Thakur Pratap Singh vs Shri Krishna Gupta And Ors.

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 2 December 1955

Coram: Vivian Bose, B.P. Sinha

In this matter, the appellant had stood as a candidate for the office of President of the Municipal Committee of Damoh, while the seven respondents were also candidates for the same office. All candidates were required to submit nomination papers on forms that had been supplied by the Municipal Committee. It later emerged that the forms used were outdated and had not been revised to reflect the amendment effected on 23‑7‑1949. Under the original rules the nomination form required each candidate to state his caste; the amendment substituted the requirement to state the candidate’s occupation instead of caste. The first respondent was the only candidate who was aware of this change. He crossed out the word “caste” on the printed form, inserted the word “occupation,” and entered his occupation as required by the new rule. The appellant and the remaining candidates completed the same outdated forms without making any alteration and entered their caste, not their occupation, as the earlier rule prescribed. The first respondent then raised an objection before the Supervising Officer, asserting that the nominations of all other candidates were invalid because they did not comply with the revised requirement and that his own nomination was the only one that satisfied the legal requirement. The Supervising Officer rejected the objection, and the election was allowed to proceed.

The appellant subsequently received the greatest number of votes and was declared elected as President. Dissatisfied with the result, the first respondent filed an election petition, which gave rise to the present appeal. The trial court dismissed the petition, holding that the defect in the nomination forms of the other candidates was not substantial and could be cured. On revision, the High Court set aside the trial court’s decision. The High Court judges, relying on the precedent set in Rattan Anmol Singh v. Atma Ram, held that any failure to comply with any provision of the applicable rules was fatal and that a nomination paper that did not conform to the rules must be rejected. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with that approach. It expressed disapproval of a rigid, technical interpretation that values form over substance. The Court observed that some procedural rules are essential and go to the root of the matter and therefore cannot be broken, while other rules are merely directory and may be overlooked if there is substantial compliance with the overall scheme and no prejudice results. When the legislature does not expressly designate a rule as mandatory or directory, the Court must exercise careful discrimination to distinguish between the two classes of rules, following the principle articulated by Viscount Maugham in Punjab Co‑operative Bank Ltd., Amritsar v. Income Tax Officer, Lahore, which states that an absolute enactment must be obeyed exactly, but a directory enactment may be complied with substantially.

The Court observed that a directory enactment need only be obeyed or fulfilled substantially, but it added that the relevant provisions are found in the Act itself. The learned High Court judges had held that the directions concerning the occupation field in the nomination form were mandatory; the Court disagreed with that view. The present dispute is governed by section 18 of the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act (II) of 1922, which empowers the State Government to make rules regulating the mode of election of presidents. Section 175(1) further provides that all rules for which the Act makes provision shall be made by the State Government and shall be consistent with the Act. Section 23 of the same Act states that anything done or any proceeding taken under the Act shall not be questioned on account of any defect or irregularity that does not affect the merits of the case. Consequently, the rules must be interpreted in the light of that provision. Rule 9(1)(i) requires each candidate to deliver to the Supervising Officer a nomination paper completed in the prescribed form and signed by the candidate himself as assenting to the nomination and by two duly qualified electors as proposer and seconder. The amended form obliges the candidate to furnish, among other particulars, his name, his father’s name, his age, his address and his occupation. Rule 9(1)(iii) directs the Supervising Officer to examine the nomination papers, consider any objections that may be made to any nomination, and either on such objection or on his own motion, after any summary enquiry he thinks necessary, refuse any nomination on certain grounds, including ground (c) which is the failure to comply with any of the provisions of clause (i). It was contended that the word “may” in this provision carries the force of “shall” because clause (a) of the rule deals with a candidate’s ineligibility under section 14 or section 15 of the Act. The argument was that if a candidate is found ineligible under those sections, the Supervising Officer has no discretion but to refuse the nomination, and therefore the word “may” cannot be given a different meaning when clause (c) is invoked. The Court noted that it need not consider whether this argument would be valid in the absence of section 23, for the rules cannot extend beyond the Act and must be read subject to its provisions. Reading clause (c) in the light of section 23, the only question is whether the omission of a candidate’s occupation can be said to affect the merits of the case. The Court affirmed that it is clear it.

In this case, the Court explained that the omission of an occupation on the nomination form does not affect the merits of a candidature. It illustrated the point by considering a person who has no occupation at all and asking what practical difference it would make if he wrote the word “nil,” crossed out the word “occupation,” drew a line through it, or simply left the space blank. The Court further observed that the situation is no different when a person who does have an occupation either fails to disclose it or misstates it, especially since a candidate’s occupation is not a statutory qualification for the office of President. Accordingly, the Court held that the occupation field on the form is merely directory and forms part of the description of the candidate; it does not go to the root of the matter provided that the remaining information on the paper is sufficient to identify the candidate beyond doubt.

The Court also considered the argument that the occupation field is required because section 15(k) of the Act disqualifies any person who “holds any office of profit” under the Committee. It noted that merely stating an occupation in general terms such as “service” or “agriculture” does not necessarily reveal whether the person holds an office of profit, and that section 15 contains other disqualification grounds that are not required to be shown on the form. Consequently, the Court concluded that the occupation field alone cannot serve as a reliable indicator of disqualification under section 15(k).

Referring to an earlier decision, the Court recalled a case where the law mandated that a specific official had to be satisfied, at a specified time, about the identity of an illiterate candidate. The Court emphasized that when the law requires such satisfaction, it cannot be substituted by another person’s satisfaction nor can it be omitted entirely. In that earlier case, the law also required the official’s satisfaction to be endorsed on the nomination paper, and the Court described that endorsement as a matter of form. It noted that if a Returning Officer omitted the attestation due to a slip but could prove that he was satisfied at the proper time, the omission might be treated as an unsubstantial technicality because the substantive element of satisfaction was present.

Finally, the Court observed that several English decisions were cited before it, but it deemed them irrelevant because the matter must be decided in accordance with the terms of section 23 of the Act, and foreign jurisprudence dealing with other statutes could not assist in interpreting the present provision.