

The appellant’s counsel relied on this passage to argue that, in the absence of adequate particulars as in the present case, the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to admit any evidence on the matter or to reach a finding. The importance of providing full particulars is paramount in cases involving allegations of fraud or undue influence, whether before the Tribunal or an ordinary court. However, the present situation differed from the case cited, where the Court had considered the validity of an order dismissing an entire election petition on the preliminary ground of missing particulars. In the current matter, although the required particulars were absent, the Tribunal nevertheless permitted evidence to be presented and taken on the issue. The question that therefore arose was whether the Tribunal’s decision to admit such evidence, despite the deficiency of particulars, was proper under the law.

In the passage quoted, the Court emphasized that particulars must be furnished with sufficient completeness and clarity so that the opposite side can respond fairly, and they must not cause the tribunal’s inquiry to become a vague and wandering investigation. Relying on that principle, counsel for the appellant argued that because the present case lacked adequate particulars, the tribunal was without jurisdiction to admit any evidence on that basis or to make a finding. The Court acknowledged that full particulars are of utmost importance in matters of this nature, just as they are in ordinary courts when allegations of fraud or undue influence are raised. However, the Court distinguished the present situation from the earlier decision cited, where the issue was whether an order dismissing an entire election petition on the preliminary ground of lack of particulars was valid. In the present case, despite the absence of detailed particulars, the tribunal had nevertheless permitted the evidence to be presented and admitted. Accordingly, the relevant question was not one of jurisdictional defect but whether the failure to provide particulars caused any material prejudice to the appellant. Accordingly, the Court held that the objection raised by the appellant must be examined in that context. The Court therefore found it necessary to scrutinise the specific evidence upon which the tribunal’s finding was based and to determine whether the appellant had a reasonable opportunity to meet that evidence. The tribunal’s finding relied on a printed pamphlet marked as Exhibit P‑3 and on the testimony of witnesses identified as PW‑10, PW‑11, PW‑12 and PW‑73. Exhibit P‑3, as indicated in the election petition, was attached to the petition when it was filed before the Election Commission; the pamphlet purported to bear the signatures of three persons—Sukh Sen Raj Gond, Thakur Din Raj Gond and Bharosa Raj Gond—and identified Kumar Printing Works, Daraganj, Prayag, as the printer. PW‑73 was the proprietor of Kumar Printing Works. The record also showed that on 5 January 1953 a series of interrogatories had been served on the appellant on behalf of the election petitioners, several of which specifically named the aforementioned witnesses. The interrogatories included questions such as whether Sukh Sen, Thakur Din and Bharosa Raj Gond were the appellant’s workers and canvassers in Shahdol district, and inquiries about their alleged candidature and party affiliations. The Court noted these details to illustrate that the evidence relied upon was directly linked to the interrogatories and that the appellant had been put on notice of the matters in dispute. Consequently, the Court concluded that the lack of particulars in the original petition did not prejudice the appellant because the evidence was already identified and the appellant had the chance to address it.

The Court considered the interrogatories that asked, in paragraph 26(a), whether Dhanukram and Devdutta Ram of Dhureta and Sanwalia Ram of Sheorajpur in Tehsil Mauganj were members of the Socialist Party and workers of the appellant in that Tehsil, and in paragraph 26(b) whether those individuals had issued the pamphlet printed by Kumar Printing Works, Allahabad, which was filed with the petition and circulated among electors. The answers to these questions were recorded on 13 January 1953, wherein the respondent answered “No” to each of the sub‑questions, including “No” to 24(a), “No, knowledge” to 24(b), “No, personal knowledge” to 24(c), “No” to 24(d), “No” to 25(a), “No” to 26(a), and “No” to 26(b). The formal recording of evidence then began on 13 April 1953, after the exchange of the interrogatories and their replies.

The Court observed that the finding on this allegation relied on the pamphlet attached to the petition and on the testimony of witnesses whose names were specifically mentioned in the interrogatories. Accordingly, the Court held that the non‑inclusion of further particulars in the election petition itself could not have caused prejudice to the appellant, and therefore the objection raised on that ground was without substance.

The Court noted that Exhibit P‑3 clearly fell within the ambit of Section 123(2) of the Act, a point that was not contested. However, counsel argued that the testimony of the four witnesses on whom the case depended was vulnerable to serious objections. The evidence quoted stated that Exhibit P‑3 had been printed at the press of PW 73 on the basis of a manuscript supplied by the appellant, Bhagwan Datt Shastri, together with another individual, Joshi, both of whom had placed the printing order. It was further alleged that the original typed manuscript bore the appellant’s signature and that the counter‑foil numbered 178‑A in the printer’s bill‑book corresponded to the bill for this printing job. The second point of the evidence was that pamphlets matching Exhibit P‑3 were distributed by red‑capped Socialist Party workers in certain villages of the constituency.

