Thakur Amar Singhji vs State Of Rajasthan (And Other Petitions)

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 15 April, 1955

Coram: Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Syed Jaffer Imam

In the matter titled Thakur Amar Singhji versus State of Rajasthan and other petitions, a judgment was delivered on fifteen April, nineteen fifty-five by the Supreme Court of India. The bench that heard the case comprised Justice Aiyyara, Justice T. L. Venkatarama, Justice Mukherjee, Justice B. I. K. Jalan (Chief Justice), Justice Das, Justice Sudhi Ranjan, Justice Bhagwati, Justice Natwar Lal H. Imam and Justice Syed Jaffer. The citation for the decision appears as 1955 AIR 504 and 1955 SCR (2) 303. The dispute centred on the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, six of 1952, and raised questions of the validity of the Act, the competence of the Rajpramukh to enact it, the meaning of the term “Ordinance” in the Covenant of the United State of Rajasthan, and whether the bill had been prepared by the Rajpramukh as the Constitution required. The petitioners further challenged the legislative competence of the State, arguing that resumption of jagir lands was not a subject enumerated in either the State List or the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule, and that consequently the Act was ultra vires. They also contended that the Act failed to provide adequate compensation, lacked a public purpose, and therefore violated Article 31(2) of the Constitution, and that its discriminatory effect breached Article 14. Additional special pleas asserted that the Act was not saved by Article 31-A because the lands resumed were neither estates, jagirs, nor grants comparable to jagirs, inams or muafi, and that some properties designated for resumption were not, in fact, jagirs as defined in the statute, rendering the notifications issued under section 21 illegal. The headnote recorded that the bill which became the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act was drafted in the Ministerial Department of the Rajasthan Government, approved by the Rajpramukh on eight February, nineteen fifty-two, reserved for the President’s consideration, received Presidential assent on thirteen February, and was brought into force by a notification dated sixteen February, with effect from eighteen February, nineteen fifty-two. Pursuant to section 21(1) of the Act, the State issued notifications resuming the specified jagirs, prompting aggrieved persons to file petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Rajasthan High Court; those petitions were dismissed, leading the petitioners to approach the Supreme Court under Article 32, challenging the Act on the grounds outlined above. The Court ultimately held that, (1) the …

In this case, the Court observed that the Rajpramukh possessed the authority to enact the law that was being challenged, relying on Article 385 of the Constitution. The Court noted that the Rajpramukh had functioned as the legislative body of Rajasthan immediately before the Constitution came into force, operating under article X (3) of the Covenant of the United State of Rajasthan. Accordingly, the term “Ordinance” used in article X (3) was interpreted to mean “Law”. The Court further explained that Article VII (3) of the Covenant dealt with the executive power of the Rulers to resume jagirs and did not limit the legislative powers conferred by article X (3). Hence, when Article 385 refers to the “Legislature of the corresponding State”, it does not refer to the legislature created by the Constitution but to the authority that performed legislative functions before the Constitution’s commencement. Under the Covenant, that authority was the Rajpramukh. The Court emphasized that Article 385 does not demand that this authority have unlimited legislative power; rather, if it was the pre-constitutional legislative body, it would, by virtue of the article, enjoy all the powers that the Constitution later granted to the State legislature or legislatures.

The Court then turned to Article 212-A (2), which requires that the Rajpramukh “prepare” a Bill. It held that the provision does not oblige the Rajpramukh to draft the Bill personally. It is sufficient that the Rajpramukh decide the essential policy questions underlying the legislation. The Rajpramukh may therefore adopt a Bill prepared by his ministers, and the only issue for examination is whether such adoption actually occurred. Since the provision contains no requirement for a separate approval by the Rajpramukh, an endorsement of approval bearing his signature on a Bill prepared by the ministerial department is taken to signify his adoption of the Bill. Consequently, once the Bill is presented with such an endorsement, the matter is considered settled, and any further inquiry into the legislative or executive mindset of the Rajpramukh is deemed inadmissible.

Finally, the Court addressed the contention that the impugned Act exceeded the powers of the State legislature. It concluded that the Act was not ultra-violet because, in substance, it dealt with the acquisition of properties that fall under entry 36 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. While the terms “resumption” and “acquisition” denote different concepts, the Court held that the appropriate test is the pith and substance of the legislation rather than the label assigned by the legislature. The Act’s provision for “resumption” does not implement the historic right of the Rulers to resume jagirs under the terms of individual grants or applicable law; instead, it exercises the State’s sovereign power of eminent domain. Accordingly, even though the Act describes the taking as resumption, the effect is that of an acquisition.

In this case the Court observed that the compensation paid to the Jagirdars could be justified only if the taking of their properties was regarded as an acquisition rather than a resumption carried out under the terms of the original grant or the law applicable to it. Although the legislation in question also attracted entry 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule, the Court held that entry 36, which deals with acquisition, was the appropriate classification and therefore the Act was valid under that entry. The Court then turned to the meaning of the word “jagir.” It explained that “jagir” originally denoted grants made by Rajput rulers to their clansmen in return for military service, but over time the term was also applied to grants made for religious, charitable, or even non-Rajput purposes. In both popular usage and legislative practice the term came to signify any grant that conferred only rights to land revenue and did not confer any rights of cultivation. The Court said that this is the sense in which “jagir” must be understood in Article 31-A. The purpose of Article 31-A, according to the Court, was to protect legislation aimed at abolishing intermediaries so that a direct relationship could be established between the State and the actual tillers of the soil. Interpreting “jagir” to include all such revenue-right grants therefore fully accomplishes that purpose, and maintenance grants made to persons who were not cultivators, such as members of the ruling family, would also fall within the definition of jagir for the purposes of Article 31-A. The Court then examined the status of the Bhomicharas, who were the descendants of Rajput rulers that had conquered the region in the thirteenth century and who later continued to hold land after the ruler of Jodhpur imposed his sovereignty, allowing them to remain in possession upon payment of an annual sum. The question was whether their holdings constituted jagirs. The Court held that a jagir may arise by a grant from the ruling power, and that such a grant need not be expressly stated; it may be implied. When the Jodhpur ruler recognised their possession, it amounted to an annexation followed by a re-grant of the lands to them. Citing earlier authorities, the Court noted that although the Bhomicharas enjoyed considerable powers, their legal status was that of subjects, not sovereigns, because the law recognizes only the two categories of sovereign and subject and admits no intermediate status. Consequently, once they acknowledged the sovereignty of Jodhpur, they could be regarded only as subjects. Even if they were not deemed grantees of the lands before the enactment of the Marwar Land Revenue Act XL of 1949, the Court said they became grantees by operation of section 169 of that Act, which declares that all lands in the State vest in the Maharajah and that all proprietary interests thereunder are deemed to be held under a grant from him. By long usage, recognition and legislative practice the Bhomicharas have come to be identified as jagirdars, and their tenure qualifies as a jagir within the intent of section 169. For the purposes of Article 31-A, the Court concluded, it is irrelevant whether the grant originates from the sovereign’s prerogative or from the legislature’s sovereign power, because grants created by statutes are equally covered by the article. Accordingly, the Bhomicharas fall within the operation of Article 31-A.

In relation to the Marwar Land Revenue Act XL of 1949, the Court observed that when the Act assigned lands to individuals as grantees of the State, those individuals were deemed to have become grantees by operation of section 169 of the Act. Section 169 declared that all lands within the State vested in the Maharajah and that every proprietary interest in such lands was to be regarded as held under a grant from the Maharajah. The Court noted that the Bhomicharas, by long usage, recognition and the legislative practice of the State, had come to be acknowledged as jagirdars, and that their tenure constituted a jagir within the meaning of section 169. For the purpose of Article 31-A, the Court held that it made no difference whether a grant originated from the sovereign exercising a prerogative right or from the legislature exercising sovereign authority; grants created by statutes, known as legislative grants, fell equally within the operation of Article 31-A. Consequently, the Bhomicharas were covered by Article 31-A. The Court further explained that the position of the Bhumias in Mewar was analogous to that of the Bhomicharas in Marwar. In addition, the terms under which the rulers of Chittor and Udaipur recognized the Bhumias’ title to land required them to render military service when called upon and to pay a quit-rent. Thus, their title rested on an implied grant and their tenure qualified as a jagir even in the stricter sense. Section 27 of the Mewar Government Kanoon Mal Act of 1947 provided that all lands belonged to His Highness and that no person could take possession of any land unless the right was granted by His Highness. Section 106(1) of the same Act declared that a Tikanadar, Jagirdar, Muafidar or Bhumia would possess all revenue rights in the lands comprising his jagir, muafi or Bhum under the Act, as granted by His Highness. The effect of these provisions, the Court observed, was to imbue the Bhum tenure with the characteristics of a grant. Article 13(1) of the Constitution of Mewar enjoined that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor denied equality before the law within the territories of Mewar. Petitioners contended that the impugned Act was void because it contravened these constitutional provisions. The Court held that, since His Highness had been the authority that enacted the Constitution of Mewar, the same authority could repeal or modify it, and therefore the impugned Act was to be considered as having repealed the Constitution to the extent of any inconsistency. The Court then turned to the Tikanadars of Shekwati, who had originally acquired lands as ijaradars or lessees and were later treated as jagirdars. Their tenure, if not a jagir, was at least a “similar grant” within the scope of Article 31-A. The Court noted that this tenure was listed in Schedule I of the impugned Act as item 6, and proceeded to examine the nature of the tenures involved.

The Court observed that the lands which were held by Subeguzars, Mansubdars, maintenance holders such as Lawazma and Kothrikarch, Tikanadars, Naqdirazan, as well as those granted under Sansan and similar arrangements were all taken into consideration. Regarding the Khandela estate, the Court noted that this estate had been granted in the year 1836 on a permanent lease. Section 2(h) of the Act defined the term “jagir” and expressly included in that definition the tenures enumerated in Schedule I to the Act; among those, Istimrari tenure was listed as item 2. The matter before the Court was whether the particular lease known as Istimrar-ijara fell within the scope of item 2. The Court held that the essential characteristics of an Istimrari tenure are twofold: first, the land must be assessed at a nominal quit-rent, and second, the tenure must be of a permanent nature. The Court found that the assessment fixed at Rs 80,001 under the deed of 1836 could not be described as nominal. Consequently, the Court concluded that the grant did not constitute an Istimrari tenure but rather amounted to a permanent Izzara. The petitioners had also challenged the validity of the Act on three grounds: that the Act failed to provide for any compensation, that there was no public purpose for the resumption of the lands, and that, for those reasons, it violated Article 31(2) of the Constitution, or alternatively that it infringed Article 14. The Court held that these objections were barred by the protection afforded under Article 31-A of the Constitution. Moreover, even setting aside Article 31-A, the Court found that the impugned Act was supported by a public purpose and therefore did not contravene Article 31(2). The Court further held that there was no breach of Article 14 because the Act uniformly subjected all jagirs to possible resumption and did not grant the Government any discretion to exempt particular holdings. In support of these conclusions the Court referred to the decisions in State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Others ([1952] S.C.R. 889) and Biswambhar Singh v. The State of Orissa and Others ([1954] S.C.R. 842). The Court also explained the proper application of the rule of ejusdem generis, stating that when words of a general nature follow specific and particular words, those general words must be interpreted as limited to things of the same nature as the specific words that precede them, rather than to a broader category.

The judgment further identified the original jurisdiction as comprising a extensive series of petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights. The petitions were numbered 354 to 359, 362, 370 to 385, 387 to 469, 471 to 475, 477 to 479, 482 to 486, 488, 490, 491, 493 to 497, 502, 503, 510, 511 to 521, 525, 527 to 529, 535 to 563, 570, 572 to 575, 577 to 584, 586 to 588, 592 to 595, 597, 600, 602, 603, 606 to 610, 613 to 619, 624, 626 to 634, 637 to 645, 653, 654, 656 to 659, 661, 662, 668, 672, 675, 679, and 684 to 688 of the year 1954, together with petitions numbered I to 14, 17, 20, 21, 25 to 27, 35 to 37, 45, 47, 49, 52, 55 to 57 and 61 to 66 of the year 1955. Counsel for the petitioners in many of these matters included Dr Bakshi Tek Chand, assisted by O C Chatterjee and K L Mehta, who appeared on behalf of the petitioners in petitions numbered 354, 362, 382 to 385, 511 to 516, 519, 537, 541, 543 to 547, 550, 553, 556, 558 to 562, 570, 573 to 575, 582 to 584, 587, 588 and 593 to... (the list continues as recorded in the judgment).

Several counsel appeared on behalf of the petitioners in the many petitions that were before the Court. H L Mordia together with K L Mehta acted for the petitioners in petition numbers 55 and 65 of 1955. Frank Anthony and K L Mehta represented the petitioners in petition numbers 56 and 64 of 1955. U M Trivedi, assisted by K L Mehta, appeared for the petitioners in petition number 615 of 1954 and petition number 20 of 1955. R K Rastogi, with K L Mehta, acted for the petitioner in petition number 634 of 1954. K L Mehta also appeared singly for the petitioner in petition number 36 of 1955. Dr Bakshi Tek Chand, joined by O C Chatterjee and Naunit Lal, represented the petitioners in petition numbers 356 to 359, 370, 372, 373, 374, 376 to 378, 380, 389, 390, 393 to 400, 415, 417, 463, 469, 482, 484, 521, 563, 577, 578, 586, 592, 606, 610, 627 and 656 of 1954. Achhru Ram, assisted by Naunit Lal, appeared for the petitioner in petition number 391 of 1954. Naunit Lal alone acted for the petitioners in petition numbers 355, 371, 375, 379, 416, 455, 468, 483, 485, 488, 491, 493 to 497, 517, 525, 529, 538, 540, 542 and 551 of 1954. Dr Bakshi Tek Chand, together with Ganpat Rai, represented the petitioners in petition numbers 381, 387, 388, 402 to 410, 412, 413, 418 to 423, 425, 426, 428 to 454, 456 to 459, 464 to 466, 477, 478, 486, 503, 510, 520, 548, 552, 557, 572, 580, 600, 624, 639, 668 of 1954 and petition numbers 8 and 17 of 1955. N C Chatterjee, assisted by Ganpat Rai and S K Kapur, appeared for the petitioners in petition numbers 462, 536, 549, 579, 630, 638 and 654 of 1954. U M Trivedi, with Ganpat Rai, acted for the petitioners in petition numbers 629, 643, 672 of 1954 and petition number 66 of 1955. Achhru Ram, joined by Ganpat Rai, represented the petitioner in petition number 424 of 1954. Frank Anthony and Ganpat Rai appeared for the petitioners in petition numbers 401, 414, 460, 502, 518, 535 and 539 of 1954. S K Kapur and Ganpat Rai acted for the petitioners in petition numbers 411 and 675 of 1954. R K Rastogi and Ganpat Rai represented the petitioners in petition numbers 427 and 461 of 1954. O C Chatterjee and Ganpat Rai appeared for the petitioner in petition number 62 of 1955. J B Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain acted for the petitioners in petition numbers 473, 479, 490, 527, 528, 554 and 581 of 1954 and petition numbers 1 and 61 of 1955. C L Aggarwal and Rajinder Narain represented the petitioners in petition numbers 471, 472, 474 and 475 of 1954. K P Gupta appeared for the petitioners in petition numbers 467 and 555 of 1954, and S C Isaacs, assisted by S D Sekhri, acted for the petitioner in petition number 392 of 1954.

Counsel for the petitioner, assisted by an additional advocate, appeared on behalf of the petitioner in Petition No. 392 of 1954. The respondent, the State of Rajasthan, was represented by the Advocate-General of the State, accompanied by counsel for the respondent. The judgment was pronounced on 15 April 1955 and was delivered by Justice Venkatarama Ayyar. The matters before the Court consisted of several applications filed under Article 32 of the Constitution. Each application sought to set aside the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, numbered VI of 1952, which the petitioners referred to as “the Act.” The petitioners contested the constitutional validity of the Act and asked the Supreme Court to overturn it.

