Shri Virindar Kumar Satyawadi vs The State Of Punjab

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 62 of 1954

Decision Date: 22 November 1955

Coram: Venkatarama Ayyar

In this case the petitioner Shri Virindar Kumar Satyawadi challenged a decision of the State of Punjab. The matter was decided by the Supreme Court of India on 22 November 1955. The petitioner was identified as the petitioner and the State of Punjab as the respondent. The judgment was delivered on 22 November 1955 by the bench of the Supreme Court. The issues raised concerned the provisions of the Representation of the People Act, Forty-third of 1951, specifically sections 33 and 36, together with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, Fifth Edition of 1898, namely sections 195(1)(b), 476 and 476-B. The central question was whether a Returning Officer, when deciding on the validity of a nomination paper under sections 33 and 36 of the Representation of the People Act, could be regarded as a court within the meaning of sections 195(1)(b), 476 and 476-B of the Criminal Procedure Code.

The headnote of the judgment recorded that the Court held a Returning Officer acting under sections 33 and 36 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and deciding on the validity of a nomination paper, was not a court within the meaning of the cited provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. In reaching this conclusion the Court referred to several authorities, including Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation ([1931] A.C. 275 at 296), B. v. London County Council ([1931] 2 K.B. 215), Cooper v. Wilson ([1937] 2 K.B. 309), Huddart Parker and Co. v. Moorehead ([1908] 8 C.L.R. 330), Rola Co. v. The Commonwealth ([1944] 69 C.L.R. 185), Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd. ([1950] S.C.R. 459), Mehar Singh v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1933 Lah. 884), Emperor v. Nanak Chand (A.I.R. 1943 Lah. 208), Har Prasad v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1947 All. 139) and Channu Lal v. Rex ([1950] 51 Cr. L.J. 199). The judgment was recorded under the heading “Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction” and concerned Criminal Appeal No. 62 of 1954. The appeal had been taken by special leave from the judgment and order dated 10 June 1953 of the Punjab High Court at Simla, which itself arose out of Criminal Revision No. 86 of 1953. That revision was based on a judgment and order dated 7 January 1953 of the Court of Sessions Judge, Karnal, in Criminal Appeal No. 355 of 1952.

Counsel for the appellant was listed as N. C. Chatterjee together with his team, while counsel for the respondent was listed as Gopal Singh and P. G. Gokhale. The judgment was dated 24 November 1955 and was delivered by Justice Venkatarama Ayyar. The factual background disclosed that the appellant had been a candidate for election to the House of the People from the Karnal Reserved Constituency in the last General Elections. The Court noted the proviso to section 33(3) of the Representation of the People Act, Forty-third of 1951, which provides that in a constituency where a seat is reserved for Scheduled Castes, no candidate shall be deemed qualified to fill that seat unless the nomination paper is accompanied by a declaration, verified in the prescribed manner, that the candidate belongs to the Scheduled Caste for which the seat is reserved. The declaration must specify the particular caste of which the candidate is a member and also the area in relation to which that caste is recognised as a Scheduled Caste. The Court further referred to Rule 6 of the Election Rules, which requires that the declaration mentioned in the proviso be verified by the candidate on oath or solemn affirmation before a Magistrate. These statutory requirements formed the basis for the Court’s analysis of whether the Returning Officer’s function fell within the definition of a court under the Criminal Procedure Code.

