Awadh Behari Sharma vs State Of Madhya Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 10 May, 1956

Coram: Jagannadhadas, J.

In this case, the Court noted that the appellant, who was serving as the Acting Station Master at Ghatera railway station on the Bina‑Katni section of the Great Indian Peninsula Railway, had been convicted under Section 101 of the Indian Railways Act for a head‑on collision of two goods trains that occurred at his station on 31 May 1950. The conviction carried a sentence of six months’ rigorous imprisonment. The prosecution had also filed charges against an Assistant Station Master named M. S. Sharma, a pointsman identified as Budhu Singh, and a guard named Badriprasad; however, the trial court had acquitted all three of them. The appellant’s conviction was affirmed by the Sessions Judge on appeal and subsequently upheld by the High Court on revision, leading to the present appeal being filed by special leave. The Court then described the factual background that gave rise to the prosecution. Ghatera was a non‑interlocked station situated between Sagoni and Bandakpur on the Bina‑Katni line, with up trains received from Sagoni and down trains from Bandakpur. The station comprised a single main line and two loop lines. On the day in question, 31 May 1950, the appellant was on duty as Acting Station Master. A ballast train had first arrived and was parked on the outer loop line. Subsequently, a double‑headed goods train designated H‑10 Up arrived at about 15:15 hours from Sagoni and was routed onto the inner loop line, which lay adjacent to the main line. Shortly after, a double‑headed goods train identified as F‑45 Down entered the station from the Bandakpur side and was also directed onto the same inner loop line, resulting in a head‑on collision with the stationary H‑10 Up train. The impact destroyed the locomotives of both trains and eight wagons, killed two drivers and one firman on the spot, and caused injuries to several other persons. According to the prosecution, because the ballast train and H‑10 Up were already occupying the two loop lines, the down train F‑45 should have been received on the main line. The prosecution alleged that the collision occurred because the down‑side signals had been improperly lowered without first setting the points to receive the incoming down train on the main line. The appellant’s defence, on the other hand, contended that at the moment F‑45 entered the station, both the home and the outer signals on the down side were at danger and had not been lowered, contrary to the prosecution’s claim. The defence further asserted that the driver of F‑45 had entered the station at excessive speed and failed to notice that the signals were not set for reception, thereby causing the accident. Finally, the Court observed that a proper understanding of both the prosecution’s case and the defence required an appreciation of the signalling and point‑setting system that was in operation at the station at that time.

At the time of the accident, the operation of signals and the setting of points for receiving trains into the various lines of the station were governed by the station’s working orders and the testimony of the permanent Station Master. To receive a train on any loop line, the points at both far ends of that loop had to be aligned so that the loop connected with the main line, and the line ahead of the loop had to be clear for a distance of at least two hundred yards beyond the outer‑most trailing points. When a train was already standing on the outer loop line, as was the case here, and another train needed to be received on the inner loop line, the guard of the stationary train bore a shared responsibility to ensure that the points were correctly set for the incoming train to enter the inner loop. In a similar manner, if another train was due to arrive at roughly the same time and was to be received on the main line, the guard of the preceding train also shared the duty of confirming that the points were reset properly for the fresh train’s entry onto the main line. Each time the points were set, they had to be aligned at both ends of the intended line. Only after the points were correctly positioned did the home and outer signals on the side from which the train was to be received get lowered to admit the train. Evidence of the permanent Station Master showed that the home signal on each side lay approximately two to three furlongs from the station. The tasks of setting the lines and lowering the signals required the manipulation of respective locks and keys. All keys for points and signals were normally kept by the Station Master, who handed the keys for setting the lines to the Mukaddam at the appropriate moment, and later gave the signal keys to the signalsman after receiving confirmation from the Mukaddam that the lines had been properly set.

In the present case, the factual record indicated that a ballast train had arrived first and was standing on the outer loop line. The next train, identified as H‑10 Up, was to be received from the Sagoni side. Following the receipt of instructions from the Controller, the Station Master transferred the key for setting the lines to the Mukaddam on duty, authorising the preparation of the inner loop line for the up train. The guard of the ballast train accompanied the Mukaddam and observed that the points were correctly aligned for the incoming train. After the points had been set and the locks secured, the Mukaddam and the guard conveyed a signal to the Station Master indicating that the line preparation was complete. Upon receiving this signal, the Station Master then proceeded to hand over the keys for lowering the home and outer signals on the up side to the signalsman, enabling the up train to be received into the inner loop line.