The Court recorded that these findings had been challenged vigorously. It was strongly contended that the appellant had not been given a reasonable opportunity to meet and refute additional evidence taken from PW 73 at a later stage, particularly concerning an alleged error in the appellant’s earlier testimony about the date of the counter‑foil. After reviewing the matter, the Court concluded that no grievance existed regarding the appellant’s opportunity to rebut the further evidence. The Court further expressed the view that there was no sufficient reason to reject the Tribunal’s conclusions, which were that (1) the pamphlet identified as Exhibit P‑3 had indeed been distributed within the constituency by certain persons, and (2) the pamphlet had been printed by the appellant himself, as he, together with Joshi, had placed the printing order.

The Tribunal found that the appellant had ordered the printing of the pamphlet identified as Exhibit P‑3 together with the proprietor of the printing press, who was the witness identified as P.W. 73. The Tribunal also concluded that the original copy of the pamphlet bore the appellant’s signature when it was handed to the printer for printing. Based on these facts, the Tribunal determined that the appellant was directly responsible for distributing the pamphlet and, consequently, for committing the alleged corrupt practice. The Tribunal further held that the distribution of Exhibit P‑3 had been carried out by workers of the Socialist Party, who, according to the evidence, acted as agents of the appellant. This additional conclusion had been challenged on both factual and legal grounds. The Court observed that, even if the allegation regarding the Socialist Party workers was disputed, that point was not essential to the finding on this item because the same evidence underlay the conclusions for all three related items. Accordingly, the challenge to that particular aspect did not affect the overall finding of the appellant’s direct responsibility.

The Court then addressed the major and minor corrupt practices alleged in connection with the distribution of a different pamphlet, identified as Exhibit P‑6. The Tribunal’s finding that this pamphlet had been distributed within the constituency was supported by the testimony of a large number of witnesses, specifically P.W.s 28, 47, 48, 50, 51, 64, 66, 67, 73 and 75. The witness who had testified about Exhibit P‑3, namely P.W. 73, gave identical evidence concerning Exhibit P‑6, and the Tribunal accepted this evidence in its entirety. The testimonies of the other witnesses were also accepted and together established that workers of the Socialist Party had distributed Exhibit P‑6 throughout the constituency. The challenge to this finding mirrored the challenge previously raised against the evidence concerning the printing and distribution of Exhibit P‑3. The Court noted that there was no dispute that the latter part of Exhibit P‑6 fell within the prohibited category. Regarding the allegation that full particulars had not been furnished, the Court found no merit in that complaint because all required particulars were explicitly listed in List D, which was referred to in paragraph 13 of the petition. Consequently, the Court concluded that no further challenge to this item could be entertained. In addition, the Court observed that, as a minor corrupt practice, this allegation did not depend on whether the act was performed directly by the candidate, by his agent, or with their connivance. Nevertheless, the Tribunal had held—without any challenge before this Court—that the content of the pamphlet also satisfied the conditions of proviso (a)(i) and (ii) to section 123(2) of the Act, thereby constituting a major corrupt practice as well.

Finally, the Court turned to the alleged major corrupt practice involving the conveyance of voters in motor vehicles to a polling station. This allegation had been seriously challenged before the Court. The alleged conduct fell within the ambit of section 123(6) of the Act, which prohibits the hiring or procurement of any vehicle for transporting electors to or from any polling station. The matter formed issue No. 6 before the Tribunal, and the specific allegations were set out in paragraph 14 of the petition, with the accompanying particulars recorded in List E annexed to the petition.

The provision concerning the hiring or procuring of any vehicle for the conveyance of electors to or from any polling station was the subject of issue number six before the Tribunal. The allegations relating to this issue were set out in paragraph fourteen of the petition, and the detailed particulars were supplied in list E annexed to that petition. The principal allegation stated that, on 11 January 1952 – one of the polling dates – a motor truck owned by Achutanand was used to bring electors from the villages of Amalak and Jurmaniya to the Alhua polling station, and that the transport was carried out by Achutanand of village Dhera together with his co‑workers. Evidence presented by the petitioners indicated that voters from several villages in the constituency were being conveyed to the polling station in motor trucks, and that those trucks belonged to Achutanand, who was a candidate of the Socialist Party for the local Assembly seat in the same constituency where the parliamentary poll was taking place. Further testimony affirmed that the trucks were indeed owned by the said candidate Achutanand himself. Witness PW‑68 testified, “I saw voters being carried from my tola neighbouring Jurmaneya to the polling station Alhua in motor trucks. Those trucks were of Shri Achutanand a candidate of Socialist Party who stood for Assembly seats. Bhagwan Datt Shastri was a candidate for Parliamentary seat … I saw Shri Achutanand and his workers sitting in that truck. I have seen Achutanand and his workers wearing red caps going in that truck.” Witness PW‑79 similarly declared, “I saw Shri Achutanand carrying voters to that station in a motor truck. He did so three or four times. There were about twenty‑five to thirty men of the public carried in each trip including Shri Achutanand. The men carried in the truck were from the villages Jurmaniya, Salwa and Amullakpur. These villages were within a mile from Alhua. The motor truck used to stop near the polling booth in the school every time.” Witness PW‑75 added, “I canvassed for Shri Achutanand who was Socialist candidate for Assembly and for Sri Bhagwan Dutt Shastri who was Socialist candidate for the House of People. Shri Achutanand had got two motor trucks.” The candidate Achutanand himself was examined as rebuttal witness 21. He denied that he personally carried or conveyed voters in a motor truck on the polling day, but he conceded that his brother Anjani Kumar and another villager named Bhayya possessed trucks that were in use during the election, and he suggested that those trucks might have been hired by the Government for the purpose of transporting ballot boxes. After considering all of this evidence, the Tribunal reached a definite finding that motor trucks belonging to Achutanand were employed on the polling date for the conveyance of electors to the polling booth.