The Election Rules stipulate that the declaration required by the proviso to section 33(3) must be verified by the candidate through an oath or solemn affirmation taken before a Magistrate. The Schedule to those Rules contains the prescribed nomination paper form and sets out the precise wording in which the candidate must make the declaration, as well as the manner in which the Magistrate must verify it. On 5 November 1951 the appellant executed two nomination papers, each bearing the statement: “I hereby declare that I am a member of the Balmiki Caste which has been declared to be a Scheduled Caste in the State of Punjab.” The Balmiki Caste is listed among the Scheduled Castes under the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950. The declaration on each paper was affirmed solemnly before the First Class Magistrate of Karnal, and the papers, together with the affirmed declarations, were subsequently lodged with the District Magistrate of Karnal, who also functioned as the returning officer for the election. Another candidate, Jai Ram Sarup, belonged to the Chamar caste, which is likewise a Scheduled Caste, and he contested the same seat. Jai Ram Sarup questioned the appellant’s eligibility, asserting that the appellant was not a Balmiki by caste and therefore could not be qualified to contest the reserved constituency. Relying on the appellant’s sworn declaration, the returning officer dismissed the objection and accepted the appellant’s nomination papers as valid. At the poll the appellant secured a majority of the votes, and on 6 March 1952 he was formally declared elected. On 27 August 1952 Jai Ram Sarup filed an application before the District Magistrate-returning officer, invoking sections 476 and 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, from which the present appeal originates. In that application he alleged that the appellant’s declaration that he belonged to the Balmiki caste was false, contending that the appellant had been born a Muslim, had later converted to Hinduism, and that, in the interest of justice and for the protection of Scheduled Caste interests, criminal proceedings should be instituted against him. The appellant responded in a counter-affidavit, stating: “I am not a Muhammadan by birth. On the other hand, I was born in a Balmiki Hindu family. I am a Hindu.” The District Magistrate conducted an inquiry during which Prith Singh Azad, President of the Depressed Classes organization in Delhi, testified that the appellant had originally been a Muslim named Khaliq Sadiq, that in 1938 he had applied to the Suddhi Sabha for conversion to Hinduism, that such conversion had indeed taken place, and that thereafter he became known as Virindar Kumar. In cross-examination, the witness affirmed that the appellant had admitted to him being a Muslim by birth and disclosed that the appellant had two Muslim wives at the time of his conversion. Jai Ram Sarup also produced ten letters purportedly written by the appellant to support his claim. After considering the evidence, on 17 September 1952 the Magistrate issued an order concluding that a prima facie case existed for initiating appropriate legal action.

On 29 September 1952 the State filed a complaint before the First Class Magistrate at Karnal, alleging that the appellant had committed offences punishable under sections 181, 182 and 193 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant challenged that order by filing an appeal before the Sessions Court at Karnal. The Sessions Judge dismissed the appeal, holding that the returning officer in the matter was not a Court, that the proceedings before him did not fall within the ambit of section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and consequently that no appeal could be entertained under section 476-B. Unsatisfied with that decision, the appellant sought revision before the High Court of Punjab. The revision was heard by Justice Harnam Singh, who reached a different conclusion on the question of jurisdiction: he held that the returning officer was indeed a Court and therefore the order was appealable. Nevertheless, Justice Singh found no merit for interference on the substantive issues and consequently dismissed the revision. The present appeal by special leave was filed against that High Court order. Counsel for the appellant argued that, having found the order of the returning officer to be appealable, the High Court judge should have remanded the case to the Sessions Judge for a full hearing on the merits, and that the summary dismissal was perfunctory. Counsel for the respondent contended that the Sessions Judge’s view—that the returning officer was not a Court and that his order could not be appealed—was correct, and further maintained that the High Court’s decision to decline interference on the merits could not be questioned by a special leave appeal before this Court.

The principal issue for determination was whether the order issued by the District Magistrate on 17 September 1952, in his capacity as returning officer, could be taken to an appeal. The statutory framework relevant to this question comprised sections 195, 476 and 476-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 195(1)(a) stipulates that no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under sections 172 to 188 of the Indian Penal Code unless the complaint is made in writing by the public officer concerned or by his superior. Section 195(1)(b) provides that no court shall take cognizance of the offences enumerated therein when such offence is committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any court, unless the complaint is made in writing by that court or by a court subordinate to it. The offence alleged under section 193 falls within the category described in section 195(1)(b). Section 476 prescribes the procedure to be followed when a court is moved to lay a complaint, and it applies only to offences mentioned in sections 195(1)(b) and 195(1)(c), not to those covered by section 195(1)(a). Section 476-B confers a right of appeal against an order passed under section 476 to the appropriate court. Consequently, if the complaint relates to offences listed in sections 195(1)(b) and 195(1)(c), an appeal from the order is permissible, but not