The Court proceeded to outline the legislative background of the Act. On 20 August 1949 the Government of India constituted a committee chaired by Sri C. S. Venkatachar. The committee was tasked with examining jagirdari and land tenure systems in Rajputana and Madhya Bharat, with the expressed purpose of promoting land reform, establishing a direct relationship between the State and the cultivators, and removing intermediary interests. The committee’s report, dated 18 December 1949, recommended, among other measures, the resumption of jagirs and the grant of rehabilitation assistance in specified cases. In 1951 the Government of Rajasthan took up the issue of legislation. A bill titled the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Bill was drafted and, on 31 December 1951, was approved by the Rajpramukh and sent to the President of India for consideration. On 21 January 1952 the President withheld his assent and, through a communication from the Deputy Secretary of the Government of India, indicated that the President would reconsider the bill if certain amendments were incorporated and a fresh bill were submitted. Acting on that advice, the Ministerial Department prepared a revised bill containing the suggested amendments. This revised bill received the Rajpramukh’s approval on 8 February 1952, was again sent to the President, and the President granted his assent on 13 February 1952. By a notification dated 16 February 1952 the Act was declared to come into force on 18 February 1952. Section 21(1) of the Act empowered the Government, after the Act’s commencement, to issue a notification in the Rajasthan Gazette fixing a date for the resumption of any class of jagir lands, and to fix different dates for different classes of jagir lands. Pursuant to this provision, the State of Rajasthan issued several notifications effecting the resumption of specified jagir lands. Aggrieved persons filed petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the Act’s validity. A Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court heard those petitions and, rejecting the petitioners’ contentions, upheld the validity of the Act, as recorded in Amarsingh v. State of Rajasthan. The present applications, filed under Article 32, raise several grounds for challenging the Act, the first of which contends that the Rajpramukh lacked the authority to enact the law, rendering the Act invalid.

The petitioners raised several separate grounds for challenging the legislation. First, they argued that the Rajpramukh lacked the authority to enact the law, making the statute invalid. Second, they contended that the Bill had not been prepared by the Rajpramukh in accordance with article 212-A(2), and therefore the law had not been validly enacted. Third, they submitted that the subject of resumption was not listed among the matters that may be legislated on in either the State List or the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, and consequently the Act was ultra vires the State’s legislative powers. Fourth, they claimed that the Act failed to provide adequate compensation and did not serve any public purpose, thereby violating article 31(2). They further asserted that the Act was discriminatory and thus contravened article 14, and that it could not be saved by article 31-A because the lands resumed were neither estates nor jagirs nor grants comparable to jagirs, inams or muafi; this particular contention was advanced by some petitioners in relation to the specific properties they held. Fifth, they maintained that the properties proposed to be resumed did not qualify as jagirs as defined in the Act, rendering the notifications issued under section 21 in respect of those properties illegal; this was another special contention raised in a few of the petitions. The Court indicated that these contentions would be examined one by one.

The Court then turned to the first issue concerning the competence of the Rajpramukh to enact the statute and began by recounting the historical events that led to the formation of the State of Rajasthan and the appointment of the Rajpramukh as its head. It noted that during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the Rajput rulers who then reigned over various parts of Hindustan were forced by the victorious Muhammadan invaders to withdraw to the southwestern region guarded by the Aravalli Hills and interspersed with deserts, a terrain that was less hospitable but also less vulnerable. In those regions the Rajputs established several independent kingdoms. The period following the founding of these states was marked by continuous wars, as the powerful Sultans of Delhi attempted to subjugate the Rajput princes while the latter offered stubborn and, at times, successful resistance. The annals of Rajputana for this era, the Court observed, record heroic deeds of men and women and constitute some of the most inspiring chapters of the nation’s history. When the Mughal Emperors later rose to power they recognized the wisdom of conciliating the Rajput rulers, acknowledged them as chiefs, secured their acknowledgment of Mughal suzerainty, and obtained promises of military assistance when required. As the Mughal power waned and the British established themselves as the masters of the country, the British, in turn, recognized the Rajput princes as sovereigns and entered into treaties with them between 1803 and 1818, as noted in Aitchison’s Treaties, Volume III. By those treaties the British Government accepted the princes’ status as independent rulers but reserved to itself matters of defence, external relations, communications and other subjects that might be agreed upon, thereby creating a relationship described as a “subordinate union”.

The relationship that existed between the British Government and the Indian princes had been described as a “subordinate union” by Mr. Lee Warner, meaning that while the princes were formally recognised as sovereigns, they nonetheless acknowledged the suzerainty of the British Crown (Vide Protected Princes of India, Chapter VI). On 15-8-1947 India attained independence, and the paramountcy that the British Crown had exercised over the princely States came to an end. Consequently a question arose concerning the legal status of the ruling chiefs of those States after the termination of British paramountcy. The chiefs soon realised that, both in the larger national interest and in their own interests, they could not remain outside the Indian Union and therefore felt compelled to join it. Integrating the former princely States into the framework of the Constitution of India presented considerable difficulties. Prior to 15-8-1947 a total of 552 States had been recognised as independent, a figure that excluded the three larger entities of Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir. A small number of those States were sufficiently large to function as separate administrative units, but the great majority were too small to be governed as distinct entities. Moreover, while some of the States possessed representative forms of government, many others did not; in those latter cases the ruler exercised the entire range of executive, legislative and judicial authority. The Government of India therefore adopted a policy whereby the larger States would continue as independent units within the Union, whereas the smaller States would be dealt with in one of three ways: if a small State formed an enclave within an existing province it would be merged into that province; if several small States were contiguous they would be integrated together to create a new State that would be called a Union; and if a small State was isolated it might be amalgamated with a neighbouring larger State. One of the newly created Unions under this scheme was the Union of Rajasthan. At that time eighteen independent rulers exercised authority over various portions of the territory that later became Rajasthan. Nine of those rulers—namely the rulers of Banswara, Bundi, Dungarpur, Jhalawar, Kishengarh, Kotah, Pratapgarh, Shahpura and Tonk—entered into an agreement in March 1948 to merge their respective territories into a single unit named the United State of Rajasthan. The ruler of Mewar joined this Union on 18-4-1948, and the rulers of Jaipur, Jodhpur, Bikaner and Jaisalmere acceded on 30-3-1949. The rulers of Alwar, Bharatpur, Dholpur and Karauli, who had formed the Matsya Union on 18-3-1948, dissolved that Union and acceded to the Rajasthan Union on 15-5-1949. With these accretions the full strength of the State of Rajasthan was achieved. The Constitution of the United State of Rajasthan, as it finally took shape, is embodied in the Covenant that was executed by the fourteen rulers on 30-3-1949. Because the authority of the Rajpramukh to enact the legislation that was being challenged derived from this Covenant, it was necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the Covenant that bore on the question. Under Article II of the Covenant the signatory States agreed “to unite and integrate their territories in one State with a common executive, legislature and judiciary, by the name of the United State of Rajasthan.” Article VI(2) provides that the ruler of each Covenanting State shall “make over the administration of his State to the Rajpramukh, and thereupon all rights, authority and jurisdiction belonging to the ruler which appertain or are incidental to the Government of the Covenanting States shall vest in the United State and”

The Covenant stated that the powers of the rulers would subsequently be exercisable only in the manner prescribed by the Covenant itself or by the Constitution that would later be framed under it. Article VII(3) of the Covenant declared that, unless the Legislature of the United State made other provisions, the exclusive right to restore jagirs or to recognize succession according to law and custom in favor of the jagirdars would belong to the Rajpramukh. Article X(3) then provided that, until a Constitution drafted under the Covenant came into effect after obtaining the Rajpramukh’s assent, the legislative authority of the United State would vest in the Rajpramukh, who could make and promulgate Ordinances for the peace and good government of the State or any part thereof, and that any such Ordinance would possess the same force as an Act passed by the United State’s legislature. The language of Article X(3) was later altered by replacing the phrase “Until a Constitution so framed comes into operation after receiving the assent of the Rajpramukh” with the words “Until the Legislative Assembly of Rajasthan has been duly constituted and summoned to meet for the first session under the provisions of the Constitution of India”. This change was made because the original plan to convene a Constituent Assembly for the State, as envisaged in article X(1), was abandoned and the Constitution of the Union of India was adopted instead. The amendment was merely formal and did not modify the substantive effect of the provision. Article XIX further required that the Government of Rajasthan act under the general control of, and comply with, any specific directions that might be issued from time to time by the Government of India.

The foregoing provisions constituted the material parts of the Constitution that governed the United State of Rajasthan before the Constitution of India became operative on 26-11-1950. Article 385 of the Constitution of India provided that, until the House or Houses of the Legislature of a State listed in Part B of the First Schedule were duly constituted and summoned to meet for their first session under the Constitution, the body or authority that had functioned immediately before the commencement of the Constitution as the legislature of the corresponding Indian State would continue to exercise the powers and perform the duties assigned by the Constitution to the legislature of that State. The respondent argued that, by virtue of article X(3) of the Covenant, the Rajpramukh was the authority that functioned immediately before the Constitution’s commencement as the Legislature of Rajasthan, and therefore, under article 385, the Rajpramukh could exercise the powers that the State Legislature could. The petitioners admitted that at the time the impugned legislation was enacted, no Legislative Assembly had been constituted or summoned, and that, insofar as that fact was concerned, the conditions of article 385 were satisfied; however, they maintained that this admission did not resolve the larger question of whether the Rajpramukh could be regarded as the Legislature within the meaning of article 385.

The petitioners accepted that the conditions of article 385 of the Constitution were fulfilled because, at the time of the impugned legislation, no legislative assembly of Rajasthan had yet been constituted or summoned. However, they argued that a proper interpretation of the Covenant’s provisions showed that the Rajpramukh was not the legislative authority contemplated by article 385. They further contended that article VII(3) of the Covenant placed a prohibition on the Rajpramukh’s power to enact the type of law that was now being challenged, and that this prohibition had never been removed by the Constitution. Consequently, the central issue became the identification of the body or authority that functioned as the Legislature of the United State of Rajasthan under the Covenant. Article X(3) explicitly states that the legislative authority of the State shall vest in the Rajpramukh. While this provision is clear on its face, the petitioners argued that its effect was limited by the word “Ordinance” used in article X(3) and by the restrictions contained in article VII(3) and article XIX of the Covenant. Counsel for the petitioners, identified as Mr N. C. Chatterjee in the lower proceedings, maintained that the Rajpramukh’s legislative power was confined to “making and promulgating Ordinances,” a power that was intended only for emergencies pending the establishment of a popular legislature, and therefore the Rajpramukh could not be regarded as a “legislative authority” within the meaning of article 385. The Court observed, however, that this argument improperly imported into the term “Ordinance” the meaning it acquired under the Government of India Act, 1935, or under the Constitution of India. Sections 42 and 88 of the Government of India Act granted the Governor-General and the Governor respectively the authority to issue ordinances when the legislature was not in session, and Articles 123 and 213 of the Constitution confer a similar power on the President and the Governors. Those provisions describe a legislative power that the head of a State may exercise when the legislature cannot act. In the present case, the United State of Rajasthan had no legislature at the time because it had not yet been constituted, and therefore the term “Ordinance” in article X(3) could not be given the same meaning as under the Government of India Act or the Constitution. The Court reminded that before the formation of the United State, the rulers who entered into the Covenant possessed sovereign legislative rights in their individual territories, and that article VI(2)(a) of the Covenant required those rulers to surrender those rights and vest them in the United State. This surrender indicated a clear intention that the State of Rajasthan should possess full legislative authority comparable to that previously exercised by the rulers, and the question arose as to where that authority was to be located if not in the Rajpramukh. If article X(3) were interpreted in the narrow way advocated by the petitioners, the result would be an absurd conclusion that no entity in the State possessed legislative power. Such an anomaly disappears when “Ordinance” is understood in its ordinary sense as a law. The term’s etymology, as noted in the Concise Oxford Dictionary, defines “to ordain” as “to decree, enact,” and consequently “Ordinance” should be understood to mean a decree or enactment having the same force as a law passed by a legislature.

The Court explained that the term “decree, enactment” is the ordinary meaning of the word “Ordinance”. It cited the authority in Halsbury’s Laws of England, Volume XI, page 183, paragraph 327, which states that when the Governor of a colony that lacks a representative assembly passes legislation with the advice and consent of the State council, the resulting measure is described as an ordinance or law. The Court held that this is precisely the sense intended in article X(3) of the Constitution, a conclusion reinforced by the subsequent wording in that article which declares that the Ordinance shall possess “the like force of law as an Act passed by the Legislature of the United State”.

The petitioners then argued that, under article VII(3), the Rajpramukh was authorised to resume jagirs only “according to law and custom”. They contended that this limitation prevented the Rajpramukh from enacting any law for the resumption of jagirs on grounds that were not recognised by existing law and custom, and that section 22 of the Act, which makes the resumption effective notwithstanding any jagir law defined in section 2(d) and which also includes custom, directly conflicted with the authority conferred by article VII(3). The petitioners further maintained that the legislative powers granted by article X(3) must be exercised subject to the restrictions contained in article VII(3), and therefore argued that the Act was beyond the Rajpramukh’s competence.

The Court found this contention untenable. It observed that the words “according to law and custom” are situated between the phrase “right to recognise succession” and the phrase “to the rights and titles of Jagirdars”. Consequently, the Court interpreted the phrase as qualifying only the “right to recognise succession to the rights and titles of Jagirdars”, and not the broader “right to resume jagirs”. Even if that interpretation had no substantial effect, the Court noted that the power to resume jagirs mentioned in article VII(3) is a power that the grantor possesses under existing law and custom.

The Court identified the core difficulty for the petitioners as follows: article VII(3) refers to the historical power of the rulers of the States to resume jagirs, and it provides that after the Constitution, this power should be exercised by the Rajpramukh. The Court explained that this power is purely executive in nature and bears no relation to the legislative power of the ruler, which is separately provided for in article X(3). The two articles therefore operate in distinct and separate fields, and article VII(3) cannot be construed as a limitation on the legislative authority conferred by article X(3). Moreover, article VII(3) expressly states that it is subject to any legislation on the subject, whereas article X(3) is not made subject to article VII(3). Even assuming, for argument’s sake, that article VII(3) did impose a limitation on the Rajpramukh’s powers, the Court held that, in view of article 385, such a limitation would not diminish the Rajpramukh’s authority to enact the law in question. The Court emphasized that article 385 requires first determining which body or authority functioned as the Legislature of the State before the Constitution commenced, and then conferring upon that body all the legislative powers provided by the Constitution, irrespective of the scope of its pre-constitutional authority.

The Court observed that once the appropriate body or authority had been identified, the Constitution assigned to that body all legislative powers granted to the State’s House or Houses of Legislature. Those powers could be broader than the powers previously held by the body, or they could be more limited, depending on the constitutional provisions. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that the extent of the former authority was irrelevant because the powers now derived from article 385 alone. Consequently, the petitioners’ claim that the Act was invalid due to article VII(3) of the Covenant was rejected by the Court. The petitioners argued that the Rajpramukh’s powers under article X(3) were subject to overall control by the Government of India under article XIX. Because of that control, they claimed the Rajpramukh could not be considered the legislative authority intended by article 385. The Court found no merit in this contention, concluded that the argument was without legal basis, and rejected it outright. Article 385, the Court explained, required that the interim legislative authority be the same entity that had functioned as the State’s Legislature before the Constitution became operative. The provision did not demand that this authority possess absolute or unrestricted legislative power, only that it be the recognized legislative body of the pre-Constitution era. Moreover, the Court noted that the effect of article XIX was not to transfer the State’s legislative competence to the Government of India, and therefore the Rajpramukh remained the appropriate legislative authority despite any limitations.

Finally, the petitioners contended that article 385 did not apply because article 168 required the Legislature to consist of both the Governor and one or more Houses. They further argued that article 238(7) replaced the Governor with the Rajpramukh in Part B States, so the Rajpramukh alone could not constitute the Legislature. Accordingly, they claimed that when article 385 referred to the body or authority functioning as Legislature, it must mean the Rajpramukh together with a House acting jointly. They relied on article 212-A(1) of the Constitution (Removal of Difficulties) Order No 11, which excluded only the first proviso of article 200 for Part B States. That provision left the main body of article 200 intact, and the petitioners argued that this means article 385 should be treated as ineffective for Part B States lacking a legislative House. The Court found this argument untenable because article 385 referred not to the Constitution-defined Legislatures but to the body or authority that had functioned as the State’s Legislature before the Constitution came into force. Furthermore, the Court noted that article 238(7), being part of the Constitution (Removal of Difficulties) Order, was itself subject to article 385. The Court also rejected any reliance on the exclusion of only the first proviso of article 200, observing that such a partial exclusion could not nullify the application of article 385. Consequently, the Court concluded that the Rajpramukh possessed the necessary legislative competence to enact the law that had been contested before it.

The Court observed that article 200 prescribed a specific procedure to be followed when a Bill had been passed by a Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State, and that the text of that provision was clearly inapplicable in a situation where no House of Legislature existed. The submission advanced by Mr Frank Anthony, which argued that the omission of the body of article 200 from the list of articles excluded for Part B States under article 212-A(1) implicitly limited the Rajpramukh’s power to make laws unless such laws were first passed by a Legislative Assembly, found no support in the wording of the provision. Consequently, the Court rejected that argument and affirmed that the Rajpramukh possessed the legislative competence to enact the law that was being challenged.

