Sadhu Ram vs The Custodian-General Of Evacuee

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 28 October, 1955

Coram: Jagannadhadas, J., Vivian Bose

The case titled Sadhu Ram versus The Custodian-General Of Evacuee was decided on 28 October 1955 by the Supreme Court of India, with the judgment authored by Justice Vivian Bose and the bench headed by Justice Vivian Bose. The Court noted that the present proceeding was an application filed under article 32 of the Constitution. The petitioner, Sadhu Ram, had purchased from Imam-ud-Din, who was a Muslim evacuee, a parcel of agricultural land comprising forty-three Bighas and fourteen Biswas situated in village Kaithal, District Karnal, Punjab, and identified by Khasra numbers 2135 to 2139, 2158, 2159, 2171, 2204 and 2206, together with associated Shamlat rights. The sale deed for the transaction was executed on 6 September 1947 and subsequently registered on 9 September 1947, prior to Imam-ud-Din’s departure for Pakistan. The agreed consideration amounted to three thousand rupees, of which approximately two thousand seven hundred rupees appears to have been paid by the petitioner to the vendor before the Sub-Registrar. Possession of the land was transferred at the time of execution of the sale deed, and the revenue authorities effected mutation of the title on 23 January 1948. The East Punjab Evacuees’ (Administration of Property) Act, 1947 (East Punjab Act XIV of 1947) commenced on 12 December 1947. This statute was later amended by the East Punjab Evacuees’ (Administration of Property) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1948 (East Punjab Ordinance No II of 1948), which became effective on 16 January 1948, and by the East Punjab Evacuees’ (Administration of Property) (Amendment) Act, 1948 (East Punjab Act XXVI of 1948), which came into force on 11 April 1948. The amendments introduced a new provision, section 5-A, into the original Act. The Court observed that these legislative changes occurred after the execution, registration, and transfer of possession of the sale deed. Section 5-A, as relevant to the present case, reads: “5-A. (1) No sale, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange or other transfer of any interest or right in or over any property made by an evacuee or by any person in anticipation of his becoming an evacuee, or by the agent, assign or attorney of the evacuee or such person on or after the fifteenth day of August, 1947, shall be, effective so as to confer any rights or remedies on the parties to such transfer or on any person claiming under them unless it is confirmed by the Custodian. (2) An application for confirming such transfer may be made by any person claiming thereunder or by any person lawfully authorised by him”. The Court noted that the section was intended to operate retrospectively. Accordingly, the petitioner filed an application for confirmation of the transfer on 23 March 1948. The Assistant Custodian at Karnal, after being satisfied of the genuineness of the transaction, recommended that the confirmation be granted. However, the Additional Custodian at Jullundur, by an order dated 11 February 1953, rejected the petition for confirmation, relying on a circular issued by the Custodian-General on 9 March 1950, which articulated a policy of refusing to confirm transactions involving agricultural property. This rejection formed the basis of the dispute before the Court.

In this case, the order of the Additional Custodian of Jullundur that had denied the petitioner’s application for confirmation was affirmed by the Assistant Custodian-General after the petitioner sought revision of that order. The petitioner’s counsel relied on the fact that the transaction, which had been investigated and found to be genuine, was entered into before the East Punjab Act XIV of 1947 was enacted and before the later amendment that introduced section 5-A became effective. He argued that the retrospective operation of section 5-A in relation to that earlier transaction amounted to a deprivation of his property without any compensation and therefore violated Article 31 of the Constitution. He further suggested that, although the situation might have been different had the matter been addressed earlier, the petitioner was now raising that contention after the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act 1955 had come into force on 27 April 1955. The Court observed that it was unnecessary to base its decision on the existence of the Fourth Amendment, because the essential question could be decided on the nature of section 5-A. The Court held that section 5-A could not be interpreted as a legislative provision that stripped an owner of his property. Rather, for transactions occurring after the amendment, the provision operated merely as a restriction on the owner’s ability to transfer property, requiring that any transferee acquire the property subject to a confirmation by the Custodian. Consequently, the matter fell within the ambit of Article 19, which protects the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property, and not within Article 31, which safeguards protection against deprivation of property without compensation. Considering the purpose and policy underlying the Evacuee Property legislation and the extraordinary circumstances that arose from and after 15 August 1947, the Court found that the confirmation requirement represented a reasonable restriction. The Court further reasoned that a restriction on future transactions, even if applied retrospectively, did not constitute a deprivation of property, and that the legislature was competent to give the provision retrospective effect from 15 August 1947. The Court concluded that the petitioner’s loss resulted not from any unconstitutional law but from the quasi-judicial decision of the Custodian to decline confirmation, and therefore the petitioner's claim that a fundamental right had been violated was rejected.

The petitioner’s counsel then contended that the Custodian’s reliance on a circular issued by the Custodian-General was illegal and that the circular did not constitute relevant material under section 5-A. The Court remarked that even if that contention were correct, it would not raise any issue of violation of fundamental rights. Since the sole ground advanced by the petitioner was the alleged illegality of the Custodian’s reliance on the circular, the Court held that the application was misconceived. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed.

In the circumstances, the Court ordered that the petition be dismissed and directed that no costs be awarded to either party. The decision therefore left the parties to bear their own legal expenses, and no monetary liability for costs was imposed on the petitioner or the respondent.