Shyabuddinsab Mohidinsab Akki vs The Gadag-Betgeri Municipal Borough and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 215 of 1954

Decision Date: 22 February 1955

Coram: Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Vivian Bose, B. Jagannadhadas

In the matter styled Shyabuddinsab Mohidinsab Akki versus The Gadag-Betgeri Municipal Borough and others, the decision was rendered on 22 February 1955 by the Supreme Court of India. The opinion was authored by Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha and was joined by Justices Vivian Bose and B. Jagannadhadas. The case is reported in the Indian Appeal Reports at 1955 AIR 314 and also appears in the Supreme Court Reporter as 1955 SCR (1) 1268. The statutory framework relied upon was the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act of 1925 (Bombay Act XVIII of 1925), particularly section 19 as amended by Bombay Act LIV of 1954, together with the provisions of sections 35(3) and 35(6) concerning notices of meetings and the effect of public presence on the validity of such meetings.

The first respondent, the municipal body governed by the Municipal Boroughs Act, consisted of thirty-two councillors, one of whom was the petitioner identified as “S”. The most recent general election for the municipality had been held on 7 May 1951, and the councillors’ three-year term was calculated from the first meeting convened on 10 July 1951 following that election. At that inaugural meeting, the fourth and fifth respondents were elected President and Vice-President respectively for a three-year tenure. Subsequently, the Municipal Boroughs Act of 1925 was amended by Bombay Act XXXV of 1954, extending the councillors’ term of office from three to four years and fixing the new expiry date as 9 July 1955. Because the original terms of the fourth and fifth respondents were due to end three years after 10 July 1951, and because the municipal corporation’s overall term had been lengthened by one year under the amendment, it became necessary to conduct fresh elections for the offices of President and Vice-President to fill the resulting vacancies for the remainder of the extended quadrennium.

In accordance with this requirement, the Collector issued a call for a special general meeting to be held on 30 July 1954 for the purpose of electing a President and Vice-President to serve for the balance of the four-year period. The Collector also appointed the District Deputy Collector, referred to as the “Prant Officer”, to preside over the meeting. On the appointed date, the Prant Officer adjourned the meeting to 3 August 1954 on instructions received from the Collector, and no business was transacted at that time. An objection raised by respondent number 3 to the adjournment was dismissed by the presiding officer. The special general meeting subsequently reconvened on 3 August 1954. During that meeting, the petitioner “S” objected that, under the provisions of the Act, a President could not be elected for a term of less than one year. The presiding officer overruled this objection. Consequently, thirteen councillors, including the petitioner, who were present out of the total of thirty-two, withdrew from the proceedings, asserting that the election of a President for a term of less than a year contravened the Act. The remaining nineteen councillors continued the meeting and elected the second respondent as President for the remainder of the quadrennium. Immediately thereafter, a further meeting chaired by the newly elected President resulted in the election of respondent number 3 as Vice-President. The same point

In this proceeding the objection that the appellant S had raised concerning the election of the President was dismissed, and as a result six councillors left the meeting while the remaining councillors continued the business. It was recorded that all thirty-two councillors of the municipality had been present at the meeting held on 30 July 1954 and also at the subsequent meeting on 3 August 1954. The appellant S filed an application under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the legality of the 3 August 1954 meeting and, by implication, questioning the validity of the election of respondents No. 2 and No. 3 to the offices of President and Vice-President for the balance of the quadrennium. The High Court dismissed that application.

The Court held, first, that the 3 August 1954 meeting, although perhaps imperfect in form, satisfied the substantive legal requirements for a valid special meeting. Consequently the meeting could not be declared invalid because the minutes showed that the actions taken on both 30 July 1954 and 3 August 1954 were carried out under the authority of the Collector. The notice issued to the councillors complied with the three-day clear-day requirement prescribed in section 35(3) of the Municipal Boroughs Act. The Court observed that the provisions of section 35(3) concerning the service of notice were directory rather than mandatory, and that any deficiencies in the method of service constituted only irregularities. Such irregularities would only invalidate the proceedings if it could be demonstrated that they had caused prejudice, a claim that was neither alleged nor proved in this case. Because every councillor of the municipality was present at both meetings, each member had full knowledge of the date, time, venue and agenda of the 3 August 1954 meeting. Moreover, under section 35(3) the presence or absence of members of the public at the meeting bore no legal effect on the validity of the election.