The second contention raised by the petitioners concerned the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Bill, which they claimed had not been prepared by the Rajpramukh as required by article 212-A(2), and therefore was not validly enacted. The factual record showed that the Bill originated in the Ministerial Department in accordance with the rules framed under article 166(3) for the convenient conduct of State business. The Council of Ministers approved the Bill on 27-12-1951 and transmitted it to the Rajpramukh with a note from the Secretary stating, “The Bill is submitted for gracious approval and signature and for reserving it for the consideration of the President.” The Rajpramukh first endorsed the Bill with the word “approved” dated 31-12-1951, and subsequently added a separate endorsement, “I hereby reserve this Bill for the consideration of the President,” bearing the same date. On 21-1-1952 the President placed an endorsement on the Bill indicating that he withheld his assent. A fresh Bill was then prepared and sent to the Rajpramukh on 6-2-1952 with a note from the Chief Secretary that read, “The Bill as finally agreed to is now submitted to His Highness the Rajpramukh for his approval and for reserving the same for the consideration of the President.” The Rajpramukh approved the Bill on 8-2-1952 and, by a further order, reserved it for the President’s consideration; the President gave his assent on 13-2-1952. Article 212-A(2), enacted by the Constitution (Removal of Difficulties) Order No 11, required that “the Rajpramukh or other authority exercising the legislative powers…shall prepare such Bills as may be deemed necessary, and the Rajpramukh shall declare…that he assents to the Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom or that he reserves it for the consideration of the President.” The petitioners contended that because the Bill had been prepared by the Ministers rather than by the Rajpramukh, article 212-A(2) had been violated, rendering the law improperly enacted. The Court noted that the petitioners conceded that the provision allowed the Rajpramukh to delegate the drafting work to others, but insisted that policy decisions essential to the legislation should have been decided by the Rajpramukh, an issue examined in further discussion.

The petitioners argued that although article 212-A(2) allows the Rajpramukh to delegate the drafting of a Bill to others, the essential policy decisions that form the core of the legislation must still be made by the Rajpramukh himself. They maintained that this requirement had not been satisfied in the present case. To support their position, they relied heavily on the affidavit of Sri Joshi, the Jagir Commissioner, which stated that the Bill had been prepared by the Ministerial Department in accordance with the rules framed under article 166(3), had been approved by the Council of Ministers, and thereafter sent to the Rajpramukh for his assent. The petitioners contended that these statements excluded any possibility that the Rajpramukh participated in formulating the policies underlying the Act, and therefore the Bill could not be said to have been prepared by him.

Accepting those facts as true, the petitioners noted that the Bill was initially not prepared by the Rajpramukh. However, they argued that this initial fact did not settle the question of whether the requirements of article 212-A(2) had been met, unless it could be shown that the Rajpramukh was not permitted to adopt a Bill prepared by the Ministers as his own, or that, even if such adoption was permissible, he had in fact failed to do so. The petitioners acknowledged that the law treats a Bill prepared directly by the Rajpramukh and a Bill adopted by him from the Ministers in the same way, and they did not dispute that principle. Their specific contention was that an adoption by the Rajpramukh must be clearly and unequivocally demonstrated, and they claimed that the record did not establish such adoption.

The respondents argued that when the Bill was transmitted to the Rajpramukh, he was not required to apply his legislative mind to its substance; his role was limited to providing executive assent. They pointed out that, as admitted by Sri Joshi, the Rajpramukh merely gave his approval, which amounted to assent, and that such assent did not imply that the Rajpramukh had adopted the Bill as his own. Consequently, there was, according to this view, no evidence that the Rajpramukh had taken ownership of the policy decisions embodied in the Bill.

Further, counsel for the respondents, Mr. Agarwala, argued that the term “approve” as used in the Constitution, for example in articles 146 and 147, denotes a situation where two distinct authorities are involved: one authority is empowered to confirm or sanction the act of the other authority, which alone has the power to perform the act. He maintained that where the latter authority lacks the power to act, the former cannot validly “approve” the act. He also cited Corpus Juris, Volume I, page 1365, which states that “approve” does not carry the same meaning as “adopt.” The argument, however, was criticized for extracting the word “approved” from its broader context and interpreting it in a narrow fashion. It was observed that, under article 212-A(2), the expression “approve” must be read in the full setting of the provision, which requires the Rajpramukh to either prepare the Bill himself or, if the Bill is prepared by the Ministers, to adopt it before reserving it for the President’s consideration.

The Court observed that the Rajpramukh was required to perform two separate functions under article 212-A(2). The first function consisted of preparing the Bill. The second function, after the preparation stage, required the Rajpramukh to reserve the Bill for the President’s consideration; the options of assenting to the Bill or withholding assent were not relevant to the present discussion. When the Rajpramukh himself prepared the Bill, his duty was limited to forwarding it to the President, and no question of his approving the Bill could arise. Conversely, if the Bill had been prepared by another authority, the Rajpramukh first needed to adopt the Bill before reserving it for the President. The Court explained that the purpose of the Rajpramukh’s signature of “approval” was to demonstrate his decision to adopt the Bill. Since article 212-A(2) contained no provision for the Rajpramukh to approve a Bill, an endorsement of approval on the Bill was to be read as an indication of adoption. The Court declined to accept the nuanced distinction proposed by counsel that separated the Rajpramukh’s legislative mind from his executive mind. It held that, if the Rajpramukh was empowered to adopt a Bill prepared by his Ministers, the only factual issue was whether he actually did so. When a Bill bore the Rajpramukh’s signature indicating approval, the Court concluded that the matter was settled and any further inquiry into the legislative or executive state of mind of the Rajpramukh was inadmissible.

The Court also noted that counsel for the respondent contended that the Rajpramukh’s role at the Bill-preparation stage was purely executive, becoming legislative only when he chose to assent, withhold assent, or reserve the Bill for the President. The Court rejected this argument. It reminded that, where a State possessed a Legislative Assembly, article 200 required that a Bill passed by the Assembly be presented to the Governor, who would then either assent, withhold assent, or reserve the Bill for the President. In a State without a Legislative Assembly, article 212-A(2) substituted the Rajpramukh’s preparation of the Bill in place of legislative passage, and thereafter imposed the same duty on the Rajpramukh to either assent, withhold assent, or reserve the Bill for the President. Thus the preparation of the Bill by the Rajpramukh performed a legislative function analogous to the passage of a Bill by a legislature, and the Court found no violation of article 212-A(2) in the circumstances presented.

Article 212-A clause 2 has been treated as equivalent to the provisions of article 200, so that the Rajpramukh’s preparation of a Bill stands in place of the passage of the Bill by a Legislative Assembly, and the function performed by the Rajpramukh is regarded as a legislative function in the same manner as the Assembly’s function. The petitioners raised another procedural objection, contending that the President lacked power under the proviso to article 201 to return a Money Bill for further consideration by a legislative house, and therefore the President’s order of 21-January-1952 returning the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Bill was ultra vires because the Bill was a Money Bill. The petitioners further argued that the subsequent presentation of the Bill to the President on 8-February-1952 was unauthorized and that the Act had consequently not been validly passed. The Court found this contention to be clearly erroneous. Article 212-A clause 1 makes clear that the proviso to article 201 does not apply to Part B States where no legislative house exists; consequently the limitation described in the proviso cannot be read into the article itself. Moreover, the President’s order of 21-January-1952 was not a return for further legislative consideration but a refusal to give assent. Although a Deputy Secretary had sent a communication to the Rajasthan Government suggesting certain amendments, that communication did not change the nature of the President’s order, which remained a withholding of assent. Finally, the Bill that was again placed before the President on 6-February-1952 was a fresh Bill, having been altered with respect to the scales of compensation, and therefore the argument that the Act was invalid for non-compliance with article 212-A clause 2 or for other procedural defects was rejected.

The petitioners advanced a third contention, asserting that the provisions of the Act concerning the resumption of jagir lands exceeded the legislative competence of the State because the subject matter was not enumerated in either List II or List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The respondent countered that the Act, in substance, dealt with acquisition and was therefore covered by Entry 36 of the State List. The petitioners maintained that the legislation plainly concerned the resumption of jagirs, that resumption is a distinct legal concept from acquisition, and that consequently the Act could not be placed within Entry 36. The Court agreed with the petitioners that resumption and acquisition denote two separate legal concepts. Resumption implies that the authority effecting the resumption already possesses a pre-existing right over the property, whereas acquisition does not carry such an implication. Generally, the effect of resumption is to extinguish the interests of the person whose property is resumed, while acquisition results in vesting the interest in the acquiring authority. By recognizing this doctrinal distinction, the Court concluded that the petitioners’ view on the nature of the legislation was correct, and the contention that the Act was ultra vires on the ground of being outside the State List was accordingly rejected.

In this case the Court explained that while the earlier discussion distinguished the concepts of resumption and acquisition, the present question was whether the impugned legislation should be characterised as an act of acquisition of jagir lands or merely as a mechanism for their resumption, and that the correct answer required an examination of the true substance of the law rather than a reliance on the label assigned to it by the Legislature. The Court observed that the name attached to a statute does not control its classification; instead, the pith and substance of the provisions must be considered. To that end, the Court reviewed the specific sections of the Act that dealt with the resumption of jagir lands. Chapter V of the Act, which is expressly concerned with resumption, contains Section 21, which empowers the State to issue notifications effecting the resumption of jagirs. Section 22(1) follows with a sweeping clause stating that from the date of any such resumption, notwithstanding any other existing jagir legislation, the right, title and interest of the jagirdar and of every other person claiming through him in his jagir lands—including forests and other appurtenances—shall stand resumed to the Government free from all encumbrances. The Court then turned to Section 22(1)(g), which provides that the right, title and interest of the jagirdar in all buildings situated on jagir lands that are used for schools and hospitals and that are not within residential compounds shall stand extinguished, and that such buildings shall be deemed to have been transferred to the Government. Section 23, also in Chapter V, creates an exception by specifying that certain properties are excluded from the operation of Section 22 and are to continue to belong to the jagirdars or to be held by them. The Court noted that Chapter VI deals with compensation, and that Section 26(1) declares that, subject to the other provisions of the Act, the Government shall be liable to pay every jagirdar whose jagir lands are resumed under Section 21 compensation determined in accordance with the principles laid down in the second schedule of the Act. Chapter VII prescribes the procedure for determining and paying such compensation, and the second schedule itself contains the principles on which the compensation is to be assessed. The Court pointed out that this was the scope of the legislation when it was originally enacted in 1952. The Court then mentioned that in 1954 the Act was amended by Act No. XIII of 1954, the most significant change being the introduction of a provision for the payment of a rehabilitation grant in accordance with principles enacted in Schedule III of the Act. Turning to the petitioners’ contentions, the Court observed that the petitioners maintained that the fundamental assumption underlying the Act is that jagirdars do not possess a right of property in the lands themselves; rather, they hold only ancillary rights relating to those lands. Consequently, the petitioners argued, the State is entitled to resume the lands without any compensation for the land itself and is required to pay only for the ancillary rights that are extinguished. The petitioners supported this view by referring to the Venkatachar Committee’s Report on Land Tenures in Rajasthan, which, according to them, formed the basis of the impugned legislation. The Committee, the petitioners explained, had held that “jagirs are not the property of the jagirdars” (see page 47, paragraph 5) and that, if the jagir system were abolished, jagirdars would not be entitled to any compensation on the ground that jagirs are not private property. The Committee further observed that, although jagirs are not property, the rights that have been enjoyed for centuries have acquired an accretion of rights by long custom and prescription and that these rights are entitled to due recognition, and that a rehabilitation grant might be given to the jagirdars (page 47, paragraph 6). The petitioners therefore contended that the language of Section 22, particularly clause (a) which declares that the right, title and interest of the jagirdars shall stand resumed, could not be understood as indicating a transfer of ownership to the State because acquisition implies that the property acquired belongs to the person from whom it is taken. Since the basis of the legislation, according to the petitioners, was that the jagirdars had no proprietary right in the lands, there could be no acquisition of something that did not belong to them. Thus, the petitioners argued that the Act should be interpreted as a statute for resumption of jagir lands, not as a law of acquisition, and that compensation should be limited to the ancillary rights and the rehabilitation grant authorized by the 1954 amendment.

The Committee’s report stated that the basis for the jagir system was “the ground of the jagirs being private property”, and further observed that “even though jagirs are not property … those rights which have in many cases been enjoyed for centuries have acquired around them an accretion of rights by long custom and prescription which are entitled to due recognition”. The report also indicated that a rehabilitation grant might be paid to the jagirdars (page 47, paragraph 6). The petitioners argued that these views were incorporated into section 22 of the Act. They contended that when section 22(1)(a) declares that the right, title and interest of the jagirdars shall stand resumed, the term “resumed” cannot be understood as meaning that the State acquires those rights, because acquisition presupposes that the property acquired belongs to the person from whom it is taken. According to the petitioners, the legislation was premised on the notion that jagirdars did not own the land; consequently, nothing could be acquired from them that they did not possess. The petitioners contrasted this with the language of section 22(1)(g), which provides that certain buildings standing on jagir lands and presumably constructed by jagirdars shall be transferred to the Government rather than resumed as under section 22(1)(a). The petitioners’ argument, however, was said to rest on an insufficient understanding of the true nature and scope of the general law right of resumption and of the power of resumption conferred on the State by the impugned Act. Under existing law, a jagir could be resumed only in limited situations: for breach of the conditions of the grant, such as failure to render services or perform obligations imposed by the grant; for rebellion, disloyalty, or the commission of serious crimes; and because jagirs were originally life grants, the estate reverted to the State upon the holder’s death, with any succession requiring a fresh grant from the State, even when the successor was the heir of the deceased. The right to resume jagirs within these limits was founded on the original grant and regulated by general law, and no legislation was required to exercise it. Every ruler of the Covenanting State possessed this grantor’s right, which had become vested in the Rajpramukh under article VII(3) of the Covenant. The petitioners’ claim that resumption was not an acquisition would be strictly correct only if the resumption were exercised under the power conferred by that article. The resumption contemplated by the Act, however, differs from that authorized by article VII(3). It is a resumption not made in accordance with the terms of the grant or the law applicable to jagirs, but contrary to them, as expressed in section 21’s phrase “notwithstanding anything contained in any existing jagir law applicable thereto”. Thus, the resumption authorized by the Act is not a mere enforcement of the rulers’ original rights.

The Court observed that the State exercised its sovereign power of eminent domain rather than merely acting as a grantor of jagirs. Consequently, the taking of the jagir lands, although described in the statute as “resumption,” was, in substance, an acquisition. This view was reinforced by the statutory provisions that required the payment of compensation. Section 26(1) imposed a duty on the Government to pay compensation in accordance with the principles laid down in the Second Schedule, and the Court found that this duty was real and enforceable. The requirement to pay compensation could be reconciled only with a taking that qualified as an acquisition; a true “resumption” under the terms of the original grant or the applicable jagir law would not attract any liability to compensate the holder. The petitioners argued that the provision for a rehabilitation grant indicated that the compensation awarded was merely ex gratia. The Court rejected this contention, noting that the rehabilitation grant was an additional payment introduced by Amendment Act XIII of 1954 and that it was payable on top of the statutory compensation. Likewise, the suggestion that the Act incorporated the Venkatachar Committee’s finding—that jagirs were not the property of the jagirdars and therefore required no compensation—was not persuasive. Section 22(1)(a) expressly identified the right, title and interest of the jagirdar in the jagir lands as the subject of the resumption and provided for compensation for that interest.

The Court further held that the opinions expressed in the Venkatachar Committee report could not be used to determine the true nature of the impugned legislation; the proper approach was to interpret the language of the statute itself. An examination of the Act as a whole made it clear that “resumption” in the statute was intended to signify acquisition. If the legislation were truly a law for the acquisition of jagirs, its provisions would necessarily reflect that purpose, and the terminology used would be of secondary importance. The Court noted that the State possessed a reversionary right in jagir lands, and when it reclaimed such lands in accordance with the original grant or the applicable law, the act could correctly be termed a resumption. However, the statute in question authorized the taking of jagir lands on grounds that did not fall within the traditional categories of valid resumption. Given the unique relationship between the jagirdar and the State, the term “resumption” could not be excluded as a description of acquisition. Moreover, Section 22(1)(a) stipulated that the lands would stand resumed “to the Government,” language that was more consistent with acquisition by the Government than with a simple resumption under the old grant terms.