In the present matter, the magistrate’s order dated 17-9-1952 directed that the appellant be prosecuted for offences under sections 181, 182 and 193 of the Indian Penal Code. It was not contested that the portion of the order dealing with sections 181 and 182 was not appealable, because those offences fall squarely within the ambit of section 195(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which excludes any right of appeal. The only point of dispute therefore concerned the charge under section 193. Section 193 creates an offence of giving false evidence whether such falsehood occurs in a judicial proceeding or elsewhere, and it also criminalises the fabrication of false evidence for use in any judicial proceeding or in any other context. If the alleged offence under section 193 is committed outside the context of a judicial proceeding, it does not attract the limitation imposed by section 195(1)(b), which applies only to offences committed “in or in relation to” a proceeding in a court. Consequently, in such a circumstance there is no statutory bar to the filing of a complaint, and the restrictions of section 195(1)(b) would not affect the prosecution. Conversely, if the alleged offence under section 193 is deemed to have been committed in or in relation to a court proceeding, then it falls within the scope of section 195(1)(b). In that situation the order directing prosecution under section 476 of the Code would become appealable under section 476-B. The critical issue to be resolved, therefore, was whether the returning officer, while adjudicating the validity of a nomination paper under section 36 of the relevant Act, could be regarded as acting in the capacity of a court. This question had not been directly addressed by existing authority, and it required an examination of the true nature of the returning officer’s functions and the extent of his powers. Legal commentary, such as Parker’s treatise on election agents and returning officers (Fifth Edition, page 30), notes a long-standing debate over whether a returning officer is a purely judicial officer, a purely ministerial officer, or a hybrid of both. Parker concludes that the returning officer possesses elements of both roles and performs a judicial function when deciding objections to nomination papers, a view that is reflected in Indian case law as well. However, for the proceedings before a returning officer that result in the acceptance or rejection of a nomination paper to be caught by section 195(1)(b), it is insufficient merely to label those proceedings as judicial in character; it must also be demonstrated that the returning officer is, in effect, acting as a court. Modern statutes frequently establish bodies and tribunals that perform judicial-type functions, yet such bodies are not necessarily “courts” in the strict sense, even though, as Lord Sankey observed in Shell Company of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation, they may exhibit some of the attributes of a court. The legal distinction between a court and a quasi-judicial tribunal is well recognised, and the determination of whether a particular authority created by legislation falls within one category or the other depends upon a detailed analysis of its functions and powers.

There has been extensive discussion in the courts of England and Australia concerning the essential characteristics that distinguish a Court from a tribunal that carries out quasi-judicial functions. The authorities cited on this point include Shell Company of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1), R. v. London County Council (2), Cooper v. Wilson (3), Huddart Parker and Co. v. Moorehead (4) and Rola Co. v. The Commonwealth (5). The Supreme Court of India examined the question in some depth in Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd. (6). It is unnecessary to revisit all of that earlier reasoning. It can be summarized that what sets a Court apart from a quasi-judicial tribunal is the duty to resolve disputes in a judicial manner and to declare the rights of the parties by issuing a definitive judgment. Deciding in a judicial manner requires that the parties are entitled, as a matter of right, to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it. It also imposes on the deciding authority an obligation to base its decision on the evidence presented and to apply the law. Consequently, when a question arises as to whether an authority created by legislation is a Court rather than a quasi-judicial tribunal, the inquiry must determine whether, in view of the provisions of the enactment, the authority possesses all the attributes of a Court.

The present case therefore requires an examination of whether, based on the principles just stated and on the functions and powers given to the returning officer under the Act, the returning officer can be considered a Court. The relevant statutory provision is section 36. Section 36(2) obliges the returning officer to examine a nomination paper and to decide any objections that may be raised against it. This power is undeniably of a judicial character. However, the statute also provides that the returning officer may reach a decision “after such summary enquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary.” This wording indicates that the parties have no entitlement to insist on producing evidence they wish to adduce in support of their case. The Act supplies no mechanism for summoning witnesses or compelling the production of documents in an enquiry under section 36, and the returning officer may act suo motu. When this procedure is compared with that prescribed for the trial of election petitions before the Election Tribunal under sections 90 and 92 of the Act, a sharp contrast emerges. While the proceedings before the Election Tribunal closely resemble civil court proceedings in all essential respects, the proceedings under section 36 present a markedly different picture. There is no lis in which adversarial parties are entitled to have their rights adjudicated in a judicial manner; instead, the enquiry resembles that conducted by an ad hoc tribunal vested with quasi-judicial power. Hence, although the function performed by the returning officer under section 36 is judicial in character, the officer does not discharge it in a judicial manner.

