Saiyid Alimuddin vs Saeed Ahmad

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 9 September, 1955

Coram: Das

In this case the Court noted that the matter before it was an appeal filed under special leave that had been granted on 24-1-1955. The appeal concerned a limited question that the appellant, Saiyid Alimuddin, raised against the judgment of the Election Tribunal, Meerut, dated 10-10-1954. The Tribunal had set aside the election of the appellant as Chairman of the Town Area Committee of Phalaoda in District Meerut and had declared the respondent, Saeed Ahmad, to be the duly elected Chairman. The Court explained that under the Uttar Pradesh Town Areas Act of 1914 the Chairman of a Town Area Committee is chosen directly by the electorate of that town at an election that is held at the same time as the general election of the Committee members. The specific election for the chairmanship of Phalaoda was conducted on 28-10-1953. Only two candidates contested that election, namely the appellant and the respondent. When the votes were counted the appellant obtained 1,980 votes while the respondent received 1,280 votes, and consequently the appellant was declared elected as Chairman. On 11-11-1954 the respondent filed an election petition invoking subsection 4-a of Section 8-A of the Uttar Pradesh Town Areas Act, as amended, seeking to challenge the appellant’s election on several grounds. The appellant contested the petition and denied each of the allegations raised against him. The Tribunal, after examining the matters raised, found that (i) nineteen votes had been recorded in the names of persons who were not present in Phalaoda at the time the voting took place, (ii) the appellant had secured a vote by personating a deceased woman named Srimati Hafizam, and (iii) the appellant had caused the Member of the Legislative Assembly, Ramji Lal, a leader of the Harijan community, to address a gathering of Harijans in support of the appellant’s candidature, during which threats were allegedly made that Harijans who did not vote for the appellant would be expelled from their lands. Based on these findings the Tribunal held that the appellant’s election was void, set aside his election, and by the same order declared the respondent to be duly elected. Subsequently, on 16-11-1954 the appellant filed a petition for special leave to appeal to this Court. Special leave was granted on 24-1-1955, but the leave was limited to the ninth ground of appeal in the petition, which asserted that “in the circumstances of the present case the order of the Tribunal declaring the respondent to be duly elected is illegal.” Because the special leave was restricted to that single ground, the Court observed that the appellant must accept that the three accusations against him had been established and that his election had been properly set aside. The only remaining point for the appellant, therefore, concerned the legality of the Tribunal’s declaration that the respondent was duly elected.

The Court observed that the order of the Tribunal which declared the respondent to be duly elected as Chairman was challenged as illegal. The Tribunal had acted under Rule 53 of the rules made under Section 8-A of the Uttar Pradesh Town Areas Act, 1914. Rule 53 contains two sub-paragraphs. Sub-paragraph (i) states that if the judicial officer finds that a person whose election is questioned was not disqualified and that his election was valid, the petition must be dismissed against that person. Sub-paragraph (ii) provides that if the judicial officer finds that a person whose election is impugned was not qualified or that his election was invalid, the officer may either declare the candidate who obtained the next highest number of votes as duly elected, or, in the case of a chairmanship election, declare the next candidate after those whose elections have been challenged, or may declare that a casual vacancy has arisen, whichever option appears more appropriate.

Clause (ii) therefore gives the judicial officer two possible courses of action after reaching the findings mentioned therein, and the officer must select the course that seems most appropriate. In the present case the Tribunal evidently decided that the first course—declaring another candidate duly elected—was the more suitable option. The appellant argued that Rule 53 vests the judicial officer with a discretion that, like any judicial discretion, must be exercised with common sense, justice, and regularity; it cannot be arbitrary, vague, or fanciful. The appellant referred to Craies on Statute Law, Fifth Edition, page 252, to illustrate the principles laid down by the courts for the exercise of discretion by judicial tribunals. The appellant’s complaint comprised two parts: first, that the Tribunal did not exercise its discretion at all; second, that even if it had, it had done so unjudicially by simply declaring the respondent duly elected as a direct consequence of setting aside the appellant’s election. In the statement of case filed on behalf of the appellant, the grievance was framed differently. It claimed that the Tribunal could not declare the respondent duly elected unless it found that the respondent had actually received a majority of the valid votes, or that, but for votes obtained by the appellant through corrupt or illegal practices, the respondent would have secured a majority of the valid votes. This objection was rooted in the principles governing parliamentary elections under the Representation of the People Act and its Rules. However, those rules did not apply to the election in question, which was governed by the special provision quoted above. The Tribunal found that the election of the appellant was

In the present case the Tribunal held that the election of the appellant was invalid because of very serious misconduct on his part. The Tribunal found that the appellant had procured undue influence over the electorate, had impersonated voters who were absent, and had even impersonated a person who was already dead. In addition, the Tribunal observed that the appellant had tampered with the Death Register, an act that could be done only to further his own interests. These findings led the Tribunal to conclude that the appellant had committed a corrupt practice as defined in Rule 49. Consequently, the appellant became liable to the penalties prescribed in Rule 54, which empower a Magistrate to declare a person disqualified for a period not exceeding five years from being an elector of a town area or from being appointed to, or retained in, any office or place that is within the gift or disposal of the Committee.

It was further noted that there were only two persons contesting the election, namely the appellant and the respondent. Because the appellant’s election was set aside on account of the misconduct, the Tribunal exercised the first option available to it under Rule 53(ii)(a). The Tribunal judged that this option was the more appropriate course in the circumstances. After considering the language of Rule 53(ii)(a) and the surrounding facts, the Court expressed that it was not prepared to find that the Tribunal had acted wrongly in exercising its powers under that rule. Accordingly, the Court held that the appeal had no substance. The appeal was therefore dismissed and the appellant was ordered to pay costs.