Second, the Court observed that section 19 of the Bombay Boroughs Act (Bombay Act XVIII of 1925) had been amended by the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1954 (Bombay Act LIV of 1954). The amendment operated retrospectively, thereby curing any illegality or irregularity that might have arisen under the original provisions of section 19. As a result, the elections of respondents No. 2 and No. 3 as President and Vice-President respectively were held to be valid. The Court referred to the authorities King v. The General Commissioners of Income-Tax for South-ampton, ex parte W. M. Singer ([1916] 2 KB 249) and Mukerjee, Official Receiver v. Ramratan Kuer ([1935] LR 63 IA 47). The judgment was delivered in the Civil Appellate Jurisdiction in Civil Appeal No. 215 of 1954, which was an appeal by special leave from the order dated 23 August 1954 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Special Civil Application No. 1665 of 1954, filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The judgment was authored by R. B. Kotwal, J. B.

Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain appeared on behalf of the appellant, while Naunit Lal represented respondents numbered one to three. The judgment was dated 22 February 1955 and was delivered by Justice Sinha. The matter before the Court was a special-leave appeal against the order dated 23 August 1954 of the Bombay High Court, which had dismissed the appellant’s petition for a writ of quo warranto or any other appropriate writ challenging the election of the second and third respondents as President and Vice-President of the Gadag-Betgeri municipality. The Court observed that the material facts were not contested and proceeded to summarise them. The first respondent was identified as the municipality governed by the Municipal Boroughs Act (Bombay Act XVIII of 1925), hereinafter referred to as “the Act”. The appellant was one of the thirty-two councillors who composed the municipality. The most recent general election for the municipal body had been held on 7 May 1951, and the councillors’ term was fixed at three years, calculated from the date of the first general meeting after that election, which occurred on 10 July 1951. In that meeting the fourth and fifth respondents were elected President and Vice-President respectively, each for a three-year term. Subsequently, the Act was amended by Bombay Act XXXV of 1954, which extended the councillors’ term from three to four years, making the new expiry date 9 July 1955. Because the terms of the fourth and fifth respondents were set to end three years after 10 July 1951, and because the municipality’s term had been lengthened by one year under the amendment, the vacancies created required a fresh election for President and Vice-President. Accordingly, the Collector called a special general meeting of the municipality to be held on 30 July 1954 for the purpose of electing a President and Vice-President to serve for the remainder of the quadrennium. The Collector nominated the Prant Officer, who was the District Deputy Collector, to preside over the meeting.

On 30 July 1954 the Prant Officer, acting on instructions from the Collector, adjourned the special general meeting to 3 August 1954 without conducting any business, the sole item on the agenda being the election of the President and Vice-President. The third respondent objected to the adjournment by raising a point of order, but the presiding officer dismissed that objection. Consequently, the special general meeting was reconvened on 3 August 1954. At that meeting the appellant raised a point of order asserting that, under the provisions of the Act, a President could not be elected for a term of less than one year, and therefore the proposed election would contravene the Act. The presiding officer, who was the same individual who had adjourned the meeting on 30 July, rejected the appellant’s objection as well. Following this decision, thirteen of the thirty-two councillors who were present at the meeting, including the appellant, walked out of the chamber in protest against participating in a meeting that, in their view, sought to elect a President for a term shorter than one year, which they claimed violated the statutory provisions.

Thirteen of the thirty-two councillors, including the appellant, left the special general meeting held on 3 August 1954. They did so because they refused to take part in a meeting that was, in their view, proposing to elect a President for a period of less than one year, which they considered contrary to the provisions of the Act. All thirty-two councillors had been present at the earlier meeting on 30 July 1954 as well as at the meeting on 3 August 1954, establishing that the full strength of the municipality was represented. The remaining nineteen councillors who stayed continued with the business of the meeting and elected the second respondent as President, specifying that he should serve as President for the remaining period of the quadrennium. After the presidential election, the newly elected President presided over an immediate subsequent meeting to elect a Vice-President. The appellant again raised the same point of order, arguing that the election would violate the Act, but his objection was overruled. Consequently, six councillors, among them the appellant, walked out, and the remaining councillors elected the third respondent as Vice-President.

