Sadhu Ram vs The Custodian-General

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Petition No. 306 of 1954

Decision Date: 28 October, 1955

Coram: B. Jagannadhadas, Vivian Bose, Syed Jaffer Imam

In this matter the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 28 October 1955. The case was styled Sadhu Ram versus the Custodian-General of Evacuee Property. The judgment was authored by Justice B. Jagannadhadas and the bench was composed of Justices B. Jagannadhadas, Vivian Bose and Syed Jaffer Imam. The petitioner was Sadhu Ram and the respondent was the Custodian-General of Evacuee Property. The citation of the decision is 1956 AIR 43 and 1955 SCR (2) 1113. The issues presented involved the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution, specifically the alleged infringement of the right to property and the question of whether the transfer of evacuee property required confirmation by the Custodian, the retrospective effect of that requirement, and whether a refusal to confirm constituted a deprivation of property without compensation under Article 31. The statutory framework relied upon was the East Punjab Evacuees’ Administration of Property Act, 1947, as amended by the 1948 amendment, particularly section 5-A.

The factual background disclosed that the applicant had purchased a tract of agricultural land from a Muslim evacuee. The sale deed was executed and registered in September 1947, and possession was delivered to the applicant before the East Punjab Evacuees’ Administration of Property Act came into operation on 12 December 1947. Subsequent amendments introduced section 5-A, which was made retrospective to 15 August 1947 and provided that any transaction involving evacuee property would be ineffective unless confirmed by the Custodian. The applicant therefore applied for such confirmation. The Assistant Custodian initially recommended confirmation, but the Additional Custodian, following a circular issued by the Custodian-General that expressed a policy of non-confirmation for agricultural lands, refused the application. That refusal was upheld by the Assistant Custodian-General on revision. The applicant contended that the retrospective operation of section 5-A amounted to a deprivation of his property without compensation and thereby violated Article 31 of the Constitution. The Court held that, although section 5-A operated retrospectively, it did not constitute a deprivation of property with respect to transactions that had already been completed. For transactions to be effected in the future, the requirement of confirmation represented a lawful restriction, not a deprivation, and was reasonable in view of the purpose and policy underlying the evacuee-property legislation. Consequently, the retrospective application of that restriction did not transform it into a deprivation. The Court further observed that the applicant’s loss stemmed from a quasi-judicial order of the Custodian refusing confirmation, not from any unconstitutional statute. Accordingly, the petitioner's claim of a violation of a fundamental right was dismissed. Even assuming that the order was illegal because it relied on irrelevant material, the Court noted that such illegality did not, by itself, raise any question of violation of a fundamental right and therefore did not furnish a basis for an application under Article 32.

The Court noted that the matter arose under article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights. The original jurisdiction was petition number 306 of 1954. The petitioner, Sadhu Ram, was represented by counsel, while the respondent was represented by the Solicitor-General of India together with two additional counsel. The judgment was delivered on 28 October 1955 by Justice Jagannadhadas. The petitioner claimed that he had purchased agricultural land from a Muslim evacuee named Imam-ud-Din. The land comprised forty-three Bighas and fourteen Biswas, identified by the Khasra numbers 2135 to 2139, 2158, 2159, 21715, 2204 and 2206, together with shared (Shamlat) rights in the village of Kaithal, located in Karnal district of Punjab. The sale deed was executed on 6 September 1947 and subsequently registered on 9 September 1947, shortly before the seller departed for Pakistan. The agreed price was three thousand rupees, of which two thousand seven hundred rupees had been paid to the seller before the Sub-Registrar. Possession of the property was transferred at the time the deed was executed, and the revenue authorities recorded the mutation on 23 January 1948.

