Machander, Son Of Pandurang vs State Of Hyderabad

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 9 of 1955

Decision Date: 27 September, 1955

Coram: Vivian Bose, B. Jagannadhadas, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha

Machander, son of Pandurang, filed a petition against the State of Hyderabad and the case was heard on 27 September 1955 before the Supreme Court of India. The opinion was authored by Justice Vivian Bose, and the bench also included Justices B. Jagannadhadas, Bhuvneshwar, and P. Sinha.

The parties were identified as the petitioner, Machander, son of Pandurang, and the respondent, the State of Hyderabad. The judgment was delivered on 27 September 1955 by the bench headed by Justice Vivian Bose. The citation for the decision is recorded as 1955 AIR 792 and 1955 SCR (2) 524. The legal issue concerned the examination of an accused under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Act V of 1898, and the effect of a failure to examine the accused on material points, which led to an acquittal.

According to the headnote, the appellant was tried for murder and the trial lasted four and a half years. The appellant’s brother, who was a co-accused, escaped and could not be tried. The evidence against the appellant was entirely circumstantial. Eight days after his arrest, the appellant made a confession that resulted in certain discoveries, but the trial court never questioned him about that confession as required by section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court excluded the confession from the evidence, upheld the conviction, and altered the death sentence to life imprisonment with rigorous labour. The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court in excluding the confession and held that the conviction could not be sustained on the evidence that remained on record.

The Supreme Court observed that in the specific circumstances of this case the failure to examine the accused under section 342 was not a mere technical lapse. It would have been unjust to remand the case for a new trial, and therefore the conviction and sentence had to be set aside. The Court emphasized that while it is essential for the courts to prevent guilty persons from escaping punishment, it is equally important to ensure that justice is not delayed and that accused persons are not subjected to indefinite harassment. The Court stated that the balance between the prosecution and the accused must be maintained. It further stressed that magistrates and sessions judges must remember their duty under section 342 of the Code to question the accused fairly, to explain the case he has to meet in clear and simple language, and to allow him an opportunity to respond.

The appeal was filed as Criminal Appeal No. 9 of 1955, taken on special leave from a judgment and order dated 26 September 1951 of the Hyderabad High Court in Criminal Confirmation No. 638/6 of 1951 and Criminal Appeal No. 770 of 1951. Those orders arose from a judgment and order dated 27 June 1951 of the Sessions Judge, Osmanabad, in Criminal Case No. 12/8 of 1951. Counsel for the appellant was R. Patnaik, while the respondent was represented by counsel named Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale. The judgment was pronounced on 27 September 1955, and Justice Bose delivered the opinion stating that the case illustrates a situation where a failure by the trial court to fulfill the statutory duty of examining the accused under section 342 necessitates an acquittal.

In this case the Court observed that the trial judge had failed to give proper effect to section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which requires that the accused be questioned fairly and that the case against him be explained to him in clear and simple language, together with every material point the prosecution wishes to rely upon, and that he be given an opportunity to respond if he wishes; the Court noted that had the Sessions Judge performed these duties, an acquittal might not have been necessary. The appellant, Machander, had been indicted for the murder of a man named Manmatb, while his brother Gona had also been charged but could not be tried because he absconded. All three men, including the deceased, lived in the same village and there was a background of ill-feeling between Machander and the deceased, a feeling that could also be said to be shared by Gona, by their father Pandu, and by another brother, Bhima, because the most recent source of enmity involved all of them. The earlier source of hostility dated from about 1947, when Machander allegedly stole a pair of bullocks and a cart belonging to the deceased; the deceased prosecuted Machander for theft and also filed a civil suit for the value of the cart and bullocks. The criminal prosecution resulted in Machander’s conviction and his imprisonment, and the civil suit produced a decree for Rs 520 which was subsequently executed against him. The events leading immediately up to the murder concerned a dispute over land that belonged to the deceased’s sister Parubai. Machander’s family forcibly took possession of that land, prompting Parubai to sue the entire family—her brother Pandu, Machander, and his two brothers Bhima and Gona—for possession. The final hearing in that suit took place on 15 December 1950, and the decision, which favored Parubai, was announced on 16 December 1950. The deceased represented his sister in that litigation, was present in court on the 15th, and remained at the court in Parenda until three o’clock in the afternoon on the 16th, after which he was not seen again. These proceedings were described as a cause of the animosity between the parties, but the record also showed that similar causes of enmity could be attributed to the father and the other brothers, and that they too had comparable opportunities to act. While the movements of Machander were traced to Parenda and back, the movements of the other family members were not established, so it could not be shown that they lacked a similar opportunity to commit the murder. Nonetheless, the Court accepted that a motive for enmity on the part of Machander was established. It was proved that the deceased travelled to Parenda on the 15th for the final hearing and was also present there on the 16th up to three o’clock in the afternoon. It was also proved that Machander was in court on the 15th and that he was in Parenda on the following day. Consequently, both the deceased and Machander were present in the same court on the 15th, and Machander therefore knew that the deceased had attended on that day. However, there was no evidence that the two men met each other or that either was aware of the other’s whereabouts on the 16th. The record showed that each went to consult his own pleader at different times and places and that each learned the outcome of the case separately. Four or five days after the decision, Machander returned home, whereas the deceased did not. When the deceased’s son, Shantiling, who knew that Machander had also been in Parenda for the case, asked his father where his father was, Machander replied that the father had not attended court, a statement that influenced the son.

