Bachharam Datta Patil And Another vs Vishwanath Pundalik Patil Andothers

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 249 of 1953

Decision Date: 20 September, 1956

Coram: Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, B. Jagannadhadas, S.K. Das

In the matter of Bachharam Datta Patil and another versus Vishwanath Pundalik Patil and others, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment on the twentieth day of September, 1956. The decision was rendered by a bench consisting of Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Justice B. Jagannadhadas, and Justice S. K. Das. The petitioners were Bachharam Datta Patil and another, while the respondents were Vishwanath Pundalik Patil and others. The case was reported in the 1957 Annual Law Reports at page 34 and also in the Supreme Court Reports at page 675. The legal issue concerned lands that were originally granted as Watan lands and later resumed by the Government after the services that the holders were required to render were dispensed with. Full assessment was subsequently levied on those lands, and the lands were thereafter described as “Japti Sanadi Inam” lands. The Court examined whether the lands retained their character as Watan lands after such resumption and re-description. The Court held that the lands had lost the character of Watan lands and had become ryotwari holdings of the former holders. The Court relied upon the earlier decision in Ramijyabi Muktum Saheb v. Gudusaheb, reported in the Bombay Law Reporter at page 405, which affirmed that the description “Japti Sanadi Inam” indicated that the lands were once the subject of an Inam grant by virtue of a Sanad, had been resumed or confiscated by the Government, and were left in the hands of the holder as ryotwari holdings. The Court further explained that when the Government commutes the services to be rendered, the determination of whether the lands continue to be Watan lands depends on the terms of the agreement entered into between the Government and the holder at the time of commutation.

The appeal arose from Civil Appeal No. 249 of 1953, which was filed on a decree dated the first day of September, 1949, issued by the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 23 of 1947. That decree itself stemmed from an original decree dated the twenty-eighth day of September, 1946, passed by the Civil Judge, Session Division at Belgawn, in Suit No. 360 of 1945. Counsel for the appellants, namely K. R. Beneri and J. B. Dadachanji together with a second pleader, represented the petitioners. Counsel for respondent No. 1, namely H. B. Datar and Naunit Lal, represented the opposing party. The judgment was pronounced by Justice Sinha. The Court noted that the appeal was taken by special leave of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay from the decision of a Division Bench of that Court, which had reversed the trial court’s judgment concerning items 3, 4, and 6 in the list of properties attached to the plaint, while upholding the trial court’s decision on the remaining items. The Court observed that the three disputed items, together with the other properties in controversy, had originally been decreed in favour of the first and second plaintiffs as Watan property. However, on an appeal filed by the third defendant, the High Court had set aside the trial court’s determination with respect to those three items, confirming the trial court’s finding on the other properties. The Court therefore focused its analysis on the legal consequences of the Government’s resumption and re-characterisation of the lands, and affirmed that the resumed lands could no longer be treated as Watan lands.

The Court observed that the trial judge had affirmed the decision of the lower court concerning the three disputed items and had also confirmed the trial court’s ruling on the remaining properties listed in the plaint. The original owner, identified as Shreemant, had died on 23 November 1941, leaving his wife Radhabai as his surviving spouse. Radhabai subsequently died on 9 May 1945, and her death gave rise to a dispute between two groups of claimants. On one side were the reversioners, including plaintiffs 2 and 3, who were the appellants before this Court. On the other side were the defendants, who asserted that they were entitled to the estate by virtue of alleged adoptions allegedly performed by Radhabai. The first plaintiff was no longer a party to the proceedings because the lower courts had jointly concluded that he possessed no right to the estate left by Shreemant through the adoption claimed in his favor. The courts found that, prior to any adoption, the estate had already vested in the actual reversioners, namely plaintiffs 2 and 3, who were the agnatic relatives of Shreemant. According to the provisions of the Bombay Act V of 1886, the portion of Shreemant’s estate that comprised Watan lands had vested in plaintiffs 2 and 3. The defendants, identified as defendant 2 and defendant 3, had each alleged that they had been adopted by Radhabai; had either of them been able to prove such adoption, they would have succeeded to the estate as adopted sons of the propositus, thereby displacing the agnatic claim of plaintiffs 2 and 3. However, both subordinate courts concurrently held that neither defendant 2 nor defendant 3 succeeded in establishing the alleged adoptions. Consequently, the trial court substantially decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs with respect to all the properties in dispute, including the three items that now formed the sole controversy before this Court. The trial court found that these three items were also Watan properties and, like the other disputed lands, were inherited by the reversioners, plaintiffs 2 and 3. On appeal, the High Court reversed the trial court’s finding concerning those three items, holding that although they were originally Watan lands, they had lost that character because the Government had resumed them after dispensing with the traditional service and after levying a full assessment on the lands. The records of the lower courts referred to those lands as “Japti Sanadi Inam” lands, and the present judgment would use that description for the disputed properties. The controversy, therefore, had narrowed to the question of whether the Japti Sanadi Inam lands continued to retain their status as Watan lands, as the trial court had held, or whether they had ceased to be Watan lands in light of the events described in the High Court’s decision. The Court noted that it was not contested that, should the lands still be regarded as Watan lands, the plaintiff-appellants would be entitled to them, just as they had already been adjudged entitled to the remainder of the disputed properties, which were undisputedly Watan lands. It is

