Member, Board of Revenue vs Arthur Paul Benthall

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 159 of 1954

Decision Date: 04/10/1955

Coram: Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Syed Jaffer Imam

In the case titled The Member, Board of Revenue versus Arthur Paul Benthall, decided on 4 October 1955, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment. The petitioner was the Member of the Board of Revenue and the respondent was Arthur Paul Benthall. The judgment date is recorded as 04/10/1955. The bench that heard the matter comprised Justice Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Justice Syed Jaffer Imam and Justice Ayyar T. L. Venkatarama, together with Justice N. Chandrasekhara Das and Justice Sudhi Ranjan. The decision is reported in 1956 AIR 35 and 1955 SCR (2) 842. The dispute centred on the interpretation of sections 5 and 6 of the Indian Stamp Act of 1899, particularly the expressions “distinct matters” in section 5 and “description” in section 6, and on whether the instrument exhibited as Exhibit A—a power of attorney—contained distinct matters within the meaning of section 5.

The majority, speaking for S. R. Das, Acting Chief Justice, Justice Venkatarama Ayyar, Justice Jaffer Imam and Justice Chandrasekhara Ayyar, held that the contention that the word “matter” in section 5 was intended to convey the same meaning as the word “description” in section 6 was without force. They explained that, in ordinary usage, the phrase “distinct matters” suggests a meaning different from that of “distinct categories.” Two transactions may have the same description yet still be distinct. Because the two words have different import, they cannot be presumed to be used in the same sense merely because they appear in consecutive statutory provisions. Consequently, the expressions “distinct matters” in section 5 and “description” in section 6 have different connotations. The Court noted settled law that when two persons jointly execute a power of attorney, whether the instrument comprises distinct matters depends on whether the interests of the executants in the subject matter of the power are separate. Conversely, where a single person holds property in two unconnected capacities and executes a power of attorney covering both, the instrument logically comprises distinct matters. Applying this principle, the Court held that Exhibit A, the power of attorney, comprised distinct matters within the meaning of section 5 of the Indian Stamp Act because it reflected several capacities of the respondent mentioned therein.

Justice Bhagwati, dissenting, expressed a contrary view. He argued that the mere fact that the donor of the power of attorney acted in different capacities was insufficient to make the instrument one that comprised distinct matters requiring stamp duty to be calculated on the aggregate amount that would be payable on separate instruments. According to the dissent, Exhibit A did not contain distinct matters but a single matter—that is, the execution of a general power of attorney by the donor in favour of the donees, who would act as his attorneys in all capacities he enjoys. The dissent emphasized that the very nature of a general power of attorney is to include within a single instrument all the distinct acts the donor is capable of performing, whether in his personal capacity or as trustee, executor, or administrator. Therefore, the instrument should be treated as comprising one matter only for the purposes of section 5 of the Indian Stamp Act.

The Court observed that the power of attorney in question was a single instrument executed by the donor, and therefore every act that the donor could perform—whether in his personal capacity or in representative capacities such as trustee, executor, or administrator—was included within that one instrument. Consequently, those acts were not separate matters that would trigger the provisions of section 5 of the Indian Stamp Act. The Court then listed several authorities that were referred to for support, namely Secretary, Board of Revenue, Madras v. Alagappa Chettiar I.L.R. [1937] Mad. 553; Ansell v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1929] 1 K.B. 608; Reversionary Interest Society v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue [1906] 22 T.L.R. 740; Davis v. Williams [1804] 104 E.R. 358; Bowen v. Ashley [1805] 127 E.R. 467; Good‑son v. Forbes [1815] 128 E.R. 999; Freeman v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue [1870‑71] L.R. 6 Exch. 101; Allen v. Morrison [1828] 108 E.R. 1152; Reference under Stamp Act, section 46, [1886] I.L.R. 9 Mad. 358; Reference under Stamp Act, section 46, [1891] I.L.R. 15 Mad. 386; Reference under Stamp Act, section 46, [1892] 2 M.L.J. 178; and Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami, 48 I.A. 302. Following these citations, the judgment proceeded to the civil appellate jurisdiction, identifying the matter as Civil Appeal No. 159 of 1954, which was taken by special leave from the judgment and order dated 27 June 1952 of the Calcutta High Court, recorded as Matter No. 214 of 1951—a reference under section 57 of the Indian Stamp Act. Counsel for the appellant, assisted by two junior counsel, appeared for the appellant, while counsel for the respondent, assisted by three junior counsel, appeared for the respondent. The appeal was dated 4 October 1955 and was heard by Justice Venkatārama Ayyar. The central issue raised by the appeal concerned the interpretation of section 5 of the Indian Stamp Act II of 1899. At the material time, the respondent occupied the position of Managing Director of Messrs Bird and Co. Ltd. and of Messrs F. W. Heilgers and Co. Ltd., both of which served as managing agents for several companies incorporated under the Indian Companies Act. In addition, the respondent was a director of a number of other companies and had, on various occasions, acted as liquidator of some companies, as executor or administrator of estates of deceased persons, and as trustee of diverse estates. On 4 July 1949, the respondent applied to the Collector of Calcutta under section 31 of the Stamp Act for adjudication of the duty payable on a power of attorney identified as Exhibit A in the proceedings, which he intended to execute. By means of that power of attorney, the respondent authorised Messrs Douglas Chisholm Fairbairn and John James Brims Sutherland jointly and severally to act for him in his personal capacity and also in the capacities of executor, administrator, trustee, managing agent, liquidator and all other capacities. The Collector referred the matter, under section 56(2) of the Act, to the decision of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, who subsequently referred it, under section 57, to the High Court of Calcutta, expressing the opinion that stamp duty was payable on the power “for as many respective capacities as the principal executes the power”. The reference was then heard by the bench of the High Court.