In this case, the Court noted that the term “acquisition by the Government” more accurately described the statutory scheme than the ordinary expression “resumption”. The respondent contended that the statute dealt with land and land tenures and therefore should be placed under Entry No 18 of the State List, which enumerates “Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization”. The respondent further argued that the heads of legislation mentioned in the Entries must be given a liberal construction and relied upon the decision in The United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum (1940) F.C.R. 110, 134 as supporting authority. The Court observed that this approach was well settled and, accordingly, the legislation could also be said to fall within the ambit of Entry No 18. Nevertheless, because Entry No 36 specifically deals with acquisition, and in view of the Court’s earlier determination that the true character of the statute was that of a law of acquisition rather than a mere resumption, the Court held that the Act properly fell under Entry No 36 of the State List.

Turning to the special contentions raised by several petitioners, the Court recorded that the petitioners argued that, with respect to the properties they held, the impugned Act was not saved by article 31-A of the Constitution and that the Act was void for contravening articles 14 and 31(2). On this point, two questions required determination. The first question was whether, insofar as the Act affected the petitioners’ properties, it lay within the protection afforded by article 31-A. The second question was whether the Act was unconstitutional because it infringed articles 14 and 31(2). On the first question, the petitioners contended that their properties were neither “estates” nor “jagirs” nor “other similar grants” within the meaning of article 31-A, and therefore the Act, at least with respect to those properties, fell outside the scope of article 31-A. The Court identified that the crux of the discussion was the precise connotation of the phrase “jagir or other similar grant” in article 31-A. To determine that meaning, the Court traced in broad outline the origin and evolution of the jagir tenure in Rajasthan. It recalled that during the period of the Muhammadan invasion, the Rajput princes of Hindustan migrated to Rajputana and established new kingdoms. The land-tenure system they adopted divided the conquered territories into two portions: one portion was retained by the sovereign and the other was allotted in blocks or estates to their followers. Generally, the grantees were leaders of the clan who had accompanied the king and assisted him in founding the kingdom or were his ministers. Occasionally, the grant was given as a reward for past services. The lands retained for the king were called “Khalsa”, and the revenue from those lands was collected directly by the king through his officials. The lands allotted to the followers were termed “jagirs” and were usually granted on the condition that the grantee render military service to the ruler, such as maintaining a militia, guarding passes, or defending the marches. The extent of each grant depended on the obligations imposed on the grantee and was intended to enable the grantee to sustain himself and his troops from the revenue generated by the jagir.

In the discussion of the conditions attached to a jagir, it was explained that a jagir could be granted to a holder for the purpose of maintaining a specified strength of troops, for guarding mountain passes, or for defending the marches and similar duties. The size of the grant was intended to correspond to the obligations imposed on the grantee, so that the revenue generated from the jagir would be sufficient for the grantee to sustain himself and to support the required forces. Mr. Pathak observed that, in general, the grant documents would state the amount of revenue that the jagirdar was expected to receive from the jagir, and that if the jagirdar collected revenue in excess of that amount, he would be obligated to account for the surplus to the State. To support this observation, he cited a passage from Baden-Powell’s Land Systems of British India, Volume 1, page 257, which reads: “While a strict control lasted, the jagirdar was bound to take no more than the sum assigned; and if more came into his hands, he had rigidly to account for the surplus to the State treasury.” The Court noted that this quotation is useful only for illuminating the legal relationship between the State and the jagirdar, because there is no evidence that such strict accounting was ever actually enforced in practice. From the foregoing discussion, the Court inferred that all State lands must be classified either as Khalsa or as jagir, and that a jagir is essentially a land-revenue grant made by the ruler. The Court further recounted several characteristics of the traditional jagir tenure: it was a life grant, succession depended upon the ruler’s recognition, it was impartible and could not be alienated. Over time, however, grants began to incorporate features that differed from the original jagir. Some later grants became heritable, although still impartible; a few were both heritable and partible. While the earliest jagirs were awarded to Rajput clansmen in return for military service, later grants were also made to non-Rajputs and for religious or charitable purposes, and these newer grants continued to be described as jagirs. The Report of the Venia-tachar Committee, page 18, paragraph 2, observed that the term “jagir” is employed both in a generic sense and in a specific sense, and that in its generic usage it refers to all non-Khalsa territory. The petitioners argued that the word “jagir” carries both a broader and a narrower meaning. Citing the Rajputana Gazetteer, which lists the various tenures—Jagir, Jivka, Sansan, Doli, Bhum, Inam, Pasaita and Nankar—Sri Amar Singh, representing the case of his father Zorawar Singh, a prominent Bhoomichara of Mallani, contended that in the Gazetteer the term “jagir” is used in its specific sense, while in its generic sense it would encompass all the other tenures mentioned.

The Court observed that the impugned Act defines “jagir land” in section 2(h) as any land in which a jagirdar possesses rights with respect to land revenue or any other kind of revenue, and that the definition expressly includes any land held under any of the tenures listed in the First Schedule. The Schedule itself places “jagir” as the first entry among those items. The Court further noted that the statutes enacted by the former Rajputana States consistently employ the term “jagir” in an extended sense. Consequently, both in popular usage and in legislative practice the word has come to signify State grants that confer on the grantees rights “in respect of land revenue,” as reflected in section 2(h) of the Act. Counsel for the petitioners argued that, notwithstanding this broad definition for purposes of the Act, the term “jagir” appearing in article 31-A should be interpreted narrowly, limited to its original and primary meaning as a grant made for military service rendered or to be rendered. According to that view, other types of grants—such as maintenance grants given to near relatives and dependents—would fall outside the scope of article 31-A. The Court rejected this contention, finding no satisfactory basis for imposing a restricted meaning on “jagir” in article 31-A. At the time article 31-A was enacted, the term already enjoyed a wide connotation both in everyday usage and in legislative terminology, and it is consistent with established principles of interpretation to adopt that broader understanding rather than an antiquated meaning derived from ancient tenures. Moreover, the purpose of article 31-A was to preserve legislation aimed at abolishing intermediaries and thereby creating a direct relationship between the State and the actual cultivators of the soil. Interpreting “jagir” in a manner that accomplishes this purpose requires that the term encompass all grants whereby the grantees possessed only revenue-related rights and were not themselves tillers of the soil. Accordingly, maintenance grants made to persons who were not cultivators, for example members of the ruling family, must be treated as “jagirs” for the purposes of article 31-A.

The Court then proceeded to examine the specific contentions raised by the petitioners concerning the properties they held, grouping those contentions into two broad categories. The first category relates to the tenures on which the properties are held, and the second concerns particular individual properties. Within the first category the Court identified estates held by (a) Bhomicharas of Marwar, (b) Bhomats of Mewar, (c) Tikanadars of Shekhwati, and (d) Subeguzars of Jaipur. Regarding the Bhomichara tenure, the Court noted that it is the subject-matter of petitions numbered 462, 579, 630, 638 and 654 of 1954. The Bhomichara tenure is found in Jaisalmer, in Shekhawati in Jaipur, and in Marwar, as recorded in the Report of the Venkatachar Committee, page 19, paragraph 13. However, the Court limited its present discussion to the Bhomichara tenure that exists in the State of Marwar.

In this matter, the Court examined solely the Bhomichara tenure that existed in the State of Marwar. The origins of this tenure trace back to the year 1212 A.D., when the Rathor clan, under the leadership of Rao Siaji—who was the grandson of King Jayachander of Kanouj—invaded the region of Rajputana, subdued the territories later identified as Mallani, Yeshwantpura and Sanchora, and established their presence there.

Approximately two centuries thereafter, a branch of the Rathors led by Biram Deo, the younger brother of Mallinath, the ruling prince of Mallani, moved eastward and founded the kingdom of Jodhpur. The senior branch that remained in Mallani, Yeshwantpura and Sanchora gradually declined in power, and the descendants of Mallinath began to partition the lands, treating each portion as personal property. This process caused the principality to fragment into many small holdings, leaving its owners weak and divided.

The internal quarrels among these fragmented chiefs attracted the attention of the more powerful kingdom of Jodhpur. The Jodhpur ruler compelled the chiefs to accept his suzerainty and to pay an annual tribute of ten thousand rupees, known as “Foujbal.” After agreeing to this arrangement, the chiefs continued to possess their lands while obligated to remit the tribute, and they consequently became known as Bhomicharas.

The region remained plagued by persistent disputes and dissensions among its leaders, eventually descending into such anarchy and confusion that British authorities felt compelled to intervene in 1835 to restore order. The British intervention was grounded in a treaty of alliance that had been concluded with Jodhpur in 1818, and the British acted in accordance with the obligations imposed by that treaty. Following the intervention, the territory was placed under the supervision of a British superintendent and later under the Resident at Jodhpur.

During the period of British supervision, the annual “Foujbal” tribute was collected by the British officials and transferred to the Jodhpur State. In a report dated 1849, Major Malcolm described the status of the Bhomicharas, stating that although the British Government had established its own claim over the district after restoring order and obedience, it willingly waived its rightful claim out of kindness and consideration for His Highness, acknowledging His Highness as entitled to sovereignty over the districts and the tribute they might yield.

In 1891, the British withdrew from the administration of the province and returned control to the Maharaja of Jodhpur, who subsequently governed the area as part of his dominions. On the basis of these historical facts, counsel for the petitioners argued that the Bhomicharas could not be classified as holders of jagirs or other similar grants within the meaning of article 31-A. Their argument rested on the proposition that a jagir could be created only by a grant from the ruler, and that the petitioners had acquired their territories by conquest long before Jodhpur asserted suzerainty or even before the state itself was formally established. Consequently, although the Bhomicharas lost political independence when Jodhpur became their overlord, the petitioners maintained that they never surrendered their right to the property.

In this case the petitioners argued that they had not lost any proprietary right, that their position was that of semi-independent chiefs rather than that of jagirdars, and that the payment called “Foujbal” was made not as land revenue but as a tribute. The Court agreed with the petitioners that a jagir can be created only by a grant, and therefore, if it is established that the Bhomichara tenure is not held under any grant, it cannot be classified as a jagir. The Court did not base this conclusion on the argument presented by Mr Achhru Ram that the term “jagir” in article 31-A should be read ejusdem generis with the phrase “other similar grants.” The Court explained that the rule of ejusdem generis means that words of a general nature that follow specific words are to be interpreted as limited to things of the same nature as those specified, and not the reverse; the specific words that precede are controlled by the general words that follow. The Court held, however, that it is inherent in the very concept of a jagir that it must be granted by the ruling authority, and where there is no grant there can be no jagir. This does not require the grant to be expressed; an implied grant is sufficient, and the question for determination was whether, on the facts of the present case, a grant could be implied.

The factual backdrop, as set out by the Court, is that the ancestors of the petitioners acquired the disputed lands by conquest and exercised sovereign authority over them. Subsequently the State of Jodhpur asserted its sovereignty over the same territories and began to demand an annual payment from the former rulers. The Court then examined the legal position of the former rulers after this imposition of sovereignty. Referring to the decision in Vajesingji Joravar Singji and others v Secretary of State, Lord Dunedin observed that when a territory is acquired by a sovereign state for the first time, the acquisition—whether by conquest, treaty cession, or occupation of previously unoccupied land—is an act of state. The manner of acquisition is irrelevant; the result is that the new sovereign recognizes only those rights that it, through its officers, chooses to acknowledge, and rights that existed under a previous ruler have no bearing in the courts of the new sovereign. The Court also referred to the Privy Council decision in Secretary of State v Sardar Rustam Khan, which applied the same principle.

Applying these principles, the Court concluded that when Jodhpur, as a sovereign state, imposed its sovereignty over the territory and permitted the former rulers to remain in possession of their lands on the condition of paying an annual sum, the situation amounted to a conquest of the territory followed by a re-grant of the same lands to the former rulers. Consequently, the former rulers’ title to the land thereafter rested on the recognition of that title by the ruler of Jodhpur. The Court noted that this reasoning was consistent with the holdings in both Vajesingji Joravar Singji and Secretary of State v Sardar Rustam Khan, where it was held that a subject of a former state could not enforce against the new sovereign a right that existed against the former ruler. In the present case, the claimants were the representatives of the former rulers themselves, and therefore the conclusion that their title derived from an implied grant was even stronger.

In the earlier authorities of others v. Secretary of State (1) and Secretary of State v. Sardar Rustam Khan (1) the Court was called upon to decide whether an individual who had been a subject of a now-defunct State could enforce, against the newly established sovereign, a right that he previously possessed against the former ruler of that State. The Court concluded that the individual could not enforce such a right, holding that the change of sovereignty extinguished the enforceability of the earlier claim. In the present suit the claimants are not ordinary subjects who merely seek to enforce a personal right; they are the representatives of the former rulers themselves. Because the earlier decision already barred a former subject from enforcing a right against the new sovereign, the same principle must apply to the present claimants, and it must do so with even greater force. The Court has previously described the factual situation as analogous to the Maharajah of Jodhpur having annexed all of the territories in question and then re-granting those territories to the former rulers. Consequently, the legal title of those former rulers must be regarded as arising from an implied grant made by the Maharajah at the time of annexation and re-grant.

The petitioners argue that, although the Bhomicharas had formally acknowledged the sovereignty of the Maharajah of Jodhpur, the Maharajah’s actual control over the country was slight and ineffective. They point out that the payment of the levy known as “Foujbal” was irregular, and they maintain that, in substance, the Bhomicharas therefore enjoyed a semi-sovereign status. Furthermore, they contend that the relationship between the Bhomicharas and the Jodhpur ruler was comparable to the relationship that existed between the rulers of the Native States and the British Crown. The Court is unable to accept this line of reasoning. Under the law a person can possess only one of two statuses: either the status of a sovereign or the status of a subject. There is no intermediate category, no “tertium quid.” The legal system does not recognise a person who is partly a sovereign and partly a subject, a principle reflected in the authorities (1) [1941] L.R. 68 I.A. 109 and (2) [1924] L.R. 51 I.A. 357, 360. Once it is accepted that the Bhomicharas acknowledged the sovereignty of Jodhpur, their legal status can only be that of a subject. A subject may occupy an exalted position, may be granted special privileges, and may even be regarded as superior to ordinary jagirdars, but the subject remains a subject in law.

The contention that the relationship between the Bhomicharas and the Jodhpur ruler is of the same character as that which subsisted between the rulers of the Native States and the British Crown is untenable. The very question of whether those Native States could be recognised as sovereign entities under the well-accepted principles of international law has been answered negatively by juristic opinion. (See Mr. Lee Warner, Protected Princes of India, 1894 edition, Chapter XIII, section 150, pages 373-376). Those Native States, however, possessed a distinct legal persona, each with a ruler who exercised executive, legislative and judicial powers of a sovereign character. In contrast, the Bhomicharas had ceased to exist as a distinct political entity. There was no State with a recognised head; instead there were several individuals who held lands independently of one another. Major Malcolm, in his 1849 report, observed that “It is uncertain how long the Rawats of Kher continued to exercise any control over the rest of the Chiefs, or to be considered as the head of a principality; but at the period when we first become acquainted with them, all traces of such power had long ceased and each Chief of the principal families into which the tribe is divided, claimed to be independent.” This observation underscores that the Bhomicharas no longer formed a single sovereign unit, but rather a collection of independent landholders, further confirming their status as subjects rather than semi-sovereign entities.

In 1891 the British transferred the administration of the territory to the State of Jodhpur, acknowledging Jodhpur’s sovereign rights and treating the Bhomicharas as its subjects. The transfer agreement contained a condition that any appointment of chief officers for Mallani or the imposition of taxes other than the Foujbal levy required the approval of the Resident or the Agent to the Governor-General of Rajputana. This condition related solely to the contractual relationship between the British and Jodhpur and did not alter the legal status of the Bhomicharas as subjects of the State. Moreover, the historical record indicates that the Bhomicharas possessed no semblance of independence at the time of the transfer. This lack of independence is evident from the subsequent legislation enacted by the Marwar administration, which uniformly applied to the Bhomichara territory. In 1922 the Marwar Excise Act was extended to the entire region of Marwar, explicitly including the Bhomichara area. On 24 November 1922 the Marwar Court of Wards Act, 1923 was passed, and its provisions were made applicable to the estates owned by the Bhomicharas. In 1937 rules were framed concerning the maintenance of the wives of jagirdars, and the Bhomicharas were expressly subjected to those rules. The Marwar Customs Act of 1938 likewise covered the Bhomichara territories, bringing them within the State’s customs regime. In 1947 regulations for assessing rents on jagir estates were promulgated and were applied to lands held under Bhomichara tenure. A further Customs Act enacted in 1948 again encompassed the whole of Marwar, including the Bhomichara area, reinforcing State control. The Tenancy Act of 1949 was also extended to the Bhomicharas, demonstrating that the State exercised complete legislative authority over their lands. This comprehensive legislative domination distinguishes the position of the petitioners from that of the rulers of the native princely States, over whom the British never exercised legislative power. Sri Amar Singh, counsel for the petitioner, acknowledged that the State of Marwar had the authority to legislate for Mallani. He contended that the definition of jagirdars encompassing Bhomicharas in the cited Acts served only the purposes of those statutes and did not determine their actual status. He further referred to the Marwar Encumbered Estates Act, 1922, which defines “jagir” as expressly excluding the Bhomicharas, to support his claim. The Court observed that the issue was not whether the petitioners qualified as jagirdars under statutory definitions, but whether their legal position was that of subjects of Jodhpur. From the legislative history outlined, the Court inferred that the Bhomicharas were indeed subjects, and any continued possession of ancestral lands by them could arise only from an implied grant. An implied grant, the Court noted, would bring the estates within the sweep of Article 31-A of the Constitution. The respondent further argued that even if no implied grant could be inferred and the petitioners’ status differed from that of jagirdars, the legislation still placed them in the same position as State grantees. Section 169 of the Marwar Land Revenue Act No XL of 1949 states that ownership of all land vests in His Highness. It further provides that all Jagirs, Bhoms, Sasans, Dolis or similar proprietary interests are deemed to be held as grants from His Highness.