In the sequence of operations, after the Mukaddam and the Guard had given the required signals to the Station Master, the Station Master transferred to the signalsman the keys that were needed to lower the home and outer signals on the up side, that is, on the Sagoni side. The signalsman then lowered those signals, after which the up train was allowed to enter and was taken into the inner loop line. Once the up train had come to a stop on that line, the Mukaddam together with the Guard moved the points on the up side back to the main line position. Following this, the Mukaddam proceeded toward the station with the intention of returning the keys for the up‑side points to the Station Master. It was at this moment that the collision occurred. The procedure that remained to be completed required that the guard of the up train, which had already arrived, join the Mukaddam. Both of them were to walk to the down side of the station and reset the points on that side to the main line position so that the anticipated down train could be received on the main line. After resetting those points, they were required to sign a confirmation and hand it to the Station Master, indicating that the down‑side points had indeed been returned to the main line. The next step prescribed by the standing orders was for the Station Master to give the signalsman instructions to release the signals on the up side and to hand over the keys that were required to lower the signals on the down side. The signalsman would then lower the down‑side signals. When this sequence was completed, the down train would obtain the necessary authority to enter the station, because at that time the lines on both sides would again have been set for reception of a train on the main line. The record contains no direct evidence that any of these subsequent steps were actually carried out. Nevertheless, in the present case it is not contested that the points had been set correctly and that the signals on the up side had been lowered in accordance with the standing orders for receiving the up train from Sagoni, and that the up train was consequently received safely on the inner loop line. It follows that, at that moment, the points on the down side must also have been positioned so as to join the main line beyond the points with the loop line. At the same time, the down‑side signals would still have been showing danger. The matter in dispute between the prosecution and the defence, therefore, is whether the down‑side signals were lowered before the down‑side points had been reset for the reception of the down train, a premature lowering that could have caused the down train to be routed directly into the inner loop line instead of onto the main line. 5. At this stage it is necessary to note the exact times at which the two trains involved in the collision arrived. The H. 10 Up goods train reached Ghatera at 15:15 hours. The F. 45 Down passed Bandakpur at 1.5 hours as a run‑through train. The distance between Bandakpur and Ghatera is six and three‑quarters miles.

According to the evidence, the scheduled interval between the two goods trains that were to meet at Ghatera, the latter being required to stop at that station, was calculated to be twenty‑two minutes. The collision, however, took place almost immediately after the arrival of the up train designated H 10, perhaps within one or two minutes of its arrival. From this sequence it follows that the down train arrived roughly five minutes earlier than its allotted time. On the route there existed a speed limitation of ten miles per hour over a particular bridge, and an additional ten‑miles‑per‑hour restriction applied to the facing points that the train had to negotiate before entering the station. The record shows, and no party now disputes, that at the moment the collision occurred the down train was travelling at approximately twenty‑five miles per hour. The testimony of the first eyewitness, identified as P.W. 1, A.T.S., affirmed that the train’s speed was twenty‑five miles per hour. Moreover, the charge‑sheet filed in the case expressly states that the down train approached from the Bandakpur side with a speed ranging between twenty‑five and thirty miles per hour and subsequently struck the up train H 10.

The principal issue for determination was whether the Station Master had been negligent by allowing the down‑side signals to be lowered for the reception of the down train without first resetting the down‑side points from the inner loop line to the main line. On this point the prosecution and the defence presented conflicting oral evidence. A substantial body of testimony was offered by railway employees who were attached to the station and to the two trains that were already standing on the line, with witnesses appearing for both sides. The prosecution examined seven witnesses, all of whom observed that at the exact moment of the collision the down‑side signals were in the lowered position. In contrast, the six defence witnesses testified that the signals remained at danger. The trial court gave preference to the prosecution’s evidence. It also concluded that the appellant had been negligent in granting a line‑clear indication to the Bandakpur Station Master at approximately fourteen‑forty‑five hours, despite being aware that the up train was scheduled to arrive at fifteen‑fifteen hours and that the down train would reach the station only a few minutes later, leaving an inadequate interval to correctly reset the points from the loop line to the main line for the down train’s reception. Accordingly, the trial court found the appellant negligent on both counts. The appellate court affirmed this view in substance. When the matter was subsequently brought before the High Court on revision, the presiding judge sought clarification of the meaning of “line clear” by recalling the permanent Station Master, identified as P.W. 4, and asking him to explain the term.