A bench of two judges, the Chief Justice and Justice S. R. Das Gupta, heard the matter and expressed differing views. The Chief Justice, joined by Justice Das, held that the various capacities in which the executant acted did not create separate matters for the purposes of section 5 of the Stamp Act. Consequently, they concluded that the appropriate stamp duty on the instrument was ten rupees, calculated under article 48(d) of Schedule 1‑A of the Stamp Act as amended by section 13 of Bengal Act III of 1922. In contrast, Justice S. R. Das Gupta expressed the opinion that each distinct capacity of the executant should be regarded as a separate matter under section 5. He argued that if separate instruments were executed for each capacity, the total duty would be the aggregate of the duties applicable to those individual instruments. The court therefore answered the question in accordance with the majority view, which favored the respondent.

The Board of Revenue of West Bengal challenged that decision by filing an appeal with special leave. It contended that the instrument in question comprised distinct matters and therefore should be stamped according to the provisions of section 5. The statutory provisions relevant to the dispute are sections 3 to 6 of the Stamp Act. Section 3, the charging provision, stipulates that, subject to certain exemptions, every instrument listed in the Schedule is liable to the duty amount specified therein as the proper duty. Section 4 provides that when a transaction such as a sale, mortgage, or settlement requires several instruments, only the principal instrument is liable for the duty mentioned in Schedule 1, while each additional instrument attracts a duty of one rupee. Section 5 declares that any instrument that contains or relates to several distinct matters shall be liable for the aggregate amount of duties that would be payable if separate instruments were used for each of those matters. Section 6, insofar as it is relevant, states that an instrument falling within two or more descriptions in Schedule I, where the duties differ, shall be charged only with the highest of those duties, subject to the preceding section.

The principal issue for determination in this appeal is the interpretation of the phrase “distinct matters” in section 5. The respondent, whose position was adopted by the majority of the lower court, argued that the word “matters” in section 5 is synonymous with the word “description” in section 6, and that both terms refer to the various categories of instruments enumerated in the Schedule. This argument is premised on the view that section 5 mandates the aggregate duty when an instrument comprises or relates to more than one category as defined by the Schedule.

The Court explained that the duty payable for an instrument that deals with distinct matters was to be calculated as the sum of the duties that would have been payable on separate instruments for each of those matters. It observed that an instrument could be charged under section 3 only when it fell within one of the categories listed in the Schedule. Consequently, section 5 was intended to cover a single document that combined different categories of instruments, for example a sale together with a mortgage, a sale together with a lease, or a mortgage together with a lease. The Court noted, however, that when the instrument belonged to a single category, section 5 did not apply. In the case before it, the instrument was a power‑of‑attorney, which fell under article 48(a) regardless of the capacity in which it was executed. Because only one category was involved, there were no “distinct matters” within the meaning of section 5. The Court therefore rejected the argument that the word “matter” in section 5 was meant to have the same meaning as the word “description” in section 6. It held that in ordinary language the phrase “distinct matters” conveyed a meaning different from “distinct categories”. Two transactions might be of the same description yet still be distinct matters. For illustration, if A sells Black‑acre to X and mortgages White‑acre to Y, the two transactions fall under different categories and are also distinct matters. By contrast, if A mortgages Black‑acre to X and also mortgages White‑acre to Y, both transactions belong to the same category but are nevertheless distinct matters. The Court added that, had the legislature intended “distinct matters” in section 5 to be narrowly limited to different categories in the Schedule, it could have expressed that intention plainly.