The respondent contended that even if, according to the material facts, no grant from the State could be inferred and the petitioners’ status was distinct from that of jagirdars, their status had nevertheless been altered by section 169 of the Marwar Land Revenue Act No. XL of 1949, a provision that effectively placed them in the same position as State grantees and consequently brought their tenure within the operation of article 31-A, whether as a jagir or as another similar grant. Section 169 reads: “The ownership of all land vests in His Highness and all Jagirs, Bhoms, Sasans, Dolis or similar proprietary interests are held and shall be deemed to be held as grants from His Highness.” Under this provision, all lands in the State vest in the Maharajah and every proprietary interest therein is deemed to be held under a grant from him. The respondent further argued that the legislature, while exercising its sovereign powers, possesses the competence to alter or abridge the rights of its subjects in any manner it deems appropriate, subject, of course, to any constitutional prohibition. In support of this proposition, the respondent cited Thakur Jagannath Baksh Singh v. United Provinces (1), wherein the Privy Council held that a State law curtailing the rights which a talukdar held under a sanad from the Crown was intra vires. This authority was later followed by this Court in Raja Suriya Pal Singh v. The State of U.P. and Another (1). However, the respondent acknowledged that those precedents were not strictly on point because the present contention rests on the hypothesis that the petitioners did not hold their lands under an express or implied Crown grant. The respondent maintained that the proposition for which Mr Pathak argued is itself not open to exception and that it must be held that it was within the competence of the legislative authority of Marwar to define and limit the rights which the petitioners possessed in Bhomichara lands, citing [1945] F.C.R., 111 and [1952] S.C.R., 1056. Moreover, Mr Pathak asserted that if the effect of the legislation was to impart upon the tenure the character of a grant, such character would be sufficient to attract article 31-A. He advanced the argument that a grant, analogous to a contract, could be not only express or implied but also constructive. To illustrate this point, he quoted a passage from Halsbury’s Laws of England, Volume VII, page 261, paragraph 361: “Contracts may be either express or implied, and of the latter there are two broad divisions, the term ‘implied contract’ in English law being applied not only to contracts which are inferred from the conduct or presumed intention of the parties, of which examples have already been given, but also to obligations imposed by implication of law, quite apart from and without regard to the probable intention of the parties, and sometimes even in opposition to their expressed or presumed intention. Strictly.”

The Court noted that the passage from Halsbury’s Laws of England described a class of agreements termed constructive contracts, stating that such agreements were not true contracts because they lacked the element of consent and were treated as contracts only by a legal fiction for pleading purposes. The Court observed that Indian law does not recognise constructive contracts; instead, the arrangements described in the English authority correspond to what the Indian Contract Act calls quasicontracts. Consequently, the Court preferred to describe statutory grants as legislative grants rather than as constructive contracts. The Court agreed with the respondent that, for the purpose of article 31-A, it made no material difference whether a grant was made by the sovereign exercising a prerogative right or by the legislature exercising its sovereign authority, as both categories fell within the operation of that provision. The remaining issue, the Court explained, was whether the Bhomicharas, who had not previously held their lands as grantees from the State before the enactment of Marwar Act No. XL of 1949, should now be deemed State grantees by operation of section 169 of that Act. This determination depended on whether the Bhomicharas fell within the scope of section 169. The Court acknowledged that the wording of the section was general and unqualified, and in its ordinary sense would naturally include them. However, the petitioners submitted that the term “jagir” in the section should be interpreted narrowly, arguing that a specific meaning was intended; otherwise, there would have been no need to mention tenures such as Bhom, Sasan and Dolis, which would be considered jagirs only in a generic sense. The petitioners further contended that Bhomicharas could not be placed within the category of “similar proprietary interests” because, in the context of the statute, “similar interests” meant interests held under a grant. After careful consideration, the Court was not persuaded by the petitioners’ attempt to limit the section’s reach. The Court held that long-standing usage, recognition, and the legislative practice of the State had come to treat Bhomicharas as jagirdars, and that their tenure qualified as a jagir within the meaning intended by section 169. Supporting this view, the Court referred to the Gazetteer of Mallani compiled by Major Walter prior to 1891, which identified the Bhomicharas as jagirdars on page 94, and to the official publication titled “Brief Account of Mallani,” wherein the history of the Bhomicharas was described as “Brief history of the jagirdars.” The Court also cited Sir Drake Brockman’s Report of the Settlement Operations (1921-1924), which referred to the Bhomichara jagir as a “survival from a time antecedent to the establishment of the Raj.” Turning to the legislation of Marwar, the Court observed that the general legislative trend was to include Bhomicharas in the definition of jagirdars, as exemplified by section 3(1) of the Marwar Court of Wards Act.

The Court observed that the Customs Act of 1938, in section 64 and Appendix E, expressly identifies the Bhomicharas as jagirdars of Mallani. It further noted that the Marwar Tenancy Act, numbered XXXIX of 1949, defines the term “landlord” in section 3(9) to include a “Bhomichara jagirdar.” Both this Act and Act No. XL of 1949 formed part of a comprehensive legislative scheme that became effective on 6 April 1949. Section 4(1) of Act XL declares that the words and expressions used in that Act shall have the same meaning as in Act XXXIX. Consequently, the Court concluded that it is reasonable to understand the word “jagir” in section 169 of the relevant statute as encompassing Bhomichara tenures. The petitioners contended that section 171 classifies jagirs as either listed jagirs or scheduled jagirs, with the enumerations appearing in Schedules I and II, and that no estate held under Bhomichara tenure is mentioned in those schedules, implying that such tenures were not intended to fall within section 169. The Court rejected this inference, stating that section 171 does not exhaust all jagirs or similar proprietary interests that fall within the ambit of section 169. The statutory scheme divides jagirs for purposes of succession and partition into three categories: scheduled jagirs, which are governed by the rule of primogeniture and are dealt with under section 188 and the following provisions; listed jagirs, which are held by co-heirs, are impartible, and whose income is to be shared among co-sharers pursuant to section 131; and “other” jagirs, which descend under ordinary Hindu law, are partible, and are governed by section 172. Because a Bhomichara tenure descends like personal property and is divisible among heirs, it must be treated as an “other” jagir and therefore falls under section 172, precluding its placement in the schedules of listed or scheduled jagirs. The petitioners further argued that the Act was intended merely to declare and consolidate existing law, not to alter it, and that clear and unambiguous language is required before a statute can deprive a person of vested rights. They cited authoritative texts on statutory interpretation—Maxwell’s “Interpretation of Statutes,” 10th edition, pages 20 and 24, and Craies’ “Statute Law,” 5th edition, pages 106, 107, and III—to support this view. While acknowledging that those rules of construction are well-settled, the Court indicated that such interpretative tools are applicable only where a statute admits two plausible meanings. In the present case, the language of the statute is straightforward and its meaning plain; therefore, the Court must give effect to that clear language.

The Court observed that the statute in question was intended not only to bring together the existing law on the matter but also to introduce amendments to it. Accordingly, the Court held that the tenure known as Bhomichara falls within the definition of “jagir” provided in section 169 of the Act. The Court further expressed the view that, irrespective of other classifications, Bhomichara constitutes a “similar proprietary interest” as contemplated by the language of that section. It was submitted that the only characteristic shared by jagirs, Bhoms, Sasans and Dolis is that each is held by virtue of a grant, and therefore the phrase “similar proprietary interests” must refer to interests that arise from a grant. The Court accepted that Bhom, Sasan and Doli are indeed held under grants from the State, as recorded in the Rajasthan Gazetteer, Volume III-A, Chapter XIII. However, section 169 expressly provides that the proprietary interests to which it applies shall be held, or shall be deemed to be held, as a grant from His Highness. The inclusion of the word “deemed” indicates that the legislature intended to cover interests that may not actually have arisen from a formal grant. Consequently, if Bhomichara is recognised as a proprietary interest, it cannot be excluded from the operation of section 169 merely because its origin was not a grant. The Court therefore concluded that Bhomichara must be taken to fall within section 169 and, by extension, within the protective scope of Article 31-A of the Constitution.

The respondent further argued that Bhomichara tenure should be treated as an “estate” as defined in section 4(iii) of Act No. XL of 1949, which would also bring it within Article 31-A. Section 4(iii) describes an “estate” as a mahal or a group of mahals owned by the same landlord. Section 4(v) defines a “mahal” as any area that is not a survey number but has been separately assessed for land revenue, while section 4(iv) defines “land revenue” as any sum payable to the Government in respect of an estate or survey number, including rekh, chakri and bhombab. It was undisputed that the Bhomicharas make an annual payment of Rs 10,000 to the estate, termed “Foujpal.” The petitioners contended that this sum is a tribute rather than a land tax, and if it is a military levy, it cannot be characterised as revenue payable on account of land. The respondent countered that the Bhomicharas are permitted to remain in possession of their lands only on the condition that they pay this amount each year, implying that the payment is made in respect of the land they hold. The Court noted that accepting this argument would mean treating every tribute as land revenue, a proposition it regarded as excessively broad. Reference was made by counsel to the Administration Report of 1883-84, which described the payment in Hindi as “Kar” (tax), but the Court found this description insufficient to determine the true nature of the payment. Moreover, the petitioners maintained that even if Foujpal is regarded as revenue, there has been no separate assessment of the mahals against which it is levied.

The Court observed that the payment in question was a single consolidated sum of rupees ten thousand, which covered an area measuring thirty-six thousand square miles. This extensive area comprised five hundred and fifty villages, each held by different proprietors. According to the Gazetteer of Mallani compiled by Major Walter, the amount identified as Foujbal had been divided among the various holders. The respondent argued that this division had been formally communicated to the Jodhpur Durbar, accepted by the Durbar, and acted upon, thereby indicating that a separate assessment of revenue had taken place. The Court, however, held that Bhomichara constituted a jagir or a similar grant as understood under article 31-A. Because the record before the Court was scant and the material submitted was limited, the Court found it unnecessary to opine on the specific contentions regarding the alleged separate assessment. Consequently, the Court concluded that, to the extent that the legislation pertained to Bhomichara tenure, it fell within the protection afforded by article 31-A.

The Court then turned to the tenure of the Bhomats, which it noted was found in Mewar. The Venkatachar Committee Report described two categories among those holding land under Bhom tenure in Mewar: the Bhomats, who paid a modest tribute to the State and could be called upon for local service, and the Bhumias, who paid a regular quit-rent, referred to as Bhum-Barar, and performed duties such as village watch, road guarding, and other local services. Earlier portions of the same report had identified Bhom tenure in the states of Jodhpur, Mewar and Bundi, emphasizing that its holders were traditionally Rajputs. Citing Tod’s “Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan,” the Court recounted that historical records indicated that ancient clans, on losing their pre-eminence, merged into a class of military landholders known as bhumias—a term derived from the word for land, signifying a deep connection with the soil. These bhumias, described as descendants of early princes, were present in various parts of Mewar and formed a substantial allodial tenantry, equipped with matchlocks, swords and shields. They paid a quit-rent to the crown and provided limited local service, especially on frontier garrisons, and were ready to supply rations to the prince’s forces during invasions. Although these bhumias claimed exemption from the quit-rent and service, the Court noted that such claims were doubtful given the modest size of the payment. From this historical account, the Court inferred that the position of the Bhumias in Mewar bore considerable resemblance to that of the Bhomicharas in Marwar, both representing groups that had earlier acquired their territories through conquest.

When the rulers of Chittoor and Udaipur later established their sovereignty over Mewar, they permitted the Bhumias to remain in possession of their lands as subjects of the new State. Their position was weaker than that of the Bhomicharas of Marwar because the tenure on which they held the land required them to render military service when called upon and to pay a quit-rent. Consequently, their title to the lands was deemed to arise from an implied grant made by the State, and their tenure was characterized as a jagir even in its stricter sense. Mr Pathak contended that, irrespective of whatever status the Bhomats might have enjoyed before the enactment of the Mewar Government Kanoon Mal Act No V of 1947, that legislation altered their position and reduced them to grantees of the State for those tenures, thereby bringing article 31-A within its scope. The act contains three pertinent provisions: sections 27, 106 and 116. Section 27 declares that all lands belong to His Highness and that no person may take possession of any land unless the right is conferred by His Highness. Section 106(1), found in Chapter XI titled “The rights of jagirdars, Muafidar, and Bhumias in Tikana jagir, muafi and Bhom lands,” provides that a Tikanadar jagirdar, muafidar or Bhumia shall have all the revenue rights in the lands comprising his jagir, muafi or Bhom as granted by His Highness, and it is followed by provisions relating to succession and transfer of such tenures. Section 116 states that a jagir or Bhom may be forfeited upon the occurrence of specified events. The respondent argued that, under these provisions, ownership of the lands vested in the Maharajah and that the tenures mentioned, including the Bhum, were held as grants from him. Mr Frank Anthony advanced a different view, asserting that under section 4(2) the act divided lands into two categories—one comprising jagirs, muafi and Bhom, the other comprising Khalsa lands—so that section 27 applied only to Khalsa lands, while section 106(1) addressed grants that might thereafter be made by the State, leaving the rights of persons who held jagirs, muafi or Bhom before the act unaffected. The Court was unable to accept this contention. It observed that no statute was required to declare the sovereign’s rights over Khalsa lands, nor was legislation necessary to define the rights of future grantees of those lands, because such definitions could be inserted directly into the grants. The language of the enactment, read as a whole, left no doubt that the legislature intended to declare State ownership of both Khalsa and non-Khalsa lands and to define the rights of the holders of the non-Khalsa lands; the effect was to impress upon the Bhom tenure the characteristics of a grant, thereby bringing it within the operation of article 31-A either as a jagir or as a similar grant.

The Court observed that the statutory provision concerning non-Khalsa lands was intended to transform the Bhom tenure so that it acquired the attributes of a governmental grant. In this transformation, the tenure was to be treated in the same manner as a jagir or any other similar grant recognized under the Constitution. Accordingly, the Court held that the effect of the legislation was to bring the Bhom holdings within the ambit of article 31-A, treating them as either jagirs or comparable grants, thereby subjecting them to the constitutional safeguards applicable to such categories of land tenure.

The petitioners next argued that the Kanoon Mal Act No. V of 1947 should be declared void. Their contention was based on the assertion that a Constitution had been adopted in Mewar on 23 May 1947, which contained a provision stating that “no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied equality before the law within the territories of Mewar” (Article XIII, Clause 1). They claimed that the Act, which came into force on 15 November 1947, conflicted with this constitutional guarantee and was therefore repugnant to it. The Court examined Article 11(1) of the same Constitution, which vested the Maharajah with the power to exercise “all rights, authority and jurisdiction which appertain to or are incidental to such sovereignty except in so far as may be otherwise provided for by or under this Constitution or as may be otherwise be directed by Shriji.” The Court reasoned that when the Maharajah, referred to as Shriji, promulgated Act No. V of 1947, he exercised sovereign authority that effectively superseded the earlier constitutional provisions. Because the Constitution had been enacted by the same sovereign authority, any later enactment by that authority that was inconsistent with the earlier one would be deemed to have repealed or modified the earlier provision to the extent of the inconsistency. Moreover, the Court noted that there was no evidence that the 23 May 1947 Constitution had ever been brought into force; no legislature had been constituted under it, nor any other steps taken to give it effect. While the Court acknowledged that acquiescence does not validate an ultra-vires law, it stressed that the Act’s validity had not been challenged on constitutional grounds until the present petitions were filed. The Court concluded that the petitioners’ belated argument lacked any substantive basis and therefore had to be rejected.