The appellant then filed a petition before the High Court of Bombay under article 226 of the Constitution, seeking a writ of quo warranto or any other appropriate writ, order or direction to restrain the second and third respondents from usurping the offices of President and Vice-President of the municipality and from exercising the powers attached to those offices. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the elections of the second and third respondents were not illegal. In its reasoning, the Court interpreted the relevant provisions of the Act to conclude that it was not correct to say that the terms of the councillors, President and Vice-President would end on 9 July 1955; rather, the intention was to elect the President and Vice-President for the remainder of the municipal term, which extended beyond the four-year period to the date when a new President and Vice-President would be elected after a fresh general election. The Court also found that the adjournment of the 30 July meeting was within the powers of the presiding officer, and therefore the 3 August meeting was not tainted by any illegality. It noted that all councillors received notice of the adjourned meeting and actually attended it, and even if any irregularity had existed in the adjournment on 30 July, it did not affect the legality of the adjourned meeting or the business transacted therein. The appellant’s request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was rejected, after which he proceeded to seek special leave to appeal before this Court.

The appellant sought special leave to appeal from this Court, and the Court granted that leave on 3 September 1954. The appellant contended that the meeting held on 3 August 1954 was void for several reasons. First, the appellant argued that the 3 August gathering could not be regarded as an adjourned meeting because the earlier meeting of 30 July 1954 had not been validly adjourned. Second, the appellant maintained that the 3 August meeting had not been summoned by the Collector as required by law. Third, the appellant claimed that the written notice prescribed by section 35(3) of the municipal Act had neither been issued nor, in any event, served and published in accordance with statutory requirements. On the basis of these alleged defects, the appellant further submitted that the business transacted at the 3 August meeting, specifically the election of the President, was likewise invalid. The appellant then argued that, because the Presidential election was invalid, the subsequent meeting held on the same day under the authority of the improperly elected President was itself invalid, rendering the election of the Vice-President illegal. In addition, the appellant asserted that both the Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections contravened section 19 of the Act and were therefore invalid, and finally alleged that the amendment of section 19 by the amending Act LIV of 1954, which was enacted after special leave had been granted, could not affect the pending proceedings even though that amendment purported to operate retrospectively. Respondents 1, 2 and 3, who appeared before this Court, offered contrary submissions. They argued that a President and Vice-President could be elected for a term of less than one year because section 19 of the Act was qualified by section 23(1)(A). They further maintained that, irrespective of any other considerations, the amendment of section 19 by the amending Act LIV of 1954 rendered the election unquestionably valid, as the Act was intended to validate all elections that occurred between the enactment of the amending Act XXXV of 1954 and the enactment of the amending Act LIV of 1954. The respondents also contended that the presiding officer possessed an inherent, if not expressly statutory, power to adjourn the 30 July 1954 meeting, and that, in any event, the 3 August 1954 gathering could be treated as a fresh meeting called by the Collector. They further argued that any irregularity in serving notice or in appointing the presiding officer was cured by the provisions of section 57 of the Act. Additionally, the respondents submitted that the appellant was not the councillor who had originally objected to the adjournment of the 30 July meeting and therefore could not raise an objection at a later stage. Finally, it was contended that the appellant lacked standing to obtain the writ or order sought because he had not suffered any injury. Consequently, the dispute presented two principal questions: first, whether the 3 August 1954 meeting had been validly held; and second, whether the President and Vice-President, elected for the remaining period of the quadrennium, had been validly elected.

The Court identified two principal issues for determination. First, it had to decide whether the meeting held on 3 August 1954 was validly convened. Second, it needed to determine whether the election of the president and the vice-president, who were elected “for the remaining period of the quadrennium,” was valid. Several subsidiary questions arose from these main points and were presented before the Court. A substantial portion of the arguments centered on the claim that the presiding officer lacked authority to adjourn the meeting of 30 July 1954 because of the provisions of section 35(11) of the Act. Counsel also referred to the proviso to section 19-A(2), asserting that those provisions indicated that the powers of the presiding officer were identical to those of the municipal president when presiding over an ordinary meeting, except that section 35(11) concerning adjournments was limited by the mentioned proviso. According to that view, the Collector or the officer appointed to preside over a meeting held for the purpose of electing a president or vice-president could refuse to adjourn the meeting, even if the majority of members present desired an adjournment. It was further contended that the High Court had erred in holding that the presiding officer possessed an inherent right to adjourn the meeting, and reference was made to passages from “The Law of Meetings” by Head, “The Law on the Practice of Meetings” by Shackleton, and “Company Meetings” by Talbot. The Court expressed the opinion that, for the purposes of the present case, it was unnecessary to resolve the merits of that controversy, assuming that the meeting of 30 July 1954 had been adjourned without proper authority. The parties agreed that the Collector had called the meeting of 30 July 1954 and that the adjournment occurred under the Collector’s instructions. Section 23(1)(A) provides that when the term of office of the president or vice-president expires, as determined by the municipality under section 19(1) of the Act, a new president or vice-president must be elected within twenty-five days of such expiry. The provisions of section 19-A, which govern the procedure for convening a meeting of a newly constituted municipality to elect a president and vice-president, were held to be applicable to the calling of that meeting and to the election procedure. Section 19-A obliges the Collector to call a meeting for the election, and the meeting must be presided over by the Collector or by an officer appointed in writing by the Collector for that purpose. The Collector or his nominee, while presiding over such a meeting, is vested with the same powers as the president of a municipality when presiding over a municipal meeting, but is expressly denied the right to vote.

