In Re: D An Advocate Of The Supreme Court vs Unknown

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 23 November 1955

Coram: Das, B.K. Mukherjea

In this matter, the Supreme Court noted that the case involved an advocate of the Supreme Court referred to only as D, with an unknown respondent, and that the proceedings were dated 23 November 1955. The Court explained that it had issued a rule pursuant to Order IV, rule 30 of its own Rules after receiving a report from the Bombay High Court. The report stated that the Bombay High Court, by an order dated 13 October 1955 in Civil Application No. 1506 of 1955, had suspended the respondent from practising as an advocate of that High Court for a period of one year measured from the date of the order. Consequently, the Supreme Court’s rule required the respondent to show cause why, considering the matters specified in the Bombay High Court’s judgment and order, the Court should not take appropriate disciplinary or other action against him.

The respondent was described as an advocate of some standing in the Bombay High Court and, by virtue of that standing, was also enrolled as an advocate of the Supreme Court. It appeared that, in the early part of 1953, the advocate faced prosecution before Mr Sonavane, a Presidency Magistrate at Bombay, on a charge of committing an offence under the Bombay Prohibition Act. The trial extended from July 1953 until November 1953. On 18 November 1953, the magistrate convicted the advocate of the alleged offence, sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment for one month, imposing a fine of Rs 201, and directing an additional four-week rigorous imprisonment in default of payment of the fine. The advocate appealed the conviction to the Bombay High Court, which, on 24 February 1954, upheld the conviction but modified the punishment to a fine of Rs 1,000 only. Meanwhile, on 25 November 1953, the trial magistrate, Mr Sonavane, submitted a report to the Registrar (Appellate Side) of the Bombay High Court concerning the advocate’s conduct while appearing personally as the accused. Upon reviewing that report, the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court constituted a tribunal composed of three members of the Bar Council to investigate the advocate’s conduct. The tribunal issued a summons to the advocate, indicating that it would examine his conduct as disclosed in two documents: (a) the report dated 25 November 1953 prepared by Shri T A Sonavane, B A LL B, Presidency Magistrate of the 18th Court, Girgaum, Bombay, relating to Case No 593/P of 1953 tried by him; and (b) the judgment recorded by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Appeal No 1532 of 1953 (with Criminal Appeal No 1564 of 1953) which upheld the magistrate’s judgment and order of conviction against the advocate in the aforesaid case.

The proceedings extended for a considerable period because the respondent repeatedly raised objections and filed petitions, thereby causing delays. Eventually, around the sixteenth day of March 1955, the respondent transmitted to the Secretary of the Bar Council Tribunal a copy of a letter he had addressed to the Registrar of the High Court in Bombay. In that correspondence he pleaded guilty to the charges that had been brought against him and requested that the Tribunal forward a report to the High Court reflecting his admission. He concluded the letter by expressing regret for having wasted the Tribunal’s time. Along with the letter to the Registrar, the respondent enclosed a separate written apology in which he unconditionally withdrew his earlier contention that the Tribunal’s proceedings were legally misconceived. He further acknowledged that the High Court possessed full legal authority to refer the matter to the Bar Council Tribunal and admitted that the statements made by Mr Sonavane in his report were true, except for two specific points that he subsequently identified. On the twenty-eighth day of March 1955 the respondent filed an additional statement that clarified and supplemented his earlier apology. Following receipt of these submissions, the Tribunal prepared a report for the High Court. In that report the Tribunal, relying on the respondent’s own admission, held that the allegations contained in Mr Sonavane’s report were established and recommended that a very serious notice be taken of the respondent’s conduct. Regarding the second allegation mentioned in the summons, the Tribunal concluded that the respondent’s conviction under the Prohibition Act did not constitute professional or other misconduct within the meaning of section ten of the Indian Bar Councils Act, and therefore it found him not guilty of that charge.

After reviewing the Tribunal’s report, the High Court issued a notice to the respondent calling for a final hearing on the matter. The final disposal took place before a bench composed of the Chief Justice and Justice Tendolkar on the thirteenth day of October 1955. Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent offered an unconditional and unqualified apology and pleaded that the ends of justice would be served if the Court merely issued a warning to the respondent. Having considered the Tribunal’s findings, the High Court deemed the respondent’s misconduct to be so serious and grave that a deterrent sanction was required. Consequently, the Court suspended the respondent from legal practice for a period of one year, effective from the date of the order. The respondent’s application for a certificate of fitness to appeal to this Court was refused, prompting him to file a petition for special leave to appeal, which this Court dismissed. The disciplinary rule therefore remained pending. In response to the pending rule, the respondent filed a petition by way of showing cause; paragraph seven of that petition stated: “7. That the report of the learned Presidency Magistrate, 18th Court, is a highly exaggerated, garbled and manifestly incorrect version of the incidents that occurred during the trial of the case.”

The petition filed by the respondent contained a paragraph in which he described the report prepared by the learned Presidency Magistrate as a highly exaggerated, garbled and manifestly incorrect version of the incidents that occurred during the trial of the case. He further urged the Hon’ble Court to consider the circumstances under which the petitioner had been more or less compelled to tender a humiliating apology, and requested that a proper inquiry be held in the matter by or under the directions of the Hon’ble Court.