Representing certain petitioners from Mewar, counsel Mr. Frank Anthony put forward the view that the petitioners were Chiefs possessing semi-sovereign powers and that they did not hold their lands as grants from the State. He cited several kowls and agreements that had been negotiated by the British Government between the ancestors of these Chiefs and the Maharajah of Udaipur. These documents, recorded in Aitchison’s Treaties, Volume III, pages 33 and 35, provided for the joint preparation of a code of law subject to the approval of the Political Agent and for the future settlement of all civil and criminal matters in accordance with that code. Further, Aitchison’s Treaties, Volume III, pages 38 to 42, documented compensation awarded to the Chiefs for the surrender of their right to manufacture salt. Counsel argued that the payments made by the Chiefs to the State under these arrangements were not revenue in the ordinary sense but were contributions made for the purpose of common defence. He maintained that, because the nature of these payments was defensive rather than fiscal, they did not convert the Chiefs into subordinate tenure-holders under the State.

The Court observed that the argument put forward sought to prevent the effect of reducing the Chiefs’ status from that of feudatory chiefs to that of subordinate tenure-holders. The petitioner’s reliance on certain observations in Biswambhar Singh v. The State of Orissa and others (1) was noted as support for this contention. However, the Court found considerable difficulty in following the argument because it was general in nature and not linked to any specific tenures or to the individual claims of the petitioners. The kowls cited to demonstrate that the Chiefs’ status was not that of subordinates were deemed inconclusive, since the value to be attached to them would depend on the prior status of the Chiefs with whom they were concluded, and no material had been placed before the Court indicating what that prior status was. Two possible hypotheses were identified: first, that the Chiefs were successors of the conquerors who had occupied the territory before the foundation of the Udaipur Raj, in which case they would be Bhoms and their rights would be identical with those of Bhoms; second, that the Chiefs were Rajput clansmen who followed the ruling dynasty of Mewar and received estates as rewards for their service in establishing the kingdom, in which case the grants would clearly be jagirs. The Court then turned to the background of the agreements as narrated in Aitchison’s Treaties, Vol. III, pp. 10-13. It was explained that for some time before the treaty concluded by the Maharajah of Udaipur with the British in 1818, the authority of the Government of Mewar was rather weak. Exploiting this weakness, neighboring States had occupied much of its territory, and the Chiefs had become lax in performing their obligations to the Durbar, leading to considerable friction between the Maharajah and the Chiefs. After the 1818 treaty, the Political Agent, Mr. Tod, sought to restore good relations and persuaded the Chiefs to settle their differences; the kowls relied upon by the petitioner were the result of those efforts. Reading those kowls in light of the stated facts, the Court found that they unmistakably established that the Chiefs’ earlier position had been that of grantees from the State, subject to certain obligations. Consequently, the agreements did not alter that status but merely provided for the performance of the obligations arising from it. On this basis, the properties held by the Chiefs would be jagirs even in the original and narrow sense of the term, and the kowls themselves described them as such (see Aitchison’s Treaties, Vol. III, p. 35, article 29). The Court noted that these jagirs fell within article 31-A. The respondent also contended that the properties held by the Chiefs would be estates as defined in article 31-A. While that contention appeared prima facie correct, the Court considered it unnecessary to express an opinion on the question, because any resumption would be protected by article 31-A.

By reference to article 31-A the Court considered whether the property in question fell within the category of jagirs or other similar grants. The discussion then turned to the Tikanadars of Shekhwati. The northern part of the State of Jaipur, lying beyond the Aravalli range, is identified as Shekhwati. In Shekhwati there are large estates that are locally called Panchpana Singhana, Sikar, Udaipurwati, Khandela and several others. Each of these estates is termed a Tikana and the persons who hold a Tikana are called Tikanadars. The petitioner in Petition No 424 of 1954 is one such Tikanadar; his estate consists of the Tikana of Malsisar and Mandrela, which are situated in the Panchpana Singhana region. The petitioner claimed that he possessed a semi-sovereign status that required only the performance of military service and the payment of a tribute known as Maumla to the State of Jaipur. Accordingly, he argued that his position should be described as that of a Maumlaguzar rather than that of a jagirdar, and that he was not a grantee of the State at all.

The historical background of these estates was set out in detail in the report prepared by Mr Wills titled “The Land Tenures and Special Powers of Certain Tikanadars of Jaipur State, 1933”. In summary, the report explains that the lands that later became the Tikanas were originally part of the Khalsa lands of the Mughal Empire. When the Mughal power began to decline, King Sawai Jai Singh, who ruled Jaipur from 1700 to 1743, acquired those lands from the Mughal emperors on a lease known as izara. King Sawai Jai Singh then sub-leased, or granted, the izara lands to various individuals, most of whom were his own clansmen. The sub-leases were made on the condition that the lessees would pay a fixed izara amount and would also render military service to the Jaipur ruler. In return for fulfilling these obligations, the sub-lessees were allowed to collect revenue from the villages that were part of the izara and to maintain their own households.

As the Mughal Empire’s control over the outlying territories weakened, the rulers of Jaipur gradually assumed almost sovereign authority over the izara lands, and those lands began to be treated as part of the royal domain. The status of the sub-lessees consequently rose, and they came to be regarded as permanent grantees who possessed their estates on a more secure basis. By the late eighteenth century, the power of the Jaipur state itself began to wane, and the holders of the Shekhwati estates attempted to break away from their allegiance to Jaipur. They claimed an independent status and started to appropriate territories that belonged to the State. Before this movement could succeed, Jaipur entered into a treaty with the British that recognised Jaipur as the sovereign authority over the whole State, including Shekhwati. The treaty required the Maharaja, after its conclusion, to resume lands that had been usurped by the nobles and to restore the proper subordinate relationship between the nobles and the Maharaja. Under the mediation of Sir David Ochterlony, agreements similar to those previously concluded at Udaipur were signed in 1819. Those agreements restored the usurped lands to the Maharaja and guaranteed the nobles their legitimate rights and possession, as recorded in Aitchison’s Treaties, Volume III, page 55.

Even after the 1819 agreements were executed, disputes continued to arise between the Maharaja and the chiefs concerning various matters, including the right of the ruler to revise the amount payable by the Tikanadars and the rights of the Tikanadars to minerals and customs. Nevertheless, these later disputes did not alter the fundamental nature of the relationship that had been established between the Maharaja and the Tikanadars by the 1819 settlement.

The Court observed that after the 1819 agreement there continued to be disputes concerning several matters, including the ruler’s authority to revise the payment demanded from the Tikanadars and the Tikanadars’ rights to minerals and customs. Nevertheless, these disputes did not alter the essential character of the relationship that the 1819 agreement had created between the ruler and the Tikanadars. According to the Court, the historical facts show that the Tikanadars initially entered into possession of the lands as izaradars under the Jaipur rulers, later improved their position, and eventually became permanent holders of those estates. Over time they were acknowledged as chiefs who were subordinate to the Maharajah. The Court rejected the view expressed by Colonel Tod that the Tikanadars were comparable to the Bhomicharas of Marwar or the Bhumias of Mewar, who had been earlier conquerors and occupiers before being subdued by Jaipur. The Court also rejected the notion that the Tikanadars were simply members of the ruling dynasty who had helped establish the Raj. Their title to the properties, the Court held, derived exclusively from grants made by the rulers of Jaipur. Even if the estates could not be strictly classified as jagirs, they were at least “other similar grants” within the meaning of article 31-A of the Constitution, which was the position taken by the State. The Court then referred to Section 4(15) of the Jaipur State-Grants Land Tenures Act No. I of 1947, which defines “State grant” to include jagir, muamla and other forms. “Muamla” refers to the amount payable by the Tikanadars of Shekhwati to the Jaipur ruler. Under Section 4(7) of the same Act, an “estate” means land comprised in a State grant. Consequently, the properties in question fall within the definition of “estate” in article 31-A. The Matmi Rules of 1945, as shown in Appendix A, provide for the recognition of succession to State grants and specifically include Muamlaguzars. The Administration Report of Jaipur for 1947-48 further explains that a muamla is a grant of interest in land for which a fixed sum is payable under a settlement reached with the State. Because of these statutory definitions and administrative descriptions, the Court concluded that the petitioner’s claim that he was an independent chieftain holding the land by right of conquest and not by grant could not be sustained. In his written response, the petitioner’s counsel, Mr Achhru Ram, altered the argument, asserting that the petitioner’s ancestors had entered as izaradars and that the impugned Act did not apply because “izara” is not listed among the tenures in the first schedule of the Act. The Court noted, however, that “Muamla” is expressly mentioned as item 6 in that schedule and that this is the tenure applicable to the petitioner. Accordingly, the Court held that the petitioner’s lands fell within the scope of article 31-A. The Court then turned to the issue of sub-eguzars, which had been raised in Petitions 471, 472 and 473 of 1954. The petitioner in Petition 473 of 1954 was identified as the holder of the estate of Isarda in Jaipur.

It was recorded that at the beginning of the eighteenth century the petitioner’s ancestor, Mohansinghji, migrated from Bagri, settled in the hilly region of Sarsop, constructed a fortress at Isarda and thereby founded an independent principality. In the year 1751 the ruler of Isarda acknowledged the suzerainty of the Maharaja of Jaipur, and the Maharaja, in turn, recognised the ancestor of the petitioner as a Subeguzar, subject to an obligation to pay tribute to Jaipur each year (see paragraph 2 of the petition). The effect of this arrangement, as was the case with the Bhomicharas, was to place the chieftain in the position of a grantee of the State. This characterization is supported by the Jaipur State-Grants Land Tenures Act No. I of 1947, wherein Section 4(15) incorporates ‘suba’ tenure within the definition of a grant, and the Matri Rules of 1945 are likewise applicable to this tenure (see Appendix A, Part III). Although the tenure is described as ‘Sube’, the holder is not designated as a Subedar—a term that carries a different meaning—but rather as a Subeguzar. The Administration Report of Jaipur for the year 1947-48 explains the nature of a Suba tenure, stating: “Suba is a tenure peculiar to Nizamat Sawai Madhopur. It is analogous to the istimrar tenure in other parts of the State. The subeguzars pay a fixed annual amount for the grant held by them” (see page 35). Consequently, the petitioner, who undeniably holds the status of a Subeguzar, possesses his lands under a grant from the State and therefore falls within the ambit of article 31-A.

The petitioners’ counsel argued that the family had historically enjoyed a special distinction because the adoption of the ruling house of Jaipur was always made from members of this family. The Court observed that such a historical distinction does not alter the legal position of Subeguzars, who must be regarded as grantees of the State. A further contention was raised concerning twelve villages that, according to the petition, were purchased in 1730 by Raja Jaisingh, the then holder of Isarda, for a sum of Rs 20,000. The petitioners claimed that these villages could not be treated as holdings under a State grant. The Court noted that Isarda itself was a newly founded State created by Mohansinghji, and its territory was gradually expanded by the acquisition of additional villages. When, in 1751, the chief acknowledged Jaipur’s suzerainty and held the estate as a Subeguzar, the title necessarily covered the entire estate, including the villages acquired earlier. Accordingly, there was no basis for treating those twelve villages differently from the rest of the estate. The Court also pointed out that this particular contention arose only in the reply statement and therefore must be rejected. Regarding Petitions Nos. 471 and 472 of 1954, the petitioner in Petition No. 471 is identified as the Tikanadar of Jhalai. In paragraph 2 of that petition, he acknowledges that he is styled a Subaguzar, and, for the reasons set out in Petition No. 473, his estate must likewise be governed by article 31-A. Nevertheless, it was contended that the Tikana comprises eighteen villages, of which only two are held as ‘Sube’. The Court recorded this argument for consideration.

In the petitions that concerned the remaining villages, the schedule annexed to the petition identified four villages as being held on the basis of maintenance grants and two villages as being held as muafi, and it was expressly stated that these six villages fell within the scope of article 31-A. Regarding the other villages included in the Tikana, the petition did not set out a separate claim about the nature of their tenure. Nevertheless, it was conceded that the Tikana constituted a permanently settled estate that yielded a fixed annual revenue of Rs 1,681. Consequently, the Tikana qualified as an estate both under section 4(7) of the Jaipur State-Grants Land Tenures Act No I of 1947 and under article 31-A. The Court held that this determination would likewise apply to Petition No 472 of 1954, in which the petitioner claimed ownership of the village of Bagina as a “subeguzar” and the village of Siras as a “jagirdar”.

The second category of petitions asserted that the specific properties owned by the petitioners did not come within article 31-A. Petition Nos 391 and 417 of 1954 fell within this category. Petition No 391 concerned the estate of Yeshwantgarh in the State of Alwar. The estate had been settled on 11 August 1941 by the then ruler in favor of his son for purposes of maintenance. The grant was characterized in the deed as a jagir, and the Gazette Notification dated 25 August 1941, which published the grant, described it in the same terms, stating that the ruler intended to create a new jagir for his second Maharaj Kumar, granting in perpetuity all villages that formed part of the Thikana of Thana together with all other properties enjoyed by the late Raja Sahib. The notification further declared that the new jagir would be exempt from rates, cesses and the obligation to maintain horses. Additional villages were added to the grant in 1944, and the present resumption proceeding related to all of those properties. Counsel for the petitioner contended that the grant did not constitute an estate under the Alwar State Revenue Code and therefore lay outside article 31-A. Under section 2(a) of that Code, an “estate” was defined as an area for which a separate record of rights existed or which was treated as such by orders of His Highness’ Government. The petitioners argued that no separate record of rights existed in Alwar, and therefore the definition could not be satisfied. The respondent, however, rejected this submission and maintained that, irrespective of the record-keeping issue, the grants were jagirs and thus fell within article 31-A. The core question therefore turned on whether the grant was a jagir. Both the deed dated 11 August 1941 and the Gazette Notification referred to the grant as a jagir, and the petitioner himself described the estate in the same manner.

In the present matter the petitioner relied upon Section 3(3) of the Alwar State Jagir Rules of 1939, which defines a jagir as a grant of land or money that is made by His Highness or is recognised as such by His Highness. The petitioner also pointed to Section 2(k) of the Alwar Revenue Code, which describes an “assignee of land revenue” as either a Muafidar or a Jagirdar. By satisfying both of these statutory definitions, the petitioner argued that the grant in question met every requirement of a jagir and therefore fell within the protective ambit of article 31-A. The next argument advanced was that even assuming the grant qualified as a jagir under article 31-A, the petitioner’s rights could not be taken away under Section 22(1)(a) of the Act. The reason given was that Section 22(1)(a) authorises the resumption of the right, title and interest of a jagirdar, not the land itself, and that the petitioner was not a jagirdar as defined in Section 2(g) of the Act because he had not been recognised as such. The petitioners further submitted that their properties, while not jagirs in the narrow, literal sense, would fall within the broader definition of “jagir” contained in Section 2(h) of the Act, which includes the several tenures listed in the first schedule to the Act. Their position was that although their estates could be classified as jagirs under this inclusive definition, the owners themselves were not jagirdars under the statutory definition because they were recognised only as holders of the specific tenures enumerated in the schedule. Consequently, they asserted that their interests could not be resumed under Section 22(1)(a) even though the estates might be officially designated as jagirs. In essence, they contended that the provision required not merely a jagir estate but also a holder who qualified as a jagirdar. The petitioners conceded that accepting this view would render Chapter V, which deals with resumption, ineffective except for those jagirs that are expressly listed as item I in the first schedule. They further argued that this situation represented a casus omissus and that it was beyond the Court’s jurisdiction to fill the legislative gap. However, the definition of “jagir” in Section 2(h) is subject to any contrary intention that the context may reveal; and when Section 22(1)(a) provides that on the resumption of jagir lands the rights of the jagirdar in those lands should cease, it clearly intends that the holders of jagirs are to be regarded as jagirdars for the purpose of that section. There can be no jagirs without jagirdars, and therefore the term “jagirdar” in Section 22(1)(a) must be read to include all holders of jagir estates, including those possessing the tenures mentioned in the schedule. Section 20 of the Act excludes from the operation of the Chapter any property whose income is used for religious purposes. Such properties are held under tenures such as Sasan, Doli and others that are listed in the schedule, and the petitioners argued that there was no justification for exempting them under Section 20 if the legislature did not intend them to fall within Section 22(1)(a). Consequently, the Court was inclined to hold that the resumption of the petitioner’s rights was valid.

The Court observed that there was no requirement to exempt the properties in question under section 20 because the Legislature had not intended to place them outside the operation of section 22(1)(a). The Court explained that the lands would fall within section 22(1)(a) only if the term “jagirdar” were interpreted broadly to include every person who holds properties that are defined as jagirs by the Act. Consequently, the Court held that the resumption of the lands was valid under the statutory scheme.