The Court explained that the proceeding before a returning officer under section 36 was not a full judicial trial in which opposing parties could have their rights adjudicated in a court-like manner. Instead, it was an inquiry similar to that conducted by an ad hoc tribunal that possessed only quasi-judicial powers. In other words, although the function performed by the returning officer under section 36 was of a judicial nature, the officer was not required to act as a judge in the exercise of that function. The Court expressed the view that a returning officer who decides whether a nomination paper is valid does not constitute a “Court” for the purposes of section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, even the offence brought under section 193 could not be said to arise in or in relation to any proceeding in a Court, and the Magistrate’s order therefore was not appealable. On this basis, the learned Sessions Judge was correct in dismissing the appeal as incompetent. The argument advanced by counsel that the learned High Court judge should have remanded the matter for a merits hearing before the Sessions Judge therefore did not arise.

The appellant subsequently contended that the application to commence prosecution under section 193, which had been made on the basis of section 476, assumed that the returning officer was a Court; consequently the order should be set aside as being without jurisdiction. The Court noted, however, that the application had also been presented under section 195, and that it was necessary to invoke section 195(1)(a) to move the returning officer with reference to offences under sections 181 and 182. Hence there could be no ground for declaring the order void for lack of jurisdiction. Regarding section 193, the Court observed that it is well settled that section 476 is exhaustive of all powers of a Court to try a complaint and that a complaint filed elsewhere than under that section should not be entertained. Nonetheless, abundant authority holds that section 476 does not prevent a presiding officer of a Court from preferring a complaint, and that the Magistrate before whom such a complaint is lodged retains the jurisdiction to try it like any other complaint. The Court cited Meher Singh v. Emperor (1), Emperor v. Nanak Chand (2), Har Prasad v. Emperor (3) and Channu Lal v. Rex (4) as authorities supporting this view. Accordingly, there was no legal impediment for a returning officer to file a complaint under sections 181 and 182 as authorized by section 195(1)(a) and to charge the accused additionally under section 193. The Court also recorded that the appellant himself had raised the objection before the Magistrate that, qua returning officer, he was not a Court and that the proceedings under section 476 were incompetent; this objection had been overruled.

The Court observed that the appellant argued the statutory provision functioned only as an enabling section and therefore could not be said to deprive the Magistrate of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court found no basis for holding that the order dated 17-9-1952 was issued without jurisdiction.

The appellant further contended that the Magistrate had misunderstood the facts by stating that the appellant had declared that he was born a Balmiki, when in reality the appellant had only asserted that he belonged to the Balmiki caste. However, the Court pointed out that in the appellant’s counter-affidavit he himself declared that he was not a Muslim by birth, that he was born into a Balmiki Hindu family, and that the Magistrate’s observation directly reflected the pleadings and arguments presented by the appellant.

The Court also noted that no objection to the Magistrate’s observation was raised either in the appeal before the Sessions Court or in the revision petition before the High Court. In addition, the charge specified in the complaint alleged that the appellant’s statement in the nomination paper, namely that he “was a member of the Balmiki caste,” was false. Consequently, the Court concluded that the appellant’s contention lacked any substantive merit.

Emphasising that the order dated 17-9-1952 was final, the Court held that because the present appeal was essentially directed against that order, only exceptional circumstances could justify interference by a special appeal. The Court found that no such exceptional grounds had been established.

Furthermore, the Court stated that the decision on whether action should be taken under section 195 is primarily within the discretion of the court hearing the application, and that such discretion is not to be lightly disturbed on appeal, even when the appeal is otherwise competent. Since the legislature did not provide a right of appeal in this context, the Court considered it unreasonable for the appellant to seek interference through a special appeal.

For these reasons, the Court dismissed the appeal.