It was established that the deceased attended the final hearing of the case on the fifteenth day of the month and remained in Parenda until three o’clock in the afternoon on the sixteenth. It was also proved that the appellant was present in court on the fifteenth and that he was in Parenda on the following day. Consequently, both the deceased and the appellant were in the same courtroom at the same time on the fifteenth, which implies that the appellant was aware that the deceased had attended court on that day. However, there was no evidence to show that the two men actually met each other, nor was there any proof that either of them knew the other’s movements on the sixteenth. The record shows that each went to consult his own lawyer at different times and locations and each learned the outcome of the case separately.

Four or five days after the hearing, the appellant returned home, but the deceased did not. The deceased’s son, Shantiling, identified as witness ten, knew that the appellant had also travelled to Parenda for the case and asked him where his father was. The appellant responded that his father had not attended court. This answer caused the son anxiety, prompting him to travel to Parenda to make inquiries. The lawyers there informed him that his father had indeed been in court on the fifteenth and had remained in Parenda until three p.m. on the sixteenth. On the twenty-sixth day of the month, Shantiling reported the disappearance of his father to the police, providing a description of his father, a list of the items his father was wearing, and a description of the horse his father was riding.

Three days later, on the twenty-ninth, he filed a formal complaint stating that he feared his father had been murdered and that he suspected the appellant and the appellant’s brother Gona. The appellant was arrested on the same day. After his arrest, he guided the police and the village officials, referred to as Panchas, to a location where they discovered blood-stained earth, grass, and a stone, together with several items previously described by Shantiling: fragments of a silver linga, two silver kadas, a silver spike and a white gilt button. All of these objects except the kadas bore human blood. About twenty-five steps from that spot, the appellant indicated another place where the body of the deceased had been buried; pearls, a yarn kardoda containing three iron keys, and other belongings were found on the corpse, all stained with blood and positively identified as the deceased’s possessions.

On the first of January 1951, the appellant led the police and Panchas to a third site where two saddle straps and two iron stirrups were concealed; one stirrup was stained with human blood. On the third of January, the horse’s reins and the horse itself were uncovered, although this discovery was not a result of the appellant’s initiative. Apart from a confession that the court has excluded, the foregoing constitutes the entirety of the evidence presented against the appellant.

In this case the Court examined whether the material presented was sufficient to place the murder on the appellant. The Court summarised the factual backdrop as follows. First, the appellant was aware that the deceased had attended a court session at Parenda on the sixteenth of the month and the appellant had, in fact, seen the deceased there. When the appellant was later questioned about this attendance, he deliberately gave a false statement. The Court observed that this situation did not fall within the classic category in which a suspect is the last person seen with the victim within a few hours of the fatal act. Although both the deceased and the appellant were present in the same court at the same time, they were not together, and because of the evident hostility between them and the fact that the deceased rode a horse, it was unlikely that they traveled together either on the way to the court or on the way back. Moreover, the appellant was not present with the deceased at the time the latter was last seen at three o’clock in the afternoon on the sixteenth. Nonetheless, the Court noted that the appellant’s conduct suggested a desire to conceal something.

Second, the appellant, thirteen days after the murder, knew that a person named Manmath had been killed. He also knew the place where the murder had been committed and the location where the body and certain personal articles of the deceased had been hidden. Third, there was clear ill-will between the appellant and the deceased, an ill-will that could reasonably be expected to be shared by other members of the appellant’s family. Fourth, the appellant possessed the full opportunity to commit the crime, an opportunity that was equally available to other members of his family. The Court then asked whether these four circumstances, taken together and viewed against the larger factual setting, were enough to conclude that the appellant had committed murder.

