Shrimati Vidya Verma, Through Next Friend R.V.S. Mani vs Dr. Shiv Narain Verma

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Petition No. 262 of 1955

Decision Date: 11 November 1955

Coram: Vivian Bose, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, B. Jagannadhadas, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha

In this matter the Supreme Court of India heard a petition that was filed under article 32 of the Constitution seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The petition, numbered 262 of 1955, was filed on 11 November 1955 and was titled Shrimati Vidya Verma, Through Next Friend R.V.S. Mani versus Dr. Shiv Narayan Verma. The bench that heard the case consisted of Justices Vivian Bose, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, B. Jagannadhadas and Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha. The petitioner was Shrimati Vidya Verma, represented as a next friend by Mr. R.V.S. Mani, who was an advocate of the Nagpur High Court. The respondent was Dr. Shiv Narayan Verma of Nagpur, who was the father of the petitioner. The Attorney-General for India, Mr. M. C. Setalvad, appeared on behalf of the Union of India along with counsel G. N. Joshi and Porus A. Mehta, while the respondent was represented by counsel Naunit Lal. The case was cited as 1956 AIR 108 and 1955 SCR (2) 983, and the relevant statutory provision discussed involved the alleged infringement of a fundamental right under article 21, the power of the Supreme Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus under article 32, and the question of whether such a power could be exercised when the alleged detention was effected by a private individual rather than by a State or an authority acting under State orders.

The Court noted that the petition had been presented by Mr. Mani without a power of attorney from Ms. Vidya Verma. When the Court’s registry informed him that a petition could not be filed without the necessary authority, Mr. Mani amended the petition and described himself as the “next friend” of the petitioner. At the initial hearing the Court directed that a notice be issued to the father, Dr. Shiv Narayan Verma, to appear before the Court. However, on the same day it was brought to the Court’s attention that the opposite party was not the Union of India, nor a State, nor any officer acting under the authority of either, but a private person. This raised the essential question of whether article 32 conferred jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus against a private individual. Consequently, before the notice could be sent, the Court recalled it and adjourned the matter for further consideration of this preliminary issue. Mr. Mani returned on the appointed date and, as noted by the Court, he was robed in the same manner as he had been on the previous occasion. The Court’s subsequent deliberations focused on determining whether a fundamental right under article 21 could be said to be infringed when the detention complained of was effected by a private person, and whether the Court possessed the authority to entertain a writ of habeas corpus in such circumstances.

In the subsequent hearing, the petitioner’s representative appeared again, but this time he was not wearing the robes that had been required on the earlier occasion. He was asked to explain his position, and he acknowledged that he possessed no power of attorney and that he was appearing solely in a private capacity as the next friend of the lady concerned. The Court instructed him that at the next hearing he must address the Court without wearing any robes and warned him that, should his petition be dismissed, he might be required to bear the other side’s costs personally.

After hearing the petitioner’s representative for a short period, the Court decided to set a date for the hearing of a preliminary question only. The question to be determined was whether a fundamental right is engaged when the alleged detention is effected by a private individual rather than by the State or by a person acting under the authority or orders of the State. The Court ordered that notices be issued to the opposite party as well as to the Attorney-General of India.

At the adjourned hearing, the petitioner’s representative appeared in person, unrobed as directed, with the advocate recorded on the case sitting beside him. He requested permission to address the Court himself. The Court declined to listen to him unless he first discharged the advocate on record. He complied with that requirement immediately and then proceeded to address the Court in his own capacity.

The Court observed that the issue raised had already been examined at length in two earlier decisions of this Court, and therefore a detailed re-examination was unnecessary. The fundamental right claimed to be infringed was the right to personal liberty guaranteed by article 21 of the Constitution. The Court referred to the decision in A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras, where four of the six judges held that the term “law” in article 21 refers only to law made by the State and not to law in the abstract, and they rejected any analogy with the United States due process clause. One judge dissented and another expressed no view on that point. Patanjali Sastri, J., observed that constitutional safeguards are generally directed against the State and its organs and that protection against violations by private individuals must be sought in ordinary law. S. R. Das, J., dealing with preventive detention, held that article 21 shields a person from preventive detention by the executive absent a law passed by the legislature.