In this case, the Court recorded that on 30 July 1954 the Collector issued a call for a special general meeting of the municipality for the purpose of electing a President. The minutes of that meeting showed that the presiding authority, acting under the Collector’s instructions, formally adjourned the meeting to 3 August 1954 at 3 p.m., and the exact wording of the adjournment was entered as “Under instructions from the Collector of Dharwar the presiding authority adjourns the meeting to 3rd August 1954 at 3 P.m.” All thirty-two councillors were present at the adjourned meeting on 3 August 1954, and the same Prant Officer occupied the chair as authorised by the Collector. The presiding authority read a telegraphic message from the Collector to the members, which stated, “Government have directed to bold election of President of Gadag Municipality on 3rd August as already arranged. Hold election accordingly today without fail.” During that meeting the appellant raised two points of order: first, that the election of the President for the remainder of the quadrennium mentioned in the agenda was illegal; second, that the meeting was not a lawful adjournment of the municipality because it was being held under the Collector’s instructions, a power the Collector did not possess. The presiding authority rejected both points, explaining that the meeting was a special meeting called by the Collector for the election of the President and that the election had to proceed as fixed. After this ruling, thirteen members, including the appellant, expressed a desire to leave and were permitted by the presiding authority to walk out. The remaining councillors continued the business, and the proposal to elect the second respondent as President for the balance of the quadrennium was duly moved, seconded, and carried unanimously, after which the meeting was concluded. The Court further noted that, according to section 35(3) of the Act, a special general meeting must be preceded by a notice of three clear days specifying the time, place, and business, which must be served on the councillors, posted in the municipal office or another public building, and published in a locally circulating vernacular newspaper. The appellant contended that the required notice had not been given in the manner stipulated by section 35(3), and therefore the meeting of 3 August 1954 was invalid. The appellant also argued that the requirements of sections 19-A(1) and (2) were not satisfied because there was no evidence that the Collector had formally called the meeting or issued a written order authorising the presiding authority to conduct it. The Court considered these submissions in light of the record of the proceedings.

In this case, the appellant argued that section 35(3) requires a written notice to be served and published as specified, and therefore the meeting of 3 August 1954 could not be said to have complied with subsection (3). The appellant also claimed that sections 19-A(1) and (2) were not complied with because there was no evidence that the Collector had called the meeting or that he had issued a written order authorising the presiding authority to conduct the meeting. The Court found that none of these submissions had any merit. The record of the proposed meeting of 30 July 1954 and the actual meeting of 3 August 1954 showed that all actions were taken under the Collector’s orders. The Collector himself had called both the 30 July and the 3 August meetings and had appointed the Prant Officer as the presiding officer for each. Although the notice for the 3 August meeting was not issued in writing, it was communicated to all councillors who were present at the 30 July meeting. That communication satisfied the requirement of a clear three-day notice because it identified the time, place and business of the meeting, even though it was not in writing. Section 35(4) provides that, unless the notice indicates otherwise, the ordinary venue for a meeting is the municipal office. It is also correct that the notice was not served in the manner prescribed by subsection (3) of section 35, and that there is no evidence of a local vernacular newspaper with large circulation in which the notice could have been published. The question, therefore, was whether those omissions rendered the notice legally ineffective. That would be so only if the provisions were mandatory. The Court examined the relevant provisions and observed that the language of section 35(3) is directory, not mandatory, and that any defect in the mode of service is merely an irregularity that does not invalidate the proceedings unless it can be shown that the irregularity prejudicially affected the proceedings. The statute states that a resolution is not invalid because of any irregularity in serving notice, provided that the municipality’s proceedings were not prejudicially affected. In the present case, all councillors were present at both the 30 July and the 3 August meetings, giving them ample notice of the meeting’s time, place and agenda. No evidence was placed that the irregularities in service of notice, or the alleged omissions, had any prejudicial effect on the proceedings.