When the respondent appeared in person before the Court, he argued with considerable vehemence that he had not received a fair hearing before the Tribunal. He contended that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to entertain the enquiry because the misconduct alleged against him was not committed in his capacity as an Advocate, noting that he had personally appeared as the accused in the Prohibition case. The respondent further submitted that the Tribunal had initially held that it possessed no jurisdiction, but subsequently, without granting him a hearing, the Tribunal reversed that decision and declined to consider the jurisdictional question in his presence. He claimed that the Tribunal failed to formulate any formal charge against him. The respondent also disclosed that he had filed an application before the High Court under Article 227 seeking to quash the proceedings on the ground of lack of jurisdiction; however, the High Court rejected this application, refused to issue a certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court, and highlighted various other matters which the respondent characterized as evidence of prejudice and bias on the part of the Tribunal.

The Court pointed out to the respondent that his application for special leave to appeal the judgment and order of the High Court had been dismissed, and therefore the present Rule did not concern itself with the proceedings before the Bombay High Court or before the Bar Council Tribunal, as observed in the earlier decision in the matter of Mr G, a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court. The respondent then relied once again on the paragraph quoted from his petition and asked the Court to order a fresh enquiry into the matter. The judgment of the Bombay High Court, which is referred to in the Rule, indicated that the respondent had admitted the truth of all the contents of Mr Sonavane’s report except for two matters. In his present petition showing cause, the respondent, apart from a vague allegation that the report is an exaggerated, garbled and manifestly incorrect version of the incidents that occurred during the trial, did not identify any specific statement in the report that he claimed to be exaggerated, garbled or incorrect. In view of his unconditional admission of the truth of the statements contained in Mr Sonavane’s report, the Court was not prepared to allow him to retract his admission on the basis of such vague allegations. The Court emphasized that a person holding the responsible position of an Advocate of a High Court and of this Court could not be permitted to manipulate the judicial process in the manner displayed by the respondent. The respondent had admitted the truth of the report.

The Court observed that the respondent had acknowledged the accuracy of the investigative report, admitted his own guilt and offered an unconditional apology, apparently in the belief that a mere apology would allow him to escape further consequences. When that approach failed to persuade the High Court, the respondent then sought to overturn his own earlier tactics by requesting a fresh enquiry, an enquiry he had effectively avoided by his prior admission and apology. The Court stated that it would not permit such a reversal. After a careful review of Mr. Sonavane’s report, the Court found complete concurrence with the High Court’s description of the report as “an extremely sad reading.” The Court noted that the respondent’s conduct during the criminal trial was, as the High Court had pointed out, wholly indefensible by any standard. It uncovered a pattern of continuous and persistent attempts by the respondent to act rudely toward the Magistrate, to disrupt the trial proceedings, and to do everything within his power to bring the administration of justice into contempt. In the Court’s view, such conduct warranted severe condemnation.

The respondent referred the Court to the decision in In re Thomas James Wallace ([1866] L.R. 1 P.C. 283), which had been applied in In re An Advocate of Benares. The Court explained that the Privy Council in that case did not intend to establish a fixed, rigid rule of law, but merely indicated a course that was reasonable, satisfactory and convenient under the specific circumstances, a view subsequently followed by the Allahabad case. The Court further cited a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in The Advocate-General of Bombay v. Three Advocates ([1934] I.L.R. 59 Bom. 57), which held that the wording “professional or other misconduct” in section 10 of the Indian Bar Councils Act was intended to give the Court discretionary disciplinary jurisdiction over all forms of misconduct, whether professional or otherwise, and to act only in appropriate cases. A similar principle was affirmed by a Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court in In the matter of an Advocate ([1936] I.L.R. 63 Cal. 867). The Court also noted that, although the advocate in In re a Pleader (I.L.R. [1943] Mad. 459) was not acting as an advocate when he shouted slogans in Court, he was nevertheless dealt with under section 13(f) of the Legal Practitioners Act. The Wallace case, the Court clarified, was decided without reference to any statutory provision such as those found in the Legal Practitioners Act or the Bar Councils Act. For these reasons, and in view of the respondent’s conduct examined in its full context, the Court concluded that the advocate had engaged in conduct unbecoming of a member of the honourable profession and therefore should be suspended from practice.

In the matter before the Court, it was noted that the individual concerned is an Advocate of this Court. The Court further observed that, based on the prevailing majority decision of this Court, the Advocate is entitled, by virtue of the Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Act, to exercise his professional duties in every Court across the Union of India. The Court considered the effect of imposing a suspension that would be shorter than the period already imposed by the Bombay High Court on the same Advocate. It was held that such a shorter suspension would inevitably create a serious inconsistency and would cause inconvenience both to the legal profession and to the administration of justice, because the Advocate would be permitted to appear in some courts while being barred from practice in others. Consequently, the Court concluded that the only appropriate remedy was to make the suspension in this Court match exactly the duration specified by the Bombay High Court. Accordingly, the Court directed that the Advocate be suspended from practice for a period that runs concurrently with the suspension fixed by the Bombay High Court, which extends up to the thirteenth day of October, nineteen fifty-six. This direction ensures uniformity of the disciplinary action across all jurisdictions and avoids any disparity in the Advocate’s ability to practice during the suspension period.