The Court noted that this principle had been applied to articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) in P. D. Shamdasani v. Central Bank of India, where a bench of five judges held that a private individual’s violation of property rights does not fall within the scope of those articles; consequently, a remedy must be pursued under ordinary law, not under article 32. Although article 21 was not directly implicated in that case, the judges referring to article 31(1) stated that it declares a fundamental right of private property in the same negative form as article 21 declares the fundamental right to life and liberty.

In stating that the Constitution declares the protection of property in a negative manner analogous to the way article twenty-one declares the fundamental right to life and liberty, the Court observed that article twenty-one contains no explicit reference to the State. The Court considered whether, on that basis, article twenty-one might have been intended to protect life and personal liberty against violations by private individuals. It held that the phrase “except by procedure established by law” plainly excludes such a suggestion. The Court noted that the same reasoning had been applied to article thirty-one paragraph one, which was held to be similar in language and therefore not applicable to invasions of a right by a private individual. Consequently, the Court concluded that no writ under article thirty-two could be issued in such circumstances. For the same reasons, the Court held that the present petition, which was founded on article twenty-one, could not be entertained under article thirty-two and therefore dismissed the petition. Regarding costs, the Court observed that Mr R V S Mani lacked a power of attorney and had chosen to appear as a next friend despite a warning given to him at the previous hearing. The matter had been raised for the fourth time in the courts. The first attempt was an application under section one hundred of the Criminal Procedure Code filed on 10-9-1954 by the person who, according to Mr Mani, was the husband of the woman on whose behalf he claimed to act; the application sought a search warrant for her recovery and was dismissed, and a revision against that dismissal also failed. The same individual then applied to the High Court at Nagpur on 18-10-1954 under section four-ninety-one of the Criminal Procedure Code. The judges examined the twenty-five-year-old woman in person on 20-10-1954, recorded her statement that she was not restrained in the house or outside, and dismissed the application on 10-11-1954. Mr Mani then filed a second petition in that High Court on 6-12-1954, also under section four-ninety-one. The judges again examined the woman on two successive days. On 20-12-1954 she declared that she did not wish to live with her father but preferred to stay with her uncle at Waraseoni; the following day she clarified that she would go to her uncle accompanied by her father, adding that she felt no discomfort living with her father but was not at ease with him and would have greater peace of mind with her uncle. She also stated, “I have no need of any counsel and have nothing to talk to Shri R V S Mani.” The court allowed her to go to her uncle. Subsequently, Mr Mani applied for leave to withdraw his petition, which was granted on 24-1-1955 without any order on costs. The present petition was then filed on 22-8-1955. The petition did not disclose that Mr Mani had made any effort to consult the alleged husband of the woman, nor did it show any attempt to contact the woman herself, her father, or her uncle.

The petition does not disclose that Mr Mani made any effort to consult the person he alleges to be the lady’s husband, a matter that remains contested and on which this Court expressly refrains from giving an opinion. Likewise, the petition fails to demonstrate that Mr Mani attempted to communicate with the lady herself, her father, or even her uncle, despite the relevance of such contacts to the issues raised. Nevertheless, Mr Mani has been present at three separate hearings before this Court, even though the Court had previously warned him that costs might be imposed for unwarranted or dilatory conduct, and the learned Attorney-General was also summoned to appear at the proceedings. After the parties fully presented their arguments and Mr Mani perceived that the Court’s inclination was adverse to his position, he resorted to the same procedural device he had employed before the Nagpur High Court, namely seeking the Court’s permission to withdraw his petition. The Court declined that request, finding that the withdrawal would be prejudicial to the interests of justice and the opposing party. Consequently, the Court invited Mr Mani to show cause why he should not be ordered to pay the costs incurred by the opposite side and the Attorney-General, and it allowed him an opportunity to be heard on any further submissions. Considering the totality of the circumstances set out above, the Court concluded that the appropriate course was to hold Mr Mani personally liable for all costs. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed, and Mr Mani is ordered to discharge personally the costs of the opposite party, the costs of the learned Attorney-General, and his own costs, each payable by him individually.