Sm. Ram Devi vs State Of Uttar Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 22 February, 1955

Coram: Bhagwati

In this case, the Court recorded that the appellant, together with five other persons, had been charged under Section 366 of the Indian Penal Code for kidnapping or abducting a minor girl named Chameli, the daughter of a railway employee named Net Ram, with the intent to force or seduce her to illicit intercourse. The other accused also faced charges under various sections of the Penal Code, but those additional offences were not necessary to mention for the purpose of the present appeal. The trial court had acquitted two of the accused, namely Prahlad Singh and Dhani Ram. It had convicted Baburam under Sections 366 and 368, and it had convicted Gokaran under Section 368. Niranjan was also convicted under Sections 366 and 368, and the appellant herself was convicted under Section 366, receiving a sentence of three years of rigorous imprisonment. When the matter was taken on appeal to the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, the court set aside the convictions and sentences of Baburam and Gokaran on the basis of a benefit of doubt, but it dismissed the appeals of Niranjan and the appellant, thereby confirming their convictions and sentences. Niranjan did not seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, whereas the appellant applied for special leave, which was granted by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution on 3 August 1953.

The prosecution’s case described that the appellant lived as a neighbour of Net Ram at Hardoi Station and supplied milk to his family. On the evening of 30 April 1949, Chameli came to the appellant’s house to collect milk. The appellant gave her milk together with a sweet, describing it as the Prasad of a religious recital. After eating the sweet, Chameli prepared tea for her father, who then left his home to attend his duties at the station as the Dehra Dun Express arrived. Subsequently, the appellant called Chameli to her house; Chameli went there, and the appellant and Chameli walked together. While they were walking, they were intercepted by Shrimati Shanti, the wife of Chameli’s brother. The appellant told Shrimati Shanti that they were going to answer a call of nature. At that moment, Prahlad was following the pair, and all of them proceeded to the station’s restroom, where they were joined by Dhani Ram, Niranjan, and Babu Ram. After leaving the restroom, the appellant and Dhani Ram returned to their respective homes, whereas Niranjan, Babu Ram and Prahlad took Chameli away, with Niranjan and Babu Ram holding her hands and Prahlad accompanying them. The prosecution further alleged that the accused took Chameli to the village of Kanehta, where she was mishandled by Babu Ram and Gokaran, and that Chameli was eventually found by the police in Niranjan’s house after a proper investigation.

The trial court challaned the appellant along with the other five accused to stand trial for the several offences with which they were charged. The prosecution evidence against the appellant comprised three specific allegations. First, it was alleged that the appellant gave a sweet to Chameli. Second, it was alleged that she accompanied Chameli for a walk. Third, it was alleged that after the walk she returned to her own house while Chameli remained with the accused Babu Ram, Niranjan and Prahlad. The charge framed against her was under Section 366, Penal Code, which deals with kidnapping or abducting a girl for the purpose of forcing or seducing her to illicit intercourse. However, the trial proceeded solely on the premise that the appellant had kidnapped Chameli from her lawful guardianship for the purpose of illicit intercourse. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Hardoi, found that this charge was proved beyond reasonable doubt and convicted the appellant accordingly. On appeal, the High Court affirmed the findings of the Sessions Court, confirming both the conviction and the sentence that had been imposed on the appellant. The sentence imposed by the Sessions Court was subsequently upheld without alteration by the appellate court.

Section 366 required that the prosecution prove that Chameli was below sixteen years of age at the time of the alleged offence. At the relevant time, the law as embodied in Section 361 of the Penal Code defined a minor girl for the purposes of this offence as being under sixteen years of age. The alleged commission of the offence was dated 30-4-1949, a date that fell before any amendment to the statutory definition of a minor. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge relied upon the medical evidence that a doctor had examined Chameli and concluded that she was approximately fifteen years old. Based on that medical opinion, the Judge concluded that the age requirement was satisfied and consequently convicted the appellant under Section 366 of the Penal Code. The High Court, however, did not accept the trial court’s finding regarding Chameli’s age. The High Court observed: “I am hesitant in holding that the age of the girl was under 16 though I find affirmatively that she was under 18 years of age”. The appellate court failed to notice that an amendment to Section 361, Penal Code, which prescribed the outside limit of the age of a minor girl for purposes of that section to be eighteen years, only came into force on 15-7-1949. Since the alleged offence occurred on 30-4-1949, the applicable legal limit at that time remained sixteen years. If that chronological distinction is accepted, the appellant could not have been lawfully convicted under Section 366 because the statutory age condition was not fulfilled.

Counsel for the respondent, Shri K.B. Asthana, then argued that even if the appellant could not be convicted under Section 366 for kidnapping because the age requirement was not met, she could still be convicted under the same provision for the purpose of abducting Chameli for illicit intercourse. The counsel’s contention rested on the notion that the statute also covered abduction with the specific intent of facilitating illicit sexual relations, irrespective of the manner in which the girl was taken. However, the court noted that such a charge was not the one that had been framed and proved against the appellant during the trial. The record of evidence did not demonstrate that Chameli was compelled by force or induced by deceit to leave her father’s residence at the appellant’s direction. Furthermore, the appellant was not examined under Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code on the issue of whether she had used the sweet to compel Chameli to depart from her home. No question was put to the appellant regarding any alleged coercion or inducement arising from the act of giving the sweet. Consequently, the respondent’s argument could not be sustained on the basis of the material placed before the court.

The Court observed that the evidence on record did not demonstrate that the appellant had compelled or induced the child to depart from her father’s residence. Because no proof existed of such compulsion or inducement, the argument advanced by the respondent could not be sustained against the appellant. Consequently, the Court concluded that the respondent could not rely on this contention to support the conviction. In light of this assessment, the Court expressed the view that both the trial court and the appellate court had erred in upholding a conviction under Section 366 of the Penal Code against the appellant. The Court therefore set aside the conviction that had been recorded and also nullified the sentence that had been imposed on the appellant. Following this reversal, the Court ordered that the appellant be acquitted of the charge and that she be discharged, thereby restoring her liberty and removing any legal consequences of the earlier judgment.