Banarsi Das and Others vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Petition No. 569 of 1954

Decision Date: 16 April, 1956

Coram: Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Syed Jaffer Imam

In the matter titled Banarsi Das and Others versus The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 16 April 1956. The judgment was authored by Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha and the bench comprised Justices Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati and Syed Jaffer Imam. The case is reported in the 1956 volume of AIR at page 520 and also in the Supreme Court Reporter at page 357. The petitioners, identified as Banarsi Das and several other former patwaris, filed the petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, invoking the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14 and 16. The respondents were the State of Uttar Pradesh and other governmental entities. The citation to the Constitution indicates that the dispute concerned the Government’s authority to prescribe qualifications for new recruits to any appointment or employment under the Government, and whether candidates who were former employees possessed a fundamental right to such employment.

The petitioners, who were former patwaris employed by the State of Uttar Pradesh, alleged that they had been denied equality before the law and equal opportunity for employment, in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. At the time of the dispute, approximately 28,000 patwaris served in the state. These officials organized themselves into an association known as “The U.P. Patwaris Association” with the purpose of improving their salaries and allowances. The association passed resolutions seeking higher pay and better emoluments. While the Government was considering these demands, a large number of patwaris commenced a “pen‑down strike”. In response, the Government withdrew its recognition of the association and subsequently published a revised “Land Records Manual” that incorporated amended rules concerning recruitment, conditions of service, and duties of patwaris. The association protested the new manual and on 2 February 1953 passed a resolution directing all patwaris to submit their resignations, to be effective by 4 March 1953, after which they would consider themselves released from any obligations to serve the Government. Approximately 26,000 patwaris complied with the resolution, intending to paralyse the revenue administration and compel the Government to meet their demands. The Government, however, accepted the resignations and relieved the patwaris of their duties before the 4 March deadline. On the following day, 5 March 1953, the Government announced the creation of a new service designated “Lekhpals” and began recruiting personnel for this service. The recruitment process included many of the former patwaris, as well as those whose service records were free from blemishes and who had withdrawn their resignations. Some of the petitioners were absorbed into the newly formed cadre of Lekhpals, indicating that the Government offered a chance for repentance to those former patwaris who had participated in the agitation. The central question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioners, who fell within the category excluded from re‑appointment, had been denied an equal opportunity of appointment as Lekhpals, thereby infringing Article 16 of the Constitution.

The Court held that the petitioners' claim of being barred from re‑entering Government service after the re‑organisation of the cadre under a new name, and of being denied the equality of opportunity guaranteed by Article 16 of the Constitution, lacked any substantive merit. The Court observed that the State was fully entitled to prescribe certain qualifications for the newly created posts and to exclude individuals who had demonstrated a lack of proper disciplinary sense. It further explained that Article 16 represents the application of the broader principle of equality embodied in Article 14, specifically concerning the opportunities for appointment and employment in Government service. Consequently, the Court affirmed that, like any other employer, the Government could select from among a large pool of applicants and could lawfully refuse appointment to persons who failed to meet the established criteria.

In this original jurisdiction matter, Petition No. 569 of 1954 was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Counsel for the petitioners included Purshotam Trikamdas, S. N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath of the firm Rajinder Narain and Co. For the respondents, the Advocate‑General of Uttar Pradesh, K. L. Misra, together with S. P. Sinha, K. B. Asthana and C. P. Lal, appeared. The judgment was delivered on 16 April 1956 by Justice Sinha. The petition was brought on behalf of 726 former patwaris employed by the State of Uttar Pradesh, seeking enforcement of Articles 14 and 16 on the ground that they had been denied equality before the law and equal opportunity for employment. The second respondent was the Revenue Minister of Uttar Pradesh, the third respondent the Land Reforms Commissioner, and respondents four to eight were the Collectors of Meerut, Muzaffarnagar, Aligarh, Badaun and Moradabad. Approximately 28,000 patwaris throughout Uttar Pradesh had organized in 1940 as “The U.P. Patwaris Association” to improve their prospects and emoluments. They served as part‑time officers in the Revenue Department, and after the implementation of the Zamindari Abolition Act their services became especially valuable. The Association regularly convened meetings, passed resolutions demanding higher pay, additional allowances, and better service conditions, and presented these demands to the Government through representations to the Revenue Minister. However, on the advice of misguided counsel, a large number of patwaris initiated a “pen‑down strike” on 9 January 1953, prompting the Government to withdraw official recognition of the Association on 19 February 1953. Meanwhile, the new Land Records Manual was issued in January 1953, incorporating amended rules on recruitment, service conditions and duties of patwaris, which intensified the dispute and led to a special session of the Association at Lucknow on 26 January 1953.