The Court held that the answer was negative. It reasoned that the same facts could point with equal suspicion toward other members of the appellant’s family. In particular, the Court recalled that the appellant’s brother, Gona, had also been a suspect and had subsequently absconded, making him unavailable for investigation. The Court expressly refrained from declaring Gona to be the murderer, acknowledging that such a conclusion would be speculative. Nevertheless, the Court indicated that if Gona had been responsible, the appellant’s knowledge of the murder and the concealment of the body thirteen days later might have been obtained from Gona, or the appellant might even have witnessed his brother committing the crime and hiding the corpse and the associated articles. These possibilities were deemed reasonable hypotheses that had not been ruled out by the evidence.

Accordingly, the Court concluded that the mere fact of the appellant’s knowledge thirteen days after the murder, combined with a motive that was shared by three other individuals and a false statement about the deceased’s movements made four or five days after the murder, could not support a conviction. Since the High Court’s judgment was based solely on these insufficient factors, the conviction was set aside. The Court assumed, without deciding, that the identity of the corpse discovered on the twenty-ninth of the month and the occurrence of murder had been established, noting that those facts, though not expressly admitted before it, required no further discussion for the purpose of its reasoning.

The Court held that, in its view, both of the material facts were proved to a satisfactory degree. Earlier in the judgment the Court referred to a confession that the High Court had excluded from evidence. That exclusion was based on the fact that the appellant had not been questioned about the confession under section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Court understood that the High Court believed that the exclusion caused prejudice, although the learned judges did not state this explicitly. The appellant had been arrested on the twenty-ninth and had made a number of discoveries on 29 December 1950 as well as on the first, second and third of January 1951, but he did not give a confession until the sixth of January. The eight-day interval between his arrest and the confession could have involved many events, and therefore the High Court was not unjustified in refusing to consider the confession without hearing the appellant’s version of the facts. The petitioners asked the Court to reopen the issue and, if necessary, to remand the case for further proceedings, but the Court declined to do so. It emphasized that judges and magistrates must appreciate the importance of the examination prescribed by section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and noted that this Court has repeatedly warned of the serious consequences that may arise when that requirement is neglected. The appellant, having been arrested in December 1950, had been subjected to trial proceedings in various forms for more than four and a half years. The Court declared that it would not allow persons who are on trial for the ultimate penalty to remain in indefinite suspense because trial judges fail to perform their duties. Justice, the Court observed, is not one-sided; it has many aspects and a proper balance must be struck between conflicting rights and duties. While it is essential to ensure that the guilty do not escape punishment, it is equally necessary to prevent accused persons from being subjected to endless harassment. Accused individuals must receive a fair and impartial trial; although investigators and officials entrusted with administering justice are entitled to reasonable latitude, limits must be imposed on the extent of their actions. Except in clear cases of guilt where the error is purely technical, the forces arrayed against the accused should not be allowed, in a special appeal, to remedy the consequences of their own errors, just as an accused should not be permitted to remedy deficiencies in his defence that he could and ought to have addressed in the lower courts. The scales of justice must remain evenly balanced, whether for the accused or the State, and one overarching principle must apply in all cases. The Court concluded that the error in this matter was not a mere technicality. The appellant appeared ready to disclose everything on the twenty-ninth and to make a full and clean confession, yet the police waited eight days before obtaining a judicially recorded confession. Although that delay might be explained, the difficulty of requiring an accused, after four and a half years, to establish facts in his own favour is evident.

The Court noted that requiring the accused to establish facts in his favour after a lapse of four and a half years presented an evident difficulty. Consequently, although the Court did not intend to formulate a universal legal principle applicable to all future cases, it examined the particular circumstances presented in the present matter. Having considered those specific facts, the Court concluded that ordering a fresh trial would be inappropriate, given the evidentiary and procedural considerations already on record. Accordingly, the Court granted the petitioner's appeal, thereby firmly overturning the earlier judgment that had affirmed the conviction. The Court expressly set aside both the conviction and the sentence imposed on the appellant, and directed that the appellant be released and formally declared acquitted. The record showed that the prosecution had failed to produce reliable evidence sufficient to sustain the judgment beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the delay in obtaining a judicially recorded confession undermined the credibility of the material relied upon by the lower court. In view of these deficiencies, the Court found that the balance of probabilities favored the appellant and that the miscarriage of justice could not be remedied by another trial.