It was equally undisputed that, if the lands described as Japti Sanadi Inam were no longer to be treated as Watan lands, the appeal could not succeed. Both the trial court and the appellate court below, however, expressed their views on this point in a rather opaque manner. The trial court, after examining the records, declared that the parcels of land bearing serial numbers three, four and six were Japti Sanadi lands and that they continued to possess the character of Sanadi lands notwithstanding the temporary suspension of the services attached to them and the imposition of a full assessment. The trial court further stated that Sanadi lands had been held to be Watan lands governed by the Watan Act. The judgment of the trial court did not attempt to substantiate these conclusions by reference to any statutory rule or to any judicial precedent that might support the contention that the lands retained their Watan status after the service was temporarily dispensed with and a full assessment was levied. The High Court, acting in its appellate capacity, addressed the same issue in the following terms: it observed that there was no evidence to support the trial judge’s remark that the services had been temporarily suspended by the Government. Consequently, the High Court held that, since the Record of Rights indicated that a full assessment was being levied on the lands and that the lands were described as Japti Sanadi Inam lands—signifying that they had formerly been Sanadi lands but had subsequently been resumed by the Government—the logical conclusion was that these parcels of land had ceased to be held under Sanadi tenure and were now held under ordinary occupancy rights.

The counsel representing the appellants forcefully contended that the High Court’s conclusion was erroneous because it rested solely on the fact that the service attached to the lands had been dispensed with and a full assessment had been imposed by the Government. The appellants based their argument on the provisions of the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act (Bombay Act III), 1874, asserting that the statutory framework did not support the High Court’s inference. Accordingly, the Court found it necessary to examine the relevant sections of the Act to determine whether they endorsed the High Court’s reasoning. Section 4 of the Act, which defines “Watan property”, “hereditary office” and “Watan”, provides that “Watan Property means movable or immovable property held, acquired or assigned for providing remuneration for the performance of the duty appertaining to an hereditary office. It includes a right to levy customary fees or perquisites, in money or in kind, whether at fixed times or otherwise. It includes cash payments in addition to the original watan property made voluntarily by Government and subject periodically to modification or withdrawal.” The same section defines “Hereditary office” as “every office held hereditarily for the performance of duties connected with the administration or collection of the public revenue, or with the village police, or with the settlement of boundaries, or other matters of civil administration. The expression includes such office even where the services originally appertaining to it have ceased to be demanded.” The definition concludes that the watan-property, if any, together with the hereditary office and the rights and privileges attached to them constitute the watan. From these definitions it was clear that the presence of a hereditary office and the assignment of property as remuneration were essential ingredients for the existence of a watan.

In order for a parcel of land to qualify as a Watan, the law requires two elements: first, there must exist a hereditary office, and second, there must be Watan property that is allotted to the holder of that office, known as the “Watandar,” as remuneration for performing the duties attached to the office. The appellants argued that it was a matter of common knowledge that the Sanadi Inam lands had originally been Watan property and that, once a piece of land acquires the character of an inam, that character persists because the Government has not been empowered by any statute to alter it. No case law or statutory provision was cited that directly supports this broad proposition.

The Court’s attention was drawn to the provisions of section 15 of the Act, which authorize the Collector to commute the service obligation and to relieve the holder of a Watan, together with his heirs and successors, from the duty to perform the service permanently, provided that the parties agree to certain conditions. The appellants’ argument, based on section 15, contended that although the service tied to the Watan lands in question might have been commuted, the Watan itself would continue to exist and the lands would retain their character as Watan lands. This line of reasoning presupposes that even after the service obligation is wholly dispensed with in perpetuity, the land’s status as a Watan endures, an assumption that the Court identified as a case of begging the question.