The Court further observed that when a statute uses two different terms in successive provisions, it is difficult to sustain the view that the terms are synonymous. Accordingly, the expression “distinct matters” in section 5 and the term “descriptions” in section 6 must be given different connotations. The Court rejected the contention that interpreting “matters” in section 5 as anything other than “categories” (or “descriptions” in the Schedule) would eliminate any conflict between the two sections and render the saving clause in section 6 – which states that the provision is “subject to the provision of the last preceding section” – meaningless. It found no merit in that argument. Although sections 5 and 6 address different topics, the Court recognized that instruments could arise that raised questions under both provisions. For example, where a family partnership is wound up and the deed of dissolution also effects a partition of family property, as in Secretary, Board of Revenue v. Alagappa Chettiar, the instrument can be regarded both as a deed of dissolution and as a deed of partition, and under section 6, the duty

In this case the Court observed that when a deed of partition is executed, the duty payable is the higher duty that applies to an instrument of partition. However, if the same deed contains a provision by which one member creates a charge or mortgage over the portion of property allotted to his share, and does so to secure money borrowed for his own purposes, that separate provision constitutes a distinct matter that attracts the duty provided for in section five. The Court noted that, absent the saving clause in section six, a party might argue that sections five and six are mutually exclusive; consequently, because the instrument would fall within section six, the only duty payable would be the higher duty applicable to a partition instrument and nothing further. The purpose of the saving clause, the Court explained, is to prevent such a contention. Counsel for the petitioner, Mr Chaudhury, placed great emphasis on the overall scheme of the Act as set out in sections three to six, contending that the term “matters” in section five must be understood to mean the same thing as “description” in section six. He argued that section three imposes duty only on instruments that fall within the descriptions listed in the Schedule; that section four makes a special provision concerning three of the categories named in the Schedule—sale, mortgage and settlement—stating that when those categories are completed in more than one instrument, only the principal document is liable for the duty specified; and that section six provides that when an instrument falls under two or more of the Schedule categories, the duty payable is the highest duty applicable to any one of those categories. Accordingly, he maintained that the categories in the Schedule form the pivotal basis of the entire legislative scheme and that, in construing the provision in light of that scheme, the expression “distinct matter” must be read as referring to distinct categories. To interpret “distinct matters” as something other than “distinct categories” would, he argued, introduce a concept foreign to the scheme of the enactment. The Court found this argument erroneous because it mistakenly assumes that the objects and scopes of sections four, five and six are identical, which they are not. Section four deals with a single transaction that is effected through several instruments; section six deals with a single transaction that may be classified under more than one category; while section five applies only when an instrument contains more than one transaction, regardless of whether those transactions belong to the same or different categories. Since the three sections address different topics, the Court concluded that referring to section four or section six for determining the scope of section five, or for interpreting its terms, would serve no useful purpose. It further observed that the legislature deliberately employed three different words—“transaction” in section four, “matter” in section five, and “description” in section six—to distinguish the distinct purposes of each provision.

The respondent’s counsel argued that the expression “distinct matters” in section 5 should be read to mean only different categories. To support this view, counsel cited observations made in Ansell v. Inland Revenue Commissioners(1). In that case the instrument was a deed of settlement that included certain Government securities together with other investments. Under the Stamp Act 1891 a single ad valorem duty was payable on the total value of all the settled properties. Section 74(1) of the Finance Act 1910 imposed a higher stamp duty on voluntary dispositions as if they were conveyances, but it expressly exempted Government securities from that provision. The question arose whether, in addition to the duty payable under section 74(1) of the Finance Act 1910 for the other investments, a separate duty was required under the Stamp Act 1891 for the Government stocks. The Court answered affirmatively. Rowlatt, J. observed that when two different classes of property are transferred by the same words of assignment in the same document, and those two classes are regarded as different for the purposes of the Stamp Act and taxation, “it seems to me in common sense that they must be distinct matters”. The respondent wishes to read this observation to mean that where matters are not dealt with separately for stamp‑duty purposes they cannot be distinct matters. That inference is incorrect. The decision concerned an instrument that dealt with properties falling into two separate categories, and the Court held that those were distinct matters. Neither the decision nor the quoted observation supports the respondent’s contention that if an instrument contains matters that fall within the same description, it cannot be construed as comprising distinct matters.

