Dhirendra Nath Mitra And Anr. vs Mukanda Lal Sen

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 1 March, 1955

Coram: Bose, J.

In this appeal the Supreme Court recorded that the case was titled Dhirendra Nath Mitra and Another versus Mukanda Lal Sen, the decision being handed down on 1 March 1955. The judgment was delivered by Justice Bose. The factual background began with four individuals, including the two appellants, who were prosecuted at the behest of a private complainant for alleged violations of Sections 448, 427, 380, 166 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned trial magistrate acquitted all four persons, finding that the prosecution had not proved the required elements of the offences.

The dissatisfied complainant filed a revision petition before the Calcutta High Court challenging the acquittals. The High Court judge, Justice Chunder, issued revision rules against three of the accused but declined to issue a rule against the fourth, thereby leaving the fourth acquittal untouched. When the revision was later heard, again by Justice Chunder, the judge upheld the acquittal of one of the three accused against whom a rule had been issued, but he set aside the acquittals of the remaining two and ordered that the case be remitted for a fresh trial. Two other judges of the Calcutta High Court granted leave to appeal this decision to the Supreme Court. The only question presented to this Court was whether Justice Chunder had correctly observed and applied the law governing the setting aside of acquittals on revision when the application is made by a private party. The Court noted three earlier decisions that were relevant to the point: D. Stephens v. Nosibolla, Logendranath Jha v. Polailal Biswas and Harihar Chakravarty v. State of West Bengal.

The factual matrix, as explained by the Court, involved a landlord who was the first accused and who owned certain premises. The complainant asserted that a woman named Sarojini Dasi was his tenant, while Bacha-ram Khatua (identified as plaintiff-witness 2), Gunadhar Sasmal (pl-w 4) and Paban Chandra Mikap (pl-w 6) were sub-tenants occupying the complainant’s premises. The landlord obtained a civil decree against Sarojini authorising demolition of specific huts that she possessed. The decree was executed on 13-August-1952 at 5:30 p.m., and during the demolition the huts belonging not only to the complainant but also to Bacha-ram Khatua, Gunadhar Sasmal and Paban Chandra Mikap were damaged. The complainant alleged that the landlord, together with his two sons, were present at the demolition site along with the bailiff, and that they intentionally caused the damage to the other huts by directing the labourers. According to the complainant’s version, the labourers initially began work on the other houses under the instructions of the four accused, stopped briefly when the complainant and others protested, and then, after conferring among themselves, the four accused deliberately ordered the labourers to damage the remaining huts.

The complainant also admitted that the huts in question were indeed damaged, but the accused contested the allegation of intentional wrongdoing. They maintained that the damage resulted from a mistake on the part of the labourers, who, because the huts stood very close together, failed to recognise that they were not supposed to touch those particular structures when they commenced demolition. The accused argued that the error was genuine and that they intervened immediately to halt the work once they became aware of the unintended damage.

In this case the accused were said to have begun work on the huts, but as soon as they became aware that damage was being caused they immediately ordered the work to stop. The trial magistrate accepted this explanation and rejected the portion of the complainant’s testimony that alleged the damage had occurred at the direction and instigation of the accused. Consequently, the magistrate concluded that no criminal offence had been committed because he found no proof of the requisite intention. Justice Chunder, however, rejected the defence of mistake on two grounds. First, he observed that under civil-court procedure a decree is not executed until a representative of the decree-holder identifies the property to be executed against, which makes it unlikely that the accused could have mistakenly damaged the huts. Second, he noted that four separate huts were damaged, a number that, in his view, rendered the mistake explanation implausible. The judge also indicated that there appeared to be a motive which warranted further consideration. The Court acknowledged that a different assessment of the evidence might be possible, but held that such a difference does not justify interfering with a revision application filed by a private party seeking to set aside an acquittal. It was emphasized that, although statutes provide for appeals against acquittals, no automatic right of appeal exists in these circumstances, and therefore revisional powers must be exercised sparingly. The Court referred to its extensive jurisprudence on this point and stated that further elaboration was unnecessary. On a brief review of the witness statements, several facts emerged. Firstly, there was no direct evidence showing that the accused had instigated the damage before the labourers began to act. Secondly, witnesses identified as P.W. 2, P.W. 4 and P.W. 6 all testified that when the complainant and other tenants protested, the accused ordered the labourers to stop. Thirdly, after conferring among themselves, the four accused reportedly encouraged the labourers to resume damaging the huts and personally took part in and assisted the act; this was corroborated by the testimony of Niroda Dasi (P.W. 3). The evidence, being straightforward, showed that none of the witnesses distinguished any one accused as acting more than the others. Nevertheless, the trial judge declined to issue a rule against the bailiff, perhaps reasoning that the bailiff could not have personal knowledge of the facts and would rely on statements of the other three accused. In contrast, the evidence did not allow a distinction between the father and his two sons, as no eyewitness singled out any of them for separate culpability. Justice Chunder, however, judged that the evidence against the father was insufficient, though he did not explain the basis for treating the father’s case differently from that of his sons. Finally, witnesses P.W. 2 and P.W. 6 both acknowledged that the officer in charge of the local police station was present at the scene, although they did not indicate that any complaint was made to him.

In the testimony, the witnesses state that no complaint was made to the police officer. At a minimum, the second prosecution witness identifies the officer as the officer in charge of the police station, whereas the sixth prosecution witness refers only to a police officer without specifying the rank. The Court finds it untenable to conclude that a judge could not reasonably disbelieve such testimony given the surrounding circumstances. The record shows that the evidence is contradictory and lacks corroboration, which makes the credibility of the statements doubtful. Consequently, the appellate Court holds that the lower judge erred in accepting the testimony at face value. Furthermore, the appellate Court observes that Justice Chunder did not engage with the legal principles articulated by this Court in earlier decisions. He failed to consider any of the criteria that have been consistently identified as necessary before a court may intervene in a magistrate’s order. The appellate Court notes that the relevant precedents require a careful assessment of factors such as the presence of a miscarriage of justice, the adequacy of the evidence, and the procedural fairness of the trial. None of these factors were examined by Justice Chunder in forming his opinion. Accordingly, the appellate Court allows the appeal. It sets aside the order pronounced by Justice Chunder and reinstates the original order of the trial magistrate, which had acquitted the two accused persons. The judgment thereby restores the decision of the lower court and affirms the acquittal.