Petition No. 417 of 1954 concerned properties located in Alwar. The petitioner raised the same contention as in Petition No. 391 of 1954, namely that the lands did not constitute an estate within the meaning of article 31-A. In the petition, the petitioner described himself as the “proprietor jagirdar of the jagir known as Garhi” and asserted in paragraph 9 that his jagir was unsettled, paying neither revenue nor tribute. The prayer in paragraph 21(3) sought an injunction restraining the State from interfering with the petitioner’s rights as a jagirdar. The Court noted that, given these specific allegations, it was untenable for the petitioner to now claim that the properties fell outside article 31-A.

Petitions Nos. 401, 414, 518, 535 and 539 of 1954 involved lands situated wholly or partly in the former State of Bikaner. The petitioners contended that the lands were not “estates” under the law of Bikaner and therefore lay beyond the scope of article 31-A. The Court referred to section 3(1) of the Bikaner State Land Revenue Act No. IV of 1945, which defined an “estate” as an area for which a separate record of rights had been made, or which had been separately assessed to land revenue or would have been so assessed if the land revenue had not been released, compounded, or redeemed. Section 28 of that Act provided for the maintenance of such records, and section 45 declared that all land, irrespective of its purpose or location, was liable to payment of land revenue to the Government of His Highness. The petitioners argued that no record of rights as contemplated by section 28 had been created, that the lands had not been assessed for revenue, and that no release, compounding, or redemption had occurred; therefore, they claimed the properties could not be estates under section 3(1). The respondent maintained that, at the very least, the lands were jagirs and thus fell within article 31-A. The Court noted that the preamble to the Bikaner Act assumed that any land not classified as Khalsa was jagir land. In petitions Nos. 414, 518 and 535, the schedule described the properties as jagirs and identified the petitioners as jagirdars. Petitions Nos. 401 and 539 lacked such admissions because no schedules were attached. Nevertheless, each petition for a stay of the impugned notification alleged that the notification under the contested Act with respect to the petitioners’ jagirs had not yet been issued, as stated in paragraph 16.

The Court observed that an act concerning the jagir of the petitioners had not yet been made, as indicated in paragraph sixteen of the record. In view of these admissions, the Court could not accept the argument advanced by counsel for the petitioners, which relied upon the narrative found in Tod’s Annals of Rajasthan, Volume II, pages 25, 26, 140 and 141, asserting that the petitioners’ properties were not jagirs. The Court then turned to Petition No 634 of 1954. That petition named one hundred ninety-two petitioners, some of whom were from the former princely state of Kishangarh. The petitioners from Kishangarh put forward a special contention that, under the law applicable in Kishangarh, their properties did not qualify as estates and therefore lay outside the ambit of Article 31-A. The Court noted that Rule 4(1) of the Jagir Rules for Kishangarh State, promulgated in 1945, defines a “jagirdar” as a person who has been granted a village or land as a jagir by the Dur­bar in consideration of past and future services, and that Rule 5 classifies jagirdars into five distinct categories. The petitioners argued that none of them could be placed within any of those categories. However, this contention was not expressly raised in the body of the petition; instead, paragraph 1 of the petition itself admitted that the petitioners’ properties are known as “Jagirs, Bhoms, Muafi, etc.”. Such a description inevitably brings those properties within the operation of Article 31-A. Moreover, the schedule annexed to the petition identified the petitioners as jagirdars and labelled the villages they possessed as jagir villages. Consequently, the Court concluded that the petitioners’ argument that their properties lie outside Article 31-A must be rejected. The petition further stated that the one hundred twenty-eighth petitioner, Prasad Singh, does not make any payment in respect of his estate and claimed that his estate is not a jagir. The Court reasoned that, if that allegation were true, the earlier admission that the properties are described as “Muafi” would apply, and a Muafi classification likewise falls within Article 31-A.

The Court then considered Petition No 536 of 1954. In that petition the petitioner claimed to be the holder of an estate in Mewar known as Bhaisrodgarh Tikana and alleged that a dispute had arisen between Rawat Himmat Singhji, who was then the holder of the estate, and the Maharajah of Udaipur. According to the petitioner, the dispute was settled in March 1855 through the mediation of the then Government Agent, Sir M. Montgomery, and that the settlement recognised the Tikana as the exclusive property of its holder. The Court noted that the alleged settlement agreement had not been produced, and even assuming the allegations were true, such an agreement could not have altered the essential character of the estate as a jagir grant. Furthermore, the estate appears as item 8 in the schedule of jagirs listed under section 117 of the Mewar Act, Number V of 1947; that inclusion alone suffices to place the estate within the scope of Article 31-A. Finally, the Court examined Petition No 672 of 1954, in which the petitioner was identified as a Bhumia who possessed an estate called “Jawas”. The historical background of the estate was cited from the book “Chiefs and Leading Families of Rajputana”, page 36. On the basis of that history, counsel argued that the Chiefs of Jawas occupied a special position as feudatories. The Court noted that this position was not materially different from that of other Bhomats and that the estate was expressly included in the schedule under section 117 of the Mewar Government Kanoon Mal Act, No V of 1947, as item 25, thereby bringing it within Article 31-A.

The Court observed that the Bhomat holdings could not be described as grants to grantees, yet their legal position did not differ from that of other Bhomats. It noted that paragraph fourteen of the record admitted that the lands formed part of the Bhomat region. The estate in question was expressly listed in the schedule under section 117 of the Mewar Government Kanoon Mal Act No. V of 1947 as item number twenty-five, and therefore it fell within the protection of article 31-A.

Several petitions, namely numbers 483, 527, 528, 675 of 1954 and numbers 1 and 61 of 1955, raised the issue of whether grants made for maintenance should be treated as “jagirs or other similar grants” for the purposes of article 31-A. In petition number 483 of 1954 the grant had been made by the ruler of Uniaara, while in petition number 528 of 1954 the grant had been made by the then ruler of Katauli before that territory merged into the State of Kotah. The Court held that maintenance grants qualified as jagirs within the broader meaning of the term and consequently fell within article 31-A.

Petition number 527 of 1954 involved a grant made to certain members of the ruling house of Jaipur. The respondent described the beneficiaries as illegitimate issue, referred to as Laljis, and stated that the grants were for “Lawazma” and “Kothrikharch”. Those expressions, according to the Administration Report of Jaipur for 1947-1948, page thirty-six, denoted maintenance of paraphernalia and household expenses. The grants presented in petition number 1 of 1955 and petition number 61 of 1955 were of a similar character. Apart from the general argument that maintenance grants were outside the scope of article 31-A, counsel for the petitioners contended that “Lawazma” and “Kothrikharch” represented tenures not mentioned in the first schedule of the Act, and therefore the resumption of the lands lacked legal authority.

The Court explained that the terms “Lawazma” and “Kothrikharch” merely described the purpose of the grant, namely maintenance expenses, and did not define a separate tenure. A grant could simultaneously be a jagir and a maintenance grant, and the fact that it was issued for Lawazma and Kothrikharch did not preclude it from being classified as a jagir. The Court suggested that the precise question of whether those terms denoted tenures distinct from those listed in the schedule could be left unresolved, preserving the petitioners’ right to pursue that issue in separate proceedings. Such an approach would be appropriate when the matter before the Court was not the constitutionality or voidness of the Act itself, but rather whether the governmental action taken under the Act was authorized by its provisions. The Court also observed that none of the petitions alleged that the properties were held under a tenure outside the schedule, while at least some petitions proceeded on the premise that the estates were jagirs.

The petitioner was the ruler of Tonk who received a monthly maintenance allowance of Rs 762. In consideration of that allowance, a resolution dated 6-3-1948 granted her the village of Bagri together with its hamlets Anwarpura and Ismailpura. Because the grant was given in lieu of a maintenance allowance, it was classified as a jagir, and the petition was framed on that footing. Counsel for the petitioner advanced a special claim that the Government was estopped from resuming the jagir lands. The basis of that claim was that on 28-11-1953 the Secretary to the Government wrote to the Collector of Tonk indicating that the petitioner should not be disturbed in her enjoyment of the jagir for her lifetime. A later communication dated 24-11-1954, addressed to the petitioner, expressed the Government’s inability to prevent resumption. The petitioner argued that the Government was therefore bound by the earlier assurance and could not revert on it. The Court found no substance for an estoppel plea. The 28-11-1953 letter was not addressed to the petitioner and did not constitute a definitive assurance or undertaking not to resume the jagir. Even assuming such an assurance existed, it could not bind the Government because its power of resumption is governed by statute and must be exercised in accordance with that law. The Act gave no authority to exempt lands from resumption, rendering any undertaking not to resume legally ineffective and precluding estoppel against the statutory power. The petition also raised a contention under rule 2(f) of Schedule II, asserting that no compensation is payable for abadi lands that remain in the jagirdar’s possession, whereas compensation is taken into account when such lands are sold. The petitioners claimed that this distinction was discriminatory. The Court explained that the provision is founded on the principle that compensation is measured by the income the property generates; abadi lands held by the jagirdar produce no income, while sale proceeds become income-producing assets. Whether this principle of assessing compensation can be challenged is a separate question that will be addressed at the appropriate stage.

The remaining petitions—Nos. 371, 375, 379, 416, 455 and 461 of 1954—generally contended that the properties involved did not qualify as estates within the meaning of Article 31-A. Petition No. 371 concerned the estate of Doongri in Jaipur. It was argued that the holder’s only liability was the payment of Naqdirazan, which the petitioners claimed was not revenue. Naqdirazan, the petitioners explained, is a monetary commutation for the obligation to maintain a specified number of horses and therefore represents a grant for military service. This characterization implies that the Doongri estate is in fact a jagir. Similar contentions were raised in Petition No. 375, relating to the estate of Renwal, where the petitioner likewise paid only Naqdirazan, described himself as the jagirdar of Renwal, and sought relief on that basis. Petition No. 379 involved the estate in Khera, with the petitioner also stating that he held the property by payment of Naqdirazan and identified himself as the jagirdar. Each of these petitions thus asserted that, despite the claim that the properties were not estates under Article 31-A, they were in reality jagirs, falling within the scope of that constitutional provision.

In this case, the Court observed that the petitioner in Petition No. 371 of 1954 identified himself as the jagirdar of Doongri and expressly acknowledged in paragraph 9 that the jagir remained unsettled. The relief sought consisted of an injunction restraining the State from interfering with the petitioner’s rights as a jagirdar, and the stay petition further alleged in paragraph 19 that the entire family depended on the jagir for support. The Court noted that Article 31-A clearly applied to such holdings. Petition No. 375 of 1954 concerned the estate of Renwal, where the petitioner claimed he paid only Naqdirazan and no revenue. Nevertheless, he described himself in paragraph 1 as the jagirdar of Renwal, admitted in paragraph 9 that the estate was a jagir, and based his claim for relief in paragraph 21(3) on that status. Accordingly, the Court held that the properties were unmistakably jagirs within the ambit of Article 31-A. Similarly, Petition No. 379 of 1954 involved a claim over the estate in Khera. The petitioner portrayed himself as the owner of the properties in the capacity of a jagirdar, and he affirmed in paragraphs 9, 14, 16 and 19 that the estate was a jagir. He sought an injunction to prevent State interference with his jagirdar rights, leading the Court to conclude that this estate also fell squarely within Article 31-A. Petition No. 416 of 1954 dealt with an estate called Sanderao, where the holder’s payment was termed Rekchakri and was argued not to be revenue. Yet the petitioner conceded in paragraphs 1, 2, 9 and 21(3) that the lands were jagir lands. Petition No. 455 of 1954 related to properties in Mewar and involved thirteen petitioners. They argued that payments described as chakri chatund and Bhom-barad were not revenue and that their properties were not estates. Nonetheless, they admitted being “owners as petty jagirdars” of the properties listed in the schedule, a statement reiterated in paragraphs 12, 17(e), 19 and 21(3) of the petition and in paragraphs 16 and 19 of the stay petition, all of which clearly acknowledged the jagir nature of the estates. Finally, Petition No. 461 of 1954 contained an admission that the petitioner held ten villages as jagirs, seventeen as istimrar and two as muafi. The istimrar tenure, identified as item 2 in the first schedule to the Act, qualified as an “other similar grant” under Article 31-A, while jagir and muafi were expressly included in that article. After reviewing all these admissions, the Court concluded that the petitioners had failed to demonstrate that the impugned Act, insofar as it concerned the properties they held, fell outside the protection afforded by Article 31-A.

Having reached that conclusion, the Court proceeded to address the petitioners’ second contention that the Act was defective because the compensation it prescribed was inadequate. The Court indicated that the relevant provisions of the Act governing compensation would now be examined, and that the second schedule to the Act set out the principles for assessing compensation. The Court therefore prepared to review the rules contained in that schedule.

The Court explained that the Act sets out specific principles for assessing compensation. Rule 2 describes the method for determining gross income and lists the various heads of income that must be included. Rule 4 outlines the deductions that may be allowed, and under rule 4(3) a deduction of twenty-five per cent of the gross income is permitted for “administrative charges inclusive of the cost of collection, maintenance of land records, management of jagir lands and irrecoverable arrears of rent”. A proviso to this rule states that the net income may never be computed at less than fifty per cent of the gross income. According to rule 5, compensation payable equals seven times the net income that is calculated under rule 4. Rule 6 provides that any compensation already paid to the jagirdar for customs duties in the basic year shall continue to be payable. Section 26(2) mandates that the compensation amount accrue interest at a rate of twenty-one per cent from the date of resumption, and section 35 requires that the amount be paid in instalments. Under section 35(A) the Court may make the payment wholly in cash, wholly in bond, or partly in cash and partly in bond. In addition, the Act contains a provision for a rehabilitation grant, the scale of which is set out in schedule III. The petitioner complained that the compensation prescribed by the rules is inadequate because it is far below the market value of the estate. The petitioner argued that rule 2 considers only the actual income presently received from the properties and ignores any potential future income, such as that which might arise from vacant house sites or unopened mines. The petitioner also relied on the decision of this Court in State of West Bengal v. Bela Banerjea, where it was held that compensation guaranteed under article 31(2) must be “just compensation”, meaning the value of what the owner has been deprived of. The Court, however, reiterated that the impugned Act is protected by article 31-A, which provides that no law dealing with acquisition of property falling within its scope can be attacked on the ground that it violates any provision of Part III. The Court cited earlier judgments, namely State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh and Visveshwar Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, which held that an objection to the validity of an acquisition law on the basis that it fails to provide compensation is an objection founded on article 31(2) and is barred when the legislation falls within articles 31(4), 31-A and 31-B. The Court also referred to Raja Suriya Pal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, noting that when the whole estate is acquired, it is not a valid objection that compensation is awarded based only on the income actually received, and that no compensation is payable for those portions of the property that do not generate any income.

In this matter, the petitioners asserted that the compensation prescribed by the rules was so insufficient that it amounted to an illusion, and consequently they contended that the Act itself constituted a fraud on the Constitution. The Court did not accept this contention. The Act provides that a jagirdar is entitled to compensation equal to the net income he would have earned during seven years, and in addition the jagirdar receives a rehabilitation grant which can range from two to eleven times his net income. Section 18 of the Act further provides that the jagirdar shall be allotted a portion of the khudkhast lands that form part of the jagir, the quantum of the allotment being proportionate to the total extent of those lands. The Act also obliges the government to pay compensation for loss of customs. At most, one may observe that the compensation calculated under these provisions would be inadequate if it were measured against the market value of the properties; however, such inadequacy is not a ground on which an enactment protected by article 31-A may be challenged. To set aside an Act falling within article 31-A, it must first be demonstrated that the true purpose of the law was to acquire property without any intention of making payment, that the compensation clauses are merely a façade concealing that purpose, and that the compensation is so illusory as to amount to no compensation at all. The Court found no basis for such a conclusion with respect to the impugned Act, and therefore rejected the allegation that the legislation was a constitutional fraud.

The petitioners, through counsel, also argued that the Act suffered from a fundamental defect because it treated all forty-one tenures listed as jagirs in the schedule as having the same character and consequently applied a uniform compensation scheme to each. They pointed out that these tenures differ widely with respect to attributes such as heritability, partibility and alienability, and that the compensation scales should have been tailored to reflect the nature and quality of each tenure. While the Court recognized that there was considerable force in this observation, it held that the objection concerned only the quantum of compensation, an issue that is not justiciable under article 31-A. Moreover, even if the petitioners were permitted to go beyond article 31-A and challenge the fairness of the compensation, they did not produce any material to substantiate the claim that the compensation was unjust; consequently, that line of objection also fails. Finally, the petitioners contended that there was no public purpose behind the resumption, alleging a violation of article 31(2). This objection is similarly barred by article 31-A, and on the merits the Court concluded against the petitioners.