The East Punjab Evacuees’ (Administration of Property) Act, 1947 (East Punjab Act XIV of 1947) became operative on 12 December 1947. It was later amended by the East Punjab Evacuees’ (Administration of Property) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1948 (East Punjab Ordinance No. II of 1948), which took effect on 16 January 1948, and by the East Punjab Evacuees’ (Administration of Property) (Amendment) Act, 1948 (East Punjab Act XXVI of 1948), which came into force on 11 April 1948. These amendments inserted a new provision, section 5-A, into the original Act. Section 5-A was worded as follows: “(1) No sale, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange or other transfer of any interest or right in or over any property made by an evacuee or by any person in anticipation of his becoming an evacuee, or by the agent, assign or attorney of the evacuee or such person on or after the fifteenth day of August, 1947, shall be, effective so as to confer any rights or remedies on the parties to such transfer or on any person claiming under them unless it is confirmed by the Custodian. (2) An application for confirming such transfer may be made by any person claiming thereunder or by any person lawfully authorised by him.” The provision was intended to operate retrospectively. Accordingly, the petitioner filed an application for confirmation of his purchase on 23 March 1948. The Assistant Custodian of Karnal, after being satisfied that the transaction was genuine, recommended confirmation. However, the Additional Custodian of Jullundur, by an order dated 11 February 1953, rejected the petition for confirmation, relying on a circular issued by the Custodian-General.

The policy that was announced in the circular dated 9 March 1950 expressly refused to confirm any transaction involving agricultural property. This policy was subsequently upheld by the Assistant Custodian-General when he considered an application for revision that had been filed by the petitioner. The petitioner’s counsel argued that the transaction in question had been examined and found to be genuine, and that it had been entered into before the East Punjab Act XIV of 1947 came into force, and also before the amendment that introduced section 5-A became operative. The counsel maintained that the retrospective operation of section 5-A in the circumstances of this case amounted to a deprivation of the petitioner’s property without any compensation, and therefore violated article 31 of the Constitution. He further submitted that, even if such a position might have been correct had the matter been decided at an earlier stage, it was doubtful whether the petitioner could now raise the same contention before this Court, especially in view of the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 which had become effective on 27 April 1955. The Court, however, found it unnecessary to decide the issue on that basis.

The Court observed that section 5-A could not be interpreted as a legislative provision intended to deprive an owner of his property. It was clear that, with respect to transactions that occurred after the amendment, the provision functioned merely as a restriction on the owner’s power to transfer his land. Any person who acquired the property after such a transaction would do so subject to the requirement that the transfer be confirmed by the Custodian. Consequently, the matter fell within the ambit of article 19 of the Constitution rather than article 31. The Court further held that, given the purpose and policy underlying the Evacuee Property legislation and the extraordinary circumstances that arose after 15 August 1947, the requirement of confirmation for transactions affecting evacuee property constituted a reasonable restriction. The Court explained that if the requirement was essentially a limitation on future dealings rather than an outright deprivation, there was no justification for treating it as a deprivation merely because it was given retrospective effect; such retrospectivity lay within the competence of the legislature. Moreover, the retrospective operation commencing from 15 August 1947 was not only reasonable but also necessary in the context that gave rise to the Evacuee Property laws. The Court concluded that the petitioner’s loss resulted not from any unconstitutional law but from the quasi-judicial decision of the Custodian to refuse confirmation of the transaction. Accordingly, the petitioner’s claim that his fundamental rights had been violated was rejected. The petitioner’s counsel also contended that the Custodian’s reliance on a circular issued by the Custodian-General was illegal and irrelevant under section 5-A. The Court noted that, even if that contention were correct, it did not raise any issue of violation of a fundamental right.

The Court noted that the petitioner had relied exclusively on the proposition that his fundamental rights had been infringed, and that no other basis for relief had been advanced. After examining that proposition, the Court determined that if the claim of a violation of fundamental rights constituted the sole ground upon which the petition was predicated, then the application could not be sustained because it lacked a sufficient legal foundation. In other words, the Court concluded that the petition was fundamentally misconceived, since it did not demonstrate any alternative or additional cause of action that might have justified the relief sought. Accordingly, the Court held that the petition could not succeed and therefore must be dismissed. The dismissal was pronounced with the specific direction that the parties would not be ordered to pay costs to each other, meaning that the petition was dismissed without any costs being awarded against the petitioner. This final order reflected the Court’s assessment that the petition, being misconceived on the ground of a solitary alleged rights violation, failed to meet the threshold required for granting the relief that had been claimed.