Moreover, clause (1) of section 15 expressly provides that the commutation may be effected “upon such conditions, whether consistent with the provisions of this Act or not, as may be agreed upon by the Collector and such bolder.” Consequently, the conditions that the former Watan holder and the Government may have agreed upon at the time of commutation can vary widely. In some instances, the agreed conditions might preserve the Watan character of the land; in other instances, the conditions might themselves contemplate ending that character.

In the present matter, the only documentary evidence concerning the lands is the entry in the Record of Rights; no additional evidence was produced to demonstrate the specific terms on which the service was permanently waived or how the full assessment was levied on those lands. Accordingly, the findings of the lower courts do not make clear whether any conditions were attached to the holding of the lands that would be compatible with the continued existence of the original Watan tenure. It is theoretically possible for an agreement to retain the Watan tenure while excusing the holder from performing the customary service. Conversely, it is equally possible that no such conditions were agreed upon, resulting in the termination of the Watan character after the service was dispensed with. According to the findings of the courts below, there was no longer any hereditary office associated with the lands, and therefore the issue of remunerating any service through the usufruct of Watan property did not arise.

The Court noted that because the customary service was no longer required, there was no longer any issue of compensating that service by granting the usufruct of Watan property or by any other mode of remuneration. The Court then turned to the provisions of section 22 of the Act, which expressly state that a Watan may lapse either in part or in whole, may be confiscated, or may be lawfully resumed by the Government. In such circumstances the Act authorises the Government to attach the resumed land to a newly created Watan in favour of persons appointed by the Government. Consequently, the Court held that it was untenable to assert that the Government lacked the power to extinguish the Watan character of a parcel of land. The Court explained that this argument ignored the well-settled legal principle that an authority which possesses the power to create an office and to provide for its remuneration, whether in cash or in kind, likewise possesses the power to revoke that grant. When such a revocation occurs, any land that had been allotted for the purpose of remunerating the abolished office must revert to its original source, namely ryotwari land that is subject to land-revenue assessment. The Court observed that this sequence of events appeared to have taken place in the case before it. The description of the land as “Japti Sanadi Inam” indicated that the land, which had originally been the subject of an inam grant by virtue of a sanad, had been resumed or confiscated by the Government and was thereafter held by the former holder as a ryotwari tenure. The lower courts, as the Court pointed out, had found no evidence regarding the original nature of the grant nor the manner or timing of its resumption, and consequently could not determine how the land came to be subject to ordinary occupancy rights. Nevertheless, those courts proceeded on the assumption that the land had originally been a Watan created by a sanad and that the Government had later resumed it because the service was no longer required and the purpose of the grant had ceased to exist. The courts differed only on the legal consequence of that resumption. The Court then referred to a similar issue that had arisen before the Bombay High Court in the case of Ramijyabi Muktum Saheb v. Gudusaheb. In that case, property that had originally been a Watan continued in the possession of the holder, but the holder was no longer bound to render any service and the land was fully liable to assessment. The question before the Bombay High Court was whether such land retained its character as Watan, with its special rules on alienation, or whether it had become an ordinary occupancy holding. A single judge hearing the appeal at first instance concluded that the land remained a Watan. However, on a Letters Patent appeal, a Division Bench, after an extensive examination of the relevant rules and precedents, reversed that view, holding that the land had lost its Watan character and was now governed by the ordinary law of land tenures in that State. We are

In the present matter, the Court observed that it was in full accord with the determination adopted by the Letters Patent Bench in the earlier decision, noting that the factual matrix of that case closely matched the circumstances before it today. The Court emphasized that the earlier Bench had undertaken a thorough examination of the applicable rules and precedents before arriving at its conclusion, and because the present facts were essentially the same, the same legal outcome necessarily followed. Accordingly, the Court held that there existed no judicial authority nor any established legal principle that could lend support to the argument advanced on behalf of the appellants. In the absence of any such authority or principle, the Court concluded that the contention raised by the appellants could not be sustained. As a result, the Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed in its entirety and that the costs of the proceedings be awarded against the appellants. The Court recorded the citation to the earlier authority as 54 Bom. L R. 405.