In addressing the case, the Court referred to its earlier decision in State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga (1) [1952] S.C.R. 889, 946-948 and others (1), observing that legislation similar to the present Act was upheld because it served a public purpose. The petitioners subsequently argued that several provisions of the Act violated article 14 of the Constitution and were therefore invalid. The Court noted that, aside from the bar created by article 31-A which makes such a challenge inadmissible, the petitioners’ claim lacked any substantive merit.

The petitioners contended that the title of the Act indicated that it was intended only to provide for the resumption of certain jagir lands, not all jagirs, and that section 21, which allows the Government to “appoint a date for the resumption of any class of jagir lands,” meant that the Government was not obligated to resume every jagir. They claimed that the Government could therefore choose to resume some jagirs while leaving others untouched, which they said rendered the Act discriminatory. The Court examined the relevant provisions, namely sections 20 and 4 of the Act. Section 20 states that “the provisions of this Chapter apply to all jagirs except jagirs the income of which is utilised for the maintenance of any place of religious worship or for the performance of any religious service.” The Court held that the Act did not confer any power on the Government to grant such exemptions, and consequently every jagir fell within the ambit of section 20, leaving the Government with no discretion to exclude any jagir. Section 4 provides that all jagir lands became liable to pay assessment from the date the Act commenced, and that the jagirdar’s liability to pay tribute ceased on the same date. From these provisions, the Court concluded that the Legislature clearly intended that all jagir lands were to be resumed under section 21.

The petitioners also argued that because section 21 permits the State to resume different classes of jagir lands on different dates, the law would operate unequally and be discriminatory. The Court found that this staging of resumptions was motivated solely by practical considerations such as administrative convenience and the facilitation of compensation payments, and therefore could not be characterized as discrimination. The Court cited its earlier ruling in Biswambhar Singh v. The State of Orissa and others (1) [1954] S.C.R. 842, 855, where a similar provision in the Orissa Estates Abolition Act No. I of 1952 had been held not to offend article 14. Accordingly, the Court overruled the petitioners’ objection.

Petitions numbered 629 and 643 of 1954, filed by jagirdars of Mewar, presented an additional contention. Their counsel argued that the jagirs had been taken over by the State in 1949 under section 8(A) of the Rajasthan Ordinance No. 27 of 1948, that the High Court of Rajasthan, by its judgment dated 11-12-1951, had declared that ordinance void under article 14, and that this decision had been affirmed by this Court. The Court examined these claims in the subsequent portion of the judgment.

The Court examined the argument that, in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Rao Manohar Singhji, the present Act, which had become operative on 8-2-1952, had been applied in a discriminatory manner. The submission claimed that the Government had improperly taken possession of the jagirs in 1949 under the Rajasthan Ordinance, and that instead of restoring those jagirs to the petitioners, the Government had first issued a notice under section 21 of the Act, thereby retaining possession. The claim further alleged that, as a result of this sequence of events, the jagirdars of Mewar had been treated differently from the jagirdars in the other Rajputana States to whom section 8(A) of the Ordinance was not applicable, and that such differential treatment amounted to a violation of article 14. The Court found no merit in this contention. It observed that the Mewar jagirdars had lost possession pursuant to legislation that had subsequently been declared void; consequently, the rights that the jagirdars possessed over the jagirs up to the date of the present notifications remained intact, and no inequitable result could arise from that circumstance. Moreover, the Court noted that the Act itself did not discriminate, because it was applicable uniformly to every jagir situated in Rajasthan. For these reasons, the Court concluded that there was no basis on which to hold that the Act, in any fashion, contravened article 14.

The Court then turned to the separate contention raised by certain petitioners that, even assuming the validity of the impugned Act, their particular estates fell outside the mischief that the Act intended to address and therefore the resumption of such estates was unauthorized. The first of these petitions, identified as Petition No. 392 of 1954, concerned the estate of Khandela, which lay in the former State of Jaipur. According to a deed dated 1836, the Maharajah of Jaipur had settled the estate on Raja Abayasingh and Raja Lakshmansingh by granting them an izara istimrar subject to an annual assessment of Rs 80,001. The present petitioner, being the successor-in-interest of Raja Abayasingh, claimed a three-fifths share in the estate. Counsel for the petitioner argued that the Act did not apply to him because he was neither a jagirdar nor a holder of any of the tenures enumerated in Schedule I of the Act. The historical background of the Khandela estate was outlined in Mr. Wills’s Report, pages 75-79. The report described Khandela as an ancient principality that had been held by the Raisalot family as mansabdars under the Mughal emperor. In 1725, Sawai Jaisingh of Amber secured an izara of Khandela from the Mughal emperor, thereby making the Raisalot holders subordinate to him. The Raisalot family lost possession of the estate in 1797, after which it formed part of the Khalsa lands of Jaipur and was administered as such until 1812. From that time until 1836, the estate was leased on short-term arrangements to the chieftain of Sikar and other parties. The 1836 grant, which formed the basis of the petitioner’s claim, was made in the context of negotiations for a marriage between a Bikaner princess and the ruler of Jaipur; the Bikaner durbar had insisted that the Khandela estate be restored to the Raisalot family. Although the marriage never materialised and the princess subsequently died, the negotiations that had been ongoing at the time led to the issuance of the 1836 grant.

The Court observed that the negotiations between the Jaipur State and the former owners of the Khandela estate led to the issuance of an izara in 1836. The central issue before the Court was whether the 1836 grant should be characterized as a jagir. The Court noted that the grant was not made in recognition of past services or for future services, nor did it convey any right to collect revenue from the estate. Instead, the grantees were entitled to retain the income generated by the lands while being obliged to pay a fixed annual sum to the Durbar. Although the estate exhibited certain features commonly associated with a jagir, such as being impartible, inalienable, and governed by the Matmi Rules in matters of succession, the Court held that these attributes did not alter the true nature of the grant. In both name and substance, the Court concluded, the grant constituted a permanent lease rather than a jagir.

Mr Pathak, appearing for the petitioner, argued that even if the 1836 instrument was not a jagir, it at least constituted an istimrari tenure, which falls under item 2 of Schedule I to the Act. He based this contention on several proceedings concerning the Khandela estate that took place between 1932 and 1939. Those proceedings arose from a dispute between the Thikanadars of Shekhwati and the Durbar regarding their respective rights, during which the status of the Izaradars of Khandela was examined. An enquiry conducted by Mr Wills in 1933 produced a report that was subsequently reviewed by a Committee, whose findings were submitted in 1935. The Committee reported, after a thorough examination of the material, that the holders of Khandela differed from other Thikanadars who paid Muamla and claimed semi-independent status as “Muamlaguzars.” The Committee held that the Khandela grantees were merely “istimrar Izaradars” holding the estate under a permanent and specific izar, and not “istimrar Muamlaguzars.” Moreover, the grant of Mal, Sayer, Bhom and Kuli habubayat under the deed did not enhance their status as Izaradars. This conclusion was accepted by the Maharajah of Jaipur on 14 April 1939.

Mr Pathak maintained that the Committee’s finding that the grantees were “istimrar Izaradars” brought them within the definition of istimrari tenure under item 2 of Schedule I, and therefore the resumption of the estate fell within the ambit of the Act. The Court, however, pointed out that the report expressly distinguished “istimrar Izaradar” from “istimrar Muamlaguzar,” and clarified that the term “istimrar” in this context referred only to the permanence of the tenure, not to its qualitative character. To elucidate the nature of istimrari tenure, the Court referred to Venkatachar’s Report, which described istimrari estates as permanently quit-rented lands, known by various names such as Dumba, Chukota, Suba and Istimrari. The Report emphasized that the essential features of istimrari tenure were a nominal, fixed quit-rent and the permanence of the assessment. The Court observed that the fixed sum of Rs 80,001 stipulated in the 1836 deed could not be described as nominal, and the 1933 Committee report had already determined that the assessment was not permanent. Consequently, the Court concluded that the 1836 grant did not create an istimrari tenure.

The Court observed that the estates in Ajmer were similar to the Jagirs that existed in Rajasthan. None of the Ajmer estates paid any revenue until the year 1755 because they were held on the condition of rendering military service. After the advent of British rule, the holders of those estates were required to pay an annual, fixed and permanent quit-rent, and consequently they were converted into holders of Istimrari tenure. The Court quoted a passage from page 22, paragraph 24, which states that under British administration “the estate holders were made liable to pay an annual fixed and permanent quit-rent and were converted into Istimrari tenure holders.” It further quoted page 24, paragraph 36, wherein it is explained that “this quit rent or fixed revenue is a nominal assessment, not related to the income from the holding, but with the condition of confirmation of grant; the amount is invariable. This class of persons are known as ‘Istimrardars.’” From these statements the Court inferred that the essential characteristics of Istimrari tenure are a permanent assessment of a nominal quit-rent. The Court then noted that the amount of Rs 80,001 fixed as assessment by the deed of 1836 could not be characterised as nominal, and that the 1933 Committee report had expressly found that such assessment was not permanent. Accordingly, the Court held that the deed of 1836 did not create an Istimrari tenure. The respondent had contended that Khandela was plainly an estate within the meaning of Article 31-A, that the legislative policy was to abolish all intermediaries, and that section 2(h) should be interpreted broadly enough to include every holder of an intermediate tenure. The Court rejected this line of argument, stating that legislative effect can be given only to the legislature’s expressed intention, and that the definition of “jagir” in section 2(h) was not sufficiently wide to encompass the petitioner. Consequently, the notification issued under section 21, insofar as it related to the properties held by the petitioner under the izara of 1836, was held to lie outside the scope of the Act and therefore to be unauthorised.

Petition No 427 of 1954 involved three villages, namely Haripura, Khata and Niradun. The lands in Haripura had originally belonged to certain Bhumias of Jaipur, and the petitioner had acquired those lands through a series of purchases, the last of which occurred in 1915. Because Bhum tenure is listed as item 17 in Schedule I to the Act, those lands fell within the purview of the Act. The petitioner’s counsel argued that, since the acquisitions were made long before the enactment of the Act, the petitioner’s rights could not be retrospectively altered by later legislation. The Court expressed difficulty in locating any issue of retrospective operation. It explained that if Bhum is indeed a tenure, as identified in Schedule I, and if the legislature intended to bring that tenure within the operation of the Act, the sole question to be answered is whether the specific properties notified under the Act are held under that tenure. If the answer is affirmative, the Act would unquestionably apply, and it would make no difference that the petitioner obtained title to the lands by purchase rather than by inheritance. On the petitioner’s admission that the lands notified belonged to his vendors as Bhum, the Court concluded that the Act would clearly apply to those properties.

The Court observed that the lands specifically notified were the property of the petitioner’s vendors under the Bhom tenure, and therefore the provisions of the Act applied to those lands without question. Turning to the lands situated in the village of Khata, the petitioner argued that the land was held under izara tenure and consequently fell outside Schedule I of the Act. The Court noted that Khata formed a Thikana in Shekhwati and, although the estates in that region were originally held under izara, they had subsequently been elevated to the status of jagirs and had been recognized as such. The Court further recorded that the village had been granted for the purpose of maintaining horses, characterizing it as a Mansab jagir, and consequently held that it fell within item 1 of Schedule I. Regarding the village of Niradun, the petitioner claimed that the land was held as Javad and that this tenure was not listed in Schedule I. The respondent contended that Javad was not the name of any recognized tenure and that it merely denoted a sub-grant. The Court examined the petition and found that it did not describe Javad as a tenure, nor did it set out any incidences associated with such a tenure. The term “javad” was absent from both Wilson’s Glossary and Ramanatha Iyer’s Law Lexicon. The Court consulted the Jagir Rules of Kishangarh, where section 4(xiii) defined “javad” as “a jagir confiscated by or reverted to the State,” a definition that referred to the practice of granting a small portion of a jagir either to the jagirdar upon confiscation or to family members when the jagir returned to the State. After consideration, the Court concluded that no tenure named Javad existed and that the petitioner’s argument would not succeed whether Javad were treated as a sub-grant or as a grant of jagir as described in the Kishangarh Rules. The Court also noted that this contentions had been raised by the petitioner in a supplemental statement.

In the matter of Petition No 468 of 1954, the petitioner claimed ownership of the estate known as Jobner and asserted that he was a Mansubdar rather than a jagirdar, thereby contending that his tenure did not fall within Schedule I of the Act. The Court explained that during the Mughal period, individuals to whom land-revenue assignments were made in return for the obligation to maintain horses for Imperial service were designated as Mansubdars. The petitioner alleged that Emperor Akbar the Great had granted three paraganas—Narayana, Kolak and Jobner—to his ancestors as Mansub for the maintenance of one thousand horses, and that in 1727 these lands had come under the “subordination of the Amber Durbar,” the name of the State before the foundation of Jaipur in 1728, after which the estate continued to be held by the petitioner’s ancestors as Mansubdars and not as jagirdars. The Court observed, however, that the grant clearly constituted a jagir because it involved an assignment of land-revenue in consideration of military service, and that “Mansub” was essentially an alternative term for a jagir. The Court further noted that the Jaipur Administration Report for 1947-1948, page 35, classified the estate as a jagir, and although that report did not possess the force of law, it provided persuasive evidence of the character of the estate. Accordingly, the Court held that the estate of Jobner fell within item 1 of Schedule I of the Act.

Regarding the village of Jorpura, which forms part of the estate under consideration, counsel for the respondent argued that the grant was not entirely for the deity, whereas the petitioner maintained that the village had been dedicated for the worship of the Devi. The respondent produced a deed supporting its position, but the petitioner challenged the deed’s effect. The Court observed that this question could not be resolved within the present petition and that the petitioner would need to prove, in a suitable proceeding, that the village or any portion of it fell within the exemption provided by section 20 of the Act.

The Court then examined petitions numbered 474 and 475 of 1954. In 1948 the Maharajah of Jaipur had granted the petitioners, who were his sons, the Thikanas of Bhagwatgarh and Mangarh comprising twenty villages without revenue liability. The petitioners contended that only the Thikanas of Dholpur listed in the first schedule of the Act, specifically item 11, could be exempt, and therefore Thikanas in other states should be excluded. The Court clarified that the term “Thikanadar” was an honorific, and that “Thikana” in jurisdictions other than Dholpur signified merely an estate, which could also be a jagir. The petitioners themselves acknowledged their status as jagirdars. Consequently, the Court concluded that the grant was clearly a jagir and therefore fell within item I of the first schedule.

In petition number 488 of 1954, the petitioners claimed interest in the villages of Dadia Rampur and Tapiplya, which were part of the izara of Khandela dated 1836 and also the subject of petition number 392 of 1954. Their title derived from a sub-grant, known as Chhut Bhayas, issued by the izaradar. The Court held that the petitioners’ rights corresponded precisely with those of the izaradars and, applying the reasoning set out in petition number 392, determined that the petitioners were entitled to succeed.

Petition number 36 of 1955 involved properties held as “Sansan,” a tenure listed as item 25 in the first schedule and therefore subject to section 21 of the Act. The petitioner asserted that the lands had been dedicated for the worship of Lord Shiva and Goddess Shakti, with the income being used for religious services by a brahmachari. The properties were described as small in extent, and the dedication was deemed plausible. The respondent had not denied the petitioner’s allegation. After reviewing the material before it, the Court concluded that the dedication was adequately established and that the properties were consequently exempt under section 20 of the Act.

In sum, the Court found that the impugned Act was within the legislative competence of the State, could not be attacked on the ground of procedural deficiency, and was protected by article 31-A. However, the notification was defective with respect to the properties in petitions 392 and 488 of 1954, because izaras were not covered by the Act, and the properties in petition 36 of 1955 were exempt under section 20 due to their religious dedication. Accordingly, appropriate writs would be issued in the three specified petitions, while the remaining petitions were dismissed, each party bearing its own costs.

The Court held that the impugned Act could not be challenged on either of two grounds. First, the contention that the Rajpramukh lacked the legislative competence to enact the statute was rejected. Second, the allegation that the procedure prescribed in article 212-A for the enactment of laws had not been followed was also dismissed. The Court explained that, in substance, the Act is a law for the acquisition of property and that such a law falls within the legislative competence of the State. Consequently, the Act is protected by article 31-A of the Constitution. However, the Court observed that the notification issued under the Act is defective with respect to the properties identified in Petition Nos. 392 and 488 of 1954, because the lands classified as izaras are not covered by the provisions of the Act. Similarly, the properties described in Petition No. 36 of 1955 are dedicated to religious services, and the Court affirmed that they are exempt from acquisition under section 20 of the Act. The Court therefore ordered that appropriate writs be issued in relation to these three petitions. In Petition No. 468 of 1954, the Court reserved the petitioner’s claim to exemption under section 20 for the village of Jorpura on the ground that the village is devoted to the worship of a deity, but otherwise dismissed that petition. All remaining petitions were dismissed in their entirety, and each party was directed to bear its own costs in every petition.