The Court observed that the parties had not established that the irregularities in serving the notice, or the omissions complained of, had prejudicially affected the proceedings. It was argued, however, that because the notice had neither been affixed to the municipal office nor to the local kacheri or any other public building, and because it had not been published in a local language newspaper, the general public had not received notice of the meeting that took place on 3 August 1954, even though all the councillors were present on that date. The Court noted that subsection (6) of section 35 expressly provides that every such meeting shall be open to the public unless the presiding authority directs otherwise. From that provision, the Court inferred that while public attendance at such meetings may be desirable, it is not a legal requirement. Consequently, the presence or absence of members of the public has no legal bearing on the validity of the election conducted at the meeting. The Court therefore held that, in substance if not in form, the meeting held on 3 August 1954 satisfied the statutory requirements for a valid special general meeting, and consequently the meeting could not be declared invalid, assuming, as previously indicated, that the order of the presiding authority to adjourn the meeting of 30 July 1954 was not authorized. The Court further reminded that a special general meeting may be presided over only by the Collector or a person duly authorized by the Collector; if neither the Collector nor his authorized nominee conducts the meeting, the councillors present lack the authority to elect their own chairman to preside over the meeting. Hence, when the presiding authority, acting under instructions from the Collector, declined to proceed with the elections on 30 July 1954, the councillors present could not convene a separate meeting with a president of their own choosing to conduct the sole business item, namely the election of president. Accordingly, whether rightly or wrongly, the failure to hold the meeting called for on 30 July required that another meeting be convened within twenty-five days of the vacancy. In the present case, the expiry of the original terms of the president and vice-president created such a vacancy, and a meeting giving the statutorily required three-day notice was consequently held on 3 August 1954. Although there were omissions in the manner of publishing or serving the notice, the Court characterised those omissions as mere irregularities that do not invalidate the election held at that meeting. Thus, the election of the president, unless otherwise invalid on different grounds, could not be challenged on the basis of the irregularities in service or publication of the notice, given the special circumstances of the case.

In the present matter, the court observed that if the councillors had not been present on 30 July or had not been notified of the proposed meeting scheduled for 3 August 1954, different issues could have arisen; however, the evidence showed that no prejudice was caused to any individual, any party, or to the municipality as a whole. The appellants further argued that the departure of thirteen councillors from the meeting rendered that meeting ineffective. The court rejected this contention, holding that the voluntary act of the thirteen councillors in walking out did not, by itself, invalidate the proceedings. Moreover, the record did not indicate that the special general meeting lacked a quorum after the councillors left. The next question before the court was whether the provisions of section 19(1) of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, as they stood on 3 August 1954, made the election of the president and the vice-president on that date invalid because the election was for “the remaining period of the quadrennium”. The High Court had held that the remaining period of the quadrennium would not necessarily terminate on 9 July 1955, relying on the proviso to section 19(1) which provides that “the term of office of such president or vice-president shall be deemed to extend to and expire with the date on which his successor is elected”. The Supreme Court noted that, in view of subsequent events, it was unnecessary to pass judgment on the correctness of that High Court view. After the High Court’s decision and after special leave was granted, the Bombay Legislature enacted Act LIV of 1954, which was published in the Bombay Gazette on 14 October 1954. Section 2 of the amending Act inserted the words “or not less than the residue of the term of office of the municipality, whichever is less” after the phrase “not less than one year” in subsection (I) of section 19, and substituted “four years” for the words “three years”. Section 3 declared that the amendments would be deemed to have come into force on the date on which the Bombay District Municipal and Municipal Boroughs (Amendment) Act, 1954, became operative, and that all elections to the offices of president or vice-president held on or after that date and before the enactment of this Act would be deemed valid as if the Act had been in force on that date; further, any person elected to those offices in such elections would not be considered illegally elected merely because the residue of the municipal term was less than one year at the time of election, causing the elected officer to serve a term less than

The Court observed that a term of one year would have been in breach of section 19 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, as that provision stood before the new legislation became operative. Sub-section (2) of the same provision states that nothing in the section may affect any judgment, decree or order of a competent court that was passed before the new Act came into force if such court had held any of the elections invalid on the ground specified in sub-section (1). The parties did not argue that the amendment of section 19 by Act LIV of 1954 fails to cover the elections now challenged, nor that section 3 of the amending Act is not retrospective. Rather, counsel for the appellant contended that the amendment should not be applied retrospectively to pending proceedings.