At a special session of the Association held in Lucknow on 26 January 1953, the Association adopted resolutions that protested the revised Land Records Manual. It also resolved that all patwaris should submit their resignations on 2 February 1953, with the intention that they would be relieved of their duties by 4 March 1953, after which they would consider themselves released from any obligations to serve the Government. Following that resolution, about twenty‑six thousand patwaris across the State tendered their resignations. By submitting their resignations collectively, the patwaris displayed a lack of discipline and appeared to aim at paralyzing the entire revenue administration in order to compel the Government to meet their demands. They did not anticipate that the Government might simply accept the resignations and act upon them. The Government indeed chose to accept the resignations, and the petitioners were relieved of their duties before 4 March 1953. On the very next day, 5 March, the Government announced the creation of a new service called “Lekhpals” and began organising that service by recruiting new personnel, many of whom were former patwaris. The new cadre also incorporated all patwaris whose service records were free from blemishes and who had withdrawn their resignations. Among the petitioners, one hundred and thirty‑two were absorbed into the new cadre of Lekhpals, and many others were likely to be taken into Government service. Consequently, the Government provided a chance for repentance to those former patwaris who had realised their mistake in joining the agitation and who now sought to re‑enter service. The petitioners complained that they were prevented from re‑entering Government service after the reorganisation of the cadre under the new scheme. However, the Government was within its authority to prescribe certain qualifications for the new recruits and was entitled to exclude persons who had demonstrated a lack of proper discipline. Therefore, it could not be said that the Government denied equal opportunity to those who were otherwise alike. The Government had not permanently filled all vacancies in the new cadre, and the petitioners who were willing to accept Government discipline could approach the appropriate authorities through the proper channels. It was expected that their cases would receive sympathetic consideration by the Government, consistent with the requirements of public service. The new recruitment scheme, as set out in the Government orders of 5 March, directed that all patwaris who had not resigned and who had not yet attained the age of superannuation would be absorbed, that patwaris who had resigned but had withdrawn their resignations by 4 March 1953 would also be absorbed, and that among those whose resignations had been accepted, only those with an excellent work record and who had not actively participated in the agitation would be taken in, alongside fresh recruits.

The judgment explained that the Government order dated 5 March specified that all patwaris who had not resigned and who had not yet reached the age of superannuation would be absorbed into the new cadre; that patwaris who had resigned but subsequently withdrew their resignations by 4 March 1953 would also be absorbed; and that among those whose resignations had been accepted, only individuals possessing an excellent work record and who had not taken an active part in the agitation would be taken in, together with fresh recruits. The petitioners contended that because they fell within the categories excluded from re‑appointment, they had been denied an equal opportunity to be appointed as Lekhpals, thereby infringing article 16 of the Constitution. The judgment held that the appointing authority is free to prescribe the qualifications and prerequisite conditions that are conducive to maintaining proper discipline among Government servants. When persons already employed on a part‑time basis have shown themselves to be lacking in discipline, the Government may lawfully decide not to appoint such persons to the permanent cadre of Lekhpals, since they cannot be regarded as as efficient as those who have an excellent service record and a greater sense of responsibility toward their employer. Article 16 is recognised as an application of the general equality principle embodied in article 14, specifically relating to opportunities for appointment and employment under the Government. Like any other employer, the Government may select from a large pool of candidates. The old patwaris had held part‑time positions, and the new cadre of Lekhpals was intended to reorganise that service on a more satisfactory basis for both the Government and the employees, making the Lekhpals whole‑time officials with higher pay and better prospects, subject to the Government Servants Conduct Rules. If the Government has chosen to exclude those part‑time servants who have demonstrated a deficiency in discipline and responsibility, this does not amount to a denial of equal opportunity for appointment and employment. No rule was promulgated that barred any particular group from being candidates; only departmental instructions were issued not to employ persons whose past service record was unsatisfactory. Selection for appointment must be on a competitive basis, and those whose past service has been free from blemish are therefore rightly considered better qualified for Government service than those whose records contain blemishes. The situation is analogous to a condition precedent for promotion within the same cadre, whereby only candidates with a very satisfactory past record may be considered for advancement.

In this matter, the government had stipulated that a promotion to a higher rank within the same cadre of government service could be granted only if the employee possessed a very satisfactory service record. The Court therefore concluded that the petitioners had not provided sufficient proof to show that they were denied the equality of opportunity guaranteed by article 16 of the Constitution. After invoking article 32 of the Constitution, the majority of the petitioners, together with a large number of other individuals amounting to a total of 1,352 persons, filed an application for special leave to appeal. The application, recorded as Special Leave Petition No. 426 of 1955, sought to challenge the judgment and orders of the Allahabad High Court dated 24 August 1954, which had been issued in Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 45 of 1954. This application for special leave was made after the petitioners’ earlier request for permission to appeal to this Court had been rejected by an order dated 5 August 1955. The special leave petition was filed beyond the period prescribed by the rules of this Court, and the petitioners themselves acknowledged a delay of forty‑four days in its filing. The only justification advanced for condoning the delay, presented in Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 1402 of 1955, was that the petitioners needed additional time to collect contributions from the many individuals who were interested in supporting the case. The Court considered this reason to be inadequate for granting condonation of the delay. Accordingly, the Court dismissed both the petition filed under article 32 of the Constitution and the application for special leave to appeal, and it ordered that no costs be awarded to either side.