Further reliance was placed on the observations in Reversionary Interest Society v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue(1). In that case a statutory declaration made by a husband and wife for the purpose of carrying out a transaction was held to be a single declaration liable for one stamp duty. That decision was based on its specific facts and does not provide useful guidance here. Accepting the proposition that section 5 applies even when the instrument contains matters of the same description leads to the issue of whether the instrument the respondent proposes to execute is a single power of attorney or a combination of several powers of attorney. Mr Chaudhury, appearing for the respondent, submitted that when the executant of one instrument grants an attorney a general authority to act in whatever matters the executant could act, there is in effect only a single delegation of authority, and consequently the instrument should be treated as one power of attorney.

In this case, the appellant argued that even though a single person executed the power‑of‑attorney, if that person acted in several capacities and the authority granted was general, the instrument should be viewed as containing separate delegations for each capacity, and therefore the total stamp duty should be the sum of the duties payable for each separate capacity. By contrast, the respondent contended that when a person grants an attorney a general authority to act in every matter in which the grantor could act, the instrument must, as a matter of law, be treated as a single matter regardless of its contents, and consequently only one duty under article 48(d) (1) [1906] 22 T.L R. 740 of the Schedule should be imposed. The Court was unable to accept the respondent’s position that a blanket general power automatically amounts to a single matter. The Court held that determining whether the instrument represents a single matter or distinct matters depends on several factors, including the identity of the parties, the subject‑matter of the authority, and other relevant circumstances. For example, if A executes a single power authorising X to manage one estate and Y to manage a different estate, there are two distinct matters even though only one instrument was signed. However, if both X and Y are appointed as joint and several attorneys for both estates, there is only one delegation and one matter, which is specifically covered by article 48(d). Conversely, where multiple persons execute a single instrument and share a common interest in the subject‑matter, the instrument is chargeable with a single duty, as held in Davis v. Williams(1), Bowen v. Ashley(1), Good‑son v. Forbes(1) and similar cases. If the executants have separate interests, the instrument must be construed as comprising distinct matters, as noted in Freeman v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue(1). Applying the same principle to powers‑of‑attorney, Allen v. Morrison(1) held that when members of a mutual insurance club executed a single power, it related to one matter, with Lord Tenterdon, C. J. observing that “there was certainly a community of purpose actuating all the members of this club”. In the Reference under the Stamp Act, s. 46(1), a power‑of‑attorney executed by thirty‑six persons concerning a fund in which they were jointly interested was treated as a single matter. A similar conclusion was reached in Reference under the Stamp Act, s. 46(2), where ten mirasdars executed a power‑of‑attorney to collect communal income attached to their mirasi rights. However, when several donors with separate interests execute a single power‑of‑attorney referring to their respective properties—for instance, when A appoints X as attorney for his Black‑acre estate and B appoints the same X as attorney for his White‑acre estate—the instrument must be regarded as containing distinct matters, as decided in Reference under the Stamp Act, s. 46(3). Thus, the determination of whether a power‑of‑attorney relates to a single or multiple matters requires a careful examination of the instrument’s terms and the nature and extent of the authority conferred.