The Court explained that the amendment in question is deemed to have taken effect on the same day in May on which the amending Act XXXV of 1954 became law. Section 3 further provides that all elections to the offices of president and vice-president that were held on or after 11 May 1954 and before the coming into force of the amending Act shall be deemed valid. Moreover, the provision declares in unequivocal terms that such an election cannot be questioned merely on the ground of contravention of section 19, a ground that had been relied upon before the High Court in questioning the elections of the second and third respondents.

From this wording, the legislature evidently intended to remove any controversy by stating that an election of president or vice-president for the unexpired portion of a municipal term could not be challenged on the basis that the pre-amendment provisions of section 19 had been violated. Nevertheless, counsel for the appellant argued that the amendment was not intended to apply to litigation that was already pending, and therefore the Court should hold that the amendment did not validate elections that were already under judicial challenge.

The Court noted that no authority had been cited to support the proposition that, in the absence of express words in the amending statute directing its application to pending proceedings, the amendment could not affect such proceedings. The Court pointed to clear authority to the contrary, quoting the dictum of Lord Reading, C.J. in The King v. The General Commissioners of Income-Tax for Southampton; Ex parte W. M. Singer. In that judgment Lord Reading said, “I cannot accept the contention of the applicant that an enactment can only take away vested rights of action for which legal proceedings have been commenced if there are in the enactment express words to that effect. There is no authority for this proposition, and I do not see why in principle it should be the law. But it is necessary that clear language should be used to make the retrospective effect applicable to proceedings commenced before the passing of the statute.” The Court indicated that this principle was relevant to the present matter.

In the earlier case reported as (1) [1916] 2 K.B. 249, 259, the court had validated assessments that had been made by commissioners for parishes that were later found to be incorrect. The judgment in that case held that the retrospective operation of the pertinent statutory provision extended to legal proceedings seeking a prohibition that had been initiated before the enactment of the statute took effect, and consequently the rule nisi that had been issued for that prohibition was discharged. The Court emphasized that, in every circumstance, the precise language of an amending statute must be scrutinised to determine whether the legislature expressly intended the amendment to apply to proceedings that were already pending when the amendment was enacted. Several authorities were cited before the Court, but it was deemed sufficient to refer to the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Mukerjee, Official Receiver v. Ramratan Kuer (1), a decision that is directly relevant to the issue presently before the Court. In that case, while an appeal was still pending before the Judicial Committee, the legislature passed an amending Act that was clearly intended to operate retrospectively, meaning that it applied to all matters of a particular description without limiting its operation to cases that were not already before the courts. In the circumstances of that decision, the Lordships observed that if a statutory saving were implied in favour of pending proceedings, the effect of the amending provision would be substantially nullified. The present case is governed by the same principle, for if a saving were read into the amendment to protect cases that were pending on the date the amendment became law, the operative words quoted in the amendment – “all elections to the office of the president or vice- president, held on or after the said date and before the coming into force of this Act, shall be deemed to be valid” – could not achieve the full effect intended by the legislature. Because the amendment contains no explicit or implicit saving clause, the Court must conclude that the legislature purposefully intended the amendment to apply to every election of a president or vice-president, irrespective of whether the election had been challenged in a court of law. It is the duty of the judiciary to give full effect to the legislative intention as expressed in the statutory text. Accordingly, the amendment must be held to have cured any illegality or irregularity alleged in the elections that are the subject of the present dispute, in accordance with the provisions of section 19 of the Act. On the basis of the foregoing reasoning, the Court is satisfied that the meeting held on 3 August 1954, as recorded in (1) [1935] L.R. 63 I.A. 47, was validly convened and that there was no illegality in the election of the second and third respondents to the offices of president and vice-president respectively. Consequently, the Court affirms the orders of the High Court, albeit for reasons that differ from those relied upon by the High Court. The appeal therefore fails, is dismissed with costs, and the order of dismissal stands.