When questioned, the permanent Station Master, identified as P. W. 4, explained that “line clear” means the track is free of obstruction between the two outer‑most signals. He clarified that within the control area the Controller, acting on instructions from the Station Master, issues the line‑clear authority after receiving those instructions. Consequently, “line‑clear” does not refer to the condition of the lines inside the station yard for receiving a train, but rather to the absence of any blockage on the line beyond the outer‑most signals on the down side of the station that the train must enter. Understanding this definition, it follows that the Station Master could not be held negligent for informing the Controller at 14‑45 that the line was clear, even though the scheduled arrival times of the two goods trains were close together. The Station Master was justified in expecting that a train would not proceed into the station until the signals on that side were lowered. This clarification appears to have been accepted, albeit implicitly, by the learned High Court judge, who, while not stating it in those exact words, seemed to adopt this interpretation. Nevertheless, the High Court judge, after evaluating the oral evidence, concluded that the signals on the down side had indeed been found lowered at the time of the collision. Accepting this finding, the judge attributed the incident to the willful default or negligence of the appellant, thereby affirming the conviction and sentence.

The counsel for the appellant argued that the evidentiary material on this issue was fairly balanced, and that the scale tipped against the appellant because of a statement attributed to the Mukaddam, Ramchand, identified as P. W. 6, which was recorded in the testimony of Balmukund, P. W. 25, the guard of the up‑bound train H. 10 Up. According to Mukaddam’s own evidence, he proceeded to the up side to set the points for receiving H. 10 Up into the inner loop line; after the train had been properly received and brought to a standstill, he reset the points on the up side onto the main line and was then moving toward the Station Master. Mukaddam claimed that the collision occurred before he could reach the Station Master to hand over the keys. The guard’s testimony corroborated that after his train stopped on the inner loop line, he remained in the brake van, felt a strong jolt, heard the noise of a collision, and, upon looking out, saw Mukaddam approaching. The guard further reported that Mukaddam told him a newly appointed porter had lowered the signals, resulting in the down train striking the stationary up train. This porter was the acquitted accused, Budhu Singh, who had recently joined the station and was responsible for operating the signals. Both the appellate and High Court judgments gave considerable weight to this statement in accepting the prosecution’s case. It is now pointed out that Mukaddam was not questioned about whether he actually made the alleged statement to the guard during his examination.

According to the Guard of the brake‑van, after the collision he stepped onto the verandah of the brake‑van and saw Mukaddam, P.W. 6, approaching. The Guard said that Mukaddam then told him that the newly appointed porter had lowered the signals, after which the down‑train struck the stationary up‑train. The Guard gave this account during his chief examination. The “new porter” mentioned is the accused who had been acquitted, identified as Budhu Singh. Budhu Singh had joined the station only a few days before the accident and was serving as both porter and signalman, being responsible for lowering and raising the signals. Both the appellate Court and the High Court, in their judgments, gave considerable weight to the Guard’s statement when they accepted the prosecution’s evidence. It has been rightly observed that during Mukaddam’s examination no question was put to him about whether he had actually made the statement attributed to him by the Guard. In other words, Mukaddam was never asked if he had told the Guard, P.W. 25, that the porter had lowered the signals. Mukaddam, P.W. 6, was examined on 12‑10‑1950, whereas the Guard, P.W. 25, was examined on 19‑2‑1951, roughly four months later, and both were prosecution witnesses. The prosecution could not plausibly have been unaware of what its own witness would later say regarding a prior witness’s statement. When such a statement is to be used, the person to whom it is ascribed must be afforded an opportunity to explain it; at the very least, Mukaddam should have been recalled for that purpose. Consequently, there is a sound basis for the grievance that a crucial piece of evidence, which was inadmissible because it was introduced months after the original testimony, effectively altered the balance of the case.