When X is appointed as attorney for the management of his estate Black‑acre and, at the same time, B appoints the same individual as attorney for the management of his estate White‑acre, the instrument must be regarded as covering distinct matters. This principle was expressly laid down in Reference under the Stamp Act, 8. 46(3). Consequently, the question of whether a power of attorney involves distinct matters must be resolved by examining the wording of the instrument together with the nature and the extent of the authority that it confers. It is noteworthy that in England such questions no longer arise because of a special provision introduced by the Finance Act, 1927 (17 & 18 Geo. 5, Ch. 10), section 56, which provides that “No instrument chargeable with stamp duty under the heading Letter or Power of Attorney and Commission, Factory, Mandate, or other instrument in the nature thereof in the First Schedule to the Stamp Act, 1891, shall be charged with duty more than once by reason only that more persons than one are named in the instrument as donors or donees (whether jointly or severally or otherwise), of the powers thereby conferred or that those powers relate to more than one matter.” No comparable provision exists in the statutes of this country, and the English provision is significant because it assumes that a power of attorney might comprise distinct matters simply because several donors or donees are named, or because it purports to relate to more than one matter, as illustrated by the authorities (1) [1886] I.L.R. 9 Mad. 358, (2) [1891] I.L.R. 15 Mad. 386, and (3) [1892] 2 M.L.J. 178. In the present case, the issue is whether Exhibit A should be considered to contain distinct matters merely because the respondent executed it in several capacities. That issue lacks direct authority and therefore must be decided on well‑recognised principles. Established law holds that when two persons jointly execute a power of attorney, the determination of whether it covers distinct matters depends on whether the executants’ interests in the subject matter are separate or joint. Conversely, if a single individual holds properties in two unrelated capacities and executes a power of attorney concerning both, the instrument should logically be treated as comprising distinct matters. This approach aligns with the generally accepted conception of distinct matters and corresponds with the respondent’s own view, as he expressly stated in the power that he acted both in his individual capacity and in his other capacities. However, counsel for the respondent argues that the fact that the respondent acted in several capacities does not alter the character of the instrument, which should be regarded as relating to a single matter.

Counsel for the respondent argued that the delegation of authority contained in the power‑of‑attorney extended to whatever the respondent could do, and that it was irrelevant that the respondent held some properties in his individual capacity and other properties as trustee or executor, because the legal title to all of those properties would vest in him equally in either capacity. The counsel maintained that the issue was not the source from which the title flowed but the reservoir in which it was now contained, thereby giving greater importance to the form of the matter than to its substance. He explained that when a person is appointed as a trustee, English law holds that the legal title to the estate unquestionably vests in the trustee, but the trustee holds it for the benefit of the cestui‑que‑trust in whom the equitable estate resides. Under Indian law, it is well established that trusts and fiduciary relationships may exist even without the legal estate vesting in the trustee, as illustrated in Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami (1) [1921] 48 I.A. 302. In such situations the legal title is vested in the institution, the mahant or shebait acting as manager, and any delegation of authority by that manager can only be on behalf of the institution he represents. The counsel further asserted that when a person possesses both a personal capacity and a representative capacity, such as a trustee, and delegates power in both capacities, the legal position is identical to a situation where different persons join in executing a power concerning matters that are unrelated. Because there is no community of interest between the personal estate of the executant and the trust estate vested in him, the two must be regarded as distinct matters for the purposes of section 5. The same reasoning applies when a person acts as an executor or administrator, since in that role the person represents the estate of the deceased, whose persona is deemed to continue in the executor for the purpose of administration. Counsel finally contended that if every capacity of the donor were to be considered a distinct matter, then distinct matters would have to be found not only with respect to capacities such as trustee or executor, but also for every transaction entered into in his personal capacity. He illustrated this by suggesting that if the donor gave his attorney authority to sell one property, to mortgage another, and to lease a third, he would be acting in three different capacities as vendor, mortgagor and lessor, and the instrument would have to be stamped as relating to three distinct matters, thereby destroying the basis of a general power‑of‑attorney. The argument was found to be fallacious because it confused the capacities a person holds with the acts that can be performed by virtue of those capacities. For example, an executor who sells one property to discharge the debts of the testator and mortgages another to raise funds for carrying on a business unquestionably performs two different transactions, but in both instances he functions solely in his capacity as executor. The Court concluded that there was no substance in this contention.

In the case under consideration, the Court observed that when an executor sells a property to discharge the debts of the testator and at the same time mortgages another property to obtain funds for carrying on his business, the executor unquestionably engages in two separate transactions; however, for both transactions he acts solely in his capacity as executor. The Court found that the argument presented against this view lacked any substantive merit. Consequently, the Court differed from the majority of the learned judges of the lower court and held that the instrument identified as Exhibit A did not comprise distinct matters based on the several capacities of the respondent that were mentioned therein. The Court affirmed that the position adopted by the revenue authorities, and supported by S. R. Das Gupta, J., was correct. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and the respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the appellant both in the present Court and in the lower court.