In the present matter the Tribunal’s finding that motor trucks belonging to Achutanand were used on the polling day could not be seriously challenged. Nevertheless, the Tribunal’s conclusion that the use of those trucks was linked to the appellant’s candidature was not supported by the evidence. The record showed that no agency relationship between the appellant and Achutanand, or between the appellant and the workers who operated the trucks, had been established. It was submitted that the Tribunal had relied on a theory of agency that was based on an incorrect understanding of what constitutes agency for election purposes, and that this theory was legally erroneous. While it is true that election tribunals have sometimes applied a different standard of proof when assessing agency in electoral disputes, the statute itself defines “agent” in section 79(a) as including an election agent, a polling agent, a counting agent, and any person who, during the trial of an election petition or of an offence relating to an election, is held to have acted as an agent in connection with the election with the knowledge or consent of the candidate. The scope and limits of the doctrine of agency in the electoral context, and the exact effect of the statutory definition, are matters that may require careful consideration by the Supreme Court when a proper case is presented. These issues are significant because they affect the overall structure of elections that are conducted on party lines, and they had not been fully addressed in the present case. Accordingly, the Tribunal’s finding against the appellant, which was based on the assertion of agency, rested on evidence that might support a positive finding of agency, but the legal basis for such a finding required further analysis of the electoral system and the statutory language.

The evidence presented by several witnesses helped to illuminate the operation of the election system at the time. Witness R.W. 14 testified that he had been a member of the Socialist Party since 1949 and that, during the election, he served as General Secretary of the Mauganj Tehsil Socialist Party. He affirmed that he knew Bhagwan Dutt Shastri was contesting as the Socialist candidate for the House of the People, and that Achutanand was one of three Socialist candidates for the Assembly. He explained that he was among those responsible for supervising the party’s election campaign, and that the party workers canvassed for the party’s candidates in general rather than for any individual candidate by name. He further stated that Respondent No. 1 had no workers of his own acting in an individual capacity, and that all expenses related to the election of party candidates were incurred from the party fund. Another witness, R.W. 18, who was also called on behalf of the appellant, confirmed that he was acquainted with the Socialist Party workers in his constituency and observed that those workers performed their duties for the party candidate collectively, not for any single individual. This testimony reinforced the view that the party’s election activities, including the transportation of voters, were conducted as part of a coordinated party effort rather than as actions directed by the appellant personally.

Witness statements indicated that campaigning was conducted for the party as a whole and not for any individual candidate. One witness said that Shastriji was a candidate of the Socialist Party. Achutanand, identified as R. W. 21, testified that in his constituency canvassing and propaganda were carried out on party lines and not for any individual candidates. He added that Respondent No. 1 had no worker or canvasser of his own in that constituency and that Respondent No. 1 obtained the majority of votes because of the extensive propaganda conducted for the Socialist Party and its symbol, the banyan tree.

On the basis of this testimony the Court observed that the evidence did not permit the conclusion that the Election Tribunal was wrong in holding that the transportation of voters to the polling station in trucks belonging to Achutanand was done with the connivance of the appellant, who was a party candidate. The Court noted that such conduct alone satisfied the requirements of Section 126(6) of the Act. It was not unreasonable to attribute to the candidate knowledge of the activities carried out by his party in that area and, consequently, to infer his connivance. This inference was supported by the return of election expenses filed by the appellant, which showed a payment made by him to the Socialist Party for certain expenses, and by the fact that, according to his own witnesses, the appellant had no independent workers of his own in that area. Accordingly, the Court was satisfied that the Tribunal’s finding on this point was well‑grounded.

The Court further held that there was no reason to interfere with the Tribunal’s findings concerning the three alleged corrupt practices previously described. Accordingly, the Tribunal’s conclusion that the appellant’s election should be set aside under Section 100(2)(b) of the Act was to be upheld. The Court considered it unnecessary to examine the Tribunal’s findings regarding the rejection of the nominations of Baboo Lal Udani, Deep Narain and Rajkishore Shukla, nor to address the two important questions of law raised in that context. In the end, the appeals were dismissed with costs, and a single set of costs was ordered to cover both appeals.