The Court noted that the proper method for resolving a matter of this nature is not to rely solely on a balance of oral testimonies, but to consider broader factors and the probability of the events. Oral evidence in such situations is often honestly inconsistent, and the issue is not merely a matter of weighing the reliability of the witnesses. Regardless of the positions taken by the trial Court and the appellate Court, the High Court had before it additional evidence concerning the mechanical aspects of the signalling system, which was admitted and ultimately decisive. In the High Court proceedings, an affidavit was filed by Mr A H Burnett, Divisional Superintendent of Central Railways, Jabalpur. The affidavit stated: “The signals at this station at the time of the accident were worked from a four‑lever ground frame situated opposite the Station Master’s office. There is a Home and an Outer signal provided on each side of the station. The Home signal levers are secured in their normal position by means of padlocks, the keys of which remain in the custody of the Station Master on duty.” This evidence clarified the configuration and control of the signals, indicating that the Home and Outer signals on the up side could be lowered for reception of the up‑train only when the corresponding signals on the down side were at danger, thereby influencing the assessment of how the signals could have been operated at the time of the accident.

The affidavit explains that the signal frame at the station was locked in a manner that required the Home signal to be lowered before the outer signal could be lowered, and that only one Home signal could be lowered at any given time. The station, identified as Ghatera, was described as a non‑interlocked station where the points were not mechanically linked to the signals. The Home signal served all three reception lines and it was the duty of the Station Master on duty to verify that the points were correctly set for the intended line and that the line was free of any obstruction before he allowed the Home signal to be lowered. In light of this evidence the Court observed that when the Home and outer signals on the up side were lowered to receive the train designated H. 10 Up, the Home and outer signals on the down side necessarily had to remain at danger. Accordingly, the Court considered the timing and method by which the down‑side signals could have been lowered. Under normal operating procedures, the Mukaddam would first return to the station after setting the points for the main line, hand back the keys of those points to the Station Master, and only then would the signalman receive orders to raise the up‑side signals to danger. Only after this sequence could the signalman, having obtained the requisite keys from the Station Master, be in a position to lower the down‑side signals. The testimony of both PW 25 and PW 6 made it clear that at the moment of the collision the Mukaddam had not yet reached the Station Master; he was still on his way to the station, approximately two furlongs from the points. Consequently, the Court found it difficult, and perhaps unfair, to assume against the appellant that the up‑side signals had already been placed at danger, thereby enabling the down‑side signals to be lowered for the down train.

The Court further noted that only if there had been a possibility for both the up‑side and down‑side signals to be lowered simultaneously could responsibility for negligent lowering of both sets of signals be assigned to the Station Master. However, the High Court’s affidavit clarified that such a simultaneous lowering was mechanically impossible at the station. Even assuming, without explanation, that the levers on the down side were found to have been lowered at the precise moment of the collision, the Court held that this circumstance did not automatically attribute negligence to the appellant. It was undisputed that the actual physical act of lowering a signal was performed not by the Station Master but by the signalman, identified as Budhu Singh, who had previously been acquitted. Moreover, the evidence presented contained no indication that Budhu Singh had, by that time, received any instruction from the Station Master to lower the down‑side signals, nor that he had been handed the necessary keys to operate those signals.

In the record, it was noted that the appellant had not received the keys required to operate the down‑side signals. The prosecution case alleged that the lowering of those signals occurred because of negligence. The Court observed that, even if the prosecution evidence were correct and the lowering resulted from negligence, there was no justification for attributing that negligence to the appellant rather than to another individual, such as the pointsman identified as Budhu Singh. The Court criticised the lower courts for adopting an erroneous approach, pointing to a passage from the trial‑court judgment that had acquitted Budhu Singh and that appeared to have been implicitly accepted by the appellate and revision courts. The passage stated: “It is alleged that Budhu Singh pointsman lowered the signal and allowed the train F. 45 Dn. to come and collide with H. 10 Up. Assuming it to be so, it cannot be said that Budhu Singh had the same knowledge as that of A. B. Sharma. Budhu Singh is supposed to act according to the orders of S. M. or A. S. M. on duty. If he lowered the signals for F. 45 Dn. he did so at the bidding of A. B. Sharma, accused.” The Court found that no evidence existed to support the underlined assertion that the appellant directed the pointsman. Accordingly, the appellant could not be convicted on the basis of an assumption concerning such a material point. The Court further held that the issue should not have been resolved merely by weighing oral testimony, especially when that balance relied on an inadmissible statement made by PW 6 to PW 25, without PW 6 being questioned about it. Considering the clear evidence of excessive speed with which the driver of train F. 45 Dn. entered the station, the Court concluded that it was more probable that the accident resulted from the driver’s failure to observe the signals. In the Court’s view, the prosecution had failed to produce evidence on the most critical matter, and therefore the charge had not been proved against the appellant. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the conviction and sentence of Awadh Behari Sharma were set aside.