Justice Bhagwati, however, expressed dissent. He stated that he could not agree with the conclusion reached in the judgment that had just been delivered. While he concurred in the principal construction of sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Act and accepted the meaning of the term “distinct matters” as used in section 5, he maintained that the question remained whether the instrument in dispute represented a single power of attorney or a combination of several powers of attorney. He explained that the majority of the Bench had been persuaded by the argument that, although the instrument was executed by a single individual, the individual’s exercise of several capacities and the grant of a general authority gave rise to distinct delegations for each capacity, thereby necessitating the aggregate stamp duty applicable to each capacity. Justice Bhagwati respectfully declined to adopt this view. He noted that the determination of whether a power of attorney relates to distinct matters must be based on an examination of the terms of the instrument and the nature and extent of the authority conferred. He further observed that the mere fact that the donor executes the power of attorney in different capacities does not, in his opinion, render the instrument a compilation of distinct matters requiring the aggregate stamp duties that would be payable on separate instruments under section 5. He described the transaction as a single transaction in which the donor appointed the donees jointly and severally as his attorneys, authorising them to act in his name and on his behalf in his individual capacity as well as in capacities such as managing director, director, managing agent, agent, secretary, liquidator of any company in which he might be interested, and also as executor, administrator, trustee or in any other capacity that might arise. Although the donor’s various capacities were combined in the instrument, Justice Bhagwati concluded that this combination did not transform the donor into separate individuals for the purposes of section 5.

It was observed that the fact that the donor signs the power of attorney in several capacities does not transform him into different persons for the purposes of section 5. The instrument is therefore not covered by the object of that provision. The Court noted that the persons who execute the instrument are not several individuals; there is only one person who executes it – the donor himself – even though he acts in a number of capacities. Those various capacities affect the character and the extent of the authority that the donor may exercise in each capacity. When he acts in his own personal capacity, he may exercise all the powers of a full owner of any right, title or interest that he possesses in the property, whether that interest is absolute or limited. He might be the absolute owner of the property, or he might hold only a life interest; he could be a mortgagee, a lessee, a dominant owner of a tenement, or merely a licensee. Whatever interest he holds in the property becomes the subject‑matter of the authority that he confers on the donee. Apart from the personal interest he may hold, the donor may also be a trustee of certain property and, in that capacity, he may enjoy the same categories of interest described above. Even if, as trustee, he is answerable to the beneficiaries for proper administration of the trust, that duty does not remove his entitlement to exercise all the powers that vest in him in respect of the trust property, and he remains able to use those powers in relation to that property. The same reasoning applies if he is an executor or administrator of a deceased estate and is in possession of that estate. In that situation the estate vests in him, although his authority to deal with it may be limited by the terms of the will or by legal restrictions. All of these circumstances may place limits on the way he can manage the property, but those limitations do not negate his right to deal with the property and to use all the powers that attach to it, subject only to the restrictions that arise from the particular capacity in which he is acting. Consequently, although he may enjoy several capacities, he remains the same individual who acts in those capacities and conducts his affairs as a single person. He is not a different person when he acts personally; he is not another person when he acts as a trustee; and he is not a third person when he acts as an executor or administrator of a deceased estate. In every capacity he remains the same individual dealing with the various matters that arise, subject only to the limitations that flow from the specific capacity in which the property has vested in him.

The Court held that the instrument under consideration did not contain separate matters but consisted of a single matter, namely the execution of a general power of attorney by the donor in favour of the donees, thereby making the donees his attorneys to act for him in every capacity he possessed. The Court explained that the instrument could not be divided into separate documents each dealing with a distinct matter concerning the donor’s various capacities. It observed that a general power of attorney embraces all acts that the donor himself could perform, irrespective of the capacity or capacities he holds, and that such a power cannot be broken down into individual acts that the donor is capable of performing and that he authorises his attorney to do on his behalf. The nature of a general power of attorney, the Court noted, is to include within one instrument every distinct act that the donor is capable of performing, whether he acts in his personal capacity or as a trustee, executor or administrator. Consequently, those acts are not separate matters that would invoke the operation of section five. On this basis, the Court agreed with the conclusion reached by the majority of Judges in the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta and therefore dismissed the appeal, ordering costs against the appellant. By the Court, in accordance with the majority opinion, the appeal was allowed and costs were awarded both in the present Court and in the Court below.